

ANNEX 1

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BLUE LINES

In Africa, respect for the elders lives on. This week the African airwaves buzzed with accolades to two sons of Africa, Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and with homages to an adopted son, Basil Davidson.

The celebration of Madiba's 92nd birthday on 18 July was especially poignant in the wake of his granddaughter's death in a car crash a month ago and the spectacular success of South Africa's hosting of the World Cup, for which Mandela had campaigned.

To widespread regret, Archbishop Tutu, 79, has announced that he is to retire from public engagements. He was a leading public critic of apartheid in South Africa while Mandela was serving a 27-year gaol sentence. The link between the two men will continue as Tutu will work one day a week with The Elders, a group established by Mandela to help address international crises.

The 10 July death of British historian and journalist Basil Davidson at the age of 95 has prompted a flurry of tributes from readers of his pioneering contributions to African history.

After leaving school at 16, Davidson was a journalist in Paris before joining the British secret service to work with anti-fascists in Eastern Europe during the Second World War. His critique of apartheid made him a 'prohibited immigrant' to South Africa; he was best-known for his prolific documentation – in some 30 books – of pre-colonial African history.

GHANA/UNITED STATES

Storm in an oil barrel

A commercial dispute between the government and a US oil company has become diplomatically damaging – so President Mills is looking for a way out

The grand launch of Ghana's commercial oil production this year has begun inauspiciously with a bruising battle between the government and the state oil company on one hand and American oil company Kosmos Energy on the other (AC Vol 51 No 7). Kosmos had announced last September that it wanted to sell its stake in the country's Jubilee oil field to the giant ExxonMobil corporation in an exclusive deal for US\$4.2 billion.

Since then, President **John Atta Mills**'s government has blocked the deal, initially because of a complex dispute between the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation and Kosmos about the company's use of Ghana's geophysical data in the sale negotiations.

Yet the affair has taken a further political, and even geopolitical, twist. This year, Attorney General **Betty Mould-Iddrissu** has charged Kosmos's local partners, EO Group, with contravening corporate and anti-corruption laws. EO, which drew up the original petroleum agreement, had brought Kosmos to Ghana and secured a 3.5% interest in the West Cape Three Points oil block which it helped Kosmos to negotiate with the GNPC in 2004.

In a further complication, the two EO directors, **George Owusu** and **Kwame Bawuah Edusei**, are friends of former President **John Agyekum Kufuor**, under whose government their oil contract was secured, and strong supporters of his New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Should the Kosmos sale go through, Owusu, Edusei and any other beneficial shareholders in EO may gain \$200 million and so become Ghana's first oil

multimillionaires. Many loyalists in Mills's National Democratic Congress fear that Owusu and Edusei may use the windfall to fund the NPP's next election campaign and secure a huge advantage over the incumbent but financially shaky NDC.

Such concerns prompted America's Anadarko, which works in Ghana, to commission a due diligence report on EO's relations with GNPC and the government. Anadarko sent the 1,200-page report by Washington lawyers Willkie Farr & Gallagher to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) to check whether any US company in Ghana would violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act if they went into partnership with EO.

THE LAWYERS' TALE

After that, the DOJ launched a nine-month investigation into Kosmos and EO operations. This June, the DOJ told both companies it had completed investigations and would not pursue a prosecution. However, Mould-Iddrissu says she has enough evidence to prosecute EO.

Although GNPC categorically rejected the Kosmos sale to ExxonMobil in June, both US companies maintained direct contact with the government. Last week, at meetings with Mills's team in Osu Castle, ExxonMobil put forward new proposals which appear to have persuaded Mills to give them another hearing. Under pressure from both detractors and promoters of the ExxonMobil deal, Mills has formed a committee to examine the options and report back within the month.

Some insiders claim that setting up the committee is a tactical defeat for GNPC

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
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THE 3.8 BILLION DOLLAR QUESTION

Aside from the party political rivalries, geopolitics and diplomatic jousting involved in the Kosmos Energy debacle in **Ghana**, there is a central concern: that the government stands to earn at least US\$3.8 billion more in tax under the terms negotiated with **Ireland's** Tullow Oil for the Deepwater Tano block than it will for the West Cape Three Points block negotiated with Kosmos. Given that the two blocks are similar in production potential, the obvious question is 'Why?'

Both contracts were negotiated under President **John Agyekum Kufuor** and the previous board of directors at the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, chaired by **Stephen Sekyere-Abankwa**. Critics of the deal on the newly appointed GNPC board, chaired by **Ato Ahwoi**, are concerned at the way in which Kosmos and its local partners, EO Group, whose directors are **George Owusu** and **Kwame Bawuah Edusei**, secured what they regard as preferential terms.

At the time of the negotiations between Kosmos-EO and GNPC, Edusei was on the executive committee of the New Patriotic Party (then in office in Accra) in North America and subsequent to the signing, Kufuor appointed him Ambassador to Geneva and then to Washington. Kufuor freely admits that Owusu and Edusei are good acquaintances and he awarded them both the highest civilian honour, the Order of the Volta, before he retired in January 2009. Abankwa, who is Managing Director of Prudential Bank in Accra, is one of Kufuor's closest business associates; Kufuor appointed him to chair both the GNPC and the State Transport Corporation.

Kosmos officials reject any allegations that cronyism or political links (which would have contravened the **United States** Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) enabled it to secure substantially better terms than Tullow. 'It's simply a question of market forces, we were there first and we took the biggest risks when no one else was willing to come in,' a Kosmos official told *Africa Confidential*. He said that Amerada Hess, whom no one has accused of having local political connections, was able to secure even better terms than Kosmos; that was mainly, he said, because the block secured by Hess was in deeper water than the West Cape Three Points block and more technically challenging.

The oil consultancy Wood McKenzie has produced one of the clearest analyses of the difference between the terms negotiated by Kosmos and Tullow Oil and concludes that over the life of the oil blocks in 2007-2042, the West Cape Three Points block (negotiated by Kosmos) will pay some \$3.61 bn. in additional petroleum tax and the Deepwater Tano block (Tullow) will pay \$7.44 bn. in additional petroleum tax. This tax is calculated on a formula which triggers higher payments at higher rates of return. The tax applies once the oil-producing companies have met all their operating and capital costs. Kosmos and EO were able to secure a higher tax threshold than Tullow, which will allow the producing companies on the West Cape Three Points block to keep more of their profits.

However, it means that the selling price of the Kosmos stake is also important for Ghana's tax collectors. The higher the price the new entrant pays – ExxonMobil has offered \$4.2 bn. – the more the new owner can claim in costs and so reduce its liabilities for the additional petroleum tax. Although Kosmos say the real market value of its stake is \$5-6 bn., officials in GNPC dispute this and pitch it much lower. That would also suit GNPC's strategy of trying to find a rival buyer and increase its own equity stake in the block. Given that it could determine billions of dollars of tax liabilities, fixing a fair market price for the Kosmos stake is of central interest to the Ghana government. That will make it all the more difficult for President **John Atta Mills's** committee to reach a speedy conclusion on the matter. ●

but others say Mills wants to spread the blame for the final decision by taking the widest possible soundings. Whatever he decides, he will face organised opposition. If he approves the Kosmos-EO sale, his own NDC supporters will slam him for rubber-stamping a Kufuor-era deal which might hugely benefit his political opponents. Yet if Mills rejects the deal, he will face opprobrium from the NPP and many business people, who were hoping for substantial commercial gains if ExxonMobil comes to Ghana.

Mills and his government would have to be convinced that any alternative strategy to the Kosmos-ExxonMobil sale would generate more revenue and contribute more effectively to the integrated oil and gas industry the government wants.

In turn, this pressures the committee to produce a convincing conclusion and strategy to break the impasse. This week, it discussed the ExxonMobil offer in detail; next week it is likely to hear the terms of a possible offer from **Norway's** Statoil in conjunction with the **China** National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).

Few details have emerged about the Statoil-CNOOC offer but it is thought to include financing provisions for downstream development, such as a refinery and a petrochemical plant, and a mechanism to allow GNPC to take another 3% equity in the Jubilee field.

Mills has pulled together an experienced group with some past and present NDC ministers. Chairing the committee is the former World Bank Vice-President and current Executive Director of the International Growth Centre at the London School of Economics, **Gobind Nankani**. Alongside him are former Finance Minister **Kwesi Botchwey**, former Prime Minister **Paul Victor Obeng**, Trade Minister **Hannah Tetteh** and GNPC Director **Kyeretwie Opoku**.

