

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No. IT-09-92-T

IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Presiding
Judge Bakone Justice Moloto
Judge Christoph Flügge

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

Date Filed: 27 May 2014

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC

**DEFENSE MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 92TER TO ADMIT THE WRITTEN
TESTIMONY OF NENAD KECMANOVIĆ**

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Dermot Groome
Mr. Peter McCloskey

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr. Branko Lukić
Mr. Miodrag Stojanović

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The Accused, **RATKO MLADIĆ**, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully submits the instant Motion pursuant to Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to the Guidance previously expressed by the Trial Chamber, motions offering written statements under Rule 92ter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to be filed at least 30 days before the anticipated testimony of a given witness. Witness Nenad Kecmanović is currently scheduled to testify within the next 30 days and thus the Defense hereby files the instant motion in compliance with the Chamber's guidance, and applying for the evidence of this witness to be heard pursuant to Rule 92ter. This Motion is filed publicly, as the witness does not require protective measures.

2. Herein this application is made to tender one written witness statement of the witness, without any associated exhibits. At this time the

Defense estimates that the evidence-in-chief of this witness will last up to 45 minutes.

3. The Defense does not otherwise seek to deviate from the Chamber's Guidelines in tendering this witness' evidence.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

4. Under Rule 92*ter* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter "Rules") a Trial Chamber is permitted to admit the evidence in whole or in part in the form of a witness statement or transcripts of a proceeding before the Tribunal, under the following conditions: i) the witness is present in court; ii) the witness is available for cross-examination and any questioning by the Judges; and iii) the witness attests that the written statement or transcript accurately reflects the witness's declaration and what the witness would say if examined.¹

5. A party calling a witness pursuant to Rule 92*ter* may seek to admit into evidence documents that have been discussed by the witness in his or her witness statement of previous testimony.²

III. DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS

A)The Chamber Should Admit the Witness Statement

¹ Rule 92*ter* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

² *Prosecutor v. Karadzic*, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, "Decision on Prosecution's Submission regarding Additional Transcript Pages from Momcilo Mandic's Stanasic and Zupljanin Testimony for Admission into Evidence." 8 September 2010, para. 5

6. Witness Kecmanović's statement is relevant, reliable and probative, as set forth in greater detail herein below.

7. The witness will be present at trial, and thus will be able to attest to the evidence and will be available to be cross-examined by the Prosecution. Thereby the requirements of Rule 92*ter* will be fulfilled, and fairness to the Prosecution will be observed. A copy of the Statement is attached at Annex A. The 65*ter* Number is provided in the table at Annex B. The statement is currently unsigned, due to travel and communications problems caused by the flooding in the Balkans. The signed statement will be provided to the Prosecution as soon as available.

8. The Defense submits that due to the nature of the Witness's evidence 45 minutes will be necessary in order to conduct a limited and focused direct examination of the witness to clarify, expand on, and contextualize aspects of his evidence directly relevant to the Defense case.

9. Witness Kecmanović became the President of the Alliance of the Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for BH in 1990 and became a member of the BH presidency in 1992. He is currently a member of the Republika Srpska Senate and political advisor to the President of the Republika Srpska. In 1992 Kecmanović was also a professor of political sciences at Belgrade University and later became Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Banja Luka University in 2012.

10. Witness Kecmanović's testimony is relevant to and probative of salient and material issues pertaining to the Indictment. The Defense is confident in that it will, among other things, establish the following:

- a. The political context in Bosnia and Herzegovina leading up to the war, including the formation and function of the first multi-party Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 with representatives from the Alliance of Reform Forces for Yugoslavia ('SRSJ'), the Party of Democratic Action ('SDA') and the Croatian Democratic Union ('HDZ').³
- b. Not all members of the Presidency were present when Izetbegović introduced the vote on the declaration of war. Kecmanović and Pejanović had expressed their veto to the decision and as a result the vote was removed from the agenda and then reintroduced when neither were present.⁴
- c. Izetbegović was an unreliable negotiator who demonstrated a tendency to change his decisions within a short time frame.⁵
- d. The BH Presidency was not properly informed on the political situation in the entire country and received unconvincing reports from Sefer Halilović on the victories of the BH Army.⁶
- e. In 1992 several meetings were held between Kecmanović, Izetbegović, Mirko Pejanović and Momčilo Krajišnik to discuss the conflicts in Sarajevo and the division lines that had been formed. A plan was discussed in which the city could be temporarily divided into territorial and ethnic divisions.⁷
- f. Kecmanović informed the Serbian leadership, including President Ćosić and Prime Minister Panić about the situation in Sarajevo. The Serbian leadership shared the same view regarding the necessity to find a solution for the conflicts in BH.⁸
- g. Meetings were held in Spring 1992 to discuss the issue of the JNA in BH and an agreement was reached whereby the JNA

³ Statement para 7, 8

⁴ Statement para 10, 27

⁵ Statement para 11

⁶ Statement para 13

⁷ Statement para 16, 17, 18, 19, 21

⁸ Statement para 21, 22, 35

would remain active to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts. However this was rejected by the BH Presidency.⁹

- h. When names were put forward for the appointments of military commanders and diplomatic representatives there were no Serbians nominated.¹⁰
- i. The vote for holding a referendum on independence by the BH Assembly went against the will of the Serbian constituents and was one of the main causes of the outbreak of the war.¹¹
- j. By the end of 1991 attacks were carried out against the Serbian population in Sarajevo. Homes were stormed, searched and looted and the civilians were abused.¹²
- k. Paramilitary groups, namely the Patriotic League and the Green Berets, and army and police ranks of the BH Army took over control of Sarajevo and targeted Serbian civilians and their property. Serbian civilians were also prevented from leaving Sarajevo.¹³
- l. The Serbian leadership launched an initiative to make it possible for any citizens to leave Sarajevo regardless of their ethnicity and the Serbians guaranteed them safe passage across the area under their control.¹⁴
- m. Private prisons were set up in Sarajevo in which Serbian civilians were detained. This issue was raised at several Presidency sessions by Kecmanović and Pejanović.¹⁵
- n. BH Army artillery batteries were distributed in the strict centre of Sarajevo, the most densely populated part of the city. This forced the Serbian forces to aim fire towards this area.¹⁶

⁹ Statement para 25

¹⁰ Statement para 30

¹¹ Statement para 37

¹² Statement para 38

¹³ Statement para 39, 41, 48

¹⁴ Statement para 42

¹⁵ Statement para 45, 49

¹⁶ Statement para 51

- o. All three sides accepted the drafting of the Cutileiro plan, including Izetbegović. However Izetbegović withdrew his support for the plan after his meeting with Ambassador Zimmerman.¹⁷

III. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing arguments, the Defense respectfully requests that the Chamber issue an order:

- a. Granting the Defense leave to call Nenad Kecmanović as a witness pursuant to Rule 92*ter*.
- b. Granting the Defense leave to admit the proffered statement, (attached hereto as Annex A) under Rule 92*ter*.

Word Count: 1152

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:



Branko Lukić
Lead Counsel for Ratko Mladić
Mladić



Miodrag Stojanović
Co-Counsel for Ratko

¹⁷ Statement para 55

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ANNEX A

**INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION
OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991**

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS DETAILS:

Last Name: KECMANOVIĆ

First Name: Nenad

Father's Name:

Date of Birth: 9th September 1947.

Ethnic Origin: Serb

Date(s) of Interview(s): 25th February 2014.

Interviewer(s): Mikajlo MITROVIĆ and Branko LUKIĆ

Language(s) Used in Interview: Serbian

Witness Signature: _____

WITNESS STATEMENT – NENAD KECMANOVIĆ

PERSONAL DETAILS

1. My name is Nenad KECMANOVIĆ. I was born on 9 September 1947. in Sarajevo, where I lived until July 1992. Until then I worked as a professor of political sciences at Sarajevo University. In 1992 I moved to Belgrade, where I now reside with my family. Until last year I was working as a professor of political sciences at Belgrade University. Now, I work as a professor and dean of the FPN /Faculty of Political Sciences/ at Banja Luka University. I am also engaged as a member of the RS /Republika Srpska/ Senate, and am a political advisor to the RS President.

2. I was a member of the Communist Party until 1989. In 1986 I agreed to be nominated a member of the SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ Presidency, as a representative of BH. After I received the largest number of votes, my candidature was contested, following allegations by the Bosnian secret service that I was a spy, working for the British Government. These allegations were never proven, nor were there any attempts to prove them, whether as part of an investigation, or judicial, political or any similar proceeding. On the contrary, since the goal had been achieved, they altered the qualification. I was no longer a spy but a “person with insufficient security awareness for holding the highest state functions”, therefore, I remained rector of Sarajevo University. That proves the most that the allegations were not true. I was never engaged for any secret service. After Biljana PLAVŠIĆ and Nikola KOLJEVIĆ, the Serbian members of the BH Presidency, left, I became a member of the BH Presidency.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BiH AND MY PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

3. In 1990 I became the president of the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for BH, which was formed by Ante MARKOVIĆ, SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ Prime Minister. Around the same time, the founders of the SDS /Serbian

Democratic Party/, KOLJEVIĆ, KARADŽIĆ, BUHA and the others asked me to be the leader of their party. During our conversation I supported the establishment of a Serbian national party, which would be the equivalent of the Muslim and Croatian parties, all the more because the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ and the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ had already been formed. At the same time, I told them that I personally favoured a party that would be active in the territory of the entire Yugoslavia, so not only did I refuse to be the president, but even a member of the SDS. Of course, the members of the SDS did not approve my rejection to lead their party, or my choice of the Reformists. However, considering my reputation among the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs in Pale, I would say that they considered me to be a person aligned with a different party, but not an opponent. I did not consider myself to be a lesser Serb than they were, but I respected the fact that based on their convincing victory at the 1990 elections, they had the legitimacy to represent the Serbian people in BH.

4. The people in the SDS used to say that those Serbs who were not with the Serbian ethnic party, were not sufficiently ethnically aware, and that it was only a matter of time before we joined them. However, those were only jokes that nobody took seriously. I can confirm that following the establishment of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and the resignation of some members of the Reform Party, and after it joined the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH, the members of the SDS saw me as someone with whom they could cooperate, unless these were matters which directly contradicted the program and goals of the SRSJ /Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia/ for BH. What brought us close objectively was our mutual strive for the survival of Yugoslavia and BH in it. Therefore, I kept in touch with the members of the SDS leadership, who were my colleagues and acquaintances of many years (KARADŽIĆ, KOLJEVIĆ, PLAVŠIĆ, etc), and I was often in touch with some leaders of the SDA and HDZ. My advantage was that all those people who were involved in the new politics knew me well, and I aimed to maintain good relations with all of them, and respected their various ethnic and political interests.

5. Because we joined the BH Presidency at a later stage, many Serbs, especially the general membership of the SDS, was Mirko PEJANOVIĆ and myself as traitors. However, I think that was partly a result of propaganda for the general public and that the SDS leadership,

whose representatives knew me well, did not think of me that way. I always tried to strike a balance between my position in the BH Presidency and my Serbian identity. For example, when Lord CARRINGTON and Jose CUTILEIRO held talks in June 1992 with the members of the BH Presidency in Sarajevo, I told them that I was not authorised to represent the Serbian side and that they would have to see KARADŽIĆ in Pale.

THE ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

6. The SRSJ for BH was one big multiethnic party, which had branches in the other parts of the SFRY and advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia. The SDS also advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia, but that was primarily a part of the Serbian people and only in BH. At the multi-party elections in 1990, the SRSJ won 11 mandates in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly. At those elections I was not elected into the BH Presidency, because according to the number of votes I was in third place, behind PLAVŠIĆ and KOLJEVIĆ. Apart from the two of them, ABDIĆ, IZETBEGOVIĆ and GANIĆ were also elected into the Presidency as representatives of the SDA, as were Stjepan KLJUIĆ and Franjo BORAS, as representatives of the HDZ. As the president of a parliamentary party I had the right to attend and participate in Assembly sessions, but I did not have the right to vote. Mr KARADŽIĆ had the same status in the Assembly, and based on that, we sometimes sat next to each other at sessions.

7. After the 1990 elections, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first multi-party Assembly that ever existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That had a major effect on the public because the parliament sessions were broadcast on television. Generally speaking, the reaction of the public to the new Assembly was very positive. The sessions at the Assembly were both formal and informal: regular official meetings were held, but the leaders of the parliamentary parties also met informally. For example, generally before each session the President of the Assembly would convene a preparatory meeting of the leaders of deputies' clubs, and the leaders of all the parliamentary parties. Being the leader of a parliamentary party, I was officially regularly invited to and actively participated at some of those meetings.

