Witness: CAR-D04-PPPP-0004

- 1 International Criminal Court
- 2 Trial Chamber III Courtroom 1
- 3 Situation: Central African Republic
- 4 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08
- 5 Presiding Judge Sylvia Steiner, Judge Joyce Aluoch and
- 6 Judge Kuniko Ozaki
- 7 Trial Hearing
- 8 Thursday, 20 June 2013
- 9 (The hearing starts in open session at 9.04 a.m.)
- 10 THE COURT USHER: All rise.
- 11 The International Criminal Court is now in session.
- 12 Please be seated.
- 13 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Good morning.
- 14 Could, please, court officer call the case.
- 15 THE COURT OFFICER: Thank you, Madam President.
- 16 Situation in the Central African Republic, in the case of The Prosecutor versus
- 17 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08.
- 18 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you.
- 19 Good morning. I welcome the Prosecution team, legal representatives of victims,
- 20 Defence team, Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Good morning our interpreters, our
- 21 court reporters. Good morning, Mr Rojas.
- 22 THE COURT OFFICER (via video link): Good morning, Madam President.
- 23 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: And good morning, Mr Witness.
- 24 WITNESS: CAR-D04-PPPP-0004 (On former oath)
- 25 (The witness speaks French)

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- 1 (The witness gives evidence via video link)
- 2 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Good morning, Madam President.
- 3 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you again for being with us. Are you ready
- 4 to continue with your testimony, sir?
- 5 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I'm ready.
- 6 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, I need to remind you that you are still
- 7 under oath. Do you understand that, sir?
- 8 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I do.
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I also wanted to remind you that you are under
- 10 protective measures and, therefore, when we are in public sessions avoid telling
- anything that could lead to your identification. If need be, we go into private
- 12 session.
- 13 Do you understand the protective measures, don't you?
- 14 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I understand.
- 15 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: And, Mr Witness, once again I have to remind you
- 16 that you are expected to speak slower than normal because yesterday our interpreters
- 17 many times they had difficulties in following you, so please speak slower, give some
- pauses between sentences and don't forget the five seconds after a question is put to
- 19 you in order to facilitate our interpreters' job.
- 20 Can we count on you, Mr Witness?
- 21 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes.
- 22 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Rojas, who is at your side, will make some
- 23 gestures from time to time to remind you that you have to slow down.
- 24 Today the Prosecution will continue with its questioning, and for that purpose I give

25 the floor back to Mr Bifwoli.

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- 1 MR BIFWOLI: Good morning, your Honours.
- 2 QUESTIONED BY MR BIFWOLI: (Continuing)
- 3 Q. Good morning, Mr Witness.
- 4 A. Good morning, Mr Bifwoli.
- 5 Q. Mr Witness, today we will proceed from where we stopped yesterday and I will
- 6 continue to ask you questions and I remind you to wait for five seconds before you
- 7 give the answer and, as Madam President pointed out, also try as much as you can to
- 8 speak slowly so that what you say is clearly interpreted. Is that okay with you?
- 9 A. Yes, that's fine. I will try.
- 10 Q. Mr Witness, at transcript T-326, real-time, page 37, lines 23 to 25, page 38, lines 1
- to 2, you testified that Bombayake took over command of the CCOP from Lengbe
- when he left. Do you recall saying that?
- 13 A. Yes, indeed. That is what I said.
- 14 Q. A document in evidence before this Court, that is CAR-OTP-0042-0237, shows
- 15 that Bemondombi is the one who took over from Lengbe. That contradicts your
- 16 testimony, doesn't it?
- 17 A. As I said yesterday, it's a problem of trust. Do you understand? The
- president was worried more about the FACA and, as I said with regard to the trust he
- 19 had in the USP and in Bombayake after the flight of Lengbe, it was Bombayake who
- 20 took over. That's what I said yesterday. I can't invent make up what I said.
- 21 Q. So again you want the Court to believe your word and not an official document
- of the CAR government? Is that your testimony?
- 23 A. As I said, the president had greater trust in the DG and was less trusting of the
- 24 FACA and normally command went straight through General Bombayake, as I said.
- 25 Q. Apart from your word, you have no document to show this Court that

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- 1 Bombayake took over the control of the CCOP, do you?
- 2 A. I said, and that was my word, what I said -- what I said. I know what I said
- 3 and I know why I said it.
- 4 Q. Do you know the organisational structure of the CCOP?
- 5 A. You have the General Staff and the CCOP is under the General Staff, you
- 6 understand? The CCOP was there to co-ordinate operations in the field. That's
- 7 what I'm saying to you.
- 8 Q. How many people worked at the CCOP?
- 9 A. As I said, the CCOP follows the orders of the General Staff. I could give you a
- 10 number, but it would be something of a lie. I can't give you an exact number, but
- under the orders of the General Staff there was a CCOP co-ordinating the operations,
- so there were people there, but if I were to give you a number, well, I would just be
- making it up and I don't want to lie to the Court. I can't give you an exact number.
- 14 Q. And do you know the sections or the units that these people came from, the
- 15 people who were working at the CCOP?
- 16 A. They were from the FACA, the Central African Armed Forces. They were
- 17 Central Africans. They were from the FACA. The Central African General Staff
- 18 employs Central African soldiers who are Central African citizens working for the
- 19 Central African Republic. They can't be foreigners. They were Central Africans.
- 20 I'm not going to lie.
- 21 Q. We know that, but we also know that FACA has different units and sections, so
- 22 do you know from which sections that the people at the CCOP came from?
- 23 A. Well, under the General Staff, there are regiments. A regiment is the military
- 24 unit made up of a number of battalions and a battalion is a military unit made up of a
- 25 number of companies. A company is a military unit made up of a number of

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- 1 platoons. There is order in this. There's the support regiment. There's the BIT.
- 2 There's a lot of structures, a lot of Central African battalions. Do you understand?
- 3 There's a General Staff and under the orders of the General Staff the -- there are
- 4 Central African regiments. Perhaps you've misunderstood what I said.
- 5 Q. Mr Witness, FACA, like any other army, had sections like intelligence, logistics,
- 6 and so on and so forth; is that correct?
- 7 A. In the General Staff, there's a second bureau which is the intelligence section.
- 8 There are bureaus, yes, indeed. That was in the General Staff.
- 9 Q. Yes. From which bureaus did the people who were at the CCOP come from,
- 10 do you know?
- 11 A. I'm telling you they were FACA. There were infantry, people who'd been to
- 12 military school and they had been trained to lead the Central African Army. They
- were military; I don't know what bureau. They were military and they were under
- 14 the orders of the Central African General Staff. I don't know whether I'm making
- 15 myself understood.
- 16 Q. Now, can you tell us their names and designations?
- 17 A. Whose names? Whose titles/designations? Apparently, I don't understand
- 18 what you're asking of me.
- 19 Q. You testified that Lengbe was the one in charge of the CCOP and you've
- 20 testified that there were people who were working at the CCOP. Can you tell us the
- 21 names and designations of these people who were working under Lengbe and later
- 22 on under Bemondombi at the CCOP?
- 23 A. As I said, at the time I was a senior sergeant. I was an NCO. I can't know all
- 24 that. You talk about my -- if you talk to me about my unit, I can take my time and
- 25 explain it to you, but these were not my friends, these were not my colleagues. I was

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- there to take orders, so I can't know all the names of my superior officers.
- 2 Talk to me about the USP and I can tell you who gave me orders in the field, I can tell
- 3 you under whose orders I was, in which company I was, in which section I was, in
- 4 which team I was.
- 5 Q. Do you know if there was any representative from the USP in the CCOP?
- 6 A. As I said, USP is also FACA, but it's a unit which is seconded to protect the
- 7 president. So it's FACA. It's quite clear.
- 8 Q. You testified in this court that USP has around 300 soldiers. Was anyone from
- 9 these 300 soldiers sent to work at the CCOP during this period?
- 10 A. Well, I said to you that after Lengbe left, General Bombayake took over the
- 11 CCOP directly. I mean, that's how it was. I'm not just telling you any old thing.
- 12 I'm telling you what happened. After Lengbe fled, General Bombayake took over.
- 13 He took over the control of CCOP. There was much less trust in the FACA, so why
- should they not have USP in the command? That would be the right -- the normal
- thing to do, to have them in the command of the CCOP.
- 16 Q. So, Mr Witness, you can't tell us the number of people who worked at the CCOP,
- 17 you can't tell us their names, you can't tell us their designations, you can't tell us the
- units from which they came from, you can't tell us who came from USP. Am I
- 19 correct to say your knowledge of the CCOP and how it functioned is limited?
- 20 A. As I said, I was an NCO in the field, a sergeant. I can't keep an eye on what my
- 21 superiors are doing. I was there expecting to receive officers. If -- I am no longer a
- sergeant, but at the time I was receiving orders, and I can't lie to you. Well, I don't
- want to lie to you.
- Q. At T-325bis, English real-time transcript, at page 18, lines 1 to 5, you testified
- 25 that on 29 October 2002 you saw about 400 MLC troops at the naval base and that

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- there were others who were waiting to cross as well. Do you recall stating that?
- 2 A. Yes, that is indeed what I said.
- 3 Q. Eventually, how many MLC troops in total came to the CAR for the operation of
- 4 2002/2003?
- 5 A. I'm going to talk in military terms. There were two battalions. Do you know
- 6 what a battalion is? Well, there were two of them. If you don't know what a
- 7 battalion is, I can explain it to you. Then there was a third battalion which came
- 8 later, but there were two battalions. Do you know what a battalion is?
- 9 Q. Mr Witness, it's my business to ask you questions, so you just keep your calm
- and I'll ask you questions. The procedure here is that you are not the one to ask me
- 11 questions, okay? You understand that?
- 12 A. I understand, Counsel.
- 13 Q. So the question was: In total, how many MLC soldiers participated in the
- 14 October 2002 to March 2003 CAR operation?
- 15 A. As I said, two battalions.
- 16 Q. Can you tell the Court how many soldiers comprise a battalion?
- 17 A. A battalion is a military unit which is made up of two or three companies, so
- from 250 to a thousand soldiers. That's a battalion. So a battalion is two or three
- 19 companies.
- 20 Q. So just to clarify this, Mr Witness, is it your testimony that a battalion comprises
- 21 of between 250 to 1,000 soldiers?
- 22 A. Indeed.
- 23 Q. What about a company?
- 24 A. A company is a military unit made up of three platoons, so about 120 men.
- 25 Q. And what about a brigade? How many soldiers make up a brigade?