The committee may wonder how a commercial dispute between GNPC and a small US oil company escalated into a dispute that risks damaging diplomatic relations between the two countries. Just over a year ago, US President **Barack Obama** chose Ghana for his first official African trip. Addressing Parliament in Accra, Obama praised Ghana's record on governance and economic reform.

Yet in March, *The Wall Street Journal*

ran an opinion piece entitled 'Ghana beats up on its biggest foreign investors'. It argued that GNPC's opposition to the Kosmos deal was 'capricious government meddling' and the 'kind of official thuggery more frequently associated with Nigeria'.

Near the centre of this campaign is veteran Washington lobbyist **Riva Levinson**, who successfully managed press relations in the USA for **Jonas Savimbi's União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola** rebels in the 1980s and early 1990s. Some Ghanaians are amusing themselves by circulating an unedited

promotional video in which Levinson declares: 'We are either a problem-solver or a troublemaker...I have a company in Ghana, an oil and gas company that went and invested a billion dollars. Now the government of Ghana has changed the terms of the original agreement... for somebody like Kosmos Energy it's knowing that I can go to the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the head of the International Financial Corporation [which has lent Kosmos more than \$100 mn.], members of Congress and get them to advocate on the company's behalf.'

Behind the bluster, Ghana is losing time and revenue as the Kosmos/EO saga drags on, along with the chance to shape its own oil and gas development plan as global demand rises sharply. If Ghana makes the right choices it could develop into the region's second-biggest oil centre, offering industry services and expertise to several new oil producers along the West African seaboard. Get it wrong, as Energy Minister **Joe Oteng-Adjei** warns, and Ghana will join the already populous ranks of badly managed oil-producing states in Africa. ●

KENYA

More gluttony

An attempt by MPs to vote themselves a fat pay rise comes unstuck – the Treasury is running out of money

Last month's vote by Kenyan members of parliament to augment their already handsome salaries is hitting political and financial roadblocks. Treasury officials say it is not affordable and the massive allocation of resources to recurrent spending makes no sense for the country's economic development. For many Kenyans outside the political elite, it would be obscene to reward the politicians who presided over three months of violence after the 2007 elections, at a cost of 1,500 lives and over US\$1 billion.

Although the MPs happily voted for the recommendations of a commission under retired Justice **Akilano Akiwumi** to increase monthly salaries and perks to 1.2 million Kenya shillings from KSh850,000, Finance Minister **Uhuru Kenyatta** says he has no funds available for the increase and is refusing to table the three bills that would turn the MPs' vote into law. In response, politicians are threatening to block the Finance and Appropriations Bill, a move that could paralyse government if it is not passed by the end of August.

Exercising its muscle, Parliament has already scuttled an adjournment motion before the 4 August referendum on the constitution (AC Vol 51 No 13). MPs are in a huge rush to push through the recommended increases before then. If the new constitution passes, matters having to do with their pay would be taken out of their hands and turned over to a Salaries and Remuneration Commission. Moreover, the lion's share of MPs' salaries and perks is currently tax-free but up to three-quarters of MPs' total take-home package would be taxed under the new constitution.

The difference between what parliamentarians now receive and their recommended increase would cover the

proposed levies on their wages and perks.

Hence, they argue that their pay would remain the same, even though they would also gain something from the increase. Many MPs insist that after deductions for loans and other expenditure, including paying off what they borrowed for their last political campaigns, their actual take-home pay is miniscule. Most Kenyans think they should be less greedy and learn to live within their vast means.

Apart from their salaries, Kenyan MPs have perks and allowances for just about everything, including duty-free vehicles, car maintenance, housing, entertainment, communication, transport and 'sitting allowances'. Kenyans are not amused by the bleating. Most ordinary people make just over \$2 a day or \$730 a year – less than two days of each MP's new proposed increased sitting allowances.

UNIONS THREATEN STRIKES

Kenya's Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU), supported by its teachers' and nurses' unions and civil society organisations, are horrified by the unremitting gluttony of those they voted for and are threatening to strike. With the proposed increases, the salaries and perks of MPs for one term of Parliament alone come to about KSh27.3 bn., more than the allocation for free primary education.

This is greater than what government now spends on antiretroviral AIDS medication, according to one Kenyan daily. The total annual wage bill for MPs would go up from KSh2.2 bn. to KSh4.3 bn., a massive increase in the government's recurrent expenditure.

The increases for ordinary MPs would leave their Kenyan counterparts with twice what MPs in **France** and **Sweden** earn, in spite of the vast differences between those

countries' and Kenya's gross domestic product.

The new monthly salaries for other senior officials would be KSh3.246 mn. for the Prime Minister, who is opposed to the suggested raises, KSh2.796 mn. for the Vice-President, KSh2.766 mn. for the Speaker, KSh1.841 mn. for the Deputy Speaker and KSh1.891 mn. for the two deputy prime ministers, with all the suggested changes being made retroactive to May 2008.

The pay package for the Prime Minister is a third higher than the salary of **Britain's** Premier and 10% more than that of the **United States** President. Another draft bill in the works proposes vast pension hikes for the President, PM, VP and Speaker, which would give them retirement packages of 80% of their final pay, with huge perks for them, their spouses and children.

This is Kenya's third recommendation for a salary increase since 2002. One of the first acts of the 2003 Parliament was to raise MPs' salaries and perks from KSh395,033 to KSh851,000, plus an additional KSh366,000 for a mileage allowance. Just before the death knell sounded on the 9th Parliament in 2007, MPs awarded themselves another KSh1.5 mn. retroactive gratuity allowance each, consisting of KSh300,000 for each of the five years served. Most think this is already much too much.

These pay increases have huge negative implications for Kenya's fiscal future, since if the constitution passes, the number of constituencies will increase by 80 and there will also be more nominated MPs, as there are provisions for special seats for women and disabled people.

In addition, there will be 47 new senators and governors as well as other elected officials lower down, all of whom will take note of the salary increases demanded by the current batch of MPs and will want something comparable. The salaries and perks of MPs, civil servants and teachers, amongst others, will eat up 70% of Kenya's total budget in 2010, leaving little left for development-oriented spending. ●

SOUTH AFRICA

Zuma's first-term casualties

With dissenting ministers and departing civil servants, President Jacob Zuma faces a tough return to workaday politics

Someone in President **Jacob Zuma's** office has read a management textbook and reproduced chunks of it as government policy. Ahead of his post-World Cup cabinet 'lekgotla' (big meeting) on 19-20 July, President Zuma sent all his ministers a paper telling them he wanted a 'new programme of action' for the rest of his presidential term, with an 'outcomes-based' approach centring on 12 'priority areas', for which delivery targets will be set. The core items are job-creation, rural development, education, crime, economic development and skills. Ministers would sign performance agreements committing them to deliver. **Collins Chabane**, the Minister for Monitoring and Evaluation, would watch progress. He used to be a singer and is not taken seriously by the cabinet colleagues whose performance he would monitor.

The only ministers to sign the performance contracts were the President's close allies – **S'bu Ndebele** (Transport), **Sicelo Shiceka** (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs), **Lindiwe Sisulu** (Defence) and **Nathi Mthethwa** (Police). Others, such as **Barbara Hogan** (Public Enterprises), demanded that their contracts be more suitably reworded. A senior official said that those who signed the original contracts knew that Zuma's friends would face no sanction in the event that they failed to deliver.

NO AGREEMENT

The new arrangements place ministries in 'clusters'. We hear that the economic cluster could not agree on a joint programme. Ministers within it – **Ebrahim Patel** (Economic Development), **Pravin Gordhan** (Finance), **Rob Davies** (Trade and Industry), **Trevor Manuel** (National Planning) and Hogan – vigorously defend their own turf. The cabinet meeting was supposed to agree on an 'alternative' economic growth path. Instead, each economic minister will now pursue his or her own plans, without any overall coordination.

The big disagreements are between ministers from the opposing camps in the African National Congress's tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party. All the performance contracts aspire to create jobs, especially for the young. **Lindiwe**

Sisulu, Zuma's close ally, has proposed using the army for a youth volunteer scheme. She belongs to the nationalist/business/populist wing of the ANC, which includes the ANC Youth League. **Gordhan**, the Finance Minister, proposes that young unemployed people could be paid less and that companies employing them would receive government subsidies. **Ebrahim Patel** and the leaders of Cosatu and the SACP reject this scheme on the grounds that it would create a two-tier labour market. So far, Zuma has said nothing and the debate continues. Many ministers are anyway reluctant to commit to new strategies until after the ANC's National General Council discusses existing policies in September. They fear that the Council will come up with new and different schemes, as Cosatu and the SACP have already said they intend to do.