8. In relation to the Assembly session on 14 and 15 October 1991, the SRS /Serbian Radical Party/ said it was against the Muslim-Croat coalition making decisions that contravened the views of the Serbian side. This was in accordance with our principle that the three ruling parties must refrain from making any moves on their own, that is to say, that a three-way consensus had to be behind all decisions.

MY MEMBERSHIP IN THE BH PRESIDENCY

9. I became a member of the BH Presidency on 1 June 1992. The other members of the Presidency were IZETBEGOVIĆ, ABDIĆ, GANIĆ, KLJUIĆ, BORAS and PEJANOVIĆ. At the same time, it was accepted that a number of prominent political officials could attend Presidency sessions, but without the right to vote. They were Prime Minister Jure PELIVAN, GŠ /General Staff/ Chief Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Assembly Vice-President Mariofil LJUBIĆ, Minister of Defence Jerko DOKO, Minister of the Interior Alija DELIMUSTAFIĆ, and others. Later, when the state of war was declared, some of them became full-fledged member of the Presidency. One time I asked Sefer HALILOVIĆ what the goal of the war his army was waging was. He said that the goal was to “liberate each foot of BH”. After this, I asked him who he intended to liberate Western Herzegovina from, when it was populated exclusively by Croats, who were in the Croatian armed formations of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/. Or, similarly, who he intended to liberate areas around Sarajevo from, which were mainly populated by Serbs who were in the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/. Mariofil LJUBIĆ, a Croat, jumped up and said, “If the BH Army starts to 'liberate' his Herzegovina, he will immediately go home from Sarajevo and fight against that army”. In those situations when the conversation took a “wrong turn”, IZETBEGOVIĆ usually stepped in and changed the subject.

10. My party set three conditions that had to be met before I could join the Presidency. First, all the members of the Presidency had to be given the right of veto. Second, those Presidency members who were party leaders had to relinquish their function in the party. Third, the Presidency had to remove the current Government and form a more competent one. After 10 days or so, IZETBEGOVIĆ told us that everything had been settled, but later he tricked us all.

- Any proposals to which I announced my veto, most usually with PEJANOVIĆ's support, were removed by IZETBEGOVIĆ from the agenda. Then, when I was absent from a session, he would reintroduce them in the proceedings, and the Presidency would adopt them. One such example is the declaration of the state of war against the Serbian side /as printed/.
- Right after I joined the Presidency, I definitely resigned as leader of the party, whereas IZETBEGOVIĆ only formally named the politically marginal Mirsad ĆEMAN as his temporary deputy.
- Prime Minister Jure PELIVAN did indeed resign at the request of the Presidency, and proceedings for the appointment of a new prime minister were underway. According to the rules, the new prime minister was also supposed to be a Croat, and I proposed Božidar MATIĆ. However, KLJUIĆ refused to accept his candidacy because he had not been proposed by the HDZ. Therefore, PELIVAN technically kept his mandate.

WAR PRESIDENCY FROM THE INSIDE

11. As soon as I became a member of the BH Presidency, I noticed that there was no established work program, so I recommended that a political platform be drawn up for the work of the BH Presidency in emergency situations. Most people welcomed my initiative, so a working group was established to draft such a document. IZETBEGOVIĆ was the only one clearly reserved. I had the impression that this was because the adoption of such a document would tie his hands and limit his presidential influence. What suited him was a non-defined, fluid and confusing situation, in which he was free to manoeuvre, change his decisions, make conclusions sound relative, change his mind about what he had said before, etc. Once later he said about himself that he changes his decisions during the same day, "In the morning this seems better, and in the evening the other thing". That is why, already in the early stages of the Bosnian crisis (the incident with ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ and the "Belgrade initiative"), IZETBEGOVIĆ gained the reputation of an unreliable negotiator, whose word could not be trusted.

12. The platform, the basis of which were the documents of my party (SRSJ for BH) based on the CUTILEIRO plan, was well-received at the Presidency. IZETBEGOVIĆ had just one, but a highly indicative objection, "Why can one not see anywhere in the text that the

Muslims were the most numerous people in BH”? I replied that three constituent peoples lived in BH, which meant that they should be equal regardless of their numbers. That is to say, that any such advantage on the Muslim side on that basis would not be acceptable to the Serbs and Croats. He did not make any further comment, but with his undoubted consent, GANIĆ subsequently and without authorisation, added to the preamble of the Platform that it was drafted in the conditions of “aggression by Serbia, Montenegro and the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/ against BH”.

13. While I was a member of the Presidency, this body was constantly in session. We would meet in the morning and work until lunch. Then, after the lunch break, we would resume the session until late afternoon or early evening. However, the Presidency was isolated in a way, because all the communication with the other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina was made impossible for all the members of the Presidency, except for IZETBEGOVIĆ. Several times I indicated the need for all members of the Presidency to be informed about the political situation in the entire country, but without results. Sefer HALILOVIĆ informed us every day about the “major victories of the BH Army”, which contradicted the reports in the media about the “great suffering of Muslim civilians” and the situation at the fronts in Sarajevo. It all sounded so unconvincing that even IZETBEGOVIĆ warned him once not to exaggerate.

SDA

14. During the 1990 elections, Fikret ABDIĆ won the most votes. According to the electoral law which was defined prior to the elections, he was supposed to become the first president of the BH Presidency. Despite this, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ assumed that office. I do not know under which conditions ABDIĆ agreed to that and why the other members of the Presidency supported it, I can merely guess.

HDZ

15. At the Presidency I saw only one of the two Croatian members, Stjepan KLJUIĆ. The other one, Franjo BORAS, did not show up during the month I participated in the work of that body. He was apparently in Western Herzegovina and Zagreb, due to his poor health and

advanced age. The Croats were informally represented by Mariofil LJUBIĆ, acting President of the Assembly (instead of KRAJIŠNIK), and Mile AKNADŽIĆ, Secretary General of the Presidency. They were both in permanent contact with Mate BOBAN, *de facto*, the number one man of the HDZ, who was in Western Herzegovina, creating Herceg-Bosna. Even though LJUBIĆ and AKMADŽIĆ had an objectively bigger political influence in the field than KLJUIĆ, the opposite was the case in the Presidency. Although a Croat and a member of the HDZ, due to his open sympathies for the idea of a unitary BH, KLJUIĆ seemed to be the fifth member of the SDA and supported IZETBEGOVIĆ in everything. The goal of the HDZ leadership located in Grude was the opposite: the creation of a separate and independent Croatian entity, which would be connected to Croatia. This fact explains why KLJUIĆ was first removed from the head of the HDZ and later, following an agreement between IZETBEGOVIĆ and BOBAN, removed from the Presidency. He was replaced by Miro LASIĆ, post-war Croatian Ambassador to Macedonia.

MEETING AT THE TERME HOTEL

16. In April 1992, Mirko PEJANOVIĆ and I asked for a meeting with Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK. It was agreed to be held at the *Terme* hotel in Ilidža. Radovan KARADŽIĆ also joined the meeting. The reasons for the meeting were the conflicts around the city, about which we wanted to be informed, and the already announced division lines in Sarajevo. The people started getting divided already then and going to territories mainly inhabited by their own people. Our goal was to take specific steps to stop the clashes in town. However, the discussions focused on the internal transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the plan recommended by CUTILEIRO, which seemed acceptable to us. However, we did not achieve any specific results, nor did we get any significant information. I had the impression that at the time, the Serbian side genuinely wanted to find a political solution for the situation, but could not find a common language with the partners in power. The meeting lasted for about an hour and a half, and KARADŽIĆ had to leave early due to a scheduled press conference.

IZETBEGOVIĆ – KRAJIŠNIK MEETING

17. In May 1992, I initiated and organised a meeting between KRAJIŠNIK and IZETBEGOVIĆ and, as they wished, was the only witness to it. For purposes of discretion and security, we met at midnight at KRAJIŠNIK's office in the building of the BH Assembly. The goal of the meeting was again to stop the clashes in Sarajevo, and the conversation was focused on the territory of the city. KRAJIŠNIK recommended the temporary division of the territory in accordance with the factual situation. He explained that a temporary division was not his wish, but the result of pressures from the Serbian people due to the victims that were falling on both sides.

18. KRAJIŠNIK suggested that the city be temporarily divided according to the existing territorial and ethnic distribution and the frontline, so the suburbs would be controlled by the Serbs and the city centre by the Muslims. IZETBEGOVIĆ accepted the proposal, and then they asked me to assist by developing the idea and offering several specific models for its realisation. I promised to deliver to them by the morning the sought material, so they would have the time to consult with their associates and prepare for a new meeting the next evening. During the night, I formulated four versions of the temporary division of Sarajevo, and in the morning I sent one copy by fax to Pale, and handed the other to Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ.

19. Both KRAJIŠNIK and IZETBEGOVIĆ told me that the most acceptable model to them was the one that envisaged the city centre, where all the joint BH institutions were located, would become a district, and that the suburbs and nearby villages dominated by one of the three ethnic groups be joined to the matching national entities further back. On behalf of the Serbian Republic of BH Presidency, Nikola KOLJEVIĆ confirmed this to me on the telephone, and on behalf of the BH Presidency, IZETBEGOVIĆ confirmed it to me personally in his office. We were all supposed to meet again at the same time and place. However, during a subsequent telephone call between IZETBEGOVIĆ, KRAJIŠNIK and myself, KRAJIŠNIK complained that somebody shot at him when he was returning from his meeting in Sarajevo to Pale, so he recommended that the next meeting be held in Serbian territory. However, as far as I know, IZETBEGOVIĆ and KRAJIŠNIK never met again in relation to this plan.

MEETING IN LUKAVICA

20. In late May 1992, at the initiative of Mirko PEJANOVIĆ and myself, we had a meeting with Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK in Lukavica. The topic was our inclusion in the BH Presidency, after PLAVŠIĆ and KOLJEVIĆ left. Even though we were candidates for the Presidency as the leaders of multi-ethnic parties (the Reformists and the Socialists), we were on the same Serbian list as the SDS candidates. We considered it our duty to represent the Serbian population in a territory under SDA – HDZ rule, and BH Army control. That was why we thought it necessary to consult with the Serbian leadership in Pale. During the meeting, KRAJIŠNIK told us that he was not authorised to approve or contest our inclusion in the Presidency, but that he would convey all that to the responsible decision-making organs. At the end of the meeting I told him that I thought that the best solution was for PLAVŠIĆ and KOLJEVIĆ to withdraw their resignations and, as members of the highest collective leadership of BH, to keep its legitimacy and continue to represent the Serbian people. I mentioned Franjo BORAS as an example that members of the Presidency need not sit in the centre of Sarajevo, but could be in Pale or anywhere in BH.

MEETINGS IN PALE

21. On 6 July 1992, I set off to Pale and Belgrade. I informed in principle the Presidency about my intention to go and talk to the RS leadership and the new Serbian leadership (ĆOSIĆ and PANIĆ), and told ABDIĆ and IZETBEGOVIĆ about my specific departure date. My transport to the barracks in Lukavica, where I was met by KOLJEVIĆ, was organised by UNPROFOR. General Lewis MacKENZIE accompanied me. During the two days I spent in Pale, as soon as I arrived I had a dinner together with KARADŽIĆ, KRAJIŠNIK, PLAVŠIĆ and KOLJEVIĆ. The next day I had separate meeting with each of them, except for PLAVŠIĆ. During these meetings I told the Serbian leadership about the problems regarding security in the city, and informed them about the dramatic situation of the Serbs in Sarajevo.

MEETINGS IN BELGRADE

22. On the morning of the third day (8 July), I flew to Belgrade together with KOLJEVIĆ. In Belgrade I met with President ĆOSIĆ, who was clearly depressed about my reports regarding the situation in Sarajevo and BH. Unlike him, Prime Minister PANIĆ appeared to underestimate the complexity and gravity of the general situation, and was overly optimistic and simplistic in his approach to the problems. During several later meetings I had with PANIĆ, I noticed that his optimism that everything could be resolved quickly and easily suddenly dissipated the more involved he became with the problems across the Drina. During our meetings, PANIĆ specifically recommended that a “blue road” be opened from Serbia across the Drina, for the more efficient supply of international humanitarian aid for BH.

23. Patriarch Pavle also saw me in Belgrade, and Bishop Nikolaj of Dabar-Bosna later joined our discussions. I informed them that the Orthodox cathedral had become the only place where both religious and non-religious Serbs could gather freely in Sarajevo, and mentioned that only one Orthodox priest remained in town and that it would be good if they sent him some reinforcement. I informed the BH Presidency briefly by fax and provided information to *Tanjug* /Yugoslav News Agency/ about all these meetings. After these planned meetings, I went to the Military Medical Academy for a check-up of an injury I suffered during a traffic accident in wartime Sarajevo. I was held there for a month for treatment.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ AT THE HEAD OF THE PRESIDENCY

24. In the spring of 1992, the question of the status of the JNA in BH was opened. In seeking a solution that would enable the JNA to remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a factor of order and peace to oppose the various paramilitary formations that were getting armed illegally, I asked for a meeting with Branko KOSTIĆ, the Yugoslav President, and General ADŽIĆ, Minister of Defence. The meeting was arranged by General KUKANJAC and we travelled in a small aircraft of *Energoinvest*. It was General Director Božidar MATIĆ and myself, and I also took with me two of my party associates, a Muslim called TOKIĆ and a Croat called PEJAKOVIĆ. IZETBEGOVIĆ supported this initiative, we even harmonised the draft text that we could offer to the JNA Main Staff in Belgrade.