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- 1 A. Well, I'm not talking about brigades. I'm talking about companies made up of
- 2 three platoons.
- 3 Q. And do you know how many soldiers make up a brigade?
- 4 A. As I said -- I'm coming back to what I'm saying. So I was talking about a
- 5 company and a platoon. I didn't talk about brigades, no, nor regiments. I'm now
- 6 talking about a company and platoons.
- 7 Q. Yes, I know we are talking about companies and platoons, but I am specifically
- 8 putting a question to you. Do you know how many soldiers make a brigade?
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, Mr Haynes?
- 10 MR HAYNES: In which army are we talking about?
- 11 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Can you -- are you being specific, or are you -- what
- 12 exactly you want to know, Mr Bifwoli?
- 13 MR BIFWOLI: Your Honours, I think the Defence should desist from interfering
- 14 with our examination. We know the line we are pursuing and evidently we are
- dealing with a qualified soldier here, so we are starting from his general knowledge,
- 16 then we come to specifics. So they should not take over examination. They can ask
- 17 those questions during re-examination, if they want.
- 18 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, Mr Haynes?
- 19 MR HAYNES: Your Honour, those of us who know something about military
- 20 structure, know that the concept of a brigade is very different in the English army to
- 21 the French army to the American army. Perhaps it might be useful to establish
- 22 whether there were in fact any brigades within the Central African Army. "How
- 23 many soldiers are there within a brigade?" without specifying which army is a
- 24 meaningless question and one which nobody can answer.
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Let's see whether the witness is able to explain to the

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- 1 Chamber about the composition of a brigade. If you're not able, just say that you
- 2 don't know, Mr Witness.
- 3 MR BIFWOLI: I thank, your Honours, and the Prosecution notes that the witness
- 4 has been responding for the past ten minutes so he understands what he's talking
- 5 about. So Mr Haynes should just maintain his calm.
- 6 Q. Mr Witness, do you know how many soldiers make a brigade in the CAR
- 7 Army?
- 8 A. Under the Central African General Staff we had brigadier-generals, but who
- 9 were not commanding a brigade. So usually you have brigadier-generals
- 10 commanding a brigade and major-generals commanding a division, but there we
- 11 have regiments downwards.
- 12 Q. And you mentioned about platoons. How many soldiers make up a platoon?
- 13 A. A platoon is a military unit made up of two sections; that is from 60 upwards.
- 14 Q. Now, a short while ago you testified that three MLC battalions came to the CAR.
- 15 How many men comprised one MLC battalion?
- 16 A. I told you that initially there were two battalions which arrived. Then there
- 17 was a third battalion. After having captured the towns, the president was
- 18 negotiating for another battalion to cross over. I didn't say there were three
- 19 battalions on the spot. I said there were two battalions.
- 20 Q. Please tell the Court how many soldiers made one MLC battalion?
- 21 A. I have already explained to you. I cannot tell you a precise number. I told
- 22 you that a battalion is made up of companies, so I can say at least one battalion was
- 23 made up of 500 men. So two battalions would be a thousand people minimum. So
- 24 what I'm telling you now that maybe the battalions had about 500 men, or 400, each.
- 25 Q. So, Mr Witness, a short while ago you told us a battalion is made up of between

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1 250 to 1,000 soldiers. Now you've moved to 500 men. So how many soldiers make

- 2 up a battalion? Can you help the Court understand this?
- 3 A. Counsel, I have explained at length to you. A battalion is a military unit made
- 4 up of from 250 to 1,000 men. It depends on the State. We can say our battalion is
- 5 300 men. It can be a battalion commanded by the commander of the battalion. So
- 6 I'm telling you what I know. From 250 to 1,000 does not mean that automatically
- 7 1,000 people make a battalion. It depends on the country and the battalion. You
- 8 can decide that your battalion is made up of 300 people commanded by a major, a
- 9 senior officer. That's how it is.
- 10 Q. So in your estimation, if there were three MLC battalions present in the CAR
- during the operation, in total how many MLC troops were in the CAR during this
- 12 conflict period?
- 13 A. Counsel, I have said that I observed that there were two battalions which
- 14 crossed over. After the fighting, after peace had been restored, there was a third
- 15 battalion that -- that was being negotiated. It was negotiated that it should cross
- over, but I did not say that there were three battalions there. So if there were 400
- and 500 men, well, I know that a battalion is from 250 to 1,000 and after 1,000 it
- 18 becomes a regiment. I believe we can understand each other on this point.
- 19 Q. Now, you have just stated that there were negotiations for the third battalion to
- 20 come in. Do you know eventually if the third battalion crossed into the CAR as well;
- 21 MLC battalion I mean?
- 22 A. I do not think so. This was already around 15 March. The war was lost.
- 23 I think the third battalion couldn't cross over. It was too late.
- Q. So just to make it clear for the record, the negotiations for the third battalion to

come in were being conducted around 15 March?

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- 1 A. The regime already felt threatened. The authorities sensed that Bozizé's death
- 2 squads, having been reinforced by a special Chadian unit, had already started
- 3 recapturing the various locations. So that is what I'm explaining to you.
- 4 Q. So am I correct that, when the operation started in October to around
- 5 March 2003, the MLC battalions that took part in this operation were just two
- 6 battalions? Am I correct to say that?
- 7 A. That is correct, Counsel.
- 8 Q. And what will be your answer if someone said in this court that there were
- 9 three battalions that took part in this operation?
- 10 A. Let me tell you this, Counsel: It depends on how that person understands
- 11 what a battalion is. It is after I became an officer that I understood certain things
- better than I had done before. When I was a sergeant, there were things that I did
- 13 not understand. It depends what that person understands by a battalion. If that
- person thinks a battalion is 250, if he sees a certain number of people, he will say,
- 15 "Okay, this is three battalions," but after having mastered certain military tactics I
- 16 better understand what is a battalion.
- 17 Q. So you've approximated an MLC battalion to be around 500 men. Now,
- 18 working with your figures, is it your testimony that only two battalions took part in
- 19 this operation?
- 20 A. I believe I've already explained to you what a battalion is and the number of
- 21 men that make up a battalion, so when I talk of two battalions I am talking of about
- 22 1,000 men. Some other people may think it is more, but I am giving that estimate
- 23 because I know it was two battalions.
- 24 Q. So that the record is clear, the MLC soldiers who took part in this operation

25 were according to you about 1,000 men; is that correct?

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- 1 A. That is correct.
- 2 Q. And what will be your response to someone who says that they were more than
- 3 that; that in fact there were three battalions and working with your figures there were
- 4 around 1,500 men? What would be your response to someone who says that?
- 5 A. It depends on that person's understanding. I cannot prevent someone from
- 6 understanding things the way he does. Today I am an officer. That is my way of
- 7 understanding things. He also has his own way. If that person tells us that there
- 8 were three battalions, well, that is what he's saying, but that is not what I am saying.
- 9 I know what I'm saying. I cannot invent something that someone else said. If that
- is what he told you, then that is what he told you, but what I'm telling you is what I'm
- 11 telling you.
- 12 Q. At T-325bis, English transcript real-time, page 25, lines 11 to 15, you testified
- that MLC troops were merged with FACA at a ratio of one-to-two and that is,
- 14 according to your testimony, two CAR platoon to one MLC platoon. Do you recall
- 15 saying that?
- 16 A. Yes, that is correct.
- 17 Q. Was this ratio of composition between MLC and FACA troops standard
- throughout the operation of October 2002 to March 2003?
- 19 A. Let me say this: As I have told you, regarding the militias that were there,
- 20 SCPS, the Sarawi forces, Paul Barril's men, USP, FACA, in relation to that the MLC
- 21 was in the minority. Do you understand me? So that team remained there up 'til
- 22 March 2003.
- 23 Q. Now, Mr Witness, in relation to MLC and FACA, who were more than the other
- in relation to just those two?
- 25 A. The FACA, those were the Central African Armed Forces. Of course, is the

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- 1 MLC the Congolese Armed Forces? Please do not under-estimate the strength of the
- 2 FACA. We are an army. This is the Central African Armed Forces. I think you
- 3 are minimising or under-estimating the Central African Army. They simply
- 4 come -- they simply came to assist us. Do you know how many soldiers are there in
- 5 the FACA? No. The FACA were more numerous than the MLC. That is clear.
- 6 Q. So am I correct to say that in all joint operations you conducted, ML -- the FACA
- 7 troops were always more than the MLC troops that came to help? Is that correct?
- 8 A. Since you are talking about the FACA, you should also talk about the USP. If
- 9 you talk about the FACA without mentioning the USP, I no longer understand you.
- 10 It's as if it is a militia group. The USP is part of the FACA, but it is a unit seconded
- 11 to protect the Head of State, but since you are mentioning only the FACA, I no longer
- 12 understand what we are talking about.
- 13 Q. But, Mr Witness, you are the one who has been repeatedly telling this Court that
- 14 USP is part of FACA. It reports FACA. So you distinguish USP and FACA when
- it's convenient?
- 16 A. The USP are FACA. When you talk of FACA, do you understand what it
- 17 means? It is the Central African Armed Forces. It is not a regiment. It is the entire
- armed forces of the Central African Republic. All CAR soldiers are FACA. So we
- 19 were all trained as FACA.
- 20 I do not know whether I am making myself clear, but there was a problem of trust in
- 21 relation to people's mentalities, in relation to individuals, but overall we are all
- 22 FACA.
- 23 Q. Now, to make the record clear, let us for this particular question consider USP
- 24 as part of FACA. Now, considering USP as part of FACA, is it your testimony that
- 25 in all operations with the MLC during this period, the FACA troops, who include

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- 1 USP, were always more than the MLC troops in the joint operations that you
- 2 conducted?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. A short while ago you testified that two MLC battalions came and there were
- 5 negotiations for the third one, which did not come. Did the two that came to the
- 6 CAR come, all of them, on 29 October 2002?
- 7 A. Let me say this: I cannot explain to you exactly whether they came the same
- 8 day, or not. I'm talking to you about what happened on the ground, in the field.
- 9 I'm not an authority who negotiated. You can ask Yangongo or Gam-Bifondel
- 10 (phon), or the Minister of the Defence. If you are asking me that, I did not know the
- schedule so I cannot give you an answer to that.
- 12 Q. Can you tell the Court the names of the two MLC battalions that came to the
- 13 CAR?
- 14 A. Am I an MLC commander to know their internal structure? I'm not an MLC
- 15 commander. You can put that question to Moustapha, or the others. I am a Central
- 16 African citizen. How can I be talking to you about the MLC when I am a Central
- 17 African citizen? You can put that question to Moustapha.
- 18 Q. So you were operating jointly with the people you didn't know; is that your
- 19 testimony?
- 20 A. Listen, is that the first time that the MLC came to the CAR in 2002? You may
- 21 not remember, but the MLC was also there in 2001. You don't know that? Is it the
- 22 first time? You have to find out.
- 23 These were Congolese soldiers who came over to assist us under our orders. Am I a
- 24 Congolese person to know the Congolese? But we became familiar with some of
- 25 them. I know some of their names, because we got to know each other in the field.

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- 1 We considered ourselves friends. So if someone is a friend, you have to say he's a
- 2 friend.
- 3 Q. Please tell the Court the names of the MLC battalion commanders that came to
- 4 the CAR.
- 5 A. Yes, there was Moustapha and then there was René that I liked a lot, but
- 6 unfortunately he died. I was quite close to René, but unfortunately he lost his life in
- 7 the CAR, which I regret. I didn't even want to mention his name here, because it
- 8 disturbs me. I got to know René much better and it's a pity. May his soul rest in
- 9 peace.
- 10 Q. So am I correct that the MLC battalion commanders that you know are
- 11 Moustapha and René?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. And you don't know who commanded which battalion? You don't know the
- 14 names?
- 15 A. No, but let me tell you they also have an organisation. They have commanders.
- 16 You told me about a battalion. The battalion is commanded by a commander, a
- 17 major. So I told you that there were two battalions, so you had René and Moustapha,
- but you also had company commanders and so on and so forth.
- 19 Q. What would be your response if someone informed this Court that in fact there
- 20 were three MLC battalion commanders in addition to Moustapha?
- 21 A. Let me tell you this: As I have said, it is only possible for me to know those
- 22 that we worked together, but I cannot force my friendship with people with whom
- 23 we were not in the same platoon. I am telling you what I know. If this is what he
- 24 told you, then that is what he told you, but I am saying what I have said. I cannot
- 25 invent names to give you. If you want, I can invent, but since I'm here to tell the

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1 Court the truth, it is pointless. So I can tell you only what I know. I cannot tell you

- 2 what I do not know.
- 3 Q. So are you saying your knowledge of the events is limited?
- 4 A. If you consider that it is limited, that's fine, but that is what I said.
- 5 Q. Now, if someone else says there were three MLC battalion commanders
- 6 operating in the CAR and you are saying -- that's besides Moustapha, and you are
- 7 saying there are two MLC battalion commanders including Moustapha, who should
- 8 this Court believe?
- 9 A. Listen, as I have told you, I can only say what I experienced and he can also
- 10 only talk about what he observed. He could consider Dominguez, Cissé Lefeur
- 11 (phon) or Brun as commanders. That is only binding on him. I am telling you
- 12 about what I know. That's all.
- 13 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Bifwoli, I am sorry if I interrupt you, but it has
- 14 come to a point in which I need really to ask you about relevance. We have been for
- 15 20 pages discussing the number of battalions and the name of the commanders and
- we are turning back and forth, back and forth, back and forth and we are not
- 17 advancing. So it has come to a point, I am sorry, I have to ask about relevance on all
- 18 these questions if there were two or three battalions and if he knows the names of the
- 19 battalions.
- 20 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, your Honours. The purpose of those questions was just
- 21 to lay the foundation and now I am going to lead the evidence which actually shows
- 22 that what the witness has said contradicts what other Defence witnesses have stated
- 23 in this Court. So I was just laying the foundation and I am through with that
- 24 foundation, so I am going now to confront the evidence that he has just stated.
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, Mr Haynes?

