1	Tuesday, 1 October, 1946
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4	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
5	Court House of the Tribunal
6	War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan
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8	The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9	at 0930.
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13	Appearances:
14	For the Tribunal, same as before.
15	For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
16	For the Defense Section, same as before.
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20	(English to Japanese and Japanese
21	to English interpretation was made by the
22	Language Section, IMTFE.)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Oneto.

MR. ONETO: Mr. President, I will continue with my explanation which I started yesterday and I hope the same difficulties which presented themselves yesterday afternoon will not occur today.

THE PRESIDENT: Yesterday afternoon the Court decided that you should speak in English, or that the French case should be put in English throughout. was the decision of the Court as announced by me. decision must be respected until it is set aside.

Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, in view of the fact that the opinion of the Court, or the judgment of the Court, on this purely procedural matter, may affect the number of nations who participate in this hearing and prosecution, and, in such manner purely by way of construction of a Charter which has not been fully argued to the content of the prosecution, may I ask that the Court take an adjournment until the matter can be fully explored as the prosecution is not willing to proceed, or not ready to proceed, for the reasons that I have stated and will state, until that matter is thoroughly explored and all of the necessary

and available facts be put before the Tribunal before this important decision is reached by it. The prosecution --

THE PRESIDENT: The Court --

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, may I proceed?

THE PRESIDENT: The Court heard all the argument that was offered.

MR. KEENAN: Would the Court be good enough to permit me to complete my statement as Chief of Counsel or am I to be refused that right?

THE PRESIDENT: You will be refused no rights.

On the other hand, I will not be prevented from stating what I know to be the fact.

I repeat: The Court heard all the argument offered on this point and came to a decision. It is for the Court to say whether they will reopen that decision and hear further argument. I do not propose to adjourn for that purpose. I propose to confer with my colleagues on the bench.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, before that is done, I have interrupted my respected associate from France, Mr. Oneto. I would like to have him complete his statement and would like, and respectfully request, that in a matter of this importance the Court announce the decision of each Member of the Tribunal individually

and in open court.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter upon which I cannot speak for the Members of the Court without their permission. I shall consult them.

(Thereupon, the Members of the Tribunal conferred upon the bench.)

THE PRESIDENT: The Court is prepared to hear further arguments on matters not already brought to their notice. We expect the Chief Prosecutor to put the argument.

MR. ONETO: (In French)

THE PRESIDENT: He is still speaking French. That is almost contempt.

MR. ONETO: (In French)

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn.

MR. ONETO: (In French)

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for five minutes.

(Whereupon, at 0945, a recess was taken until 1050, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

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DEPUTY MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief Prosecutor, the Members of the Tribunal have taken into consideration the conduct of Mr. Oneto which led to the adjournment some minutes ago.

We take a serious view of the matter. It appears to constitute contempt of court. However, we propose to adjourn that matter until half past one this afternoon so that Mr. One to may have an opportunity of reconsidering the whole matter. He may have a satisfactory explanation, or he may be prepared to apologize. Failing one or the other, he will be liable to proceedings as for contempt of court in the face of the court.

In the meantime, we have also decided to hear whatever further argument you and the defense may have to offer on the scope of the Charter as regards the languages that may be used in this court. If you are prepared to go ahead straightaway we will hear you now, Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I believe I would prefer to go ahead straightaway so that no time would be wasted in these proceedings.

The section of the Charter which concerns the

- 24 matter we are discussing is Section III, which is entitled "Fair Trial for Accused"; so that the prosecution will respectfully contend that as in the interpretation of any legislation, the body of the instrument in which it appears, the purposes of the provision, the main purpose and the surrounding circumstances, will be taken into consideration by this honorable Tribunal in its interpretation thereof.

I assume, may it please the honorable Court, that there need be little time consumed in calling the Court's attention to the inherent difficulties concerning language in any trial where more than one language is used. Further, when it is considered that the experiment of this trial has no precedent in the entire history of the world, it is important that its broad purposes remain forever clear and not be obscured by any unnecessary narrowing of technical interpretations.