25. According to the proposal, five transitional years were supposed to be provided, during which the JNA was supposed to remain in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and guarantee peace and security, in order to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts. After these five years, the members of the JNA would have the right to choose whether to become members of the BH Army or withdraw, and join the army in their own homelands. During the time we spent in Belgrade, we informed President Branko KOSTIĆ and Minister ADŽIĆ about the proposal at three separate and informal meetings. At IZETBEGOVIĆ's explicit request, we also met with President Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ. All the three people we talked to supported the proposal. The agreement was finalised in Ohrid, in Macedonia, and that meeting was attended by IZETBEGOVIĆ, KOSTIĆ, ADŽIĆ and the host, Kiro GLIGOROV. However, when after all this IZETBEGOVIĆ offered the agreement to the BH Presidency for adoption, this collective organ unexpectedly rejected it, supposedly at the insistence of Ejup GANIĆ.

26. Once I was in IZETBEGOVIĆ's office when his daughter, who was also his secretary and *chef de cabinet*, entered the room and told her father that he had an urgent call from Eastern Bosnia. I cannot say where exactly. However, I understood the call to be important and I could hear a panicked voice at the other end of the line. A few sentences later IZETBEGOVIĆ raised his voice at the other person and said, "I told you that the struggle for the state requires victims". Then he nervously slammed the phone down.

27. During the period of my engagement at the BH Presidency in June 1992., IZETBEGOVIĆ expressed his intention to declare war. PEJANOVIĆ and I had serious reservations about the matter and announced our veto to that decision, because that war would practically be a war of the Muslims and would mean the disintegration of multi-ethnic society. IZETBEGOVIĆ reacted by first removing from the agenda the proposal that had formally come from General HALILOVIĆ. Then, late at night he called another Presidency session, without informing either me or PEJANOVIĆ about it. He later justified it by saying that it was urgent and that the service could not get through to us because of the blackout and shooting around town. Of course, that was a naïve explanation. Communication in town was still difficult, but it was always possible to contact the members of the Presidency, and it had to be possible to contact them regarding any decision to declare a state of war. The meeting

ended with a unanimous decision, contrary to the view of the Serbian members of the Presidency.

28. According to the minutes of the BH Presidency session held on 20 June 1992, IZETBEGOVIĆ said that the country could not accept any pressure for the creation of ethnically clean territories. However, I recall a big promotional gathering of the SDA in Kladaša, when IZETBEGOVIĆ, as party leader addressed those gathered with the following rhetorical question, “Does the Muslim population really want BH to be an Islamic state, which is a frequent criticism”? The mass of about 100 people chanted back as one, “Yes, we do! Yes, we do”! IZETBEGOVIĆ reacted by saying that it was still too early for that and that the “Muslims will take such a chunk of Bosnia that they can successfully control”. However, as we showed before, that was another example of IZETBEGOVIĆ’s tendency to frequently change his views regarding various matters. That is too weak a formulation because in June 1992 I realised that he was working behind the back of the Presidency, and tricking the members of this collective organ.

29. I once read a short piece of news in the *Oslobodjenje* daily that the day before IZETBEGOVIĆ signed a military alliance with the Croatian President, TUDJMAN. At the morning session I immediately asked how it was possible that this was not previously discussed in the Presidency. IZETBEGOVIĆ replied that the journalists had made it up, and when I asked that we issue a prompt denial, he asked me to leave that for the end of the agenda. He soon called for a break and called me into his office for coffee. He explained that he “signed that alliance as a party leader, on behalf of the SDA, and not as the President of BH”. I asked to see that document and noted aloud that he and TUDJMAN were both signed as statesmen. “The men in the administration made a mistake”, he replied. And when I warned him that military alliances were not signed by parties but by states, he replied, “I might have made a mistake, but what can we do now”? Later during the Presidency session I asked the question again, but the Muslims were not in the mood for a discussion because of Alija, and the Croats because of Franjo.

30. One day the appointments of military commanders and diplomatic representatives were put on the agenda. I immediately noticed that there was not a single Serbian name

among the 20 or so on the lists. When I told ABDIĆ and GANIĆ about it, who were sitting next to me, they just shrugged their shoulders. When the meeting started, I asked this question. Since General HALILOVIĆ honestly, but politically carelessly replied that Muslim soldiers will not accept being commanded by a Serb, IZETBEGOVIĆ reacted. In his already described manner of naïve deception he replied that “the Serbs dominated some earlier adopted military and diplomatic lists”. Since I insisted on seeing those lists, IZETBEGOVIĆ sent his advisor Kemal to fetch them. Kemal did not return to the hall that day and the next day, when I asked him about it, he apologised for still not having been able to find them.

31. Once I asked why dead BH soldiers, at least according to the notices of death published in *Oslobodjenje* were being buried as martyrs. I said, “As far as I know, martyrs are fighters fallen for Islam and the glory of Allah, and not soldiers who fell defending their homeland. So, it turns out that this is jihad, meaning a religious and not a homeland war.” IZETBEGOVIĆ was very annoyed and agitated and replied that it was a fact that religious Muslims were the ones who fought and died the most in the struggle for Bosnia, so it was natural that they would be buried like that.

MOMČILO KRAJIŠNIK

32. I always received very positive opinions and information about Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK from my Croatian and Muslim acquaintances in *Energoinvest*, regarding his professionalism and strong principles. They stressed in particular his respect for other nations, religious and customs. As the financial director of one plant in *Energoinvest*, they said that he never failed to congratulate the Muslims and Croats on their holidays and offer them a day off. As President of the BH Assembly, KRAJIŠNIK lent importance to the Assembly and directed its work highly appropriately. He never limited any discussions. Since frequently the sessions lasted unusually long as a result, people would joke and say, “There can be no war while KRAJIŠNIK is presiding in the Assembly, because he won’t allow the politicians out of the building”.

33. If the members of the SDA, HDZ and other parties were to pick their most favourite negotiator on the Serbian side, then that would be Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK without any doubt

whatsoever. He often said that he was raised to show respect towards his neighbours of different faiths. He was always calm and patient and had a lot of energy to build or keep bridges among all the sides during the negotiations. I can confirm that between January and March 1992, KRAJIŠNIK did not do anything that would have provoked or contributed to the war breaking out.

RADOVAN KARADŽIĆ AND THE SERBIAN LEADERSHIP

34. KARADŽIĆ was the leader of the SDS at the time when the BH Assembly was formed, despite not holding any state function. I know for a fact that he did not see himself as a leader, nor did he wish to be one, because he kept offering me to be president of the SDS. Once he saw that neither he, nor KOLJEVIĆ, BUHA or the others could convince me, he tried to do it through his older brother, Dušan, who was KARADŽIĆ's colleague at the Psychiatric Clinic in Sarajevo. As far as I know, he made the same offer to Milorad EKMEVIĆ, Svetozar KOLJEVIĆ and some other distinguished Serbian intellectuals. Since he was very skilful and successful in preparing the formation of the SDS, at one moment they all agreed that it was natural for him to be the one to assume formal leadership.

35. When the Republika Srpska Presidency was formed in Pale, Dr KARADŽIĆ was its President, while Mr KOLJEVIĆ and Ms PLAVŠIĆ were vice-presidents. From several meetings with these people I gained the impression that the leadership in Pale was very concerned about what was happening in Sarajevo, and that what was happening in the other parts of BH was of secondary importance. I think that PEJANOVIĆ and I on the one hand, and KRAJIŠNIK and KARADŽIĆ on the other, shared the same view regarding the necessity to find a solution for the conflicts in BH through political negotiations, and to avoid or stop the war at any cost. However, it seems to me that we also shared the feeling of helplessness to do anything.

NATIONAL EQUALITY COUNCIL

36. The concept of a National Equality Council was developed before the 1990 elections. This body was supposed to be some kind of a substitute for the council of citizens, which is an

unavoidable element of parliamentary structure in a multi-ethnic community. The council was the mechanism that protected the vital national interests of each of the three constituent peoples. If one of the sides in the tri-partite ruling coalition noticed during BH Assembly sessions that some item on the agenda might threaten its national interests, it was necessary for it to collect 20 deputies' signatures to have the disputed matter removed from the agenda. In accordance with further procedure, the disputed item on the agenda would then be forwarded to a commission that was composed from an equal number of representatives of all the three national parties, each of which had the right of veto. If any of the sides were to veto the disputed question, then that item would no longer be returned to the agenda in the Assembly. The Council was created to preserve the equality of the rights of all ethnic groups, and in practice it functioned in the period between the multi-party elections and the beginning of the war. Any threat to that mechanism by the SDA or HDZ deputies that fateful night in the Assembly signified the beginning of the war.

WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

37. War became practically inevitable when the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly trampled for the first time on the principle of equality, at the detriment of the Serbian people. The vote for holding a referendum on independence against the will of the Serbian deputies in the BH Assembly was the final step that in the end led to war. In other words, I believe that this outvoting of the Serbian deputies in the BH Assembly was one of the main causes of the war. It crucially strengthened the idea about the transformation of BH into three ethnic entities (Serbian, Muslim and Croatian entities) as a compromise and the best possible solution that would satisfy all the sides in the conflict.

38. Between the end of 1991. and March 1992., the situation in the entire country, and especially in Sarajevo, was very tense and violence kept spreading. In the city of Sarajevo, attacks were mainly carried out against the Serbian population and especially against the families of JNA officers. Their homes were stormed, searched, looted, and the members of the households abused. One of the events worth mentioning was the occupation of the JNA *Maršal Tito* barracks and the Army Social Centre in the centre of Sarajevo. This was shocking, in light of the fact that the army had intervened unbiased just before, during the

clashes between the three sides. Even though following the withdrawal of the Muslims and Croats from its ranks the JNA was mainly manned by Serbian officers, the army intervened against the barricades which had been erected in the city by the Serbs. I am referring to the barricades that the Serbs erected as a response to the murder of a Serbian wedding guest in Bašćaršija, near the old Orthodox church.

39. One event that also illustrated well the atmosphere of disorder and violence in Sarajevo was the breaking of shop windows, the burglaries of shops, looting of goods, accompanied by shooting and the sound of glass breaking. This happened during several late nights. By the morning, all the shops in the centre of the city had been emptied and demolished. This was a showdown between paramilitary criminal groups grappling for control over certain parts of town. These gangs, dressed in the uniforms of the Green Berets and the Patriotic League, with army and police ranks of the BH Army, took over control in the capital, with the support of the authorities. Their motive was not primarily ethnic, but Serbian property was a legitimate target for them, because all the Serbs were suspected of being traitors and were the least protected group in town.

40. All this happened after the Serbian leadership had left Sarajevo and went to Pale, and it was represented in the media as mobilisation against the “Serbo-Chetniks” and the “Yugo armada”. Some of the more famous pre-war criminals, now paramilitary commanders and criminals under the protection of the BH Army, were celebrated as heroes of the town defence. In the beginning, this was for example Jusuf PRAZINA aka Juka, and later Mušan TOPALOVIĆ aka Caco. What is the worst is that these two criminals, who were liquidated later, and many others, with the nicknames Ćelo, Kruško, Puška, Dedo etc, were members of the regular BH Army, most often as commanders of special army and police units. There is photo-documentation that shows that IZETBEGOVIĆ received and decorated them.

41. Due to the events described in Sarajevo in the spring of 1992, my family, like many Serbian and non-Serbian families, sent their children to stay with relatives in Belgrade. The situation was deteriorating every day, and the violence was more ethnic. The Serbs could not leave the city, although most of them did not want to leave anyway. It was possible to leave the city only if one paid a bribe or allowed the Muslim paramilitary or police forces to use

their apartment. People paid large sums of money in foreign currency just to leave the city. Those who tried to break the internal ring around Sarajevo and leave the city without such “assistance”, lost their lives at the confrontation line or were caught, arrested and punished for desertion. Mobilisation was declared, and every attempt to leave Sarajevo was treated as treason.