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- 1 MR HAYNES: An entirely different point. But the witness mentioned at line 8
- 2 three names. I wonder if before Mr Bifwoli moves on, we could clarify the names he
- 3 gave, because only the name Dominguez appears in the transcript.
- 4 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I had not understood that he was giving real names,
- 5 but in any case I can ask him.
- 6 MR HAYNES: Your Honour may be right.
- 7 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, on page 20, line 6, you were saying that
- 8 you "... can only say what I experienced and he can also only talk about what he
- 9 observed. He could consider Dominguez ...", or other name, another name, as
- 10 commanders. You were mentioning three real names, or you were inventing names
- 11 just to make your point?
- 12 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) As I said, your Honour, these are people with
- 13 whom we lived. We worked. Dominguez, Cissé Lefeur, this is how we called them,
- or Brown. I do not have their birth certificates. I am not related to them, so if
- somebody tells me his name is Dominguez or Cissé Lefeur, I cannot force him to give
- me another name. I can only tell you what I know. So if the other witness thought
- 17 that Dominguez or Cissé Lefeur were commanders, that depends on him, but as I told
- 18 you a battalion is made up of 250 to 1,000 men. In a battalion there are companies.
- 19 He can consider a company commander as a battalion commander. It depends on
- 20 his understanding. Maybe that was the case with me too before, but ever since I
- 21 became an officer I know these things better, so I'm not inventing anything here.
- 22 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: So let's try, Mr Witness, when Prosecution puts to
- 23 you a question and you don't know the answer, you just say, "I don't know," instead
- of coming back and repeating again and again, and we hope that Mr Bifwoli really

25 advances in its line of questioning.

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- 1 I'm sorry to interrupt, but it was necessary.
- 2 You have the floor, Mr Bifwoli.
- 3 MR BIFWOLI: Well guided, your Honours.
- 4 Q. Now, Mr Witness, yesterday you testified that you together with the MLC
- 5 troops fought in, for example, PK12, Damara, Bossembélé, Bossangoa, Bozoum and
- 6 many other places. Do you recall saying that?
- 7 A. Yes, indeed. That is what I said.
- 8 Q. And today a few minutes ago in your testimony you said that in all joint
- 9 operations the FACA troops were the majority. Now, Defence Witness D-19, who
- 10 was one of the MLC soldiers who participated in this operation, testified before this
- 11 Court at transcript T-292, page 30, lines 24 to 25, page 31, lines 1 to 25, that in
- 12 Bossangoa, Damara and Bozoum there was one MLC battalion and one FACA
- 13 company. This contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 14 A. Well, Counsel, as I said, we all have different understandings of things and all
- depends on the rank, in fact where you are in the hierarchical order. I can't explain
- to you something that I have no knowledge of, but when the MLC came to the Central
- 17 African Republic was it their homeland? No, we were at home. How could they
- 18 fight on behalf of us?
- 19 I have great respect for the MLC soldiers because they died for a good cause. They
- 20 came to help and to save a friendly country, but they were less numerous than we
- 21 were. I can't invent these things. A battalion or an armed force, which is more
- 22 numerous? We were. We were the Central Africans at home. They just came to
- 23 give us a hand and, as I said, this wasn't the first time they had done so.
- 24 In 2001 they came as well, and in 2002 we wanted them to come because we wanted
- 25 them to follow orders from the General Staff, but how can one say that they were

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- 1 more numerous than we were? That's a different way of understanding things.
- 2 I mean, I can only tell you what I know. I'm not going to make things up. A whole
- 3 battalion in Bossembélé? No, that's a story. A company is 120 men. 120 men only.
- 4 That's what he said. What I'm saying is what I said. I don't want to make things up.
- 5 I just said what I know, what I'm familiar with. Only a company 120 men? No, I
- 6 can't imagine things like that. I'm only telling you what I know.
- 7 Q. Again, Defence Witness D-19 testified at T-292, page 31, lines 1 to 25, that there
- 8 were no MLC troops in the Bossembélé operation. This again contradicts your
- 9 testimony, doesn't it?
- 10 A. Well, Counsel, we're going to be opening old wounds here, wounds we have
- 11 forgotten. The combat in Bossembélé was the hardest fought combat in the Central
- 12 African Republic. It was fierce and, if I have to talk about that, then really that's
- 13 going to affect me, but it was mixed and it was thanks to the MLC. They died also in
- 14 that combat. Thanks to them we were able to regain Bossembélé. We really fought.
- 15 We fought together to regain Bossembélé. There was a lot of loss of human life in
- that combat. So it all depends how an individual understands things. I'm not just
- 17 telling you any old thing. I'm only telling you what I know. That's all I can tell
- 18 you.
- 19 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I'm sorry if I interrupt you. I just want now to
- 20 understand.
- 21 Mr Witness, you said that the MLC just came to give you a hand and that FACA was
- 22 superior in numbers than MLC. Now you just said that thanks to the MLC you were
- 23 able to regain Bossembélé. If you were outnumbering them and stronger than them,
- 24 how is it possible that thanks to them you won the battle for Bossembélé? Can you
- 25 explain that to me? I'm not a soldier, so I would like to understand.

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- 1 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Madam President, as I was saying, war affects
- 2 your heart. War is not simply fought. You have to have the heart to fight. You
- 3 have to have courage and with their courage they were very courageous. I liked
- 4 their way of fighting. I liked that a lot. They were very courageous soldiers.
- 5 Courageous. The FACA was strong at a certain time, but we needed their courage to
- 6 advance with two Libyan aircraft that enabled us to advance. They were very
- 7 courageous and courage is what counts. Courage is all that counts. Courage and
- 8 morale is what counts.
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I'm not sure if I understood, but in any case let's go.
- 10 Let's move forward, Mr Bifwoli.
- 11 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, Madam President, your Honours.
- 12 Q. Mr Witness, apart from the walkie-talkie, did Commander Moustapha have
- 13 other types of communication equipment?
- 14 A. Well, in Bangui and PK12 they used walkie-talkies and communications radios,
- but to advance to go to Damara and so on they had to use a Thuraya.
- 16 Q. So am I correct to understand that when you left Bangui, therefore Commander
- 17 Moustapha was receiving his orders on Thuraya?
- 18 A. And communications radios, of course. Communications radios and the
- 19 Thuraya.
- 20 Q. And what was communicated on the Thuraya you had no way of knowing?
- 21 Were you able to know what was communicated on the Thurayas?
- 22 A. It was just orders. They were just only giving orders to -- which Moustapha
- 23 had to carry out. That's discipline, and there was only discipline and order in that
- 24 case. So I know that it was just orders. That's all.
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Bifwoli, I'm sorry again. Judge Aluoch wants a

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- 1 clarification.
- 2 JUDGE ALUOCH: Mr Witness, I will return to Bossembélé. A few minutes ago
- 3 you said you had the fiercest fight in Bossembélé, but when I look at transcript 326bis
- 4 of 19 June I suppose that's yesterday's or, rather, when Mr Haynes was questioning
- 5 you, this is the question Mr Haynes asked you on the 19th: "What did you find
- 6 when you entered Bossembélé after the loyalist forces took it?" And this is what you
- 7 said, Mr Witness: "When we arrived in Bossembélé, we saw that the whole
- 8 population had fled, had hidden, in fields because they were Bozizé's men
- 9 carrying -- Bozizé's men raping women, looting livestock from the people of
- 10 Bossembélé."
- 11 From this answer that you gave yesterday and from the transcript this morning, can
- 12 you clarify? Did you arrive there and find all this having happened, or did you
- arrive and stage -- and fight in that place, in Bossembélé? It's not clear to me what
- 14 really happened in Bossembélé from those two answers.
- 15 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) It's as I said, the greatest amount of fighting we
- 16 had was in Bossembélé. It was fierce, but once we had ousted the enemy from the
- 17 town of Bossembélé that's what I said once we had dislodged the enemy from the
- town of Bossembélé, we saw the damage caused by them. That's what I said. We
- 19 saw damage caused by the -- them. That's all I said, and I explained yesterday what
- 20 I meant by "damage." We saw this damage.
- 21 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Bifwoli?
- 22 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, Madam President, your Honours.
- 23 Q. Mr Witness, in yesterday's transcript at T-326, real-time, page 48, lines 13 to 16,
- 24 you testified that Bombayake controlled operations from Bangui via walkie-talkie.

25 Do you recall stating that?

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- 1 Mr Witness, are you able to hear me?
- 2 A. (No audible response)
- 3 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: We lost connection.
- 4 Mr Witness, can you hear me?
- 5 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) I hear you, Madam President.
- 6 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Bifwoli?
- 7 MR BIFWOLI:
- 8 Q. So, sorry, Mr Witness, we lost connection and therefore I'll repeat my last
- 9 question which I think you did not hear. In yesterday's transcript at T-326, real-time,
- page 48, lines 13 to 16, you testified that Bombayake controlled operations from
- 11 Bangui via walkie-talkie. Do you recall stating that?
- 12 A. That was in the town of Bangui up to PK12. That's what I said. I said in the
- town of Bangui, the city of Bangui, up to PK12.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, Mr Haynes?
- 15 MR HAYNES: The witness has in fact answered the question, but what in fact he
- said at lines 13 to 16 yesterday was that General Bombayake controlled proceedings
- 17 by transmission or walkie-talkie. I assume the omission of the "transmission or" by
- 18 Mr Bifwoli was a mistake.
- 19 MR BIFWOLI: I believe this evidence is still fresh in the mind of the witness. When
- 20 I don't get it right, the witness will outrightly tell me. However, I will proceed.
- 21 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Bifwoli, I'm sorry, but if you are referring to
- 22 something that the witness said yesterday and you were even giving the page and the
- 23 lines, I think you should reproduce the totality of what the witness said. So in this
- 24 point I think Mr Haynes is right. So the witness did not say said that Bombayake
- 25 controlled operations from Bangui via walkie-talkie. He said, "transmission or

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- 1 walkie-talkie," which makes a lot of difference. So avoid cutting off some parts of
- 2 the reference in order not to give rise to any kind of confusion in the mind of the
- 3 witness.
- 4 You can proceed.
- 5 MR BIFWOLI:
- 6 Q. Now, can you explain to the Court how he controlled operations after you left
- 7 PK12; that's Bombayake?
- 8 A. It's as I was saying to you, Counsel. When we left PK12 to go up towards
- 9 Damara, there were Thuraya which had been issued, but we still had our
- 10 communications radios to control operations. That's what the authorities did to give
- orders to their men in the field. That's what it was. I'm not going to make things
- 12 up and tell them to you.
- 13 Q. And, Mr Witness, throughout your testimony you have testified that you were
- 14 in the field. Is there any particular time you were with Bombayake during the
- operations, or during this conflict period?
- 16 A. As I was saying yesterday, I presented myself, but after that I was detached
- 17 elsewhere to increase numbers to the USP and FACA soldiers, FACA in the field.
- We were in the front line, as I said. I can't be next to him at his side and in the field
- 19 at the same time, no. In the field, that's where I was, and that's what I said.
- 20 Q. Can you clarify to the Court you were in the field until when, month or date, if
- 21 you can recall?
- 22 A. It's a long time ago, Counsel. I can't -- I don't want to make up a date to give
- 23 you, but I can say what I said and that is that I remained in the field and that's what I
- 24 said.
- 25 Q. Would I be correct, therefore, to say you remained in the field until the end of

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- 1 the conflict?
- 2 A. No, no. I said every time we advanced -- it's as I explained to you yesterday.
- 3 At Bossangoa we were relieved and we returned to Bossembélé, and from Bossembélé
- 4 we were going to and fro between Bossembélé and Bangui. So I don't know how
- 5 much time that was, but I can't say the exact time without making something up.
- 6 Q. And did you take part in these operations until the time when they ended
- 7 around 15 March 2003?
- 8 A. As I said, as we progressed, as we regained terrain, peace came, but when there
- 9 were reinforcements they started to gain terrain from us and that was the end. We
- 10 couldn't do anything different. The morale was very low among the troops and
- 11 15 May was the end, but there were times when there was peace, when we were able
- 12 to liberate occupied towns, but once the attackers had the reinforcements, they
- 13 regained terrain from us.
- 14 Q. What we are trying to understand is if you took part in this operation until the
- 15 time Bozizé rebels gained control again or whether you might have left earlier. Can
- 16 you just clarify for the record whether you were there until the end of the operation,
- 17 which is around 15 March, or not?
- 18 A. Negative. I did not stay in the field all the time. I have family. We were
- 19 relieved from time to time, so I didn't remain there continuously. So the answer is
- 20 "negative."
- 21 Q. And a short while ago you said while in Bossembélé, you still come to Bangui.
- 22 Am I to understand that that's the time you spent with your family, when you came
- 23 back to Bangui?
- 24 A. It was organised. Our section left. Other sections replaced us. So, yes, why

25 not?