Zuma's Presidential Office includes three full ministers, Chabane, Patel and Manuel, but the Office itself is falling apart. The President's economic advisor, security advisor and political advisor are all leaving, along with the chief operating officer, director general, head of communications, spokesman and head of support services.

● **Mandisi Mpahlwa**, Economic Advisor, will become the Ambassador to **Russia**. This means that for one of the President's key priorities, economic development, he will not have an economic advisor. Zuma did not see eye to eye with Mpahlwa.

● **Welile Nhlapo**, Security Advisor, is seeking a diplomatic post. He was a close ally of former President **Thabo Mbeki** and Zuma's allies do not trust him. So another priority area, crime prevention, will have no one to drive it.

● **Charles Nqakula**, Political Advisor, is on his way out; like the other two, he felt Zuma sidelined him.

● **Vusi Mona**, Director General of Communications, has been 'redeployed' to the Government Communications and Information Services. He led the media team which had to deal with the President's sexual controversies.

● **Vusi Mavimbela**, Director General in the Presidency, a close ally of Mbeki, quit because some of Zuma's allies complained that he shut them off from the President. The offer of an ambassadorship could persuade him to depart quietly.

● **Thozzi Gwanya**, Director General in the Department of Rural Development, resigned over 'policy differences' with the Minister for Rural Development and Land Reform, **Gugile Nkwinti**, who is trying to persuade him to stay on. The Department was created by Zuma when he began his term in office in April last year.

● **Vincent Magwenya**, Zuma's Spokesman, says he has discovered that his niche is really in the private sector. **Steyn Speed**, chief of Support Services in the Presidency, says he is going to study. **Joel Netshitenzhe**, Director General of Policy Coordination in the Presidency, was forced out late last year. **Jessie Duarte**, the former Chief Operating Officer, left because she felt Zuma did not heed her advice.

QUEEN LAKELA

The head of Zuma's private office, **Lakela Kaunda**, appears to be the President's most trusted employee. However, without senior officers the office cannot function properly and it takes about three months to confirm an appointment in the Public Service. Some of those who are leaving resented the pre-eminence of Zuma's close advisors, which include the **Shaik** brothers, especially **Mo** and **Yunus**, and Zuma's lawyer **Michael Hulley**. Zuma sent Yunus Shaik to negotiate the departure of the former Eskom Chief Executive, **Jacob Maroga**, usually a task for a minister.

The Department of Labour has suspended **Jimmy Manyi**, its Director General, for using his position to secure government deals. Communications Minister **Siphiwe Nyanda**, another of Zuma's close allies, has been fighting with his Director General, **Mamodupi Mohlala**, who refused to sign off tenders going to supporters of the Minister.

We hear that the President is considering a cabinet reshuffle to reboot his presidency. Senior staff in Barbara Hogan's office at the Public Enterprises Ministry believe that if the reshuffle happens, she will probably get the axe as demanded by Zuma's nationalist, black business and populist loyalists. Hogan oversees the state-owned companies which many in the ANC regard as lucrative sources of patronage for whoever is in control of the governing party. Many of Zuma's allies want a public enterprise minister whom they can 'trust' to award lucrative state tenders and positions to them as 'rewards' for supporting Zuma.

Except for Hogan, most ministers were appointed to balance crucial constituencies within the ANC tripartite alliance. If Zuma fires anyone, their supporters are likely to be very angry. He wants to avoid an Mbeki-style rebellion against his leadership and is likely to play safe. ●

FRANCE/AFRICA

Forgotten promises

In 2007, a just-elected President Sarkozy promised to remake France's Africa policies but strategic political and economic interests still prevail

On 14 July, troops from 13 African countries marched down the Champs-Élysées in the annual Bastille Day parade, while elderly sub-Saharan veterans of the French colonial army saw their pensions put on a level with comrades in France. These gestures, intended by President **Nicolas Sarkozy** as a salute to former colonies on the 50th anniversary of Independence, were widely seen as symbols of post-imperial paternalism. What has happened to the President's election-night promise of 2007 that Africa would be one of his three foreign policy priorities, alongside Europe and the Middle East?

The June departure of France's Ambassador in Dakar, **Jean-Christophe Rufin**, highlighted both the diminishing role of the diplomatic corps in Africa and rifts within the Elysée Palace (see Senegal Box & AC Vol 51 No 14). Rufin's relationship with the family of President **Abdoulaye Wade** had broken down and there was faction-fighting in the Elysée. Rufin told the press that the Foreign Ministry on the *Quai d'Orsay* was 'disaster-stricken' and marginal on policy questions. One French diplomat told *Africa Confidential* he broadly agreed but added, 'At a modest level, we work very closely with the Elysée – we meet there every Thursday afternoon to talk about African issues.'

One faction is led by **Claude Guéant**, the Elysée Secretary General, who worked with Sarkozy as Interior Minister and sees Africa policy as mainly an issue of French security. Guéant, backed by the lawyer **Robert Bourgi**, who has become a buffer between African leaders and Sarkozy, has much more influence on policy than Foreign Minister **Bernard Kouchner**. Some of Kouchner's colleagues reckon he is out of his depth. His Africa counsel is **Charlotte Montel**, a junior advisor who fairly recently graduated from university.

Guéant is currently on top against a rival Elysée faction led by the diplomatic counsellors **Jean-David Levitte** (former Ambassador to Washington) and his deputy, **André Parant**. Their ideas are closer to those of the *Quai*. Levitte and Parant were at the France-Africa summit in Nice in June but a *Quai* official called that 'window-dressing'. We hear that there are plans to replace **Stéphane Gompertz**, a respected diplomat who heads the *Quai*'s Africa division, with the Ambassador to Chad, **Bruno Foucher**.

Sarkozy began his presidency with a visit to Dakar in 2007 but his speech there was poorly received. Yet his first year in office brought an injection of energy and initiatives and the appointments of **Senegalese-born Rama Yade** as Secretary for Human Rights and of Kouchner, the founder of the medical aid agency *Médecins sans Frontières*, which is very active in Africa. Yade, now at Sport, remains very popular. The biggest impact on policy was a new focus on Chad and Darfur, **Sudan**. Sarkozy and Kouchner quickly hosted a conference on Darfur, about which France had hitherto said little, and Sarkozy lobbied hard to mobilise the European Union to deploy the **Irish-led** but mainly French EU peacekeepers of Eufor, to protect civilians in Chad and **Central African Republic**.

The overall French aid budget seemed about to shrink, partly because of the completion of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries debt cuts, whose cost counts as aid. The socialist **Jean-Michel Sévérino**, kept on at the head of the *Agence française de développement*, increased the focus on poverty reduction. The Sarko-Kouchner double act has produced a few key results, notably the restoration of reasonable working relations with **Rwanda**.

In Brussels, France supports the EU's Cotonou governance principles for relations with developing countries. Paris and Washington agreed in private to warn **Guinea's** interim leader, **Sékouba Konaté**, that he must introduce democratic reforms after the brutalities of his predecessors. France has kept on pressing **Madagascar's** post-putsch leader, **Andry Rajoelina**, to compromise with his rivals over terms for a democratic transition. Nevertheless, Africa has gradually slipped to the margins of the policy agenda. The messages from Paris have been inconsistent. Where strategic or economic interests are at play, reform slides down the list, notably in the oil-producing states of west and central Africa. Last year's presidential election in **Gabon** was dubious but 'Sarko' rushed to Libreville to show confidence in the dynastic succession of **Ali Ben Bongo**.

In Chad, French soldiers in Eufor were studiously neutral. Yet France's own military mission there provided President **Idriss Déby Itno** with intelligence to help crush Sudanese-backed rebels advancing on Ndjamena. In **Congo-Brazzaville** in March 2009, Sarko met members of

the opposition and raised their concerns about elections with President **Denis Sassou-Nguesso**, yet Sassou's patently manipulated re-election in July passed without comment. Follow-up action on a politically inconvenient official probe into the French assets of ruling families in African oil states was halted.

Sarkozy moved his first Cooperation Minister, the Christian socialist **Jean-Marie Bockel**, in March 2008 after he had upset the late President **Omar Bongo** with remarks about the end of *Francophonie* (AC Vol 49 No 7). The replacement was **Alain Joyandet**, a loyalist who sees political and business interests as paramount. Observers had already noted Sarkozy's personal connections with **Vincent Bolloré** and **Martin Bouygues**, whose companies are deeply involved in Africa.

For two years, Sarkozy has said little about development and reform. He has not disowned the modernising agenda established under **Alain Juppé** and **Lionel Jospin**, which continued fitfully under President **Jacques Chirac**. Now, France's Africa policy looks more like crisis response and the cultivation of old allies. Substantial resources are still allocated to aid and peacekeeping but with no overall strategy. The logical military slim-down in West Africa, abandoning old-style defence accords in favour of a focus on training local peacekeepers, is seen as a retreat.