42. In this period, the Serbian side launched an initiative to make it possible for those citizens of Sarajevo who wished to leave the city, to do so. KARADŽIĆ called on the authorities in Sarajevo live on the radio to allow those citizens who wished to leave the city to do so. Regardless of their ethnicity, the Serbian side guaranteed them safe passage across the territory under its control. Crossing from Serbian territory to the Muslim one and vice versa was not a problem only during the first days of the conflict. However, the situation rapidly deteriorated with time, to the extent that already in May 1992, and especially later, it became practically impossible to leave Sarajevo.

43. As for violence in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina I had only indirect knowledge, mainly through the media. The Sarajevo news was wartime propaganda: only the Muslim victims were innocent, and crimes were being committed only by the Serbian army. Of course, only the BH Army fought gallantly, and shot only at enemy soldiers, while the Serbian army allegedly killed only civilians, etc. Therefore, I could only guess what was actually happening outside of Sarajevo.

DETENTION CENTRES

44. It started with the removal of all Serbian leading staff in town. Already in early 1992 there was not a single /Serb/ among company directors, heads of clinics, deans of faculties, chiefs of municipal services, etc. Those who were not removed, were surrounded by the distrust and disobedience of the employees, so they resigned on their own. The most persistent ones, such as for example the directors of *Žitopromet*, were accused of collaborating with the “Serbo-Chetniks”. But that was just the beginning.

45. At several Presidency sessions, PEJANOVIĆ and I raised the question of private prisons in Sarajevo, where exclusively Serbian civilians were detained and abused, under the false accusations that they were hiding weapons or giving light signals to the Serbian artillery. Based on the information we received from the people who came to us for help daily, we presented the specific complaints of Serbian citizens regarding people being taken away, evicted, robbed, abused or imprisoned. An appropriate mixed commission was formed at our initiative, composed of Serbian members of the Presidency and the Government, of which PEJANOVIĆ was a member, and which was led by Deputy Prime Minister Miodrag SIMOVIĆ, a lawyer with police experience.

46. Although my department at the Presidency were foreign affairs, I can talk personally about the existence of a private prison in the basement of the *Zagreb* hotel in Marindvor. While searching for a missing doctor, Trifko GUZINA, professor Slavko LEOVAC and his wife, Ankica, because of an alarmed request by their relatives, I found them, having been imprisoned for a few days just for being members of the political council of the Serbian Democratic Party. In a similar way, I found out that such a prison also existed in the basement of the *Evropa* hotel, when priest Drago UBIPARIPOVIĆ, his parish clerk and many Orthodox churchgoers were taken into custody and detained after leaving prayer at the Orthodox cathedral. The official police organs (including Minister DELIMUSTAFIĆ) had no information about this and were unable to assist with freeing these people. It is symptomatic that in such cases it was very effective to intervene with IZETBEGOVIĆ.

47. When I was appointed to the BH Presidency, the exchange of prisoners between the various ethnic groups was underway. Lists of prisoners to be exchanged existed on both sides, and, according to our division of tasks, PEJANOVIĆ was dealing with that. According to his information and my recollection, the total number of people exchanged on a monthly basis was as many as 250 to 300 people.

48. At that time, the situation in Sarajevo was chaotic. The city was divided into zones controlled by the various paramilitary formations, who were connected to the authorities but not under their control. These violent groups, which sometimes acted as military units and sometimes as police ones, held the territory of the city *de facto* under their control. They had

their own prisons, but one never knew their name or number, nor did they officially exist. Despite several interventions in the Presidency, we never received any specific information about these prisons, which were practically intended only for Serbs.

49. This problem was mentioned during Presidency sessions, although we never received any specific or detailed information about it. The remaining information related to examples of many civilians losing their lives in the fighting in and around Sarajevo. It was also said that the Muslim people were the ones primarily suffering. It was mentioned that their houses had been torched and many of them killed. However, no specific information was provided in relation to those claims. Apart from this, the media in Sarajevo was one-sided and not objective in their assessment.

ARTILLERY FIRE

50. During meetings with the leading representatives of the Serbian leadership in the summer of 1992, I raised the matter of the shelling of Sarajevo several times. Serbs and the other two peoples were suffering as a result of the shelling equally. The response I was given was that the Muslim artillery was opening fire against the Serbian positions around the city. I was told that the Muslim artillery was located in the most densely populated parts in the city, and that the Serbian artillery was forced to respond to the fire, aiming towards the locations where the fire was coming from.

51. BH Army artillery batteries were indeed distributed in the strict centre of the city. I saw that these were the places against which the Serbian side was opening fire during my temporary stay in the Ciglane residential area. Artillery batteries were located at both ends of this residential area, and they were active mainly at night. One was located in a narrow strip between the BH Army 1st Corps Command and the residential complex, and the other on a nearby flyover. It was fixed to a self-propelled vehicle, which hid in the tunnel after firing. The incoming Serbian fire was not always precise and there were no guarantees that they managed a direct hit or that shrapnel would not land near a place with civilians. That was why my, and not only my impression was that the shelling was arbitrary, that is to say, non-selective. Usually during night-time actions by both artilleries, we civilians were unable to

differentiate between downward or upward detonations, so all of them appeared to be downward ones. That fit into the image of the war painted by the Sarajevo media, according to which only one side was shelling and only one suffering. Those Muslim neighbours who had a more sensitive ear and were more familiar with weapons would sometimes quietly grumble and say, “Our guys are provoking them and then we get smacked on the head”?!

52. General MacKENZIE was the first international official who warned about the Muslim snipers shooting at civilians in the centre of Sarajevo, in order to put the blame on the Serbian side. I have not read MacKENZIE’s book and do not know what evidence he presented, but I know that many independent experts claimed that the shells which caused many casualties in the city could not have come from Serbian positions. It is also a fact that the Muslim side did not respond with counter expert reports, but with floods of hatred towards General MacKENZIE. This hatred remains rife to this day in Muslim circles, not only in Sarajevo but around the world, including Canada itself.

53. During the time I lived in Sarajevo, I was in a position to assess the results and consequences /not/ only of shells fired from the Serbian side, but also the consequences of shells fired by the BH Army in Sarajevo. This led me to conclude that the Serbian artillery was superior in relation to the BH Army artillery. In any case, the level of damage caused by the Muslim artillery in the Serbian part of Sarajevo was something I was not in a position to assess while I was in the centre of the city. The first post-war photographs of destroyed Grbavica and other areas on the Serbian side of town put my earlier impression into perspective.

THE CUTILEIRO PLAN

54. I was present during some of the meetings in Sarajevo, presided by CUTILEIRO. My party and I supported the agreements reached after these meetings. I never gained the knowledge that the SDS leadership was not truly dedicated to the implementation of the CUTILEIRO plan. It is a well-known fact that all the three sides accepted the CUTILEIRO plan. In the end, only the Muslim side gave up on it. I personally believe that IZETBEGOVIĆ supported the plan, but then gave it up under American influence, that is to say, after his

meeting with Ambassador ZIMMERMAN. I know that he was counting on NATO intervention back in the summer of 1992. At Presidency meetings in June 1992 he was quite precise on two occasions, "No later than mid-August"! This must have been the approach supported by radicals in the SDA who, instead of international compromise and a division into cantons, wanted all of Bosnia only for the Muslims.

55. I was told that on 18. March 1992., Dr KARADŽIĆ said in the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs that the CUTILEIRO Plan had been accepted as a basis for further negotiations and that the document had not been signed. I agree that the CUTILEIRO Plan was not a final document, but a draft agreement. However, it is a fact that the Serbian side accepted the basic principles of that plan, which would have been the basis for the continuation of the negotiations. I believe that the CUTILEIRO Plan was not seen by the Serbian side as some kind of an ideal solution, because it was the desire of the Serbian population for BH to remain within Yugoslavia. I also believe that it was possible to transform Bosnia and Herzegovina territorially and ethnically without any radical or forced changes to the ethnic structure on the ground. Why would any movement of the population be qualified as ethnic cleansing? After the war, that is to say, during peace, Serbs and Croats left Sarajevo en masse, and it was only in the post-1995 years that the city became mainly Muslim. What would we call that process? Ethnic cleansing? Humane resettlement? Peacetime resettlement? Or something else? The metaphor about the leopard and his spots which, apparently, faithfully reflects the highly mixed ethnic composition of Bosnia, is largely a construct. Even before the war in BH, there were practically single-ethnic zones, such as the Cazin Krajina or Western Herzegovina. Bosnia is mainly a rural country, and the villages in Bosnia have always been Muslim, Serbian or Croatian, not multi-ethnic.

THE MEDIA

56. News was mainly coming from two sides: Radio Sarajevo, which was under Muslim control (at that moment it was probably called the BH Radio), and Radio *SRNA*, under Serbian control. I can confirm that the program of Radio Sarajevo mainly boiled down to wartime propaganda. On the Serbian side the program was more or less the same, only with the opposite sign. That is why information about the events in Sarajevo was highly

controversial and unreliable, and prone to all kinds of interpretation by the public. While I was still in Sarajevo, it was possible to catch the BBC and other main global media on long or mid-wave on the radio. Their information and interpretation more or less matched that of the Muslim media. That had quite a substantial effect on my Muslim and Croat friends, who, in the beginning, kept the same distance from all three ethnic parties. Later, they became negatively biased against the SDS, Republika Srpska and the Serbs.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read this statement consisting of ___ pages and it is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and am aware that it may be used in proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for

Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, and that I may be called to testify publicly before the Tribunal.

Signed: _____

Dated: _____

**MEĐUNARODNI SUD ZA KRIVIČNO GONJENJE OSOBA ODGOVORNIH ZA
TEŠKA KRŠENJA MEĐUNARODNOG PRAVA NA TERITORIJI BIVŠE
JUGOSLAVIJE OD 1991**

IZJAVA SVEDOKA

PODACI O SVEDOKU:

Prezime: Kecmanović

Ime: Nenad

Ime oca:

Datum rođenja: 09. 09. 1947

Nacionalnost: Srbin

Datum(i) razgovora: 25.02.2014.

Razgovor(e) vodili: Mikajlo Mitrović i Branko Lukić

Jezici korišćeni u toku razgovora: Srpski

Potpis svedoka: _____

IZJAVA SVEDOKA - NENAD KECMANOVIĆ

LIČNI PODACI

1. Zovem se Nenad Kecmanović. Rođen sam 09. 09. 1947. godine u Sarajevu, gde sam živeo sve do jula 1992. godine. Do tada sam radio kao profesor političkih nauka na Univerzitetu u Sarajevu. Godine 1992. sam se preselio u Beograd, gde i sada živim sa svojom porodicom, a do prošle godine sam radio kao profesor političkih nauka na beogradskom univerzitetu. Sada radim kao profesor i dekan FPN na Univerzitetu u Banjaluci. Angažovan sam i kao član Senata RS i politički savetnik Predsednika RS.

2. Bio sam član Komunističke partije do 1989. godine. Godine 1986. godine sam prihvatio kandidaturu za člana Predsedništva SFR Jugoslavije ispred BiH. Nakon što sam dobio najveći broj glasova, moja kandidatura je osporena optužbom bosanske tajne službe da sam špijun i da radim za britansku Vladu. Optužba nije nikada dokazana niti je bilo pokušaja da se dokaže u smislu istražnog, pravosudnog, političkog ili nekog sličnog postupka. Naprotiv, pošto je cilj ostvaren promenili su kvalifikaciju. Više nisam bio špijun nego „osoba sa nedovoljnom bezbednosnom kulturom da bih mogao obavljati najviše državne funkcije" pa sam tako i dalje ostao rektor univerziteta u Sarajevu. To najbolje pokazuje da optužba nije odgovarala istini. Nikada nisam bio angažovan za bilo koju tajnu službu. Nakon odlaska srpskih članova iz Predsedništva BiH, Biljane Plavšić i Nikole Koljevića, postao sam član Predsedništva BiH.

POLITIČKA SITUACIJA U BIH I LIČNO UČEŠĆE U POLITICI

3. Godine 1990. postao sam predsednik Saveza reformskih snaga Jugoslavije za BiH, koju je formirao premijer vlade SFRJ Ante Marković. Negde u isto vreme osnivači SDS Koljević, Karadžić, Buha i dr. pozvali su me da stanem na čelo njihove partije. Tokom razgovora sam podržao formiranje srpske nacionalne stranke koja bi bila pandan muislmanskoj i hrvatskoj partiji, tim više što su SDA i HDZ već bile formirane. Istovremeno, rekao sam im da lično dajem prednost stranci koja će delovati na prostoru cele Jugoslavije, te nisam prihvatio da budem ne samo predsednik, nego ni član SDS. Naravno, članstvo SDS-a

nije odobravalo to što sam odbio da vodim njihovu partiju kao i moje opredelenje za Reformiste. Međutim, s obzirom na reputaciju koju sam uživao među rukovodiocima bosanskih Srba na Palama, ja bih rekao da su me oni smatrali kao osobu koja jeste bila u drugoj partiji, ali nije bila protivnik. Ja sebe nisam smatrao ništa manjim Srbinom od njih, ali sam uvažavao činjenicu da su oni ubedljivom pobedom na izborima 1990. obezbedili legitimitet da predstavljaju srpski narod u BiH.