Trial Hearing (Private Session) ICC-01/05-01/08

Witness: CAR-D04-PPPP-0004

- 1 Q. So, apart from being with your family in Bangui, what else did you do during
- 2 this period when you have been relieved by other soldiers?
- 3 A. I'm a soldier. In Bangui, if we go to Bangui, that doesn't mean we do any more
- 4 work. I said I was attached (Redacted) and so I carried on
- 5 doing my work. So every two days we worked, then we had a day off. That's the
- 6 way it's organised. It's organised like that.
- 7 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn briefly into private session.
- 8 *(Private session at 10.29 a.m.) Reclassified as Open session
- 9 THE COURT OFFICER: Madam President, we're in private session.
- 10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, please avoid mentioning in open
- session to which unit or battalion you were attached, because that could lead to your
- 12 identification. I already ordered the redaction from the transcript -- the transcript
- and from the broadcast, so don't worry, but try to avoid giving such kind of details.
- 14 Do you understand that, sir?
- 15 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) I understand, Madam President.
- 16 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, turn back into open session please.
- 17 MR BIFWOLI: Your Honours --
- 18 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, Mr Bifwoli?
- 19 MR BIFWOLI: We could remain in the private session for a few questions.
- 20 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Please go ahead.
- 21 MR BIFWOLI:
- 22 Q. Mr Witness, we are in private session because I just have a few questions on
- 23 what you've just said. When you came back to Bangui, and I quote you at page 31,
- 24 from line 7, your answer is, "I'm a soldier. In Bangui, if we go to Bangui, that doesn't

25 mean we do any more work. I said I was attached to -- I can -- (Redacted)

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- 1 so I carried on doing my work. So every two days we worked and then we had a
- 2 day off. That's the way it's organised." So can you help us? Within this period,
- 3 how frequent would you come back to Bangui let's say in a month to do your work?
- 4 A. I am an employee of the Minister of Defence to work and to defend my country.
- 5 I have told you that, after we had been relieved, we would go to Bangui and work;
- 6 that is there were positions in PK12, Landjia, Bimbo and so on, so the (Redacted)
- 7 had positions there. We would be sent there to take up guard. That was the
- 8 routine. We were soldiers. It does not mean that when the war ended we would
- 9 come back and do nothing else, so we stayed on our usual routines. We would take
- 10 up guard and so on. There was a schedule there. If you were supposed to be on
- guard duty, then you would be on guard duty. It was planned. I do not know
- 12 whether you understand me?
- 13 MR BIFWOLI: We can go back into public session.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn into public session.
- 15 (Open session at 10.33 a.m.)
- 16 THE COURT OFFICER: We're in open session, Madam President.
- 17 MR BIFWOLI:
- 18 Q. So, Mr Witness, in your testimony before this Court you have been stating that
- 19 it is Bombayake who issued orders to Moustapha and the soldiers that were in the
- 20 field. Is that your testimony?
- 21 A. Well, I said that when Bombayake took over the CCOP, I mean there was a
- 22 problem of distrust, so command was back to him. That is when he transmitted the
- orders that he had received, so -- but I did not tell you that apart from the others from
- 24 the hierarchy Bombayake gave his own separate orders. I didn't say that. I do not

25 know whether you understand me?

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- 1 Q. Now, Mr Witness, in a document before this Court, that is CAR-OTP-0019-0215,
- 2 in this document Bombayake is quoted as saying that MLC worked under the orders
- 3 of Mazi and Lengbe. This contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 4 A. Let me say this: As I have told you, there were two phases of the events. The
- 5 first phase and then --
- 6 THE INTERPRETER: The sound is out.
- 7 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, can you hear me?
- 8 THE WITNESS: (No audible response)
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: We lost connection.
- 10 Mr Witness, can you hear me?
- 11 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I can hear you, your Honour.
- 12 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: It is better if you repeat the question. We don't
- 13 know 'til what point the witness was able to listen to you.
- 14 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, Madam President, your Honours.
- 15 Q. Mr Witness, I'll repeat the question. The question is that we have a document
- in this Court and that document is CAR-OTP-0019-0215 and in this document
- 17 Bombayake is quoted as saying that the MLC operated under the orders of Lengbe
- and Mazi. So if that was the case that would contradict your testimony, wouldn't it?
- 19 A. As I was saying, there were two different periods. Before Lengbe fled, the
- 20 command was in the hands of Lengbe under Mazi, but when Lengbe fled the
- 21 president lost trust in Mazi; that is the individual Mazi, not the FACA. He lost trust
- 22 in Mazi and Lengbe, who had fled. It was then that the orders were transmitted
- 23 directly through Bombayake, but I cannot -- I did not say that before Lengbe fled it
- 24 was Bombayake who was giving orders. No, there were two phases: Before
- 25 Lengbe fled and after he fled. That is what I said, Counsel.

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1 Q. Mr Witness, the Court has the document and it will make its own

- 2 determinations.
- 3 Now, again in this document, Mr Witness, Bombayake is quoted as stating that at a
- 4 place called Barthélemy Boganda School, 4th arrondissement, an incident occurred
- 5 between the FACA and MLC troops as a result of which MLC proceeded alone to
- 6 PK12 without FACA. Now, in your testimony you are saying you proceeded jointly
- 7 to PK12. Again, if you look at what Bombayake is stating in this document, it
- 8 contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 9 A. Listen, as I was telling you, the MLC came to assist us and they were under
- 10 orders. It was our weapons and our uniforms that were given to them. It was not
- in 2001 maybe when they crossed on their own, but in 2002 we did everything for that
- 12 force to be Central African. So I cannot say that they went alone. Did they know
- 13 the roads to advance alone? How could they have advanced alone? We were
- 14 advancing jointly. I am telling you what I know, what I experienced. I cannot
- 15 invent anything. It was up to us to show them the way. Did they know PK12? In
- 16 2001, they only reached Ouango. They did not go to PK12. They did not know the
- 17 terrain. That was our terrain. We were together in the platoons. I cannot invent
- anything, Counsel. That is what he is saying, but I am telling you what I am seeing.
- 19 I told you what I know and I am not inventing.
- 20 Q. Again, in this document Bombayake is quoted as stating that the MLC
- 21 committed crimes of rapes, pillaging and so on. This would contradict your
- 22 testimony, wouldn't it?
- 23 A. As I was saying, Counsel, I can only talk about what I observed. I was on the
- 24 front line, backed up by two Libyan aircraft. We were focused on recapturing
- 25 territory, so I cannot invent anything that I did not see. I'm there to ensure that the

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- 1 Court should know the truth about what I experienced. I prefer not to invent
- 2 anything. I have told you what I experienced.
- 3 Q. Mr Witness, you have testified in this Court that you conducted joint operations
- 4 with MLC throughout. Now, Lengbe testified at T-182, page 43, lines 5 to 14, that
- 5 there was only one joint operation with the MLC on the first day and that it lasted
- 6 only three to four hours. This contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 7 A. Counsel, as I'm saying, General Bozizé's men were heavily armed. How can
- 8 the fighting in the 4th arrondissement take only three to four hours? I told you that
- 9 the fighting took three to four days with the Libyan planes, but three to four hours?
- 10 That's a -- that's what he's saying, but I'm telling you what I experienced on the
- 11 ground. It hurts me that somebody should say something like that. I am telling
- 12 you only the truth.
- 13 Q. Again at T-182, page 38, lines 2 to 10, Lengbe testified that MLC committed
- 14 crimes and they pillaged the musical instruments that belonged to the FACA and
- some weapons that were -- that belonged to FACA. Did you know that?
- 16 A. Listen, Counsel. The FACA are not women. The FACA are forces. We are
- 17 not going to stand by for a small MLC battalion to come and disturb us in our country.
- 18 That cannot happen. Do not under-estimate things. We cannot under-estimate
- 19 ourselves. FACA is not a cupboard in which a cockroaches hide. No. FACA does
- 20 not make -- does not mean weakness. It is a force. Are we going to just stand by
- 21 and allow people who came to assist us to pillage us? I cannot imagine any Central
- 22 African Republic officer tolerating such a thing. I cannot tolerate that myself. That
- 23 is history. I cannot invent anything.
- We are just going to stand by and they are going to pillage our weapons? Do they
- 25 know where our armouries are? These are just tall tales. It is comical. They do

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- 1 not even know where our armouries are.
- 2 From the naval base, we took them to the support regiment. There is a music unit
- 3 there, but you cannot say that that happened. They came without weapons, with
- 4 light weapons. We had started the fighting even before they arrived. If we were
- 5 not fighting we would have lost power even before they arrived, so would such
- 6 people come and restore order?
- 7 I cannot invent anything for nothing. I am a soldier and my duty is to serve my
- 8 country and I have to respect that principle. I cannot invent things or simplify or
- 9 underestimate the Central African Army. I do not believe that, I cannot invent
- things to tell you to be consistent with what he said there.
- 11 Q. So, Mr Witness, for your information, apart from Lengbe, this Court also heard
- 12 Defence Witness 51, who was a senior USP soldier, on the same issue. It has the
- 13 record and it will make its own determinations.
- 14 Now, Mr Witness, you know Mazi, don't you?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. Now, in a document before this Court, that's document CAR-OTP-0019-0230, at
- 17 0233, Mazi is quoted as stating that MLC committed crimes while based at PK12.
- 18 This contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 19 A. As I was telling you, I was in the field. We arrived PK12. Let me explain
- 20 PK12 to you. The PK12 is the place of residence of many dignitaries of the MLPC;
- 21 that is the party in power. They lived there, so that neighbourhood had to be
- 22 liberated at all cost. So I do not see why they would arrive there to kill the
- 23 president's supporters. I do not know. He could have said that, but I'm telling you
- 24 what I saw, what I know. I cannot accept just anything.
- 25 I told you that I saw that the small brother of Jérôme Bombayake, his throat was cut in

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- 1 PK10 by the Zaghawas. We saw his dead body. So, when I see the damage that
- 2 was caused, I have told you about it. I cannot invent things. People said just about
- 3 anything.
- 4 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Bifwoli, if I may? In order to help the Chamber
- 5 to follow the questioning, next time you mention a document, if you could be so kind
- 6 in informing which number on the Prosecution list, because otherwise every time we
- 7 have to go through the binder to find the relevant document. Thank you very much.
- 8 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, your Honours.
- 9 Your Honours, the last two documents we've talked about, the one which is quoting
- 10 Bombayake is 17 and the one quoting Mazi is 18 on the list. Thank you.
- 11 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: In the updated list. In the previous one it was 15
- 12 and 16.
- 13 MR BIFWOLI: That's correct, your Honours.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you.
- 15 MR BIFWOLI:
- 16 Q. So, Mr Witness, from the evidence Bombayake, who was a senior military
- official, who even you claim was controlling operations. Mazi and Lengbe, both of
- 18 whom were senior military officials, state MLC continued to commit crimes, but you
- 19 continue to deny that. Is that correct?
- 20 A. As I was telling you, I cannot imagine things on their behalf. I am speaking
- 21 about what I know, what I saw, what happened in the field. I was in the field. I'm
- talking about what I observed in the field.
- 23 We were on the front line and our lives were at risk on the front line. We did not
- even have bullet-proof vests. We were sacrificing our lives for a good cause. I
- 25 cannot invent something that I did not see, so I'm talking about what I know, what I

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1 saw, in the field. I came here to shed light on the events for you, so I'm not inventing

- 2 anything.
- 3 Q. Is it your testimony that the senior FACA officials who were involved in this
- 4 operation therefore didn't know what was going on in the field?
- 5 A. Listen, Counsel, if you don't know the combat -- the combat system on the field,
- 6 then let me explain. It is the ground troops, the ground forces, that fight; that is the
- 7 rank and file soldiers who fight and the NCOs who are on the ground. So the
- 8 officers are not there. That is the structure of the fighting. It is not these officers
- 9 who comes to the field to fire the weapons. The officers do not do that. They issue
- orders and the rank and final troops and NCOs execute those orders. They are
- trained for those types of operations and that is what they do. I do not know
- 12 whether I am making myself clear.
- 13 Q. But the troops in the field were reporting to these commanders, weren't they?
- 14 A. Yes. It is an army that is well-organised and well-structured. The second
- bureau is there for intelligence and then you have another bureau for the instructions
- and then we received orders and report. It is necessary to report back. It is normal.
- 17 MR BIFWOLI: One last question.
- 18 Q. And, Mr Witness, these being senior officials to whom the troops in the field
- 19 reported to had an overview of the events, had a better knowledge of the events, than
- 20 you; is that correct?
- 21 A. As I have told you, we were in the field. We reported to our commanders and
- 22 our commanders also reported to the hierarchy. So what I'm saying is that I was in
- 23 the field. That's all.
- 24 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you, Mr Bifwoli. We have to go to our

25 break.