France retains key economic interests south of the Sahara, symbolised in the uranium mining in **Niger** by nuclear power group Areva, and oil in Gabon and elsewhere. Yet Prime Minister **François Fillon** has little say in foreign policy. Kouchner's ministry does not count for much either. In the late 1990s, its staff joined up with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office to forge the pro-democracy principles for a common European position on Africa, leading to the Cotonou Accord of 2000. These days, decision-making is concentrated in an old-style presidentialisation of France's actions in Africa, and indeed, elsewhere.

The Elysée is said to have been relieved when Sévérino retired from the AFD. **Dov Zerah**, a strong believer in deploying bilateral aid credits to back business investment, took over. He also has a personal interest in the development of the Sahel, which he knows well from a stint as head of cotton company Dagris.

Sarkozy is trying to be tougher with illegal migrants and negotiate agreements with Sahelian countries on regulating migration. However, the first target, **Mali**, has resisted pressure to sign a deal it sees as unbalanced. The Immigration Ministry has launched development programmes for areas from which migrants come and support for Africans in France who want to invest in their old homes, which has at least bought some goodwill. ●

UGANDA/SOMALIA

Fighting on a new front

The United States' containment policy has failed and, with its regional ambitions strengthened, Al Shabaab is back on the front foot

President Yoweri Museveni welcomes African Union leaders to Kampala on 25 July playing a role he has made his own: military leader and regional policeman. Ugandan opposition politicians fear that the two *Al Shabaab* bombs which killed at least 76 people in Kampala on 11 July have made victory impossible for

them in February's elections. Insecurity favours the incumbent and international criticism of Museveni, already muted, will diminish further.

Yet the role and capability of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Somalia is open to doubt despite Museveni's promise to send thousands

more soldiers to 'root out' *Shabaab*. The UPDF comprises most of the 6,300 personnel of the African Union Mission in Somalia bolstering President **Ahmed Sheikh Sharif's** shaky regime. Uganda offered to increase its Amisom contingent to 8,000 last year but the **United States** was reluctant to pay for staff or tactical changes. A rethink looks likely.

Shabaab would welcome the confrontation as it hones its image as Somalia's only true Islamist and nationalist movement fighting foreign influence. Clashes in Mogadishu intensified after the bombings, following some weeks when *Shabaab* had been driven back. US support had decreased along with its faith in Sheikh Sharif, especially after May's unsuccessful Istanbul summit on Somalia. The hope was that a containment policy would manage tensions and keep *Shabaab* within Somalia. That policy has manifestly failed and a more coherent political strategy is needed.

SECRETIVE SHABAAB

Al Shabaab's political tactics and internal dynamics are deliberately, systematically opaque, on the classic Islamist model. It is both nationalist and avowedly part of the global jihad. *Shabaab's* fighters may number anything between 3,000 and 10,000 and it recruits across the region. The bombs in Kampala on 11 July, which Spokesman **Ali Mohamud Rage** claimed for *Al Shabaab* on 12 July, are a response to the **Uganda People's Defence Force's** key role in the African Union Mission in **Somalia** (Amisom), sent to shore up **Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's** Transitional Federal Government (TFG, AC Vol 51 No 6). For *Shabaab*, the bombings initiated a regional jihad while exploiting opposition to Amisom in Mogadishu, where it regularly lobbs mortars into residential areas, killing civilians that *Shabaab* uses as human shields.

Claims from the **United States** and elsewhere that *Al Qaida* foreigners have hijacked the group underestimate the extent to which *Shabaab* field commanders act autonomously, again on a classic Islamist model. Outsiders often underestimate how ambitious Somali jihadis, including the *Shabaab* leader, Emir **Ahmed Abdi Godane 'Abu Zubeir'**, **Fuad Khalaf 'Shongole'** and **Ibrahim Haji Jama 'Al Afghani'** (aka **Zeyli'i**), share objectives with the foreigners who provide new resources and military tactics. The label 'foreigner' is itself misleading, given that hundreds of members are **Kenyan-born** Somalis and that for Islamists, 'nation' means the Muslim nation, the *Umma*.

Confident outsiders claim that foreigners – usually unnamed because unknown – now sit on the central praesidium of a more hierarchical organisation than before, alongside the core leadership of Godane and other Somalis with experience of jihad abroad. The links and relationships may be more informal. There are divisions and nuances, some driven by clan loyalty or personal ambition.

Godane and *Shabaab's* former Spokesman, **Mukhtar Robow Ali 'Abu Mansur'**, remain allies but not friends. Rage is frequently touted as a 'moderate', with little justification. Observers often see doubtful distinctions between moderates and extremists; when the chips are down, they come together. There may be several hundred foreigners, including the US jihadi **Abu Mansur 'al Ameriki'**, but mostly Kenyans and **Bangladeshis**. **Comorios-born Fazul Abdullah Mohammed** (aka **Harun Fazul**) is believed to be a senior commander and, wanted for the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya and an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa in 2002, one with considerable operational experience.

Shabaab's 'control' of large parts of the south and Mogadishu also relies on clan militia, whose loyalty is bought but who might be turned. *Shabaab* calculates that intensified attacks by the USA and its allies will increase its support. If an ineffectual response from Uganda and the USA poses little threat in the coming months, the status quo can continue and jihadists with broader regional ambitions will be bolstered.

Shabaab may be unable to force Amisom out but the foreign presence is a recruiting tool. Yet *Shabaab's* chances of taking over the country are slim. The TFG may exist only in name but the Sufi militia with which it now has a fragile alliance, *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'a*, backed by the USA and **Ethiopia** in the centre and south, cannot be ignored because of the support it gets from major Hawiye clans. *Shabaab* allies hold areas and its administrations in Kismayo and Baidoa function well, but in many places clans and warlords pay lip service to the strongest force and local discontent with *Shabaab's* extremist practices has emerged. Yet in the medium term, controlling all of Somalia as a coherent 'nation-state' may not be what *Shabaab* wants. ●

FAILURE OF SECURITY

In the days after the Kampala bombings, the government arrested some 40 Somalis and seven **Pakistanis**; these moves may have more to do with the police's long-held concern about gangs involved in drug smuggling and human trafficking. The authorities also declared that the Salafist Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), long dormant in western Uganda after **Sudan-backed** prominence in the late 1990s but recently active in **Congo-Kinshasa**, may have been involved in the bombings.

Intelligence officers then announced that the heads of two suicide bombers had been found, one with a 'Somali' appearance, the other Ugandan. Then the name of **Comoros-born Fazul Abdullah Mohammed** (aka **Harun Fazul**) emerged, believed to be in *Al Qaida's* Saleh Ali Nabhan Brigade, named after the senior *Shabaab-Qaida* leader killed by an American strike in 2009 (AC Vol 50 No 19). Fazul is wanted for involvement in bombing the US Embassy in Nairobi, **Kenya**, in 1998 and the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in 2002. US intelligence sees him as a key player in *Al Qaida's* African operations. He is married to a Somali, who was arrested crossing into Kenya in 2007.

Ugandans have rallied behind the government for now. The opposition Forum for Democratic Change has long opposed the Somalia deployment, arguing that there is no peace to keep, yet the FDC has little power to sway public opinion. That could change in the event of a sustained bombing campaign as some 60% of the economy is based in Kampala.

The UPDF, though, benefits from the training and funds that Amisom provides. The USA, **Britain** and **France** compete to act as security mentors. As in Uganda's involvement in Congo-Kinshasa in 1998-

2002, money and influence is gained from extraterritorial deployment.

'Museveni will use this attack to intensify fear among the people,' FDC presidential candidate **Kizza Besigye** told *Africa Confidential*. The wider opposition fear is that its strategy of using the USA to pressure the President for fair elections will now come to naught. Across East Africa, security will be the overriding US policy imperative.

In Kampala, special forces, antiterrorism police and hundreds of plain-clothes officers hit the streets from 18 July ready for the AU summit. Somalia will dominate meetings of the Peace and Security Council along with the East African Standby Brigade (EasBrig). Heads of state and government meeting on 25-27 July are expected to endorse a decision by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to send 2,000 more troops to Mogadishu. Kenya may contribute Somalis trained within its borders.