4. Ljudi u SDS-u su govorili da Srbi, koji nisu uz srpsku nacionalnu stranku, nisu dovoljno nacionalno osvešćeni, te da je samo pitanje vremena kada ćemo im se pridružiti, ali to su bile šale koje niko nije uzimao ozbiljno. Mogu da potvrdim da su me nakon osnivanja Skupštine bosanskih Srba, kao i ostavke pojedinih članova Reformističke stranke i njihovog priključivanja Skupštini srpskog naroda u BiH, pripadnici SDS-a smatrali kao nekoga sa kim mogu da saraduju, osim ako se radilo o pitanjima koja bi bila u direktnoj suprotnosti sa programom i ciljevima SRSJ za BiH. Ono što nas je objektivno približavalo jeste obostrano zalaganje za opstanak Jugoslavije i BiH u njoj. Dakle, i dalje sam održavao kontakte sa članovima rukovodstva SDS, koji su bili moje dugogodišnje kolege i poznanici (Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšićeva i dr.), kao što sam često bio u kontaktu sa nekim rukovodiocima SDA i HDZ. Moja prednost bila je u tome što su me svi ti ljudi koji su bili uključeni u novu politiku dobro poznavali, a ja sam nastojao da održim dobre odnose sa svima njima i uvažavao njihove različite nacionalne i političke interese.

5. Zbog kasnijeg uključivanja u Predsjedništvo BiH, Mirko Pejanović i ja smo za mnoge Srbe, posebno u širem članstvu SDS-a postali izdajnici. Ali, smatram da je to delom bilo i posledica propagande za širu upotrebu, a da rukovodstvo SDS-a, čiji su me predstavnici dobro poznavali, nije o meni tako mislilo. Uvek sam pokušavao da uspostavam ravnotežu između svog položaja u Predsedništvu BiH i mog identiteta kao Srbina. Recimo, kada su Lord Karington i Žoze Kutiljero u junu 92. vodili razgovore sa članovima predsjedništva BiH u Sarajevu, ja sam im rekao da nemam legitimitet da predstavljam srpsku stranu i da će morati da odu kod Karadžića na Pale.

SKUPŠTINA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

6. SRSJ za BiH je bila jedina velika multietnička stranka koja je imala ogranke i u drugim delovima SFRJ i zalagala za očuvanje Jugoslavije. SDS se takođe zalagala za

očuvanje Jugoslavije, ali je to bila stranka prvenstveno srpskog naroda i isključivo u BiH. Na višestranačkim izborima 1990. godine SRSJ je osvojila 11 mandata u Skupštini Bosne i Hercegovine. Na tim izborima nisam uspeo da budem izabran u Predsedništvo BiH jer sam prema broju glasova zauzeo treću poziciju, iza Plavšićeve i Koljevića. Pored njih dvoje u Predsedništvo su izabrani i predstavnici SDA Abdić, Izetbegović i Ganić, kao i predstavnici HDZ Stjepan Kljuić i Franjo Boras. Kao predsednik parlamentarne stranke imao sam pravo da prisustvujem i učestvujem na sednicama Skupštine, ali nisam imao pravo glasa. Gospodin Karadžić je imao isti status u Skupštini i ponekad smo po toj osnovi na sednicama sedeli jedan do drugog.

7. Posle izbora 1990. godine, Skupština Bosne i Hercegovine je bila prva višepartijska skupština koja je ikada postojala u Bosni i Hercegovini. To je imalo veliki uticaj na javnost jer su se sednice Parlamenta javno emitovane na televiziji. Generalno govoreći, reakcija javnosti na novu Skupštinu je bila veoma pozitivna. Sastanci u Skupštini su održavani kako na formalan tako i na neformalan način: održavani su redovni zvanični sastanci, ali su se šefovi parlamentarnih stranaka takođe nezvanično sastajali i komunicirali. Na primer, bilo je uobičajeno da pre svake sednice Predsednik Skupštine saziva pripremni sastanak šefova poslaničkih klubova i vođa svih parlamentarnih stranaka. Kao vođa parlamentarne stranke, ja sam službeno redovno pozivan i aktivno sam učestvovao na nekim od tih sastanaka.

8. Povodom sednice Skupštine održane 14. i 15. oktobra 1991. godine, SRS se izjasnio protiv toga da muslimansko-hrvatska koalicija donosi odluke suprotne stavovima srpske strane. Bilo je to u skladu sa našim principijelnim pristupom da se tri vladajuće stranke moraju uzdržavati od preuzimanja jednostranih poteza odnosno da iza svih odluka treba da stoji trojni konsenzus.

MOJ ULAZAK U PREDSEDNIŠTVO BIH

9. Ja sam postao član Predsedništva BiH 1. juna 1992 godine. Ostali članovi Predsedništva su bili Izetbegović, Abdić, Ganić, Kljuić, Boras i Pejanović. Istovremeno, bilo je prihvaćeno da jedan broj istaknutih političkih funkcionera mogu da prisustvuju sednicama Predsedništva, ali bez prava glasa. To su bili premijer Jure Pelivan, načelnik GŠ general Sefer Halilović, potpredsednik Skupštine Mariofil Ljubić, ministar odbrane Jerko Doko, ministar unutrašnjih poslova Alija Delimustafić i drugi. Kasnije, kada je proglašeno ratno stanje, neki od njih su postali punopravni članovi Predsedništva. Jednom prilikom sam pitao Sefera

Halilovića šta je cilj rata koji vodi njegova vojska. Odgovorio mi je da je cilj "oslobađanje svake stope BiH". Potom sam ga upitao od koga namerava da oslobodi Zapadnu Hercegovinu kada tamo žive isključivo Hrvati koji su u hrvatskim oružanim formacijama HVO, ili, po istom principu, od koga namerava da oslobodi krajeve oko Sarajeva gde su uglavnom živeli Srbi i bili uključeni u VRS. Na to je skočio Hrvat Mariofil Ljubić i uzviknuo: "Ukoliko Armija BiH krene da „oslobađa“ njegovu Hercegovinu, on će odmah iz Sarajeva otići kući da se bori protiv te vojske. U takvim situacijama kada bi razgovor krenuo u "krivom pravcu" obično bi reagovao Izetbegović i menjao temu.

10. Moja stranka je postavila tri uslova koji su morali da budu prethodno ispunjeni da bih ja prihvatio da uđem u Predsedništvo. Prvo: svi članovi Predsedništva su morali da dobiju pravo veta. Drugo: članovi Predsedništva koji su bili vođe stranaka morali su se odreći funkcije u stranci. Treće: Predsedništvo je moralo da smeni aktuelnu i formira novu kompetentniju vladu. Posle desetak dana Izetbegović nas je obavestio da je sve prihvaćeno, ali je posle sve izigrao. Predloge na koje sam ja, najčešće uz podršku Pejanovića, najavljiavao veto, Izetbegović je skidao sa dnevnog reda, a onda ih, na sjednicama na kojim nisam bio prisutan, vraćao u proceduru i Predsedništvo bi ih usvajalo. Takav primer je proglašenje ratnog stanja protiv srpske strane.

Dok sam se ja, odmah po ulasku u Predsjedništvo, definitivno povukao sa čela stranke, Izetbegović je samo formalno imenovao politički marginalnog Mirsada Ćemana za svoga privremenog zamenika.

Premijer Jure Pelivan je istina bio podneo ostavku na zahtev Predsedništva i postupak za imenovanje novog premijera je bio pokrenut. Prema pravilima, i novi predsednik Vlade je trebalo da bude Hrvat i ja sam predložio Božidara Matića. Kljujić je, međutim, odbio da prihvati njegovu kandidaturu jer nije bio predložen od strane HDZ-a. Tako je Pelivan ostao premijer u tehničkom mandatu.

RATNO PREDSEDNIŠTVO IZNUTRA

11. Čim sam postao član Predsedništva BiH uočio sam da ne postoji utvrđen program rada. Zato sam predložio da se izradi politička platforma za rad Predsedništva BiH u vanrednim uslovima. Većina je pozdravila moju inicijativu pa je formirana radna grupa koja bi pripremila takav dokument. Jedini je Izetbegović bio vidno uzdržan. Imao sam utisak da je

to zato što bi mu usvajanjem takvog dokumenta bile vezane ruke i ograničen predsjednički uticaj. Njemu je inače odgovaralo nedefinisano, fluidno i konfuzno stanje u kome je mogao slobodno da manevriše, menja odluke, relativizuje zaključke, odustaje od onoga što je ranije rekao i sl. Jednom kasnijom prilikom on je i sam za sebe rekao da u istom danu menja odluke: "Prije podne mi se čini da je bolje ovako, a poslije podne onako". Otuda je Izetbegović već u ranoj fazi bosanske krize (incident sa Zulfikarpašićem i "Beogradskom inicijativom") stekao reputaciju nepouzdanog pregovarača na čiju reč se nije moglo osloniti.

12. Platforma za koju su kao osnova poslužili dokumenti moje stranke (SRSJ za BiH) bazirani na Kutiljerovom planu bila je dobro primljena na Predsedništvu. Izetbegović je stavio samo jednu ali vrlo indikativnu primedbu: "Zašto se nigdje u tekstu ne vidi da su Muslimani najbrojniji narod u BiH?" Odgovorio sam mu da u BiH žive tri konstitutivna naroda, što znači da treba da budu ravnopravni bez obzira na brojno stanje. Odnosno, da bilo kakva prednost Muslimana po toj osnovi ne bi bila prihvatljiva za Srbe i Hrvate. Nije na to dalje reagovao, ali je Ganić, uz njegovu nesumnjivu saglasnost, naknadno i neovlašćeno, dodao u preambuli Platforme da je pripremljena u uslovima "Agresije Srbije, Crne Gore i JNA na BiH" .

13. Dok sam bio član Predsedništva, ovo telo je bilo u nekoj vrsti stanja permanentnog zasedanja. Sastajali smo u jutarnjim satima i radili do ručka. Zatim bi, posle pauze za ručak, nastavili sednicu do kasnih popodnevni ili ranih večernjih sati. Međutim, Predsedništvo je bilo u nekoj vrsti izolacije jer je sva komunikacija sa ostalim delovima Bosne i Hercegovine bila onemogućena za sve članove Predsedništva, osim za Izetbegovića. U više navrata sam ukazivao na potrebu da svi Članovi Predsedništva moraju biti informisani o političkoj situaciji u celoj zemlji, ali bez rezultata. Jedino nas je general Sefer Halilović dnevno informisao o "velikim pobjedama Armije BiH" koje su protivečile medijskim informacijama o "velikim stradanjima muslimanskih civila" kao i stanju na sarajevskom ratištu. To je zvučalo toliko neuverljivo, da ga je i sam Izetbegović jednom upozorio da ne pretjeruje.

SDA

14. Na izborima 1990. godine, Fikret Abdić je dobio najveći broj glasova. Prema izbornom zakonu koji je definisan pre izbora, trebalo je da on dobije položaj prvog predsednika Predsedništva BiH. Uprkos tome, Alija Izetbegović je preuzeo tu funkciju. Pod

kojim uslovima je Abdić na to pristao i zašto su to podržali ostali članovi Predsjedništva nije mi poznato i mogu samo da nagađam.

HDZ

15. U Predsedništvu sam zatekao samo jednog od dva hrvatska člana - Stjepana Kljujića. Drugi, Franjo Boras, nije se pojavio tokom mesec dana koliko sam participirao u tom telu. Boravio je, navodno, u zapadnoj Hercegovini odnosno u Zagrebu zbog slabog zdravlja i odmaklih godina. Hrvate su neformalno zastupali Mariofil Ljubić, v. d. predsjednika skupštine (umesto Krajišnika) i Mile Akmadžić, gensek Predsedništva, obojica na stalnoj vezi sa Matom Bobanoni, de facto prvim čovekom HDZ-a, koji je boravio u zapadnoj Hercegovini i stvarao Herceg-Bosnu. Iako su Ljubić i Akmadžić imali objektivno veći politički uticaj na terenu nego Kljujić, u Predsedništvu je bilo obratno. Mada Hrvat i HDZ-ovac, Kuljić je zbog otvorene naklonjenosti ideji unitarne Bosne i Hercegovine delovao kao peti član SDA i u svemu pružao podršku Izetbegoviću. Cilj rukovodstva HDZ.-a, lociranog u Grudama, bio je, naprotiv, formiranje posebnog i nezavisnog hrvatskog entiteta, koji bi bio povezan sa Hrvatskom. Ova činjenica objašnjava zašto je Kljujić najpre smenjen sa čela HDZ-a. a kasnije, dogovorom Izetbegovića i Bobana, uklonjen i iz Predsedništva. Zamenio ga je Miro Lasić, posle rata ambasador Hrvatske u Makedoniji.