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1 Mr Witness, it's almost 11 o'clock. We have half-an-hour break. That's time for you

- 2 to take a coffee, a cup of tea. We will resume at 11.30.
- 3 The hearing is suspended.
- 4 THE COURT USHER: All rise.
- 5 (Recess taken at 10.59 a.m.)
- 6 (Upon resuming in open session at 11.35 a.m.)
- 7 THE COURT USHER: All rise.
- 8 Please be seated.
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Welcome back, everyone.
- 10 Mr Witness, welcome back.
- 11 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Good morning, Madam President.
- 12 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Are you ready to continue with your testimony, sir?
- 13 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I'm ready.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, we understand that sometimes when a
- 15 witness is answering some questions and get too passionate about what he or she is
- saying and starts speaking too fast. This is what happened, so once again I wanted to
- 17 remind you not to speed up. Try to speak slow -- slowly in order to allow the
- interpreters to do their job.
- 19 Can we count on you on that, Mr Witness?
- 20 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I will endeavour to follow procedure.
- 21 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much for your co-operation.
- 22 Mr Bifwoli, you have the floor.
- 23 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, Madam President, your Honours.
- 24 Q. Now, Mr Witness, I will proceed from where we stopped. If Moustapha while in
- 25 the Central African Republic communicated with Mr Bemba, you wouldn't know that,

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- 1 would you?
- 2 A. I know nothing of that side of things. I don't know.
- 3 Q. Now, Mr Witness, throughout your testimony you have continued to deny that
- 4 MLC committed crimes. Now, a document here that is CAR-OTP-0042-0243 -- and this is
- 5 document number 34 on the list, your Honours. This document is an internal Minister of
- 6 the Interior memo, transmitting information given by two truck drivers from Douala
- 7 saying that their merchandise is being stolen by ALC elements stationed at Bossembélé.
- 8 You have testified that you participated in the operation at Bossembélé, so this document
- 9 contradicts your testimony that MLC never committed any crimes, doesn't it?
- 10 A. As I was explaining to you, Counsel, I said that I did not see, and I can't make things
- 11 up so that I can tell them to you. If these truck drivers -- well, there was a problem
- 12 recognising MLC forces and FACA. We were all wearing FACA uniforms.
- 13 Even -- everybody was wearing the same uniform, and there are some of us including me
- who speak Lingala, members of the Central African forces. So it is possible, but I can't
- 15 make things up. I don't know why this is. They might have been Central African
- Lingala-speaking soldiers, but I don't know. I didn't see.
- 17 So I don't want to make up something, or confirm what was said there. I can only tell
- 18 you what I've seen. I can only tell you what happened in the field. It depends when
- 19 this was. I might not even have been there. I really can't just make things up and tell
- 20 them to the Court. I don't know.
- 21 Q. Mr Witness, can you explain to the Court why you have -- you seem to know very
- small details about the events, the operations, the people and so on, but you don't seem to
- 23 know anything about the crimes committed by the MLC troops whom you claim you
- 24 conducted the operation jointly?
- 25 A. Well, Counsel, as I was saying to you, in any battle on the battle-field we're firing

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- 1 real bullets, not water pistols. As I said, during the battle there are always deaths,
- 2 always people killed on both sides, but after we had regained Bossembélé and dislodged
- 3 the enemy from the town in the outskirts of Bossembélé our platoon continued to advance,
- 4 but I can't make things up if I didn't see them.
- 5 We saw damage caused by the attackers, as I've explained. I said that there was a
- 6 communication, a communiqué, a press communiqué, where the government spokesman
- 7 invited political authorities, people from the international community, the French
- 8 ambassador, to Bossembélé to observe the damage done. It was shown on Central
- 9 African TV. So if it was during the battle there will be people killed, we're firing at each
- other, but as to seeing MLC men committing crimes I can't make things up, Counsel.
- 11 Q. You have just mentioned the press. Is it your testimony that you did not even hear
- 12 from the press that the MLC committed crimes in the Central African Republic during the
- 13 October 2002 to March 2003 operation?
- 14 A. I'm going to try and explain things to you a little bit.
- 15 When we retook a town with the MLC, we advanced and behind us the loyalists came and
- set up. There was no way to distinguish between Congolese or Central African, because
- among a number -- you know there are a lot of Central Africans who speak Sango.
- 18 THE INTERPRETER: I am sorry, the witness corrects himself: "Lingala."
- 19 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Plenty of us speak Lingala, so there may be confusion
- 20 because we were all wearing the same uniform, MLC and FACA. They were all wearing
- 21 FACA uniform, so there may be confusion because of the language. But name me a
- 22 battle where no one dies. Any war has consequences. Things are difficult, wherever
- 23 you have a battle. So saying that I saw this, no, I was firmly concentrating on the
- combat.
- 25 MR BIFWOLI:

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- 1 Q. I'm going to talk about another document, and that is CAR-OTP-0042-0255. That's
- 2 document number 40 on the list.
- 3 Now, Mr Witness, this is a correspondence letter dated 7 March 2003 from Gendarmerie
- 4 National Centrafricaine regarding some exactions perpetrated by a group of 40 to 50
- 5 Congolese elements and the wary of the population. "MLC troops are reported to have
- 6 opened gun-fire on USP troops manning the Boali checkpoint. One soldier and a
- 7 number of people were badly injured by MLC troops. A pair of Ranger boots and a
- 8 rocket were looted by the MLC."
- 9 So, Mr Witness, at least USP soldiers can be able to identify MLC, can't they?
- 10 A. As I was saying to you, there was no combat in Boali. The road to Boali is the road
- 11 to Bossembélé, but there was no combat. It was not in combat. It might have happened
- 12 behind me, but not in my presence. I'm telling you what I saw. There was
- 13 confrontation between us in 2002, no. In 2001, perhaps, but not in 2002. I saw nothing
- 14 of that sort.
- 15 Q. I repeat my question: USP soldiers can identify MLC soldiers, can't they?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Yesterday, at transcript T-326bis, English real-time -- I am sorry, I don't have the
- 18 exact lines but I will ask the witness if -- generalise the question.
- 19 Yesterday, Mr Witness do you recall that you -- testifying that you reached PK12 after
- 20 three or four days? Beginning from the 30th, after three or four days you reached PK12;
- 21 do you recall stating that?
- 22 A. Yes, I do.
- 23 Q. So if you do your calculations, conservative estimate would be the earliest you took
- control of PK2 then would have been 3 November 2002; is that not the case?
- 25 A. As I said to you, we took three or four days and I can't recall exactly which, and

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- 1 that's what I said.
- 2 Q. And you still maintain your testimony that you took three or four days from 30
- 3 October 2002 to reach PK12?
- 4 A. Indeed.
- 5 Q. At T-295, English edited transcript, page 9, lines 11 to 18, Defence Witness D-45, a
- 6 senior military commander, testified that they reached PK12 on the 31st. That
- 7 contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 8 A. As I have been saying to you, Counsel, that's what I said and that's what I
- 9 experienced. So I'm talking about what I experienced. They were people, they were
- 10 armed. They were heavily armed and the death squadrons were there and the special
- 11 units. It was a battle. It was a fierce battle. You'd never manage that in one day. So
- 12 I'm telling you what I know.
- 13 I'm not just saying any old thing. I'm talking about combat. And they're not water
- pistols we were firing at each other, it was real weapons that we used to fight the enemy.
- One has to carry out reconnaissance of the terrain, know what the enemy has, how many
- men, what type of weapons. We'd have to have all this intelligence before attacking the
- 17 enemy. You can't do all that in an hour or two; it takes time.
- 18 I know what I'm talking about. I'm not a civilian, I'm military. I know the
- 19 consequences of being in the field. So to say that depends, well, I cannot say what I
- 20 didn't see. I'm telling you about what I know and what I saw, and that's it.
- 21 Q. Again, Mr Witness, at T-295, edited version of the transcript, page 3, lines 15 to 25;
- page 4, lines 1 to 25; page 5, lines 1 to 14, another MLC commander, soldier,
- 23 testified that's D19 testified that fighting started on 30 October 2002 and MLC reached
- 24 PK12 the next day. That again contradicts your testimony, doesn't it?
- 25 A. As I was saying to you, Counsel, I don't want to change what I said. What I told

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- 1 you was what I went through. I fought on -- in the field, and I can't lie to you today. I
- 2 can't do that because of our comrades who fell on the field of honour. I can't lie. I have
- 3 to tell you what I saw, what I know.
- 4 Q. Again, Mr Witness, another document, that is CAR-OTP-0056-278 at 0280, number
- 5 299 on the list, Radio France Internationale reported that Mr Bemba was in PK12 on 2
- 6 November 2002. So is it your testimony that MLC commander-in-chief was in the
- 7 territory of the rebels on 2 November 2002?
- 8 A. That's what I was saying to you, Counsel. What I said was what I said, three or
- 9 four days of combat before retaking PK12. So I don't want to make things up. I said
- 10 what I said. On the terrain there were no French military, no RFI, so it is as I said. I'm
- 11 not making things up.
- 12 Q. Who was responsible for the discipline of MLC troops who were taking part in the
- 13 CAR operation?
- 14 A. As I was telling you, the commander was Moustapha. That's what I said.
- 15 Q. Is your testimony therefore that the discipline of the MLC troops was under
- 16 Commander Moustapha, who was in charge of the discipline of MLC troops?
- 17 A. I said that he was in charge. I'm not a Congolese soldier. I'm not familiar with
- their organisation, their hierarchy. That's not my business. I know what our chain was
- and that's what I told you but, another thing, I don't want to explain to you things that I'm
- 20 not familiar with, the organisation of the MLC. I'm a Central African.
- 21 Q. So you don't know who was in charge of the discipline of the MLC troops, do you?
- 22 A. As I said, I knew the name of their commander. Whether he was responsible for
- 23 discipline or whatever, I don't know.
- 24 Q. And do you know if the CAR authorities were responsible for the discipline of the

25 MLC troops in the CAR?

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- 1 A. It's as I've been saying to you. They were under the orders of Central African
- 2 authorities. That's what I said. That is what I said.
- 3 Q. Can you clarify, Mr Witness? When you say they were under the orders of the
- 4 Central African Republic authorities, this means that the Central African authorities also
- 5 had the authority to take disciplinary action or measures against the MLC who committed
- 6 crimes?
- 7 A. As I was saying, they were under the command of the Central African Republic.
- 8 They arrived and they found us already organised, so they had to be under our orders.
- 9 That's what I know. If they were disciplined, I don't know. I don't know what was in
- 10 people's heads, what their mentality was.
- 11 Q. So if the MLC troops were under the CAR, then it meant that if an MLC soldier
- 12 committed a crime the CAR authorities would have arrested, investigated, probably
- prosecuted or taken action against that soldier? Isn't that not the case?
- 14 A. I cannot tell you anything about that because I do not know anything about it.
- 15 Q. Mr Witness, the evidence before this Court shows that Mr Bemba ordered the arrest,
- investigation, prosecution and even these soldiers were sentenced for crimes that were
- 17 committed in the CAR, so this one shows that he's the one who had authority, doesn't it?
- 18 A. As I was telling you, I'm a FACA, a Central African citizen. I'm not a Congolese. I
- 19 can tell you what happened on the ground when we were merged, but I cannot explain to
- 20 you their own internal organisation. I am not familiar with that. I do not know how
- 21 they do things.
- 22 Q. So you have limited knowledge about how they do their things, don't you?
- 23 A. About the MLC, I know nothing. I am limited there.
- 24 MR BIFWOLI: Madam President, can we go briefly in private session for one question?
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn into private session.