It is, of course, of prime necessity that the accused, and each of them, understand clearly every matter that transpires within this courtroom affecting his life or liberty. Secondly, it is, of course, of equal importance that each hember of the Tribunal thoroughly understand the evidence to be presented if this proceeding is to conform to the minimum requirements

of intelligent judgment.

In the only precedent of consequence existing for procedure, the Nucrenberg trial, there was the requirement of the use of the German language, the English language, the Russian language, and the French language. And in giving consideration to the procedure before this Tribunal, or of it, undoubtedly the authorities enacting and proclaiming this Charter had in view the prime requisites that are so obvious, which I have been permitted by the indulgence of the Court to call to its attention.

obvious, too, that it was intended that each nation represented on this Tribunal and in the prosecution would receive as near as practical equal privileges, if they may be so called, by way of all practical facilities for a clear understanding of the evidence adduced and for clear presentation thereof in the process of production. The number of nations participating in this proceeding was known to be, of course, so numerous that any attempt to follow the existing precedent, which would have been desirable if at all practical, of allowing -- of requiring, Mr. President, requiring, that everything in this proceeding from the beginning to the end be presented in the language

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of the eleven nations represented on the Tribunal and in the prosecution as well as the Japanese will upon any examination be shown to have been utterly unfeasible for practical purposes and the Court; of course, in its wisdom in construing this instrument of Charter will take such fact into consideration, we contend, we hope, believe it should.

Mr. President, the concept that the participation in these proceedings, either in its judgment or the presentation of the evidence on the part of any one of the nations, would be pro forma, would be the shadow and not the substance, would be an ugly and evil one.

May I inquire as to the strict legal interpretation, Mr. President? Paragraph b, we contend on fair construction, especially in view of what I believe to be very pertinent remarks previously made as to the background for interpretation, means that the minimum requirement of the presentation of the proceedings in the courtroom, the trial including related proceedings, could not be encumbered as a practical matter by making it mandatory to have translations in any number approximating eleven tongues.

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English and Japanese can be employed in the prosecution or the defense would be to add one word to the first sentence which is not there and can only be put in by the Court, to-wit: the word, "only" or "alone." In other words, it is our contention that from a practical view of the purposes of this trial as outlined in the Charter, the English and Japanese language shall be used in every proceeding, every related proceeding from the beginning to the end of this trial; but, if the Court please, nowhere in this Charter is it found that where necessary under the circumstances for accomplishing the just and legitimate purposes of this trial no other language than English and Japanese can be employed.

tend, clearly relates to no other matter than that stated in the Charter, to-wit: "Fair Trial for Accused." I hope it is not presumptuous to suggest that the Court probably will approach the process of deciding this matter in first determining whether or not this Tribunal has any discretion in the matter as point number one. Then I assume the Court, in the event that there is an affirmative answer as

That is simply not in the Charter as it now exists.

to such discretion, would address itself to the exercise of that in conducting these proceedings.

Counsel would feel that there would be some doubt as to whether or not it should present any argument on point number two, or whether the discretion should be exercised if it exists. So, unless directed by the Court, I shall confine the brief remaining words to the first point, namely: Has the Court discretion to permit the use of another language than Japanese or English in the conduct of the prosecution or the defense?

In that regard I would advert to the purpose of Section III, "Fair Trial for Accused," and also the language of Section b to see if there is anything in it that prohibits or inhibits or binds this Court, the jurisdiction of this Court, to permit the use of another language other than English and Japanese.

The Court will note, of course, that no effort was made to present anything in the French language without it being interpreted into English and Japanese. Therefore, in so doing the requirements of "b. Language," with reference to its purpose, Section III--"Fair Trial for Accused," of course, is fully and completely fulfilled; and,

of course, in an unprecedented proceeding, a trial of this nature, it is to be assumed that from beginning to end reasonable construction of all matters in the Charter and concerning it will be on the breadth and scope fitting the occasion and resort will not be made to narrow technical interpretations that so often defeat the ends of justice in the domestic courts of all of our lands.

