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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

February, 1946

Diplomatic Data.

Part of the Record of Japanese-American Negotiation.

(From February, 1941, to December, 1941)

Compiled by the Foreign Ministry Data on Japanese-American
Negotiation.

(1) The Second Konoye Cabinet Era. Page 61-62.

Instruction of the German Government to the German
Ambassador in Tokyo (brought by the German Ambassador in
Tokyo, Ott, on the occasion of a conversation with Foreign
Minister Matsuoka on 17 May 1941)

The German Government is of the opinion that the best way
to prevent American participation in the war would have been
for Japan to refuse decisively to negotiate on the American
proposal. The German Government regrets that the Japanese
Government did not wait . . . the German opinion before sending
its answer for to the American Government. The Tripartite Pact
was concluded last year as a political and moral union of the
three powers Japan, Germany and Italy, and its great aim was
to prevent third countries from participating in the war. The
Pact has attained its aim heretofore and it will show its
effectiveness also in the future if the United front of Japan,
Germany and Italy can be closely maintained. Any treaty entered
upon by one of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact with third
countries outside the Pact can be taken to mean ^{of} a weakening of

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the Tripartite front and therefore, a diminishing of the political effect of the Pact. If, nevertheless, the Japanese Government thinks it unavoidable to negotiate with the U.S. government concerning Japanese-American relations, it will at least be necessary to forestall the possibility of such an unfavourable effect as mentioned above, since the USA is virtually enemy of the Axis powers (although according to ^{the} international law, she is not).

Therefore it must be made the cardinal point of the Japanese-American agreement that the obligation of the US government not to interfere in the war between Britain and the Axis (in a much clearer form than before) and the obligation arising for Japan from the Tripartite Pact are established clearly and unequivocally. All other stipulations must be dependent on this cardinal point. Under these circumstances, the question of form would have the most important meaning. The second paragraph of the Japanese reply, which relates to the existence of the Japanese obligation arising out of the Tripartite Pact, set out the minimum of which should be referred to in a Japanese-American agreement; to deviate from or to weaken that minimum would bring matters to a downfall and, as a result, would contradict the spirit and meaning of the Tripartite Pact, ultimately making the Pact illusory.

The German Government now has to assert the request that it be permitted to participate fully in the Japanese-American

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negotiations and be informed immediately of the answer of the USA. It will not comply with the relations of the Tripartite Pact if the Japanese Government receives American communications and decides the Japanese position in the future without first reaching an understanding with the German Government as to all of there important questions.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Instructions of the German Issued on May 17 to the Ambassador in Tokyo", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 21 day of May, 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: URABE, Katsuo

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