Trial Hearing (Private Session) ICC-01/05-01/08

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- 1 *(Private session at 12.03 p.m.) Reclassified as Open session
- 2 THE COURT OFFICER: We are in private session, Madam President.
- 3 MR BIFWOLI:
- 4 Q. Mr Witness, today you testified that after Lengbe left it is Bombayake who took
- 5 control of the CCOP. Do you recall stating that?
- 6 A. I told you that, given the distrust of the Head of State, General Bombayake had
- 7 taken over command. That is what I said.
- 8 Q. At transcript T-321, French version, edited, page 68, lines 24/25, and page 69, line 11,
- 9 and the English transcript T-321bis, edited, page 10, line 7 to 21, another Defence witness
- 10 testified that he collected -- he was spying on Bombayake and Mazi and he was passing
- on that information to the CCOP. So that would mean that this witness was collecting
- 12 information on Bombayake and passing the same to Bombayake; is that correct?
- 13 A. Listen, Counsel. As I have been telling you, I'm not an intelligence officer. I do
- 14 not know anything about that. I am a soldier. Ask me about the types of weapons they
- were using I will tell you, but regarding intelligence there is the office the B2 intelligence
- office that is in charge of that, so I do not know anything about that. That is what
- somebody else told you, but I do not know that.
- 18 Q. Is it logical that a witness will collect intelligence or spy on Bombayake and report to
- 19 the same Bombayake? Is that logical.
- 20 A. As I was telling you, I cannot say anything about that because I know nothing about
- 21 it. I cannot invent anything that I do not know. What I'm telling you is what I said. I
- 22 can't make up anything, Counsel. I do not know.
- 23 MR BIFWOLI: Madam President, we can go back into public session.
- 24 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn back into open session.

25 (Open session at 12.07 p.m.)

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- 1 THE COURT OFFICER: We are in open session, Madam President.
- 2 MR BIFWOLI: Thank you, Mr Witness. That brings us to the end of questioning by the
- 3 Prosecution, and we thank you for answering our questions and thank you very much.
- 4 That's all, your Honours
- 5 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much, Mr Bifwoli.
- 6 Mr Witness, as you were informed at the beginning of your testimony, the Chamber
- 7 authorised the legal representatives of victims to put some questions to you, and therefore
- 8 I'll give now the floor to Maître Zarambaud.
- 9 Maître Zarambaud, please.
- 10 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) Thank you, Madam President.
- 11 QUESTIONED BY MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation)
- 12 Q. Good afternoon, Mr Witness.
- 13 A. Good afternoon, Counsel.
- 14 Q. Mr Witness, I am Maître Zarambaud Assingambi, lawyer in the courts and tribunals
- of the CAR and I'm a legal representative of victims here at the ICC.
- 16 As the Chamber has informed you I was granted leave to put to you a certain number of
- 17 questions, and in addition to those questions I can ask you what we refer to here as
- 18 "follow-up questions;" that is related to the answers that you have given to questions in
- 19 the courtroom put to you by the Defence and by the OTP.
- 20 Mr Witness, I am a citizen of the CAR and when I ask you a question you may be tempted
- 21 to say, "Look, you really know what happened because you were there," but in fact that
- should not be the case. This is because the questions that we ask here is to shed light on
- 23 the events for the benefit of the Chamber so that the Chamber can base its decisions on the
- 24 truth.
- 25 That said, Mr Witness, my first question relates to the time when you joined the army and

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the areas where you fought, but you have already answered those questions, as well as

- 2 the questions relating to the dressing or the uniforms and foot-wear of the MLC troops,
- 3 but what I would like to know is this: After the MLC soldiers were given uniforms, did
- 4 they have the insignia reflecting their corps and the rank as is the case in the other armies?
- 5 A. Thank you, Counsel. As you are aware, this was a time of crisis. The MLC
- 6 soldiers needed to have uniforms and these uniforms were FACA military uniforms, and
- 7 since you are a Central African citizen you know that FACA uniforms have the insignia
- 8 "FACA," that is Central African Armed Forces, but there were no military ranks. They
- 9 were given FACA uniforms; that is the FACA uniforms were given to the MLC troops.
- 10 Q. Thank you. Regarding the FACA soldiers themselves, during the period did they
- 11 have any insignia, that is reflecting the corps and rank of the soldiers, and this could be
- berets, the colour of the berets and so on and so forth?
- 13 A. As you know, Counsel, during combat even the lieutenant removes his epaulettes so
- 14 as not to be identified, so even that person commanding the unit removes the rank
- 15 insignia. So the FACA did not have any insignia relating to rank on their uniforms so
- that they shouldn't be identified by the enemy. But we were wearing FACA uniforms,
- but those that were going to fight, and I am talking about those who were going to fight
- on the front line, the people of the platoons. I am not talking about those who were
- 19 simply moving about in the neighbourhoods. I am talking about those who fought on
- 20 the battleground.
- 21 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. When you were asked questions about the general
- situation, you referred to the year 2001, and this is transcript 326 of 19 June 2013, page 64,
- 23 lines 19 to 21, and you said, "Let us go back a little bit. In 2001, when General Kolingba's
- coup d'état failed, the Libyan forces arrived in the Central African Republic."
- 25 In order to sort of define the context within which these events took place, after the

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- aborted coup d'état of General Kolingba to which you referred, did the soldier -- did the
- 2 army lose a lot of soldiers?
- 3 A. As I was telling you, during that period part of the army was from the Kolingba
- 4 ethnic group; that is the Yakoma. They fled. Some of them went to Brazzaville, others
- 5 to Cameroon. So some of those soldiers fled. A small proportion of those soldiers fled.
- 6 Q. When you say that the FACA were divided, this division did not concern those who
- 7 had already fled. Is it the FACA who were still on the spot? Are they the ones who
- 8 were divided?
- 9 And the reference is the same transcript, page 66, line 13.
- 10 A. As I was telling you, in 2001, there were many groups trying to carry out a coup
- 11 d'état. You had the group of General Kolingba; the group of the Minister of Defence at
- 12 the time, Démafouth; the group of the Chief of Staff at the time, General Bozizé, so that is
- 13 why I said that there was a division. Each one of them had prepared his coup. That is
- 14 what I said, Counsel.
- 15 Q. That is a clarification for me. What I wanted to know was whether that division
- applied only to those who had remained behind, that is after some soldiers had fled after
- 17 the attempt by General Kolingba.
- Now, did the army lose other soldiers? Did other soldiers leave the army before that
- 19 situation in 2001?
- 20 A. As I told you, there were several coup d'états in the CAR. There were successive
- 21 mutinies. Before 2001 there were other events.
- 22 Q. So this was a very weakened army?
- 23 A. Not weakened, no. No. I do not believe so. I cannot say weakened. If we had
- been weakened, the enemy would have taken over power ever since the events began, so

it was not weakened as such.

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- 1 Q. Mr Witness, that is your analysis and I respect that, but as far as I am concerned,
- 2 when you tell me that there were successive coup d'états and that the army was divided,
- 3 but you say that the army was not weakened despite that, this is your analysis but which I
- 4 do not share.
- 5 Mr Witness, while mentioning the forces involved, you talked about the presidential
- 6 security, SCPS, the CEN-SAD forces. You talked about Miskine's Sarawis. You talked
- 7 about Barril, the French lieutenant, and you talked about the FACA themselves. Wasn't
- 8 there a group led by a certain Mr Gan-Befio?
- 9 A. Let me say this: When I talked about Lionel Gan-Befio, he was working together
- 10 with Paul Barril. That is what I said. Gan-Befio was with Barril.
- 11 Q. Throughout your testimony, Mr Witness -- Madam President, regarding the
- reference to the forces mentioned, it is the same transcript, page 58, lines 20 to 24.
- 13 Throughout your testimony, Mr Witness, you talked about the merger or mixing of the
- 14 MLC troops and the FACA troops. What was the situation with the loyalist forces?
- Was there a merger also amongst the loyalist forces?
- 16 A. As I was telling you, Counsel, when I talk about loyalists, I am referring to those
- 17 who stayed loyal to President Patassé. That is including the militia groups, CEN-SAD,
- 18 Miskine's men, Paul Barril's men, the USP, and FACA. That is what I refer to as the
- 19 loyalists. So it is those groups brought together that I refer to as loyalists, generally
- 20 speaking.
- 21 Q. That is what I think also. The loyalists are all those forces, but when they were
- 22 going to fight, were those loyalist forces joined together? Did they fight as a single group?
- 23 For example, did the Sarawis fight in the same unit with the USP or the FACA? That is
- 24 what I wanted to know.
- 25 A. That is what I was saying. Since they were already mixed together, that was

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- already the situation so as to set up the resistance. If that had not been the case, the
- 2 Zaghawas and the death squads would have taken over power, but thanks to that merger,
- 3 the CEN-SAD, SCPS, the Sarawi forces, FACA, USP, because they came together, we were
- 4 able to stop the attackers until the arrival of the MLC troops. So it was thanks to those
- 5 troops coming together that we were able to stop the attackers. That is what I said,
- 6 Counsel.
- 7 Q. Mr Witness -- in the same transcript, Madam President, and this time page 61, lines
- 8 13 to 15, Mr Witness, you described the Sarawi forces as follows: "The Sarawi forces are
- 9 the former Chadian rebels who followed Abdoulaye Miskine and who work or fight with
- 10 Miskine."
- 11 You also said that was a militia, and you were referring to the SCPS. You said it was a
- militia group made up of the Kabas, the Saras, the Gbayas and the Kodos and the ethnic
- 13 group of the president. Now, with the Sarawi militia group made up of rebels who you
- 14 have said as foreigners Chadians and an ethnic militia group made up of citizens of the
- president's province, Kodos, Saras, and so on and so forth, do you really think that they
- 16 could make up an army that would defeat the enemy?
- 17 A. It is as I told you. It is because of their experience, their courage. Thanks to those
- 18 who were on the ground that we were able to resist the attackers. You saw the evidence.
- 19 It was because of them that we were able to put up resistance. That is what happened.
- 20 We all know that. The Central African people know that. It was thanks to those people
- 21 that we were able to put up resistance to the attackers.
- 22 Q. Mr Witness, as I said at the beginning of my questions, it is not what I know as a
- 23 Central African Republic citizen that is important here. We have to shed light on the
- situation for the Chamber, so we are providing information to the Chamber, and even as a
- 25 CAR citizen but as a legal representative of victims, I do not have the right to testify here;

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- 1 I only have to ask questions.
- 2 Now talking about the rebel troops of General Bozizé, you stated that there were death
- 3 squads and they were Chadians also. So, in the final analysis, it seems that there were
- 4 Chadians on both sides, given that the Sarawis were former Chadian rebels while the
- 5 death squads were also made up of Chadians. So are you telling us that there were
- 6 Chadians on both sides?
- 7 A. That is what I said. I really explained clearly to the Court that is what happened,
- 8 and I think that is what is still happening today. We do not know when it will all end.
- 9 That is what is happening.
- 10 Q. Now, speaking about the period of interest to the Chamber, October 2002 to
- 11 15 March 2003, there were Chadian fighters in Bozizé's camp and Chadian fighters
- 12 amongst the loyalist fighters; is that what you are saying?
- 13 A. Listen, as I was telling you, now who is Abdoulaye Miskine? I want the Court to
- 14 understand what happened; the truth. I cannot invent anything. That is what I said.
- 15 It is what happened and it is what is happening even today, so that is what I said.
- 16 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Sorry, Maître Zarambaud.
- 17 Mr Witness, could you please be so kind in answering the question put by Maître
- 18 Zarambaud in a more objective way? The question is: There were Chadians in both
- 19 sides; is that correct or not? It's a very simple and direct question.
- 20 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, Madam President.
- 21 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much.
- 22 Maître?
- 23 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) Thank you, Madam President.
- Q. So on the same transcript as I quoted earlier, Mr Witness, I'm on page 58, 59 and
- 25 following pages, you gave some rough numbers of making up the loyalists and the