Therefore, in the procedure suggested and under scrutiny and objection, every sound, reasonable requirement for fair trial for the accused is fully met. The language, Mr. President, is unimportant. It is the substance that goes on under the language; that is the meat of the matter. The language is the shell and a very thin one.

Nowhere in Section b is there any statement that no other language than Japanese and English can be used. Plainly there is no inhibition unless it is put in by interpretation. Therefore, with great respect to this Court the prosecution suggests and urges that a fair interpretation of this section, the purpose it serves -- "fair trial for accused," adverting to the language itself shows at least that the Court would be doing no violence in construction -- in holding that there being no inhibition of the use

of any other languages other than Japanese and English, there is the privilege of their use if it serves the general purposes of this trial and violates none of the basic provisions of the Charter otherwise.

If it be held in the strictest sense,
Honorable Members of this Court, that no language
other than the two named could be employed in
the conduct of the trial, it would lead to the
absurd conclusion perhaps in narrow minds that
you could not even hear another language from the
witness box or in the document presented to this
Court. That would be absurd.

I assume, Mr. President, that the important legal point, from the standpoint of technical considerations, with which we are all familiar, is that a fair construction of Section b means that the use of these two languages is obligatory at all times but other languages than Japanese and English may be employed in the conduct of the trial at any time and under any circumstances that the discretion of this Court dictates to be advisable.

I am cognizant of the fact, Mr. President, that this Honorable Tribunal with its distinguished personnel, having to do with points of law, may have Goldberg & Spratt

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to indulge me in a parting word on what I think is the foundation of the trial and the real reason why other languages should be permitted and must have been intended in the Charter as proclaimed.

The important purpose of this trial in that respect, Mr. President, is not alone what happens to these accused, but what will this Court call in its judgment, or what does the prosecution claim in its presentation constitutes criminal conduct upon the part of individuals in international relations.

THE PRESIDENT: I would advise you, Mr. Chief Prosecutor, to keep clear of any argument in terforem.

MR. KEENAN: I don't understand the language of the Court. Will you please explain the last word? I neither heard it, nor do I understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a well known legal phrase.

MR. KEENAN: "In terrorem." I didn't understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: That is friendly advice.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I would clear it up forthwith, not alone with you, but every

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Member of this Honorable Tribunal, that my remarks at no time have intended to be anything other than helpful to the Court in attempting to relate what I believe to be the obvious purposes of this trial, and the obvious proper construction of the provisions of the Charter. THE PRESIDENT: Before you leave the lectern --MR. KEENAN: We have language difficulties, your Honor, that is very embarrassing at times here. THE PRESIDENT: Have you concluded? MR. KEENAN: I have not concluded. I would say, Mr. President, that the facts and circumstances

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that exist every day during the conduct of this trial show the difficulties -- transmission of languages and the hearing of the different individuals concerned in all parts of this room -- and make the necessity for the employment of all legitimate languages in this proceeding the more important. It is then, therefore, in summation, that the purposes of the trial that are apparent, the purposes of the Section, fair trial for the accused, the fact that no language is found in the Charter to prohibit the use of any other language, and that both an expeditious and thorough conduct of the trial might well require the use of other languages, it is the respectful contention of the prosecution that the determination of what language shall be used in addition to Japanese and English belongs to the Tribunal, and that as long as those two languages are employed the full provisions of the Tribunal are complied with.

THE PRESIDENT: For the benefit of some of my colleagues, Mr. Chief Prosecutor, I would like to deal briefly with Article 1, which, among other things, provides that the Tribunal is established for the just and prompt trial of the accused, of Article 12, which provides that the Tribunal shall

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confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues, and to Article 13, which provides that the Tribunal shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious procedure. I am also referring to 12(b), which says that the Tribunal shall take strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay. Can you meet this argument, that those provisions enjoining a prompt and an expeditious trial are not the explanation of the provision that the trial shall be conducted in Japanese and English?

MR. KEENAN: All right.

THE PRESIDENT: Again, if we have a discretion, can we exercise it in favor of a language which would lead to delays, which are prohibited by the Charter? The judges who are affected by those considerations do not overlook the fact that a just trial is of paramount importance always. I need hardly say that the attitude toward admitting other languages is based wholly on the provisions of the Charter. Their reading of the Charter is alone responsible for their attitude.