If the United Nations Security Council eventually agrees to a more interventionist role for Amisom, it is not clear whether African governments will contribute more soldiers. Ugandan officials are floating the possibility of unilateral action but this may be designed to draw a US reaction. Yet with equally complex conflicts raging in **Afghanistan** and **Iraq**, Washington may prefer failed containment to messy engagement. **Ethiopia**, whose 2006 invasion brought down the Islamic Courts Union from which *Shabaab* emerged, argues that neither the European Union or USA are ready for the required military and financial commitment to fight *Shabaab*. Addis Ababa would prefer the UN to take on a proper peacekeeping operation.

Prime Minister **Meles Zenawi** withdrew Ethiopian troops in 2009 partly because there was no effective coalition to work with and partly because Sharif Sheikh's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) attracted hostility for its collaboration with Ethiopia. It would take a public and very generous offer from the West to persuade Ethiopia to commit troops again. Or if *Shabaab* finally seized power in Mogadishu and threatened jihad against Ethiopia's Somali region, the Ogaden, Meles told us that he would deploy troops to oust such a regime.

Kenya looks vulnerable. It has a large Somali minority, a porous border and little capacity to back up its words with deeds. That may be changing. Some 2,500 Somalis are reported to have been trained with US help to fight alongside the TFG.

On 20 July, *Shabaab* fighters again attacked Kenyan border guards in Lagdera and there are veiled threats of terrorism against the Nairobi government. The next few months will test the belief that Kenya is relatively insulated by its deep cultural and commercial links with Somalia. ●

CONGO-KINSHASA

Katanga makes a comeback

The secessionist movement that almost split the country 50 years ago is again on the march

In the main square of Lubumbashi on 11 July, more than 20 people were arrested while demonstrating for the independence of Katanga. A month earlier, the Place de la Poste had been renamed the Place **Moïse Tshombé**, in memory of the President of the short-lived secessionist Katanga state, which was suppressed by a United Nations force immediately after Congo was granted its own independence by **Belgium** in 1960. Tshombé, who held Katanga in 1960-63, died in **Algeria** in 1969. May's banned demonstration commemorated the 50th anniversary of his declaration of independence.

The protest, 300-400 strong, was brutally suppressed. A Belgian documentary film maker, **Thierry Michel**, said he had been beaten up, along with many others. On 23 May, Katanga's capital had looked like a city under siege, with soldiers and police everywhere. A score of people were arrested for showing Katanga flags. One of them, **Mbenga Sandonga**, a lawyer who wants a referendum on independence, was mines minister under the late dictator **Mobutu Sese Seko**, whose Katanga security chief, the current provincial Interior Minister and former Ambassador to **Zambia** **Jean-Marie Dikanga Kazadi**, had claimed that an armed separatist organisation controlled by General **Elie Kapend Kanyimbu** was preparing for trouble.

The retired general is now Chairman of the *Front de libération national congolais* (FLNC), whose roots are among the Katangan gendarmes, who organised two insurrections in 1977-78, and their descendants, collectively known as 'diabos'. Kapend was previously arrested in 2006 by UN peacekeepers from the *Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* (MONUC) and handed over to the Congolese police.

The authorities thought the 23 May demonstrators intended to take over Luano international airport. During the trouble, a soldier and a policeman were killed, and members of President **Joseph Kabila's** family took refuge with the Presidential Guards in Kibembe camp.

Last December, dozens of people were arrested in Lubumbashi, suspected of planning to destabilise the government. Katangans say there is massive anger against the central government, fed by

its failure to implement provisions of the 2005 constitution decentralising more power and 40% of state revenue to provincial authorities. Katanga has felt little benefit from **Chinese** contracts, which are not seen as being in Congo's interest, and hundreds of jobs were lost when the courts cancelled the contract granted to First Quantum Minerals for the Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings (KMT) project (AC Vol 51 No 13).

The charismatic provincial governor, **Moïse Katumbi Chapwe**, is caught in the middle, trying to boost the hopes of the Katangans and to remain loyal to Kabila. He renamed the square in memory of Tshombé and completely renovated the secessionist leader's car, a black Lincoln convertible. He also took responsibility for suppressing the 11 July demonstration, even if he did not order it. He may have to make up his mind as the 2011 national elections draw near.

There was disappointment in the province when Katumbi told the **French** news magazine *Le Point* that he would not be standing for the presidency. Many powerful figures in the Kinshasa government detest him. In August 2007, someone at Kinshasa airport sabotaged the landing gear of his private jet.

Katumbi's position grows riskier still as support grows for the Katanga secessionists. In 2003, 1,000 senior provincial figures signed a letter sent to the UN Secretary General by the independence leader Sandonga. This is uncomfortable for Kabila, who in the 2006 election took three-quarters of the province's vote and whose father, the late President **Laurent-Désiré Kabila**, was born in Katanga (Joseph is said to have been born in a rebel camp in South Kivu).

Like his father, Joseph Kabila is identified with the Balubakat, the anti-secessionist Katangan Baluba people from the north of the province. Their rivals, mostly Lunda from elsewhere in Katanga, follow Tshombé's secessionist line. If the Katangans were to lose their influence in Kinshasa, it could strengthen the secessionist cause. They might then fall back on their own resources and struggle for their own independence, reckons political scientist **Jean Omasombo**, from Kinshasa University and the African Institute at Tervuren, **Belgium**. ●

SENEGAL

He's old but he's running

President Wade is set to take the presidency again but his favourite son is not sure to follow

At 84 and still looking chipper, President **Abdoulaye Wade** plans to run for the presidency again in 2012. His advisors insist he is full of ideas and enthusiasm and he has begun to clean up the political terrain, with moves to restore standards in public affairs. In mid-July, through an advisor, he made peace overtures to the building entrepreneur **Bara Tall**, who is fighting a court case against what many see as a state vendetta aimed at his business. Yet Wade will be 86 in 2012 and one of his numerous constitutional changes restores the presidential term to seven years, instead of the present five.

Wade's supporters point to new roads, housing and the airport now under construction, arguing that after 40 years of sluggish rule by the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) he has modernised Senegal. 'Unlike the others, he works even if he is old' is the refrain from loyalists of the

President's *Parti démocratique sénégalais-libéral* (PDS). Yet for every diehard there is a ferocious critic, particularly in Dakar, arguing that Wade should serve out his term and retire gracefully. His personalised leadership makes the President and his performance the focus of political activity, for both supporters and opponents. Wade's age and his future are central issues, giving an edge to debates over the role of his son **Karim Wade**, who heads a sprawling ministry combining international cooperation, regional development, infrastructure and air transport (see Box).

Karim Wade, who once worked in a London bank, was originally brought in to head an agency to build the infrastructure when Senegal hosted the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in 2008. He now plays a central role in government; his father says he is better than his colleagues. The creation

of a vice-presidency (still vacant) has sparked speculation that the President might install Karim as his deputy, get re-elected, then retire after a year or two to make way for him. The idea appals many Senegalese. Karim is not popular, has a poor command of Wolof, the main language, and his mother is French. He does not seem to be 'one of us'.

The President is a smart politician and may flinch before pushing Karim forward. Many hate the notion that their country, with its long history of elections and debate, might follow the 'Bongo model' set last year by **Gabon's** presidential succession. Karim initially appeared to see government work as a filial duty but sources close to the presidency say he seems to be acquiring a taste for political power. Yet his election outing in the 2009 municipal polls ended disastrously. In the Dakar city council race, he was humiliated even at the polling station near the Wade family home in the prosperous Point E district. Like most other main cities in Senegal (except Ziguinchor, in Casamance in the far south) Dakar voted for the opposition.

PAYING FOR THE OIC JAMBOREE

Many contracts have upset the public (see Boxes). One involved refurbishing Dakar's *Le Méridien* Hotel for 26 billion CFA francs (US\$47.66 million), with 25 'presidential suites' and 46 'junior suites' for the OIC jamboree. The contractors were the Saudi Binladen Group of **Saudi Arabia** and Areen Design Services of **Britain**. The contract led to a clash between Karim – who pushed the project – and Economy and Finance Minister **Abdoulaye Diop**, who refused to sign it off. Karim, after complaining to his dad, persuaded Minister of Urban Development, Housing, Construction and Hydraulics **Oumar Sarr** to sign.

In addition to the fuss over the **Sudanese** mobile telephone company Sudatel (see Box), **Luxembourg**-based Millicom, which operates in Senegal under the Tigo brand, is currently involved in proceedings at the World Bank's court for commercial disputes in Paris, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In a meeting in June 2008 with Millicom Chief Executive Officer **Mark Beuls**, Karim said that the company would have to pay \$200 mn. to retain its operating licence. Beuls refused and, in September, Karim sent a letter telling Millicom that its licence had been revoked for unspecified breaches of contract. Millicom was given until midnight on 7 October 2008 to pay \$200 mn. It refused and a ruling is expected later this year.