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1 Presidential Guard. You said 300 to 500, SCPS you said about 1,000, CEN-SAD you said

- 2 was about 500, but I didn't hear what you said about the number of troops for Miskine,
- 3 nor for the actual FACA, the ORGP. Can you give us a figure for these two entities?
- 4 A. Well, Counsel, as I was saying, the FACA is the Central African Forces made up of
- 5 regiments, regiments under the General Staff, and a regiment is a military unit which has
- 6 a thousand or upwards.
- 7 But we have more than one regiment under the orders of the General Staff, so to give you
- 8 an exact number I would be telling you an untruth. It's an army. It's not a wardrobe, or
- 9 an armoire. It's an army. So I can't give you an exact number of the strength of the
- 10 FACA, nor of the troops of Abdoulaye Miskine. I can't give you an exact figure. I don't
- 11 want to tell lies to the Court.
- 12 Q. Mr Witness, if we're asking this question it's because a logical analysis is not going
- 13 to be the way of proving things to the Chamber. We want to base ourselves on facts. If
- 14 you take the Chinese army, it has millions of people. The Central African Republic could
- be 10,000. So it would be good for us to have an idea of the strength of the Central
- African Army, but I note that you have no reply to that question. What about the
- 17 number of soldiers that make up the Bozizé rebels?
- 18 A. Well, Counsel, as I said I wasn't with them. I can't make an estimate. I wasn't
- 19 there. I wasn't with them. I don't want to make up a figure because I wasn't with them,
- 20 so I don't know how many he'd recruited. We all know that he was helped by a Chad
- 21 military unit, but I don't know how many made up those units. I can't know that.
- 22 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, I must confess that I couldn't find anything
- 23 laughable in the question put by Maître Zarambaud and so I don't understand why you
- started laughing, but in any case my question and I'm not a military person, as I said it's
- 25 not normal that an army knows the number or the strength of the enemy when you go

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- 1 into a fight? So you went to fight without having any idea on the number of enemies
- 2 you were going to fight?
- 3 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Madam President, it's as I was saying. There's the
- 4 intelligence section that deals with that. There are people who deal with this. There are
- 5 people who get the -- collect the military intelligence so that we know what the strength is,
- 6 type of weapons, the positions they've taken up. That's all covered by them. There's
- 7 military intelligence. They do that, that's their job, but me in the field, a soldier, we have
- 8 commanders who receive information from the General Staff and that is that it -- we are
- 9 just the men in the field. We are given orders once the intelligence has been given on the
- 10 field. That's all I can say to you.
- 11 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Judge Aluoch.
- 12 JUDGE ALUOCH: Mr Witness, on page 57, real-time transcript, you describe the Sarawi
- 13 force as "... those former Chadian rebels who followed Abdoulaye Miskine and who work
- 14 with him." As far as you know, are there any -- were there any Central African people
- amongst the Sarawi, or were they all Chadian rebels as far as you know?
- 16 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, there were Central Africans. It was not only
- 17 Chadians. There were Central Africans there as well.
- 18 JUDGE ALUOCH: Thank you.
- 19 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation)
- 20 Q. Mr Witness, every time you talk about the Bozizé rebels, you talk about the death
- 21 squads. Could you give us some information about what you mean by the death squad?
- 22 A. Designed to die, that's it. The death squad were designated to die. They were
- 23 afraid of nothing. They confronted all dangers. This unit was known as the death
- 24 squad.
- 25 Q. The death squad with the Bozizé rebels reached Bangui, but where had they come

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- 1 from when they arrived in Bangui?
- 2 A. As we all know, after the coup d'état of 28 May, where General Bozizé was accused
- 3 of being part of the coup d'état, when the Prosecutor gave the order to arrest Bozizé at
- 4 home with his men, they fled to Sido. That's what I know. From there they reinforced
- 5 themselves, but I don't know how they did that. I just know that they came from Sido
- 6 and Sido is on the Chadian border. They came from there, but that's all I can say about
- 7 this.
- 8 Q. Do you know how far it is in kilometres from Sido to Bangui?
- 9 A. It's a long way. I don't know how far it is. I just know it's a long way. A long
- 10 way, that's all I know.
- 11 Q. So in these conditions, just before the break, Mr Witness, you were getting quite
- 12 carried away and you described the Central African Army as not being an army of women,
- 13 not being a cupboard of cockroaches and other words I don't want to use here in court
- 14 and other such terms. How can you explain that rebels can leave Sido hundreds of
- 15 kilometres away and arrive in Bangui before there is any response organised?
- 16 A. Well, listen, Counsel. We know, all of us, that before you organise a war you have
- 17 to have contacts in the field, and perhaps they made agreements with people who helped
- 18 them pass through. I don't know. So -- but as they passed through on the way to
- 19 Bangui, as far as the presidential palace, that's what I know, but -- I don't know how they
- 20 left Sido on their way, but -- I don't know, but they came and attacked us, the FACA.
- 21 That's all I know.
- 22 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. With regard to PK12, where you said that the loyalists
- 23 had set up a headquarters the transcript in real-time 326, 326, of 19 June 2013, yesterday,
- 24 at page 68, lines 19 to 21 "We set up a headquarters at the École Begoua. As I'm
- 25 repeating what you say, before taking the road to Damara, as I said, I was there, I was

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- 1 there in person."
- 2 Now, I would like to know whether the MLC had also set up their headquarters in PK12
- 3 at the Begoua school?
- 4 A. That's what I was saying, Counsel. Yesterday I said that we arrived after we'd
- 5 retaken PK12 with the help of the MLC and the FACA. We went to the Begoua school
- 6 because there was space there. We could put -- there was space for our vehicles, for our
- 7 heavy weaponry that we had with us, so there, there was space, with the MLC and the
- 8 FACA together. We were all there at the Begoua school. That's what I said.
- 9 Q. Where were the commanders of the MLC billeted?
- 10 A. I don't want to tell a lie. I will tell you what happened, but to say where they were
- billeted, where they were, I don't know that. I know nothing about that.
- 12 Q. So while you were at PK12, you didn't see the MLC commanders?
- 13 A. I told you, we were all at the Begoua school. The commanders came and they
- 14 commanded at the Begoua school, but whether they were actually accommodated there, I
- don't know. We didn't have the sufficient calm state of mind to take note of all that.
- 16 That's what I said. We had our headquarters at the Begoua school. That's what I said.
- 17 Q. To be clear, Mr Witness, were there MLC commanders who had taken up residence
- in the homes of private individuals?
- 19 A. Well, listen, Counsel, I can't make things up. I've told you what I said and what I
- 20 know. I can't say that I knew where they were sleeping. I -- I don't know.
- 21 Q. How were the MLC troops fed? I believe you've already given a reply in the
- real-time transcript 326 of 19 June. You said that they had an allowance. It's page 43,
- 23 line 1 to 4: "They had an allowance, an allowance given to soldiers in the field during this
- 24 period of deployment, an allowance that one gives to soldiers."
- 25 You also added on page 42, lines 23, 24, "Yes, the troops received the PGA allowance.

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- 1 They were given food and there was even an ambulance."
- 2 Does "PGA" stand for "prime agro-alimentaire" in French or does it stand for "prime
- 3 générale d'alimentation," which would be a general food allowance?
- 4 A. I think we're all going in the same direction. It's an allowance which we give
- 5 to -- which is given to soldiers. That's my way of explaining it. What do you want me
- 6 to say? The PGA is an allowance, military allowance. It's an allowance. So it's up to
- 7 you in the way you understand it.
- 8 Q. Mr Witness, I'm not trying to impose the way I see things, I would just like to know
- 9 what "PGA" stands for. So, they were given this PGA and food as well, if I read lines 23,
- 10 24 that I quoted earlier.
- 11 Did you hear me, Mr Witness?
- 12 A. Yes, indeed, I did hear you. But as I was saying, there were a number of stages.
- 13 There was a stage where they arrived, the support regiment. They had to be given
- sardines and bread, food. There were stages, as I said, but there were stages. For
- 15 example, when they arrived in Kaga-Bandoro, we could no longer take them bread and
- sardines, we had to give them an allowance. That's what I was saying, Counsel.
- 17 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. So with troops from Sudan, Libya, and a third country the
- name of which I'm looking for right now, you said in the transcription, page 54, line 6 -- or
- 19 lines 8 and 9, you said that Libyan aircraft were dropping bombs. You could say bombs
- 20 or small missiles. So, with an army that was not weakened, which was very strong, that
- one couldn't refer to as an army of women, and with Libyans dropping bombs, why was it
- 22 necessary to bring Bemba's troops?
- 23 A. That's what I was saying. I'm not Patassé. I can't reply. It wasn't -- it was his
- 24 decision, his decision to invite the MLC troops. It wasn't their idea, either. They were
- 25 called as reinforcements, so I can't reply. I know nothing, and I don't want to speak on

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behalf of the late lamented Ange-Félix. I can't lie. If he was still alive today, he would

- 2 be able to answer that question.
- 3 Q. I thought that the Central African soldiers, who were strong, who were not
- 4 weakened, might have had their own ideas about the decision to bring them a crutch
- 5 when they were marching quite capably. So I thought you would have an idea, but I will
- 6 now move on to something else.
- 7 You said just before the break that the Central African army, and you repeated, was a big
- 8 army and the others only came to lend a hand. I don't really quite understand why, if
- 9 the MLC militia were only there to help, when there was a merger, took -- there was one
- 10 Central African platoon with two MLC platoons, because the FACA were more numerous.
- 11 It was the army of a country, they was not weakened, whereas the MLC was the army of
- 12 the rebellion. Well, I think perhaps "militia" would be a better term. Army is a state
- 13 force. So you have one Central African platoon and two MLC platoons. Can you
- 14 explain that to me?
- 15 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, Mr Haynes.
- 16 MR HAYNES: That's not the evidence that the witness gave. It's also not an authorised
- 17 question, and I'm struggling to see that it's a question at all rather than just a comment or
- 18 how it's in the interest of Mr Zarambaud's clients.
- 19 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I thought your objection would be in another sense,
- 20 Mr Haynes. The point on relevance is for the Chamber to decide. But, Maître
- 21 Zarambaud, I would like to see and to check the reference that the proportion was the two
- 22 MLC peleton to one Central African platoon.
- 23 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) Transcript of 18th of the 6th, 2013, paragraph 71,
- 24 lines 1 and 2.
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you. You can proceed.

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- 1 MR HAYNES: Sorry, what's the transcript reference to, French, English, real-time,
- 2 edited?
- 3 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) The edited version of the French transcript.
- 4 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître Zarambaud, I asked you for the reference because
- 5 what we have in the English transcript is exactly the opposite. The English transcript
- 6 says that it was two Central African platoons to one MLC platoon, so maybe we have a
- 7 problem here with transcripts. So maybe it's better if we ask the witness to confirm how
- 8 the troops were merged.
- 9 What was the proportion?
- 10 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) As I said yesterday, Madam President, I said that they
- 11 were mixed, two Central African platoons with one Congolese platoon. That's what I
- said, but what you said was not what I said yesterday.
- 13 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you for the clarification. Probably there was a
- 14 problem with the transcript.
- 15 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) What I read was exactly what was in the French
- 16 transcription.
- 17 Q. Mr Witness, I'm going to move on to some follow-up questions. You stated that
- 18 General Bombayake stayed close to the president. The real-time transcript of 19
- 19 June yesterday page 49, lines 21 to 24, you said, "Bombayake stayed with the president,
- 20 so he controlled everything by communications and walkie-talkie. So having retaken
- 21 PK12 General Bombayake arrived, but not during the time of the combat. He arrived
- 22 once peace had returned."
- 23 So my question is as follows: Did -- was the accused, Bemba, able to join his
- 24 troops -- able to communicate with his troops by radio or walkie-talkie and the other way

25 round?