MR. KEENAN: In the light of the Court's remarks, I think I ought to explain that I have at no time intended to suggest that the Court go without

the confines of the Charter, but that the Court shall, in interpreting this Charter, as in any other instrument or piece of legislation, examine the purposes for an intelligent resolution of any permissible privilege that the Court may extend to either the prosecution or the defense in procedural matters. To repeat, Mr. President -- am I inter-

THE PRESIDENT: No.

MR. KEENAN: To keep, Mr. President, within the confines with what, with my limited facilities,
would provide an orderly analysis, I have attempted
to divide the question into two points. First, has
the Court any discretion in the matter; secondly,
if it has, then we would like to address ourselves
to the question of why we would urge that the discretion be exercised in favor of the use of another
language.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me put very shortly, and I hope more clearly, the points that give concern to my colleagues, or some of them.

IR. KEENAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: They think the Charter confines the proceedings to the two languages -- English and Japanese -- to insure a prompt trial.

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Others think that if they have the discretion to allow a third or fourth language, then they cannot exercise it in favor of that language if delays are its result, provided that English or Japanese is available to put the particular case or point in a case, as happened yesterday in the case of the French charges. It was suggested yesterday by me from the Bench that the French case could have been put in English by members of the French Section who speak English well. That may have been wrong, but it has not been contradicted yet.

MR. KEENAN: I am getting a little confused, Mr. President, in this discussion of the law, when we have to advert to facts that are outside of the record, and where there may be some differences of facts, and where the Court, if it is interested, since it has said it has not heard the matter discussed, might like to know what the exact facts are. I would want permission of the Court before discussing matters of fact of that nature, or its direction or suggestion at least. Does the Court care to learn of what the situation is with reference to any lawyers who are capable of presenting the case in English more clearly than the Associate Prosecutor named by the Republic of France, or shall •

I for the moment confine my remarks to a discussion of the law in this case without reference to any extraneous facts in any section of the prosecution?

THE PRESIDENT: We are dealing now with the question whether the Court has a discretion. If the Court has a discretion, it may say, "We will allow French if time is not wasted."

MR. KEENAN: It would seem orderly, Mr. President, if we could find out, first, whether or not the majority of the Court felt that that discretion existed before we consumed time in arguing how it should be exercised if it does not exist.

THE PRESIDENT: Clearly, we do not want to deal with this matter piecemeal. We may go away and find that we have a discretion, and then we might like to know before coming into court on what grounds we might exercise the discretion in favor of the French case. Those grounds would be matters of fact. You might tell us now if in fact, if you are in position to do so, that if French is allowed there will be no delay. You might tell us now, if it be the fact, that the French case cannot be put in English because no English-speaking person is available to put it in English. We do not want a number of retirements on this matter. It should be dealt with as a whole,

after we have heard full argument this morning and this afternoon.

MR. KEENAN: Completing, for just a moment, the reasons advanced for the prosecution's contention that discretion does exist what I call point No. 1, if I may so designate it, the very fact, Mr. President, that in the consideration of this matter the Court has considered other parts of the Charter, including such basic words as "unreasonable" and "justice" --

THE PRESIDENT: And "promptness" and "expedition."

there is no great difference in the substance of the thought. It is because we believe that an examination of the pertinent Section b -- Subsection b under Article 9 of Section III -- shows that there is no inhibition -- no statement that no other language shall be used. The Court's hands are not tied in that respect by the Charter. Therefore, plainly the Court is not prevented from exercising that basic, inherent power of all courts to use its discretion unless there is a denial of that inherent, basic right and privilege in a section of the Charter itself, to wit, in this instance, paragraph b of

of Article 9 of Section III, and our answer is that just no such prohibition exists. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

MR. COLYNS CARR: Would the Tribunal permit me to add a few words to the argument of the Chief Prosecutor?