The capital's new mayor, **Khalifa Ababacar Sall**, supported by the well-oiled PS political machine, has impressed

WADE'S ONE-MAN BAND

Power is concentrated in the hands of President **Abdoulaye Wade**; development strategy is led by his son, **Karim Wade**. There are 41 ministers (plus a new Vice-Premier, a job suddenly announced for **Awa Guèye Kébé** on 3 July) but most have little clout. President Wade takes the big decisions, then allocates subjects to individual ministers with narrow technical briefs and narrow political bases of their own. Some estimates put Karim in charge of 46% of the entire national budget. Presidential sources insist the real proportion is less, when projects funded by foreign aid are included.

Whatever the exact figure, Karim clearly has the financial power to make his presence felt nationwide in funding projects and setting strategy. Donors say he is a highly effective minister but complain that he has undermined the Finance Ministry, which used to oversee all development aid relationships, and deprived the government of a clearly coordinated strategy. Yet contributors' dealings at the technical level with Senegalese officials remain close and efficient.

In recent weeks, Karim's department has begun summoning major international partners for bilateral meetings outside the traditional aid coordination with the Finance Ministry. Transparency campaigners allege the government is trying to circumvent Western governance conditionality by greater reliance on **Chinese** and Arab money. As power has become more concentrated, corruption has certainly worsened. Employees of the national telecommunications company, the *Société Nationale des Télécommunications du Senegal*/Orange threaten a national strike after the third mobile telephone licence, and the right to offer 3G services (high-speed mobile broadband data and voice services), was awarded to Expresso, a group led by Sudatel of **Sudan** in which some very senior figures are alleged to have shareholdings. Sudatel was majority-owned by Sudan's ruling National Islamic Front (now National Congress Party) but now describes itself as publicly listed (AC Vol 41 no 18).

The official price paid for the Senegal licence was US\$200 million and the press has alleged that \$40 mn. in commission was paid through Dubai, where a judicial investigation is under way. Sonatel had wanted the right to offer 3G for a year; the strike threat has pushed the government into hinting it may now allow this. A public petition against the Sudatel deal, launched by businessman **Bara Tall** (see Feature), is rapidly gathering signatures. ●

KARIM THE SUCCESSOR

The presidential succession of **Karim Wade** is far from a *fait accompli*, not least because his father, **Abdoulaye Wade**, does not yet want to step down. One French diplomat, who knows both men well, told *Africa Confidential*: 'When you see them both together, you realise that there is a great taboo in the family, which is the end of [Abdoulaye's] political life. Karim is very respectful and shy in front of his father – I am sure he has never put the topic of succession on the table by himself.'

The most acute source of public opposition to Karim concerns corruption during his time at the *Agence nationale pour l'organisation de la conférence islamique*, preparing the 2008 Organisation of Islamic Conference summit. Amidst allegations that target the government more broadly, many in Dakar lament the days of the **Abdou Diouf** presidency, when a minister might be known as '*Monsieur 10%*' – the figure for 'commission' payments is much higher these days. Karim's tenure at ANOCI became a byword for wastage and corruption. Its official total spend of 72 billion CFA francs (US\$142.26 million) was shown to be over CFA205.2 bn. when the ANOCI-associated contracts signed for by other state ministries were included.

The publisher of the Dakar weekly *La Gazette*, **Abdou Latif Coulibaly**, unearthed some of the most egregious contracts, including the expansion of six kilometres of Dakar's Corniche Ouest road – cost: CFA27.55 bn. – and a credit line of CFA26 bn. to build presidential villas to house visiting dignitaries, which were never started.

An ongoing scandal concerns the award of Senegal's third mobile telephone licence in November 2007 to **Sudanese** telecommunications company Sudatel, which was once owned by Khartoum's Islamist government; it still holds 'over 21%'. At first, the government claimed Sudatel had paid \$200 mn. but this was later changed to \$180 mn., a difference blithely written off by government as an exchange-rate fluctuation.

An e-mail sent that November to Sudatel Chief Executive Officer **Emad (Hussein) Ahmed**, obtained by local journalists, shows that a request for a \$10 mn. 'success fee' came from the e-mail account of Senegalese international banker **Keba Keinde**, CEO of the Millennium Finance Corporation, and was forwarded to **Thierno Ousmane Sy**, the government's technology advisor who worked on the deal and is close to Karim and his father.

MANHATTAN TRANSFER

Then on 9 November, a New York property company sued the government of Senegal for \$15 mn. in damages as it had failed to pay the balance on a plot of vacant land in Manhattan, which it had agreed to buy for \$27 mn. According to court documents, Dakar's Ambassador to the United Nations, lawyer **Paul Badji**, signed on behalf of his government. Dakar paid \$2 mn. on 26 June but did not pay the balance, despite repeated promises to do so. The lawsuit accused Badji – widely seen as a mentor to Karim Wade – President Wade and Energy Minister **Samuel Sarr**, a financial advisor to Wade, of 'acting like the notorious deadbeat who swears that the check is in the mail'. In New York for the UN General Assembly, on 21 September Wade met the seller, accompanied by a mysterious Senegalese businessman based in Staten Island called **Pape Mamadou Diedhiou**. On 16 November, Dakar RFM radio reported the lawsuit. Within two days, Wade's government paid the \$25 mn. As questions increased, President Wade claimed he was building a new centre called the '*Maison du Sénégal*'.

Although he is unpopular locally, Karim has been cultivating his image overseas. In **France**, he has amassed a network of supporters in the Elysée Palace, including presidential Secretary **Claude Guéant** and lawyer and Special Advisor on Africa **Robert Bourgi**. **Rasseck Bourgi**, Robert's brother and also a lawyer, is employed by Karim to manage family business interests, including two Paris-based property companies which Karim owns with his sister, **Sindiély**. He also advises the **Equatorial Guinean** government and is a friend of lawyer **Henry Page**. President **Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo** hired Page to try to prosecute **Ely Calil** for his alleged role in **Simon Mann's** botched coup attempt (AC Vol 51 No 13).

Karim hired **Anne Meaux**, head of public relations firm *Image-Sept* and a veteran of ex-President **Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's** press service, and helped install **Maimouna Sourang Ndir** as Senegal's Ambassador in Paris in 2008, seen as more pliable than her predecessor, **Doudou Salla Diop**.

Karim socialises with celebrity-philosopher **Bernard-Henri Lévy**: they have a mutual friend, **Abbas Jaber**, a Senegalese-Lebanese businessman who has acquired several large national companies under the Wade government. Diplomats in Dakar insist that France's Ambassador in Dakar, writer, doctor and aid worker **Jean-Christophe Rufin**, was pressed to leave the country because he clashed with the Wade family, Karim in particular. Rufin's replacement, former Ambassador to **Congo-Brazzaville** **Nicolas Normand**, may survive longer; he has strong support from Robert Bourgi. ●

citizens and diplomats alike, and it gives his party hope. Senior PS officials admit that the former ruling party has had trouble recovering from its defeat in 2000 by Wade, the opposition veteran. Dakar pundits say it has no prospect of regaining national power on its own in 2012, least of all with technocratic, long-standing party boss **Ousmane Tanor Dieng** as its presidential flag-bearer.

The credible challenge will come from the **Benno Siggil Senegaal** opposition coalition, of which the PS is by far the largest component (AC Vol 50 No 8). Yet it is sapped by rivalries between would-be presidents such as Dieng, **Moustapha Niasse** and the mayor of Fatick, **Macky Sall**. Sall's *Alliance pour la république-Yaakaar* party is small but he is the one opposition figure who stirs popular enthusiasm in Dakar.

Senegal's two-round electoral system would permit several coalition candidates to run in the first round. Then, with luck, they would unite behind the best-placed challenger for the run-off. If too many stand, though, none will qualify for the run-off, so there is a public wrangle over whether to pick a single candidate from the start. Some senior PS figures say they would back a single non-PS opposition challenger if necessary but that would upset many grassroots socialists.

RIOTS IN SOUMBÉDIOUNE

The European Union and **United States** have taken up a government invitation to audit the electoral register and reinforce the credibility of the elections. Politically sophisticated Dakar appears relaxed but pressure and frustration can break through. When government rangers shot dead a fisherman whose canoe had allegedly drifted into a closed zone on 5 July, there were violent riots in Dakar's Soubédioune fishing district.

On the same day, inhabitants of the sprawling Guédiawaye suburb, furious at delays in dealing with local floods and providing new homes, tried to loot the Médina Gounass town hall. Imams in Guédiawaye are organising a national march and there have been rumours of a national general strike on 25 July.