SASTANAK U HOTELU "TERME"

16. U aprilu 1992. godine Mirko Pejanović i ja smo inicirali sastanak sa Momčilom Krajišnikom, koji je dogovoren u hotelu "Terme" na Ilidži. Razgovoru se priključio i Radovan Karadžić. Povod za sastanak bili su sukobi oko grada o kojima smo hteli da se informišemo sa druge strane već naznačene linije podele Sarajeva. Već u to vreme stanovništvo je počelo da se deli i da odlazi na teritoriju gde je bilo većinsko stanovništvo svoje nacije. Naš cilj je bio da se preduzmu konkretne akcije za zaustavljanje sukoba u gradu. Diskusija se, međutim, uglavnom fokusirala na unutrašnju transformaciju Bosne i Hercegovine, na plan koji je predložio Kutljero i koji se i nama činio prihvatljiv. Međutim, nismo došli do konkretnih rezultata, niti smo dobili značajnije informacije. Dobio sam utisak da je srpska strana u to vreme iskreno želela da pronade političko rešenje za situaciju, ali da nije mogla da nađe

zajednički jezik sa partnerima u vlasti. Sastanak je trajao oko sat i po, a Karadžić je morao ranije da nas napusti zbog zakazane konferencije za medije.

SASTANAK IZETBEGOVIĆ - KRAJIŠNIK

17. Ja sam u maju 1992. inicirao i organizovao sastanak Krajišnika i Izetbegovića, te po njihovoj želji, bio i jedini svedok razgovora. Radi diskrecije i iz bezbednosnih razloga, sastali smo se u ponoć u Krajišnikovom kabinetu u zgradi Skupštine BiH. Cilj sastanka je opet bio da se zaustave sukobi u Sarajevu i razgovor je bio fokusiran na područje grada. Krajišnik je predložio privremenu podelu teritorija u skladu sa faktičkim stanjem. Nakon toga bi usledili dalji politički pregovori koji bi konačno rešili sva sporna pitanja. On je objasnio da privremena podela nije njegova želja, nego rezultat pritiska srpskog naroda zbog žrtava koje su padale na obe strane.

18. Krajišnik je sugerisao da se grad privremeno podeli prema postojećem teritorijalno etničkom rasporedu i liniji uspostavljenog fronta, tako da prigradska naselja kontrolišu Srbi, a centar grada Muslimanima. Izetbegović je prihvatio predlog, a zatim su zatražili od mene da pomognem tako što ću tu ideju što pre razraditi i ponuditi nekoliko konkretnih modela realizacije. Obećao samo da ću im već ujutro dostaviti traženi materijal kako bi imali vremena da izvrše konsultacije sa saradnicima i pripreme se za novi sastanak već sutradan uveče. Tokom noći sam formulisao četiri varijante privremene podele Sarajeva i ujutro jedan primjerk poslao telefaksom na Pale, a dugi predao Aliji Izetbegoviću.

19. I Krajišnik i Izetbegović su mi javili da im je najprihvatljiviji model koji je podrazumevao da centar grada u kome su bile locirane zajedničke institucije BiH postane distrikt, a da se periferija i prigradska naselja sa dominacijom stanovništva jedne od tri etničke grupe priključe odgovarajućim nacionalnim entitetima u pozadini. U ime Predsedništva Srpske republike BiH to mi je telefonom potvrdio Nikola Koljević, a u ime Predsedništva BiH Izetbegović u direktnom razgovoru koji smo obavili u njegovom kabinetu. Trebalo je da se svi zajedno ponovo sastanemo u isto vreme i na istom mestu. Međutim, prilikom naknadne telefonske komunikacije između Izetbegovića, Krajišnika i mene,

Krajišnik se požalio da je na njega pucano dok se sa sastanka u Sarajevu vraćao na Pale. Zbog toga je predložio da sledeći sastanak bude na srpskoj teritoriji. Međutim, koliko ja znam, do ponovnog sastanka između Izetbegovića i Krajišnika povodom ovog plana više nije došlo.

SASTANAK U LUKAVICI

20. Krajem maja 1992, na moju i inicijativu Mirka Pejanovića u Lukavici je održan naš sastanak sa Momčilom Krajišnikom. Tema je bila naše uključivanje u Predsedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, nakon što su to telo napustili Plavšićeva i Koljević. Iako smo kandidovani za Predsedništvo kao lideri multietničkih stranaka (reformisti, socijalisti), bili smo na istoj srpskoj listi na kojoj su bili i kandidati SDS. Smatrali smo da je naša dužnost da predstavljamo srpsko stanovništvo na teritoriji pod vlašću SDA-HDZ, te kontrolom ABiH. Zbog toga smo ocenili da je potrebno da konsultujemo srpsko rukovodstvo na Palama. Tokom sastanka Krajišnik nam je rekao da nema ovlašćenje da nam odobri ili ospori uključivanje u Predsedništvo, ali da će sve preneti nadležnim organima koji o tome donose odluke. Ja sam mu na kraju razgovora rekao da mislim da je najbolje rešenje da Plavšićeva i Koljević povuku svoje ostavke i da kao deo najvišeg kolektivnog rukovodstva BiH zadrže legitimitet da predstavljaju njen srpski deo. Pomenuo sam mu Franju Borasa kao primer da Članovi Predsedništva ne moraju da sede u centru Sarajeva i da to može da bude i na Palama ili u bilo kom delu BiH.

SASTANCI NA PALAMA

21. Šestog jula 1992. krenuo sam na put na Pale odnosno u Beograd. O nameri da idem i razgovaram sa rukovodstvom RS i novim rukovodstvom Srbije (Ćosić i Panić) načelno sam obavestio Predsedništvo, a o konkretnom terminu polaska Abdića i Izetbegovića. Moj transport do kasarne u Lukavici, gdje me je dočekaio Koljević, organizovao je UNPROFOR, a pratio me je general Luis Mekenzi. Tokom dvodnevnog boravka na Palama, najprije sam, odmah po dolasku, uz zajedničku večeru razgovarao sa Karadžićem, Krajišnikom, Plavšićevom i Koljevićem. Tokom sutrašnjeg dana imao sam odvojene sastanke sa svakim od njih, izuzev sa Plavšićevom. Tokom pomenutih razgovora obavestio sam srpsko rukovodstvo

o problemima vezanim za bezbednosnu situaciju u gradu, a posebno ih informisao o dramatičnoj situaciji u kojoj se nalaze Srbi u Sarajevu.

SASTANCI U BEOGRADU

22. Trećeg dana ujutro (8. juli), zajedno sa Koljevićem, odletio sam u Beograd. U Beogradu sam se susreo sa predsednikom Čosićem koji je bio vidno deprimiran mojim izlaganjem o situaciji u Sarajevu i BiH. Nasuprot njemu, premijer Panić je, čini mi se, potcenjivao složenost i težinu sveukupne situacije i preterano optimistički i pojednostavljeno gledao na probleme. Tokom nekoliko kasnijih susreta sa Panićem, primetio sam da je njegov optimizam da se sve može rešiti brzo i lako, naglo opadao u meri u kojoj je više ulazio u prekodrinsku problematiku. Tokom naših susreta, Panić je konkretno predložio da se otvori jedan "plavi put" iz Srbije preko Drine za efikasniji dotur međunarodne humanitarne pomoći za BiH.

23. U Beogradu me je primio i patrijarh Pavle, a našem razgovoru se kasnije priključio i vladika dabrobosanski Nikolaj. Njih sam obavestio da je Saborna crkva postala jedino mesto slobodnog okupljanja, kako verujućih tako i neverujućih sarajevskih Srba i pomenuo da je u gradu ostao samo jedan pravoslavni sveštenik i da bi bilo dobro da mu pošalju pojačanje. O svim ovim razgovorima telefaksom sam ukratko obavestio Predsedništvo BiH i dao saopštenja agenciji Tanjug. Nakon što sam obavio planirane razgovore otišao sam na Vojno-medicinsku akademiju na pregled povrede zadobijene u saobraćajnom udesu u ratnom Sarajevu i zadržan sam na jednomesečnom lečenju.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ NA ČELU PREDSEDNIŠTVA

24. U proletnjim mesecima 1992. otvoreno je pitanje statusa JNA u BiH. U traženju rešenja koje bi omogućilo da JNA ostane u Bosni i Hercegovini kao faktor reda i mira nasuprot raznoraznim paravojnim formacijama koje su se ilegalno naoružavale, ja sam zatražio sastanak sa predsednikom Jugoslavije Brankom Kostićem i ministrom odbrane generalom Adžićem. Sastanak je ugovorio general Kukanjac a putovali smo malim avionom "Energoinvesta" - generalni direktor Božidar Matić i ja, a ja sam u Beograd poveo i moja dva partijska saradnika - Muslimana Tokića i Hrvata Pejakovića. Izetbegović je podržao ovu

inicijativu pa smo čak usaglasili predlog teksta koji bi mogli ponuditi Glavnom štabu JNA u Beogradu.

25. Prema predlogu, trebalo je omogućiti pet godina prelaznog perioda tokom kojeg je JNA trebalo da ostane na teritoriji Bosne i Hercegovine i da garantuje mir i bezbednost u cilju sprečavanja međuetničkih sukoba. Po isteku pet godina pripadnici JNA bi imali pravo da biraju da li da postanu deo Armije BiH ili da se povuku i postanu deo vojske u svojim domovinama. Tokom boravka u Beogradu, mi smo na tri odvojena i neformalna sastanka o predlogu upoznali predsednika Branka Kostića i ministra Adžića. A na izričitu molbu Izetbegovića, susreli smo se i sa predsednikom Slobodanom Miloševićem. Sva tri sagovornika su podržala ovaj predlog. Sporazum je finalizovan u Ohridu u Makedoniji, a na tom sastanku su prisustvovali Izetbegović, Kostić, Adžić i domaćin Kiro Gligorov. Međutim, kada je posle svega toga Izetbegović ovaj sporazum ponudio Predsedništvu BiH na usvajanje, ovaj kolektivni organ ga je neočekivano odbio, tobože na insistiranje Ejuba Ganića.

26. Jednom prilikom sam bio u kancelariji gospodina Izetbegovića, kada je njegova ćerka, koja je u isto vreme bila i njegova sekretarica i šef kabineta, ušla u sobu i rekla ocu da ima hitan telefonski poziv iz Istočne Bosne. Ne mogu da kažem preciznije odakle. Međutim, shvatio sam da je poziv bio važan i čuo sam paničan glas sa druge strane žice. Poslije nekoliko rečenica Izetbegović je dmgoj osobi na telefonu povišenim tonom rekao: "Ja sam vam govorio da borba za državu zahteva žrtve". I zatim nervozno lupio slušalicu.

27. Tokom perioda mog angažovanja u Predsedništvo BiH u junu 1992 godine, Izetbegović je izrazio nameru da proglasi rat. Pejanović i ja smo imali ozbiljne rezerve po tom pitanju i najavili veto na tu odluku jer bi taj rat praktično bio rat Muslimana i značio bi raspad multietničkog društva. Izetbegović je najprije reagovao skidanjem sa dnevnog reda tog predloga koji je formalno bio došao od generala Halilovića. Zatim je kasno noću sazvaio novu sednicu Predsjedništva, a da o tome nije obavestio ni Pejanovića ni mene. Posle se pravdao je stvar bila hitna, da služba nije mogla da sa nama uspostavi kontakt zbog zamračenja i pucnjave po gradu. Naravno, bilo je to naivno objašnjenje. Komunikacije u gradu su bile i inače krajnje otežane, ali kontakt sa članovima Predsedništva se uvek mogao uspostaviti, a povodom odluke o proglašenju ratnog stanja je i morao biti uspostavljen. Sednica se završila jednoglasnom odlukom nasuprot stavu srpskih članova Predsedništva.

28. Prema zapisniku sednice Predsedništva BiH održane 20. juna 1992. godine izetbegović je izjavio da zemlja ne sme da prihvati pritisak za stvaranje ernički čistih teritorija. Međutim, sećam se velikog promotivnog skupa SDA u Kladuši, kada se Izetbegović, kao partijski lider obratio okupljenima sa retoričkim pitanjem "Da li muslimansko stanovništvo zaista hoće BiH kao islamsku državu, kako se često prigovara?". Prisutna masa od stotinjak hiljada ljudi u jedan glas je odgovorila skandiranjem: "Hoćemo! Hoćemo!" Izetbegović je reagovao rečima da je još uvek rano za to i da će "Muslimani uzeti onoliki komad BiH koliki mogu uspješno da kontrolišu". No, kao što smo to i ranije pokazali, bio je to još jedan primjer Izetbegovićeve sklonosti da često menja svoje stavove po raznim pitanjima. I to je preblaga formulacija jer sam se tokom juna 1992. uverio da radi iza leđa Predsjedništva i da obmanjuje članove ovog kolektivnog organa.