The Chief Prosecutor has dealt with the question of construction on broad lines. I desire to deal with it primarily as a matter of strict construction of the clause in question. I only point out by way of introduction that Article 2 clearly contemplates that judges, and Article 8 b clearly contemplates that counsel, associate counsel, shall be appointed from countries whose language is neither English nor Japanese. Article 9 b reads: "The trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the accused." The question is whether the word "conducted" governs the language in which the counsel standing at this lectern shall speak. The vital word is the word "and". It is not "in English or in the language of the accused." Therefore, if the contention against me is correct, it would follow that every person, every counsel who

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stands at this lectern must speak both in English and in Japanese, and, on the strict language, in both languages at the same time. On that view, no part of these proceedings have complied with this clause from the beginning. This is absurd. It follows that the clause cannot mean that and it merely means that it is obligatory that all parts of the proceedings, every word which is spoken, shall be able to be heard in English and in Japanese by anybody who wishes to do so. So long as those conditions are complied with, in my submission there is nothing in the clause to prevent any language, convenient to any counsel, from being used in speaking from this lectern.

Now, as to the question of convenience. In my submission, as long as the matter in hand is the making of a speech or the reading of a document, which can be and has been translated and circulated beforehand, it is less condusive to delay that the counsel concerned should be allowed to use his own language than that he should be compelled to use one with which he is unfamiliar. I think experience has shown that the most difficult thing and the thing producing most delay is for the interpreters to have to deal with something which is spoken in English by someone who has not a perfect command of the language.

The real difficulty and the inevitable difficulty arises when something has to be said, some argument has to be made, some objection or some interposition and the onset of which cannot have been prepared and translated beforehand. That difficulty works both ways. It is difficult for counsel not fully familiar with English to understand what is being said to him, and I venture to think that that will be found to be the cause of the unfortunate occurrences yesterday afternoon and this morning. It is equally difficult for the Tribunal and other persons in court to understand what is being said in English by a person who has not a full command of the pronunciation.

In my submission it will be found to be quicker in the end if, with regard to the reading of documents and the making of speeches, counsel is allowed to make them in his own language, which can be simultaneously reproduced both in English and Japanese, thus causing no delay at all, and if, with regard to discussion, which cannot be prepared beforehand, it is translated to him in his own language and his reply is translated from his own language into the two languages required to be used by the article.

To sum up, therefore, my submissions are

three. First, on the strictest construction of the article, there is no prohibition against the use of a language other than English and Japanese, provided everybody can hear in those two languages. Second, the express provision for non-English speaking countries to be represented, both on the Bench and at the Ear, raises a presumption in favor of their being allowed to use their own language if necessary. Third, the use of their own language will in our submission, when all the factors and difficulties of interpretation and reproduction are fully appreciated, be found to lessen rather than to increase the delay, some of which is inevitable under the circumstances.

Finally, I would like just to mention a matter of fact on a point referred to by you, Mr. President, this morning. That is the possibility of a member of the French delegation other than Mr. Oneto reading in English.

THE PRESIDENT: Member of the prosecution.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Ah, other than the French
delegation?

THE PRESIDENT: Or the defense, yes.

MR. COMYNS CARR: I misunderstood the observation this morning evidently. In answer to that suggestion, I would respectfully submit that although

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we are, and we are proud to be, working together as an international team, it would be rather hard to expect the delegation of one country to hand over part of its national case to representatives of another.

I am reminded, your Monor, that I should have added that when witnesses come to give their evidence that is just as much a part of the trial and related proceedings as the making of speeches or the reading of cocuments. With regard to the witness himself, the Tribunal has already permitted witnesses who did not speak either English or Japanese to testisy in their own language. But in my submission, with regard to the counsel examining the witness, there would also be a great deal of confusion and delay if he were required to frame his questions in a language of which he has imperfect command and which the interpreter would have great difficulty for that reason in translating to the witness.

The PRESIDENT: I did not suggest that the French case should be handed over to the prosecutor of another country. I suggested it should be conducted by a member of the French Prosecution Section who could speak English, and I said yesterday I believed there was such a person. In the course of

my business in Chambers I thought I discovered that. I may have been mistaken.