Yet President Wade remains a formidable campaigner, especially in the rural areas. He carefully maintains good relations with religious interests: after the death on 30 June of **Serigne Mouhamadou Lamine Bara Mbacké**, Caliph General of the influential Mourides brotherhood, he hurried to the religious centre of Touba to pay his respects and hold talks with the successor, **Serigne Sheikh Maty Lèye Mbacké** (AC Vol 49 No 1). The PDS government may be unpopular in Dakar but not necessarily so across the nation. ●

ZIMBABWE

What mattered was the football

World Cup fever overshadowed both a spectacular political row and preparations for a new constitution

Robert Mugabe has earned a reputation as one of the globe's leading gatecrashers but his poise, self-confidence and chutzpah have not rubbed off on his travelling entourage. Officially invited to the football World Cup opening and closing matches in **South Africa**, President Mugabe arrived at the VIP box with a platoon of henchmen. The world football authority, the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) allowed only Robert and **Grace Mugabe** in and the rest, including **Robert Junior**, were shown the red card and had to find less august billets.

Almost everyone in Zimbabwe was obsessed by every game. The Minister of Energy and Power Development, **Elias Mudzuri** of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), lost popularity when in the first week of the tournament, he failed to deliver the promised constant electricity for television. He lost the Energy portfolio in Prime Minister **Morgan Tsvangirai's** reshuffle on 23 June (AC Vol 51 No 12).

With everyone indoors, crime abated. Police Commissioner General **Augustine Chihuri** was looking forward to a relaxing month watching the games to the sound of the splash of the **Israeli** water cannons that irrigate his garden. This idyll was broken by the **Temba Mliswa** tsunami, which threatened to engulf leading figures in both the dominant Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the MDC.

MLISWA IN THE SIN BIN

Hitherto a ZANU-PF untouchable, Mliswa rashly and publicly said that Chihuri was the most corrupt person in the country. This exaggeration infuriated the Commissioner and the police began throwing the book at Mliswa for stale offences including those dating from the height of the land invasions, when the police had seemed to turn a blind eye.

At the last count, more than 30 dockets had been opened and the police spokesman, Assistant Commissioner **Wayne Bvudzijena**, implies that there may be more. Mliswa is ZANU-PF's provincial Secretary for Lands in the faction-torn Mashonaland West party. The province's land is rich and Mliswa has been involved in seizing several farms, including a South African-owned crocodile farm. A fitness fanatic and former national rugby player, he has used the tactics of the pitch

to oust farmers (black and white) and to flout restraining court orders. He is from Manicaland, related to the veteran **Didymus Mutasa** of ZANU-PF and part of the power lobby of the Indigenisation Minister, **Saviour Kasukuwere**, and businessman **Phillip Chiyangwa**, men of substantial resources and egos. Like Chihuri, Chiyangwa claims Mugabe as a cousin.

THE UNTOUCHABLES

In anticipation of the Indigenisation Acts and applying to industrial firms the same tactics as to land reform, Mliswa and **Martin Mutasa** set their hearts on an automobile parts supplier operating as Benbar. To their surprise, they were arrested on charges of extortion and fraud and granted bail only on appeal, when the state rescinded it on the grounds that they were interfering with witnesses. Didymus Mutasa, father of Martin, then announced that any police officer helping white farmers would be locked up and the keys given to Deputy Commissioner of Police **Godwin Matanga**. This seeming confirmation of impunity tempted Mliswa into his remark about Chihuri.

The matter was not related to land and Chihuri is conscious of the dignity of his office and his relationship to Mugabe (his stepmother-in-law, Professor **Hope Sadza**, is Mugabe's cousin and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe). With uncharacteristic speed, the police reopened old files to bring more charges of fraud and extortion, outside the special framework for land cases.

Bail was finally conceded under conditions that included not talking to the media. Meanwhile, Didymus was working away outside the court, accompanied not by his ZANU-PF co-Minister of Home Affairs, **Kembo Mohadi**, but by his MDC co-Minister, **Theresa Makone**.

Some think Didymus Mutasa's star has faded since he lost in the Praesidium election at December's ZANU-PF party congress and Mohadi couldn't be bothered to lend a hand. Makone had only been promoted from Deputy Justice Minister the previous week (replacing the ineffectual **Giles Mutsekwa**). Her support for Mutasa outraged some MDC people, who resented her and her husband's influence in Tsvangirai's 'kitchen cabinet' of close advisors. She is also suspect as a close friend of **Jocelyn Chiwenga**, wife

of the Army chief, Gen. **Constantine Chiwenga**.

The World Cup also overshadowed the launch of the Constitutional Parliamentary Committee Consultative Process. Since football took precedence, the COPAC process was deferred until after the games were over. In the rural areas, participation has been low, with meetings badly advertised, poorly attended and short, so that ZANU-PF spokesmen dominate proceedings.

The party has been preparing since January, through the traditional leaders who control communications and seem to have the only copies of what little printed material is available. The presence of security forces has kept people away, as has ZANU-PF's Operation *Chimumu* ('keep quiet'). People are not ready to take risks. Some of the officiating legislators have rented their Parliament-allocated cars to COPAC during the consultations. Few believe that the next two scheduled consultations can be held in time to get a draft constitution out by early next year.

Last Sunday's *Standard* confirmed that the President's former spin doctor, **Jonathan Moyo**, has been working for **Emmerson Mnangagwa** and the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee since December (AC Vol 50 No 10). Professor Moyo's strategy includes discrediting COPAC through delays and disruptions. Here the month-long World Cup has been useful.

ZANU-PF is co-opting the fast-growing Apostolic Christian movement. At the weekend, Mugabe was installed as an honorary prophet of the **Johanns Marange** sect (one of the oldest Apostolics) in Manicaland. Accoutred in ankle-length white surtout (like all Apostolics) with shepherd's crook and funny hat, it looked like a parody of the installation of a Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. The President addressed the faithful, expounding on a pet theme: 'We say no to gays! We will not listen to those advocating the inclusion of their rights in the constitution.'

Mliswa is now back inside doing his press-ups. The score in extra time is three separate arrests, three denials of bail and two successful appeals, although the third was not allowed as the police claimed that Mliswa had been interfering with witnesses on the earlier two. Meanwhile, the number of charges has now risen to 70, many dating back to 2002.

At the opening of Parliament, Chihuri took pride of place next to Mugabe in the inspection of the guard of honour. A very grumpy looking Chiwenga trailed along in their wake. ZANU-PF youth were a disruptive presence, singing Mugabe's praises, denigrating Tsvangirai and openly threatening the same tactics used in the June 2008 elections. ●

ZIMBABWE

Restless spirits

The Ndebele can't agree on a living leader and many still take their inspiration from the late Joshua Nkomo

Sibangilizwe Nkomo, the sole surviving son of **Joshua Nkomo** (1917–99), is campaigning to exhume his father's remains from the 'foreign' soil of Heroes' Acre in Harare and transfer them to the Matopos Hills near Bulawayo, sacred to the Ndebele people. Sibangilizwe believes that his father's spirit is unhappy at having to accompany a lot of upstarts from the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) whom he never trusted in life. In his final years, as **Robert Mugabe's** Vice-President (and owner of several rich farms), Joshua was deeply upset at what the President was doing to the country.

The white-haired Sibangilizwe addressed a modest memorial service on the eleventh anniversary of his father's death, wearing the leopard-skin hat that was his trademark. Most of those present were elderly traditionalists who remember the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s. They believe Mugabe dealt the Ndebele and Joshua Nkomo ('Father Zimbabwe') a rough hand after Independence in 1980 and that the 1987 Unity Accord merging ZANU and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) failed to deliver. The recent allocation of confiscated white farms has benefited not the local leaders but

incomers from Mashonaland, Masvingo and the Midlands. When resettled Ndebele peasants reach accommodations with white commercial farmers, ZANU ideologues often scupper the deals.

Matters might not change much should the Movement for Democratic Change win sole power. Under **Morgan Tsvangirai**, the MDC struggled to find suitable cabinet material from Matebeleland in the initial ministerial appointments, as many of its leading lights had switched to **Arthur Mutambara's** MDC-M in 2005. In the recent reshuffle, the reassignment of **Gordon Moyo** and **Thamsanqa Mahlangu** were seen as demotions. **Sekai Holland**, the MDC member on the National Healing Commission, was sharply rebuked by the MDC Deputy Prime Minister, **Thokozani Khupe**, for commenting that in her own Mberengwa area, where Matebeleland meets Mashonaland, the pre-colonial depredations of the Ndebele far exceeded anything done by the white colonialists.