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1 A. That's what I was saying, Counsel. With Bemba and his -- with regards Bemba and

- 2 his troops I can't say anything, I know nothing about that, but I did tell you what I said
- 3 that the combat was led -- before we left PK12 on the way to Damara, we got orders that
- 4 way with communications radios. We -- the support regiment was given
- 5 communications radios and walkie-talkies up to PK12, but from PK12 onwards we had
- 6 the communications radios and the Thuraya. I said -- I didn't say that General
- 7 Bombayake was in the field during the combat at PK12. I didn't say that. I didn't say
- 8 that.
- 9 Q. Mr Witness, I did not say that either. It is just that, since from Bangui he could give
- 10 instructions to his soldiers on the field, my question was: Could Bemba's soldiers in the
- 11 field also receive orders from their supreme commander, who was Bemba, or report to
- 12 him? That was my question. I did not question what you said. You had constantly
- stated that Bombayake always stayed by the side of the president.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître Zarambaud, what -- this question would ask the
- 15 witness just to speculate. Maybe you could move to your next question, because it
- 16 would be just a speculation.
- 17 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) Your Honour, what I wanted to know was
- 18 whether to his knowledge Bemba's soldiers in the field reported to Bemba, or whether
- 19 Bemba also gave them orders.
- 20 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: This way of formulating the question is more
- 21 appropriate.
- 22 Can you answer, Mr Witness?
- 23 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Your Honour, I do not know anything about that side
- 24 of things. I do not know.
- 25 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation)

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- 1 Q. Mr Witness, I will ask you one of my last few questions. You testified that you
- 2 advanced on three axes, Boy-Rabé, Fouh, Gobongo and PK12, and then another axis
- 3 towards the airport; is that correct?
- 4 A. That was my testimony.
- 5 Q. As a result, you did not witness what might have happened in Boy-Rabé, or on the
- 6 other axis or road towards the airport; is that correct?
- 7 A. That is correct.
- 8 Q. And so if the ALC soldiers committed offences in Boy-Rabé, you wouldn't be able to
- 9 say anything about that because you were not there?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. The same thing would apply to the road to the airport; that is regarding Miskine,
- 12 Miskine's fighters and the others?
- 13 A. That is correct.
- 14 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Lastly, Mr Witness, for you who were in the field, how
- did it happen that the loyalist forces were defeated?
- 16 A. I did not quite grasp your question, Counsel.
- 17 Q. My question to you was this: Despite the diversity of the composition of the
- loyalist forces, how did it happen that Bozizé's rebellion was triumphant on
- 19 15 March 2003?
- 20 A. Counsel, as you know, the stronger side will always win, and if General Bozizé
- 21 received more sophisticated equipment, if he received reinforcements, that is normal,
- because during that period the Head of State was not there. He did what he could do to
- 23 put up a resistance. He lost power. That was destiny.
- 24 THE INTERPRETER: From the interpreter: The sound quality continues to deteriorate.
- 25 MR ZARAMBAUD: (Interpretation) Mr Witness, thank you for kindly answering all

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- 1 my questions.
- 2 Your Honour, I have no further questions.
- 3 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much, Maître Zarambaud.
- 4 Mr Witness, now Maître Douzima Lawson, also a legal representative of victims in this
- 5 case, is going to put some questions to you.
- 6 Maître Douzima, you have the floor.
- 7 MS DOUZIMA LAWSON: (Interpretation) Thank you, Madam President.
- 8 QUESTIONED BY MS DOUZIMA LAWSON: (Interpretation)
- 9 Q. Good afternoon, Mr Witness.
- 10 A. Good afternoon, Maître Edith.
- 11 Q. It would be better if you say "Maître Douzima," or just "Maître." Do we agree on
- 12 that?
- 13 A. Very well.
- 14 Q. I would like to say that I share Mr Zarambaud's observations about your role and
- our role as legal representatives of victims in this case.
- 16 Let me introduce myself. I am Maître Marie-Edith Douzima Lawson and, apart from
- being the legal representative of victims in this case in which you are testifying, I'm a
- lawyer in the CAR Bar and I am a citizen of the Central African Republic.
- 19 Mr Witness, you stated on several occasions that you took part in the fighting and that
- 20 you were on the front line. Can you explain how the operations in the field were
- organised during the fighting; that is jointly of course with the MLC troops?
- 22 A. Very well, I will explain it to you.
- 23 Q. I am listening. Please proceed.
- 24 THE COURT OFFICER (via video link): Madam President, this is the courtroom officer.
- 25 If it is okay, we will disconnect the call for just a few seconds and then redial again in

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- order to improve the quality of the output and the video too.
- 2 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Yes, please, Mr Rojas.
- 3 Mr Witness, can you hear me?
- 4 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, I can hear you, your Honour.
- 5 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I'll give back the floor to Maître Douzima, and I ask
- 6 please the court interpreters to let me know whether the quality of the sound improved?
- 7 Maître Douzima, I think it's better if you repeat your question, please.
- 8 MS DOUZIMA LAWSON: (Interpretation) Very well, your Honour.
- 9 Q. Mr Witness, my question was as follows: You stated on several occasions that you
- 10 took part in the fighting, that you were on the front line. Can you briefly explain to us
- 11 how operations on the field in the company or alongside the MLC were organised?
- 12 A. As I was saying, there were two CAR platoons that were put together with one
- 13 Congolese platoon. Now, what happens in a platoon? A platoon is a military unit
- 14 made up of two sections. And what is a section? A section is a military unit made up of
- 15 two teams and a team is a military unit composed of 16 men. You have team
- 16 commanders, you have section commanders and platoon commanders. So, in a section
- 17 you have a fire team and a shock team, so that is one team with light weapons and
- another team with heavy weaponry. That is how it happened.
- 19 Q. Were the MLC and FACA platoons mixed or together on the ground in the field?
- 20 A. As I told you, Counsel, there was a merger between the FACA and MLC platoons.
- 21 Q. Very well. In which language did the FACA communicate amongst themselves?
- 22 A. Amongst us, there are FACA soldiers who of course speak Lingala. There are
- 23 FACA who speak Sango and other FACA who also speak French. Amongst the MLC
- 24 soldiers, there were some who spoke Lingala and others who also spoke French. I do not

25 know whether I have made myself clear.

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- 1 Q. Mr Witness, you did not answer my question. Let me rephrase. Amongst the
- 2 FACA soldiers, which language did you use to communicate, that is amongst yourselves?
- 3 A. On the ground, it depends. We received issues from the command and we spoke
- 4 in Sango, but there were some FACA amongst us who also spoke Lingala.
- 5 Q. And when you were addressing members of the population, which language did
- 6 you use?
- 7 A. During or after the fighting?
- 8 Q. During or after.
- 9 A. Because during the fighting the population went into hiding because of stray bullets,
- so during the fighting it is not possible to speak with the members of the population, but
- after the fighting the FACA would address members of the population in Sango.
- 12 Q. Which language did the MLC soldiers use amongst themselves?
- 13 A. As I was telling you, it was by habit. After we familiarise ourselves with
- 14 themselves -- with them. After liberating a territory, they had their friends, they would
- talk about their things, we would talk about our things. But during the fighting, we were
- 16 united.
- 17 Q. Mr Witness, my question is clear. A short while ago you said that amongst your
- 18 FACA and I do not know what you were talking about I asked what language you used.
- 19 You told me that you were using Sango. Now, I'm asking you when -- since you were
- 20 together with MLC troops, which language did they use to communicate amongst
- 21 themselves?
- 22 A. As I was telling you Counsel, after the fighting, after having taken measures, friends
- 23 can speak. So they were speaking Lingala and we were speaking Sango.
- Q. And between you, that is the FACA and the MLC, which language did you use?
- 25 A. That is what I was telling you, Counsel. There are FACA soldiers who speak

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- 1 Lingala and there are MLC soldiers who speak French. This means that we could
- 2 understand each other very well. It depended on which individual you wanted to speak
- 3 with.
- 4 Q. I have understood you very well, Mr Witness.
- 5 In the hearing of 18 June 2013, real-time transcript 325, page 79, lines 14 to 18, you stated
- 6 that "When the MLC soldiers arrived, there was an emergency meeting, and during that
- 7 meeting the president gave the order for the MLC men to be given uniforms, because
- 8 what they had brought as uniforms were not comfortable."
- 9 What do you mean by that? Why were those uniforms not comfortable?
- 10 A. When I said that they were not comfortable, it is because there was a problem.
- 11 Some of them simply had military trousers and were wearing T-shirts. Others were
- wearing boots, but dressed in civilian clothing. Some of them were wearing military
- tops and jeans trousers, so for military purposes and to avoid confusion amongst the
- troops, it was necessary to provide uniforms so as to be able to recognise friendly soldiers.
- 15 Q. This means therefore that the FACA and MLC soldiers were wearing the same
- 16 uniform and foot-wear?
- 17 A. That is correct, Counsel.
- 18 Q. Does that mean that all MLC soldiers received military uniforms from FACA?
- 19 That is all of them, they received uniforms and Ranger boots?
- 20 A. As I told you, all those who were there received uniforms and Ranger boots.
- 21 Q. Mr Witness --
- 22 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Sorry to interrupt, just to follow up this last answer.
- 23 Mr Witness, only the MLC troops received uniforms and boots from FACA? Or the
- other troops, like Miskine, CEN-SAD, et cetera, they also received uniforms and boots

25 from FACA, or were they wearing different uniforms?

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- 1 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Madam President, as I was explaining to you, initially
- 2 the CEN-SAD forces had been there ever since 2001. The SCPS troops were there, had
- 3 been there for a long time, but the MLC troops had just arrived, and as I have told you,
- 4 they needed to have FACA uniforms. But the SCPS and the other troops had been there
- 5 for a long time. They were in FACA uniforms.
- 6 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: And Miskine troops as well?
- 7 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, they were all in FACA uniforms.
- 8 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: And Bozizé's troops?
- 9 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) No, Bozizé's troops had their own organisation.
- 10 They had their own way of recognising themselves, but they did not have our uniforms.
- 11 Some of them were in civilian clothes, but they were not wearing our uniforms.
- 12 THE INTERPRETER: The sound is getting bad again.
- 13 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: But part of Bozizé's troops were composed by former
- 14 FACA soldiers that fled with Bozizé, isn't it?
- 15 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) That is correct, your Honour.
- 16 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: And then when they followed Bozizé, they didn't get
- 17 their uniforms with them, or their weapons?
- 18 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) That is what I was telling you. Since General Bozizé
- 19 was fleeing, he fled with some men and those men were armed. It was near Chad, in
- 20 Sido, that they received reinforcements. That was their own organisation. I don't know
- 21 how they were organised, but at least they did not have our uniforms. Maybe some of
- 22 them could have kept the former uniforms that they had had, but I cannot imagine what
- 23 they had.
- 24 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître Douzima, we have only two or three minutes and
- 25 interpreters are saying that the quality of the sound is deteriorating, so if you don't mind,

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- 1 we could suspend right now for the lunch-break and you continue after the lunch-break, if
- 2 that's fine with you.
- 3 MS DOUZIMA LAWSON: (Interpretation) That is very convenient for me, your
- 4 Honour.
- 5 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much.
- 6 Mr Witness, we will have now our lunch-break. It's almost 1.30. We'll be back at
- 7 3 o'clock.
- 8 The hearing is suspended.
- 9 THE COURT USHER: All rise.
- 10 (Recess taken at 1.27 p.m.)
- 11 (Transcription of the hearing continues in Transcript:
- 12 ICC-01/05-01/08-T-327bis-CONF-ENG)
- 13 RECLASSIFICATION REPORT
- 14 Pursuant to Trial Chamber III 's Orders, ICC-01/05-01/08-2223 and
- 15 ICC-01/05-01/08-3038, the version of the transcript with its redactions
- 16 becomes Public.