29. U dnevnom listu "Oslobođenje" jedno jutro sam pročitao kratku vest da je dan ranije Izetbegović potpisao vojni savez sa Predsednikom republike Hrvatske Tuđmanom. Na prepodnevnoj sednici sam odmah postavio pitanje kako je moguće da ta tema nije prethodno bila razmatrana na Predsjedništvu. Izetbegović je odgovorio da je to novinarska izmišljotina, a kada sam na to zatražio da promptno reagujemo demantijem, zamolio me je da to ostavimo za kraj dnevnog reda. Ubrzo je dao pauzu i pozvao me u kabinet na kafu. Objasnio mi je da je "taj savez potpisao kao stranački lider u ime SDA, a ne kao predsednik Predsedništva BiH". Zatražio sam da vidim taj akt i naglas utvrdio da su i on i Tuđman potpisani kao državnici. "Pogriješili su ovi u administraciji" odgovorio je. A kada sam ga upozorio da vojne saveze i ne potpisuju stranke nego države, odgovorio je "Možda sam i pogriješio, ali šta sada da radimo". U nastavku sednice Predsedništva ponovo sam otvorio pitanje, ali Muslimani zbog Alije, a Hrvati zbog Franje, nisu bili raspoloženi za raspravu.

30. Jednog dana na dnevni red su došla imenovanja vojnih komandanata i diplomatskih predstavnika. Odmah sam primetio da na listama među dvadesetak imena nema baš nijednog srpskog. Kada sam na to skrenuo pažnju Abdiću i Ganiću, koji su sjedili pored mene, samo su slegli ramenima. Kada je sednica počela, otvorio sam to pitanje. Pošto mi je general Halilović iskreno, ali politički neoprezno, odgovorio da muslimanski borci ne prihvataju da im komanduje Srbin, reagovao je Izetbegović. Opet u svom već opisanom maniru naivnog obmanjivanja, dogovorio mi je da su "na nekim ranije usvojenim vojnim i diplomatskim listama dominirali Srbi". Pošto sam insistirao da vidim te liste, Izetbegović je poslao svog

savetnika Kemala da ih donese. Kemal se tog dana više nije vratio u salu, a sutradan se, na moju prozivku, izvinio što jos uvek nije uspeo da ih nađe.

31. Jednom prilikom postavio sam pitanje zašto se poginuli borci ABiH, bar prema smrtovnicama objavljenim u Oslobođenju sahranjuju kao "šehidi". "Koliko znam", rekao sam, "šehidi su borci poginuli za islam i u slavu Alahu, a ne borci koji su pali u odbrani domovine, pa ispada da je ovo džihad odnosno verski a ne otadžbinski rat". Jako iznerviran i uzbuđen, Izetbegović je odgovorio da je činjenica da se upravo muslimanski vernici najviše bore i stradaju u borbi za Bosnu i da je prirodno da se tako i sahranjuju.

MOMČILO KRAJIŠNIK

32. O Momčilu Krajišniku sam uvek dobijao veoma pozitivna mišljenja i informacije od mojih hrvatskih i muslimanskih poznanika iz "Energoinvesta" u smislu njegove profesionalnosti i principijelnosti, a posebno su isticali njegovo uvažavanje drugih nacija, vera i običaja. Kao finansijski direktor jednog pogona u Energoinvestu, kažu, nije propuštao da Muslimanima i Hrvatima čestita njihove praznike i da im ponudi neradne dane. Kao predsedavajući Skupštine BiH Krajišnik je davao na značaju Skupštini i usmeravao je rad Skupštine na vrlo korektan način i nikada nije ograničavao bilo kakvu raspravu. Pošto su sednice zbog toga često neubičajeno dugo trajale, ljudi su se šalili: "Dok Krajišnik predsedava Skupštini ne može biti rata jer on političarima ne da da izađu iz zgrade".

33. Ako bi pripadnici SDA, HDZ i drugih stranaka birali svoga najomiljenijeg pregovarača na srpskoj strani onda bi to bez konkurencije bio Momčilo Krajišnik. On je često isticao da je vaspitavan tako da pokazuje poštovanje prema svojim inovertim susedima. Uvek smiren i strpljiv ispoljavao je veliku energiju da pregovorima izgradi ili održi mostove između svih strana. Mogu da potvrdim da u periodu od januara do marta 1992. godine Krajišnik nije preduzeo nikakvu akciju koja je imala za cilj provociranje ili doprinos izbijanju rata.

RADOVAN KARADIĆ I SRPSKO RUKOVODSTVO

34. Karadžić je bio vodeća ličnosti u SDS-u u vreme kada je formirana Skupština BiH, uprkos tome što nije bio na zvaničnoj državnoj funkciji. Pouzdano znam da nije sebe video

kao vođu niti je to želeo da bude jer je meni vrlo uporno nudio da budem predsednik SDS-a. A kada je vidio da ni on sam, kao ni Koljević, Buha i drugi ne mogu da me ubede, pokušavao je to da uradi preko moga starijeg brata Dušana, koji je bio Karadžićev kolega na Psihijatrijskog klinici u Sarajevu. Koliko mi je poznato sa istom ponudom išao je i kod Milorada Ekmečića, Svetozara Koljevića i još nekih uglednih srpskih intelektualaca. Pošto je vešto i uspešno radio na pripremi formiranja SDS, u jednom momentu su se svi složili da je prirodno da upravo on bude taj koji će i formalno preuzeti vođstvo.

35. Kada je formirano Predsedništvo Republike Srpske na Palama dr. Karadžić je bio predsednik Predsedništva, dok su gospodin Koljević i gospođa Plavšić bili potpredsednici. Iz više susreta sa tim ljudima stekao sam utisak da je rukovodstvo na Palama bilo veoma zabrinuto zbog događaja u Sarajevu i da im je u drugom planu bilo sve ono što se dešavalo u ostalim delovima BiH Smatram da smo Pejanović i ja, s jedne strane, i Krajišnik i Karadžić, sa druge strane, delili isti stav po pitanju potrebe da se za sukobe u BiH pronade rešenje u političkim pregovorima i da se rat po svaku cenu mora izbeći odnosno zaustaviti. Ali delili smo, čini mi se, i osećanje nemoći da se nešto učini.

SAVET ZA NACIONALNU RAVNOPRAVNOST

36. Koncept Saveta za nacionalnu ravnopravnost bio je razvijen još pre izbora koji su održani 1990. godine. To telo je trebalo da bude svojevrsan supstitut za veće naroda koje je neizostavan element parlamenarne strukture u višenacionalnoj zajednici. Savet je bio mehanizam da se zaštiti vitalni nacionalni interes svakog od tri konstitutivna naroda. Ukoliko bi jedna od strana u tripartitnoj koaliciji na vlasti, tokom sednica Skupštine BiH uočila da neka tačka u dnevnom redu može da ugrozi njene nacionalne interese, bilo je dovoljno da reaguje potpisima 20 poslanika pa da se sporno pitanje ukloni sa dnevnog reda. U skladu sa daljom procedurom, sporna tačka dnevnog reda bi zatim bila upućena komisiji, sastavljenoj od jednakog broja predstavnika sve tri nacionalne stranke od kojih je svaka imala pravo veta. Ukoliko bi bilo koja strana stavila veto na sporno pitanje, onda se ta tačka više ne bi vratila na dnevni red Skupštine. Savet je stvoren u cilju očuvanja ravnopravnosti prava svih etničkih grupa i funkcionisao je u praksi u periodu između višestranačkih izbora i početka rata. Narušavanje tog mehanizma od strane poslanika SDA-HDZ one kobne skupštinske noći označilo je početak rata.

RAT U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

37. Rat je praktično postao neizbežan kada je Skupština Bosne i Hercegovine prvi put pogazila princip jednakosti na štetu srpskog naroda. Glasanje za održavanje referenduma o nezavisnosti protiv volje srpskih predstavnika u Skupštini BiH je bio presudan korak koji je na kraju doveo do rata. Drugim rečima, smatram da je to preglasavanje srpskih poslanika u Skupštini BiH bilo jedan od osnovnih uzroka rata. To je presudno osnažilo ideju o transformaciji BiH na tri etnička entiteta (srpski, muslimanski i hrvatski entitet), kao kompromis i kao najbolje moguće rešenje koje bi zadovoljilo sve strane u sukobu.

38. Između kraja 1991. godine pa do kraja marta 1992, situacija u celoj zemlji, a posebno u Sarajevu, bila je vrlo napeta uz konstantno širenje nasilja. U gradu Sarajevu, napadi su uglavnom počinjeni nad srpskim stanovništvom i posebno protiv porodica oficira JNA. U njihove stanove su upadali, pretresali, pljačkali i maltretirani ukućane. Jedan od događaja koji vredi napomenuti je bila okupacija kasarne JNA "Maršal Tito" i Doma armije u centru Sarajeva. To je bilo šokantno u svetlu činjenice da je vojska neposredno pre toga nepristrasno intervenisala u sukobima između tri strane. Iako je JNA, nakon povlačenja Muslimana i Hrvata iz njenih redova, bila uglavnom popunjena srpskim oficirima, vojska je intervenisala protiv barikada koje su u gradu postavili Srbi. Mislim na barikade koje su Srbi podigli kao reakciju na ubistvo srpskog svata na Baščaršiji ispred Stare Pravoslavne crkve.

39. Događaj koji je takođe dobro ilustrovao atmosferu nereda i nasilja u Sarajevu bilo je razbijanje izloga, obijanje radnji i pljačkanje robe, uz pucnjavu i lom stakala. Sve se dogodilo u nekoliko kasnih noćnih sati. Sve trgovine u centru grada osvanule su ispražnjene i demolirane. Bio je to obračun između paravojnih kriminalnih grupa koje su se otimale za kontrolu nad pojedinim kvartovima. Te bande obučene u uniforme zelenih beretki i patriotske lige sa vojnim i policijskim činovima Armije BiH preuzimale su kontrolu u glavnom gradu, uz podršku vlasti. Njihov motiv nije bio primarno etnički, ali je srpska imovina bila njihova legitimna meta jer su svi Srbi bili osumnjičeni kao peta kolona i bili najmanje zaštićena grupacija u gradu.

40. Svi ovi događaji su se desili pošto je srpsko rukovodstvo već bilo izašlo iz Sarajeva na Pale, a medijski su predstavljani kao mobilizacija protiv "srbočetnika" i "jugoarmade". Neki od poznatih predratnih kriminalaca, a sada paravojnih komandanata i zločinaca pod okriljem

ABiH, bili su slavljani kao heroji odbrane grada. U početku je to, recimo, bio Jusuf Prazina - Juka, kasnije Mušan Topalović - Caco. Ono što je najgore i ova dva kasnije likvidirana zločinca, kao i mnogi drugi pod nadimcima Ćelo, Kruško, Puška, Dedo itd. su bili deo regularne ABiH, najčešće kao komandati specijalnih jedinica vojske i policije. Postoji fotodokumentacija da ih je Izetbegović primao i odavao im priznanja.

41. Zbog opisanih događaja koji su se odigrali u Sarajevu u proleće 1992 godine, moja porodica je, kao i mnoge srpske i nesrpske porodice, poslala decu kod rođaka u Beograd. Situacija se iz dana u dan pogoršavala i nasilje je sve više dobijalo etničko obeležje. Srbi nisu mogli da napuste grad, iako je većina njih to želela. Grad je bilo moguće napustiti samo putem plaćanja mita ili ustupanja stanova muslimanskim paravojnim ili policijskim snagama. Ljudi su plaćali velike sume novca u stranoj valuti samo da bi napustili grad. Oni koji su pokušali da probiju unutrašnji обруč oko Sarajeva i napuste grad bez takve vrste "pomoći" izgubili su život na liniji sukoba ili su uhvaćeni, uhapšeni i kažnjeni kao dezerteri. Bila je proglašena mobilizacija i svaki pokušaj da se Sarajevo napusti tretiran je kao veleizdaja.

42. U ovom periodu srpska strana je pokrenula inicijativu da se omogući građanima Sarajeva koji to žele da napuste grad. Karadžić je uživo, preko radija, pozvao vlasti u Sarajevu da odobre građanima koji su to želeli da napuste grad. Srpska strana im je bez obzira na etničku pripadnost garantovala siguran prolaz preko teritorije pod vlastitom kontrolom. Prelazak sa srpske teritorije na muslimansku i obrnuto, nije bio problem samo u prvim danima sukoba, međutim, situacija se vremenom rapidno pogoršala do te mere da je već tokom maja meseca 1992. a pogotovo kasnije postalo gotovo nemoguće izaći iz Sarajeva.