Ndebele tend to see the MDC-Tsvangirai as a Shona-dominated party. In 2008, the MDC-T swept the board in Bulawayo but the Matebeleland rural areas split three ways among the MDC-T, MDC-M and ZANU-Patriotic Front – it was

the MDC-M's only area of electoral success. The independent *Standard* speculates that at the party's elective congress in early 2011, Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara will face a stiff challenge from **Welshman Ncube**, International Trade Minister and an Ndebele. If Ncube then picked **Gibson Sibanda** as his deputy, it would align the MDC-M with its Ndebele grassroots but damage its national ambitions by forcing it to compete for the same voters as **Dumiso Dabengwa's** ZAPU (AC Vol 51 No 10).

ZANU-PF, too, has leadership problems in Matebeleland. Vice-President **John Nkomo** (no relation) is competing with the mega-rich **Obert Mpofu**, Minister of Mines, for the provincial chairmanship. Bigwigs **Sikhanyiso Ndlovu**, **Jacob Mudenda**, **Sithokozile Mathuthu** and **Cain Mathema** back **Zenzo Ncube**, the incumbent, against Mpofu's attempt to replace him with **Jonathan Moyo**. Mpofu stubbed his big toe in the independence struggle, winning a huge disability payout and pension in the war victims' compensation scam of the 1990s. There are concerns that his war wound may trouble him again.

As Matebeleland searches for a credible figurehead among the living, a symbol from the dead could provide a focus. The MDC-run Bulawayo Council has allocated a site for a statue of Nkomo, to replace one completed in the mid-2000s, which portrayed Father Zimbabwe's hand extended in an uncomfortable likeness to the MDC's salutation. Hastily covered up, it may have been melted down. The spirits may have offered a propitious moment for Sibangilizwe's campaign. ●

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POINTERS

Sudan/Britain

KHARTOUM'S MOST WANTED

■ The first test for the International Criminal Court's 12 July arrest warrant for genocide against President **Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir** is his visit to Ndjamenah this week. **Chad** ratified its ICC membership in 2006 and is legally bound to arrest him. Before tentatively restoring relations, Chad's President **Idriss Déby Itno** had called for the African Union to expedite the arrest and trial of Omer on genocide charges.

There is also growing concern about the safety of Sudanese assisting the ICC with evidence. In 2009, the then security chief, **Salah Abdullah 'Gosh'**, threatened to kill or amputate them and several 'suspects' have been tortured. In London, many Sudanese believe that the human rights lawyer **Abdel Salam Hassan Abdel Salam**, who helped the Court, was murdered in March by the Khartoum regime (AC Vol 51 No 6).

On 13 July, prominent British-Sudanese activist **Salah al Bander** invited 'the Sudanese community' and police to a 17 July 'symposium' on the murder. Salah Bander added the 'al' when living in **Bahrain**, whence he was deported in 2006; he is now a Liberal Democrat councillor in Cambridge. On 14 July, Salah wrote on the website *SudaneseOnline*: 'Sudanese feel very worried, especially after the attempt by some through an organised campaign to accuse the Sudanese Security apparatus both directly and in a number of British papers that they are behind the liquidation of the late Abdel Salam.'

Also involved in the meeting, at the Abrar Islamic Foundation off Edgware Road, was **Ibrahim el Nur**, a well-known figure to Arab businesses in that area. He is also known to the Metropolitan Police, as translator, interpreter and what one officer called 'a key advisor' on the Sudanese community at top level. He works, too, on the Arab community. Ibrahim is also a founder of the Sudan International Defence Group, which campaigns against the ICC. In February 2009, the SIDG and the Sudanese Workers' Trade Union Federation used Sir **Geoffrey Nice** QC to try to block the ICC cases against Omer el Beshir, unsuccessfully (AC Vol 50 No 4). On a SIDG trip to Khartoum in 2008, Ibrahim appeared on television with National Congress Party barons **Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e**, **Ibrahim Ghandour** and **Salah Gosh**. Ghandour has said SWTUF, which he heads, paid Nice's fees; he is also NCP Political Secretary.

Few people attended Salah's meeting. Police stayed away but went to a Sudanese community meeting the next day, to appeal for information on the murder.

Egypt/Southern Sudan SECRET TALKS

■ Egypt has quietly accepted that Southern Sudanese may choose independence in January's referendum in return for assurances that the Juba government will not abandon the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, *Africa Confidential* understands (AC Vol 51 No 14). After recent 'top-level meetings under the radar', said one Southern source, Cairo has made a 'marked shift', even though there is for Juba 'no question of revisiting' the Jonglei Canal project at present. Egypt wants the canal, uncompleted because of war, to drain (highly controversially) the Sudd swamp. President **Omer el Beshir's** recent belligerent statements on Halaib enclave, contested with Egypt, suggest Khartoum has been told about the secret talks.

Gambia

COUPS AND COCAINE

■ The enforced celebration of 'Freedom Day' on 22 July, the 16th anniversary of President **Yahya Jammeh's** coup, prompted protests by exiles and human rights groups, who say the regime is increasingly repressive and that Banjul has become a regional centre for organised crime.

Rights groups question the validity of the trial of eight people accused of plotting a coup against Jammeh (AC Vol 50 No 22). Six army officers, including former Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant General **Lang Tombong Tamba** and former Director of the National Intelligence Agency, **Lamin Badjie** were convicted of treason, alongside two businessmen. They were all sentenced to death on 15 July. All plan to appeal.

Widely criticised for corruption and incompetence, Jammeh has become proficient at identifying his enemies. Undercover security units float plans for coups and draw in unsuspecting opponents; there follow reports of 'coup attempts' and waves of arrests. A security roundup in 2007 resulted in the capture and murder of 40 **Ghanaian** fishermen.

Another case – if it comes to trial – could have wider consequences than the myriad phantom coup plots. Earlier this year, police seized 2.1 tonnes of cocaine in Banjul, which they said was bound for Europe. A joint investigation with **Britain's** Serious Organised Crime Agency led to the arrest of a dozen suspected traffickers, none of whom are Gambian. Critics are asking how the country could become a transit point for US\$1 billion worth of drugs without collusion from members of the regime. For some years, Banjul has been an important transshipment point for arms and drug smugglers in the region.

We hear that a dispute has been rumbling between the Banjul government and Whitehall over a letter sent in early July to British High Commissioner **Philip Sinkinson**, informing him he was *persona*

non grata. It might prove costly for Banjul; the new British coalition government has announced it will cut aid to governments which fail to tackle corruption and human rights abuse. Undaunted, Jammeh is campaigning across Gambia for the 2011 election, for a third term in power.

Mali

A FORMIDABLE NEW PARTY

■ Party leaders face a new challenger for the 2012 succession to retiring President **Amadou Toumani Touré** (ATT). The *Parti pour le développement économique et solidaire* (PDES), launched on 17 July with ATT's not-so-tacit backing, presents its mission as continuing his 'project for economic and social development'. Touré governs as a non-party President.

The new party's prime focus is not poverty reduction, though: the subtext is to unblock the domination of the *Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali* (Adema), which has been at the heart of government since pluralist democracy began in the early 1990s. Adema wants to recover the presidency it lost in 2002, when **Alpha Oumar Konaré** (AOK) retired and ATT took his place. Touré says he wants to spend his last two years reinforcing the democratic structures established after he overthrew dictator **Moussa Traoré** in 1991. Malians will soon vote on constitutional measures for accountability and transparency.

The PDES will presumably pushing these reforms. The party is drawn largely from independents and the *Mouvement Citoyen* (MC, Citizens Movement), which supports Touré's presidential work. Many will see the new party as designed to entrench his power and influence.

The key PDES patron is Touré's wife, **Lobbo Traoré Touré**, and its leader is Infrastructure and Transport Minister **Ahmed Diane Séméga**. Other senior figures include ministers **N'Diaye Bâ**, **Hamane Niang**, **Mohamed el Mactar**, **Diarra Mariam Flantié Diallo**, **Ahmadou Abdoulaye Diallo** and **Salimata Gakou Fofana**. The PDES may simply rearrange the pattern of parties and allegiances within the urban political class and the governing *Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès* (ADP) coalition. Bâ, for example, was once General Secretary of *Mountaga Tall's Congrès national d'initiative démocratique*.

The new party could help offset Adema's dominance: it has been near impossible to elect a government without the biggest party at its core. Yet the PDES will have to resist the clubby pressures towards consensus and develop ties with potential challengers to Adema, such as the *Union pour la république et la démocratie* and its probable candidate, **Soumaïla Cissé**, who heads the Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union.