43. Što se tiče nasilja u drugim delovima Bosne i Hercegovine, imao sam samo posredna saznanja, uglavnom putem medija. Sarajevske vesti bile su ratna propaganda: nevine su bile samo muslimanske žrtve, a zločine je činila samo srpska vojska. Viteški se borila navodno samo ABiH i pucala je samo na neprijateljske vojnike, dok je srpska navodno ubijala isključivo civile itd. Tako da sam mogao samo da nagađam šta se zapravo dešava izvan Sarajeva.

PRITVORI

44. Počelo je sa smenom svih srpskih rukovodećih kadrova u gradu, pa već prvih meseci 1992. više nije bilo nijednog među direktorima preduzeća, šefovima klinika, dekanima fakulteta, načelnicima opštinskih službi itd. Oni koji nisu bili smenjeni, okrazeni nepoverenjem i neposlušnošću zaposlenih, sami su podnosili ostavke. One najupornije, kao što su, recimo, bili direktori "Žitoprometa", stizale su optužbe za kolaboraciju sa "srbočetnicima". Ali to je još bio samo početak.

45. Pejanović i ja smo u više navrata na sednicama Predsedništva pokretali problem privatnih zatvora u gradu Sarajevu u koje su bez ikakvog osnova zatvarani i maltretirani gotovo isključivo srpski civili pod lažnim optužbama da su sakrivali oružje ili davali svetlosne signale srpskoj artiljeriji. Na osnovu informacija koje smo dobijali od ljudi koji su nam se svakodnevno obraćali za pomoć, mi smo iznosili konkretne žalbe srpskih građana u vezi odvođenja, deložiranja, pljačkanja, zlostavljanja i zatvaranja. Na našu inicijativu formirana je i odgovarajuća mešovita komisija sastavljena od Srba - članova predsedništva i vlade u koju je ušao Pejanović, a na čelu bio potpredsjednik Vlade Miodrag Simović, pravnik sa policijskim iskustvom.

46. Mada su moj resor u Predsedništvu bili spoljni poslovi mogu lično da posvedočim postojanje privatnog zatvora u podrumu hotela "Zagreb" na Marindvoru. Tragajući za nestalim lekarom Trifkom Guzinom i profesorom Slavkom Leovcem i njegovom suprugom Ankicom na alarm njihovih srodnika, pronašao sam ih nekoliko dana zatočene samo zato što su bili članovi političkog saveta Srpske demokratske stranke. Na sličan način otkrio sam da takav zatvor postoji i u podrumu Hotela "Evropa" kada je bio privođen i pritvaran sveštenik Drago Ubiparipović, njegov crkvenjak i veći broj pravoslavnih vernika po izlasku sa molitve iz Saborne crkve. Zvanični policijski organi (uključiv ministra Delimustafića) o tome nisu imali podatke i nisu mogli da pomognu oko oslobađanja ovih osoba. Simptomatično je da je u takvim slučajevima intervencija kod Izetbegovića bila vrlo delotvorna.

47. Kada sam imenovan u Predsedništvo BiH, razmena zarobljenika između različitih etničkih grupa je bila u toku. Spiskovi zatvorenika za razmenu su postojale na obe strane i tim poslovima se po našoj međusobnoj podeli bavio Pejanović. Po njegovim informacijama i

mome sećanju, ukupan broj ljudi koji je bio razmenjivan na mesečnoj osnovi dostizao je i do 250 - 300 lica.

48. U to vreme, u Sarajevu je vladala haotična situacija. Grad je bio podeljen na zone koje su kontrolisale razne paravojne formacije, koje su bile na vezi sa vlastima i pod njihovom kontrolom. Te nasilničke grupe, koje su ponekad delovale kao vojne jedinice, a ponekad kao policija, držale su de fakto gradski teritorij pod kontrolom. Imali su i svoje zatvore kojim se nikada nije znalo ni mesto ni broj, niti su zvanično postojali. I pored više intervencija na Predsedništvu, nikada nismo dobili konkretno podatke o tim zatvorima koji su praktično bili namjenjeni isključivo za Srbe.

49. Ovaj problem je spominjan tokom sednica Predsedništva, iako nikada nismo dobili nikakvu specifičnu ili detaljniju informacije o tome. Ostale informacije su se ticale primera da su mnogi civili izgubili život zbog borbi koja se vodila u i oko Sarajeva a iznošeno je da je muslimanski narod taj koji pre svega pati. Navođeno je da su njihove kuće spaljivane i da su mnogi od njih ubijeni, međutim nisu nam iznošene konkretne informacije o takvim tvrdnjama. Pored toga, mediji u Sarajevu su bili jednostrani i nisu bili objektivni u svojoj proceni.

ARTILJERIJSKA VATRA

50. Prilikom sastanaka sa vodećim predstavnicima srpskog rukovodstva tokom leta 1992. godine nekoliko puta sam otvarao pitanje granatiranja Sarajeva od koga jednako stradaju Srbi kao i ostala dva naroda. A kao odgovor sam dobijao da muslimanska artiljerija iz Sarajeva otvara vatru na srpske položaje oko grada. Rečeno mi je da je muslimanska artiljerija locirana na najgušće naseljenim mestima u gradu i da je srpska artiljerija primorana da odgovori na vatru prema lokacijama odakle dolazi.

51. Artiljerijske baterije ABiH su zaista bile raspoređene po najužem centru grada a da su to istovremeno bila mesta na koje bi bila otvarana vatra sa srpske strane uverio sam se tokom privremenog boravka u stambenom naselju Ciglane. Na oba kraja tog naselja bile su locirane artiljerijske baterije koje su uglavnom delovale noću. Jedna je bila smeštena u tesnom prostora između komande 1. korpusa ABiH i stambenog kompleksa, a druga na obližnjem nadvožnjaku, postavljena na samohodku koja se posle dejstvovanja sakrivala u tunel. Srpska

uzvatrna vatra nije uvek bila precizna i nije bilo garancija da direktni pogodak ili geler neće pasti u blizini mesta gde su se naižali civili. Otuda je moj, i ne samo moj, utisak bio da je granatiranje bilo nasumično odnosno neselektivno. Tokom najčešće noćnog uzajamnog delovanja artiljerije, mi civili nismo mogli da razlikujemo silazne i uzlazne detonacije tako da nam se činilo da su sve silazne. To se uklapalo u sarajevsku medijsku sliku rata u kome samo jedna strana granatira, a druga strana samo strada. Muslimanske komšije osetljivijeg uha i boljeg poznavanja oružja, ponekad su tiho gundale: "Naši ih provociraju a onda mi dobijemo po glavi?!".

52. General Mekenzi je bio prvi međunarodni zvaničnik koji je upozorio da muslimanski snajperisti pucaju na civile u centru Sarajeva kako bi krivicu svalili na srpsku stranu. Nisam čitao Mekenzijevu knjigu i ne znam kakve je dokaze iznio, ali znam da su mnogi nezavisni eksperti tvrdili da granate koje su prouzrokovale brojne žrtve u gradu nisu mogle doći sa srpskih položaja. Činjenica je, takođe, da muslimanska strana nije odgovorila kontraekspertizama, nego provalama mržnje protiv generala Mekenzija, koje ni do danas ne jenjavaju u muslimanskim krugovima ne samo u Sarajevu, nego i u svetu, pa i u samoj Kanadi.

53. U vreme dok sam živeo u Sarajevu, bio sam u poziciji da procenim samo rezultate i posledice granata ispaljenih sa srpske strane, ali ne i posledice granata ispaljenih od strane ABiH u Sarajevu, što me je navelo na zaključak da je srpska artiljerija bila superiorna u odnosu na artiljeriju ABiH. U svakom slučaju, nivo oštećenja od strane muslimanske artiljerije u srpskom delu Sarajeva je nešto što ja nisam mogao proceniti dok sam bio u centru grada. Prve posleratne fotografije porušene Grbavice i drugih naselja na srpskoj strani grada relativizovale su moj raniji utisak.

KUTILJEROV PLAN

54. Prisustvovao sam nekim od sastanaka u Sarajevu kojima je predsedavao Kutiljero i ja sam, kao i moja stranka, podržavao sporazume koji su posle tih sastanaka bili postignuti. Nikada nisam stekao saznanje da rukovodstvo SDS nije istinski bilo posvećeno sprovođenju Kutiljerovog plana. Dobro je poznata činjenica da su sve tri strane prihvatile Kutiljerov plan, ali da je na kraju samo muslimanska strana od njega odustala. Ja lično verujem da je Izetbegović podržavao plan, ali je od njega odustao pod američkim uticajem, odnosno posle

razgovora sa ambasadorom Cimermanom. Znam da je računao na intervenciju NATO još u leto 1992. Na sednicama Predsedništva tokom meseca juna 1992. u dva navrata je bio sasvim precizan: "Najkasnije do polovine avgusta!". Verovatno da su takav pristup podržavali radikali unutar SDA, koji su, umesto međunacionalnog kompromisa i kantonizacije hteli celu Bosnu samo za muslimane.

55. Predočeno mi je da je dr. Karadžić 18. marta 1992. u Skupštini bosanskih Srba izjavio da je Kutiljerov plan prihvaćen kao osnova za dalje pregovore i da dokument nije potpisan. Slažem se da Kutiljerov plan nije bio konačan dokument, već nacrt sporazuma. Međutim, činjenica je da je srpska strana prihvatila osnovne principe tog plana koji bi činili osnov za nastavak pregovora. Verujem da Kutiljerov plan nije doživljavao od srpske strane kao neko idealno rešenje jer je želja srpskog stanovništva bila da BiH ostane u Jugoslaviji. Takođe verujem da je bilo moguće teritorijalno-etnički transformisati Bosnu i Hercegovinu bez radikalne i prisilne promene zatečene nacionalne strukture. Zašto bi svako pomeranje stanovništva bilo kvalifikovano kao etničko čišćenje? Sarajevo su posle rata, odnosno u mira, masovno napustili Srbi i Hrvati, te je grad tek u godinama posle 1995. postao uglavnom muslimanski. Kako bismo taj proces nazvali? Etničko čišćenje? Humano preseljenje? Mirnodopsko preseljenje? Ili nekako drugačije? Metafora o šari leopradove kože koja, navodno, verno odslikava intenzivnu etničku izmešanost u Bosni predstavlja u velikoj meri konstrukciju. I pre rata u BiH su postojale bezmalo jednonacionalne zone poput Cazinske krajine i zapadne Hercegovine. Bosna je pretežno ruralna zemlja, a sela u Bosni su uvek bila muslimanska, srpska ili hrvatska, a ne multietnička.

MEDIJI

56. Radio vesti su uglavnom dolazile sa dve strane: Radio Sarajevo pod muslimanskom kontrolom (u tom trenutku verovatno se zvalo radio BiH) i Radio SRNA pod srpskom kontrolom. Za Radio Sarajevo mogu da potvrdim da se program uglavnom svodio na ratnu propagandu. Na srpskoj strani, program je bio manje ili više isti, ali naravno sa suprotnim predznakom. Zato su informacije o događajima u Sarajevu bile veoma kontraverzne i nepouzdana te podložne svakojakim interpretacijama publike. Dok sam još bio u Sarajevu, na dugim ili srednjim radio talasima bilo je moguće uhvatiti BBC i druge velike svetske medije. Njihove informacije i interpretacije bile su manje-više iste kao i u izveštajima muslimanskih medija. To je dosta uticalo na moje prijatelje Muslimane i Hrvate koji su u početku imali

ekvidistancu prema sve tri nacionalne stranke. Kasnije su postali negativno pristrasni prema SDS, RS i Srbima.

POTVRDA SVEDOKA

Pročitao sam ovu izjavu od _____ strana i ona sadrži sve što sam rekao, po svom znanju i sećanju. Izjavu sam dao dobrovoljno i svestan sam da se može upotrebiti u sudskom postupku pred Međunarodnim sudom za krivično gonjenje osoba odgovornih za teška kršenja međunarodnog prava počinjena na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije od 1991, kao i da mogu biti pozvan da javno svedočim pred Sudom.

Potpis: _____

Datum: _____

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No. IT-09-92-T

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC

ANNEX B

KECMANOVIC Nenad GRM122			
Witness Statement to be admitted pursuant Rule 92ter			
Statement	Date	65ter Number	Closed Session/Under seal
Witness Statement of KECMANOVIC Nenad	25 Feb 2014	RM 65ter 1D01633	/
No Associated Exhibits wich the Defence seeks to tender pursuant to Rule 92ter			
Description	Paragraph Number in Statement	65ter Number	Doc ID (BCS/ENG)