MR. COMYNS CARK: I apologize. It seems that my first understanding was better than my second. I first thought that that was what the President meant. I ought to inform the Tribunal that the gentleman referred to is not a member of the legal profession; he only accompanies the delegation in the character of interpreter. As I have already pointed out, the mere reading of cocuments -- in the mere reading of documents, the essential thing is what comes over the transmitting apparatus, and that comes just as quickly in English over the transmitting apparatus whatever language it is actually read in. Even if the gentleman who is not a member of the legal profession were permitted to read a document, the moment any discussion arose about it he would have to give way to somebody qualified to deal with the discussion and the real difficulty would then arise as before.

THE PRESIDENT: I regret that I was not told yesterday afternoon when I mentioned the matter first that the gentleman was not a member of the legal profession. It is hardly fair to the Court to keep it in the dark that way.

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MR. COMYNS CARK: I am sorry. I was not present myself and I am afraid I don't know the exact circumstances of those who were, whether they understood the question or not.

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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, and Members of the Tribunal: I have prepared a short and brief reply to the Chief Prosecutor's argument this morning, and with the Court's permission I should like to give a copy of that to the translators so that I can proceed and in that way save some time. Is that satisfactory to the Tribunal?

I asked the prosecution what they had to say.

I cannot hear, and it will not be heard over the microphone.

MR. KEENAN: Certainly not.

MR. LEVIN: Before I begin reading from my short argument, I should like to state to the Court that a number of my associates have advised me that the gentleman of the French delegation who was referred to by Mr. Comyns Carr was presented to the Court as an associate counsel. I do not know that fact of my own knowledge excepting the statements, the information, I received from a number of my associates.

At the outset may I say that the determination of the question before the Tribunal does not involve a question of privilege of nations. Were the matter the mere granting of a courtesy to another nation or

a customary courtesy of one lawyer to another, a member of the bar, I know that I, and I feel certain all my colleagues would be perfectly willing to join in granting such a courtesy.

The question before the Tribunal is a fundamental one. It cannot be answered merely by stating that it involves the technical construction of language, but must be answered in the light of the Charter.

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I think it would be helpful to the Court to consider for a moment the preparation of the Charter. Our information is that prior to the preparation of the Charter, members of the prosecution staff made a thorough study of the Nuernburg Charter and the proceedings which were conducted there, and after this study prepared the Charter in question. Neither the defendants nor anyone connected with the Japanese Government had anything to do with the preparation of the Charter. Whether the prosecution or others prepared the Charter is of no great moment, except that this is the fundamental law which guides the Court. As you, Mr. President, have indicated, the thing with which the Tribunal is concerned is a fair trial of the accused, and under the terms of the Charter they are required to have a fair trial in accordance therewith.

In the discussion between the President and

the learned Chief Prosecutor for the United States, the various provisions of the Charter under which these defendants are being tried have already been adverted to.

Article 1 states: "The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East is hereby established for the
just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals in the Far East. . "

"Article 12. Conduct of Trial. The Tribunal, shall: a. Confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges.

b. Take strict measures to prevent any action which

These are the general provisions of Section I of the Charter, and throughout the Charter there is a studied attempt to make sure that its various provisions are such as to insure the defendants a fair trial.

We come now to Section III of the Charter, which provides for a fair trial for the accused.

would cause any unreasonable delay. . ."

The Charter specifically provides for a fair trial in Section III. At the beginning we have the legend "Fair Trial for Accused."

Article 9 provides: "In order to insure fair trial for the accused the following procedure shall be followed," and in subdivision b of this Article it is provided: "b. Language. The trial and related

proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the accused. Translations of documents and other papers shall be provided as needed and requested."

It will thus be seen that it is fundamental that the trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the accused.

Learned counsel, the Chief prosecutor for the United States, states that the language is unimportant. He used the Words of Telleyrand when he said the language was used to conceal thought. Mr. President, that may be true and for myself I have often regretted that, but, nevertheless, this is the only articulate manner in which we can make ourselves understood.

It is no answer to the problem to say that certain witnesses have appeared in the witness box whose language was other than English or Japanese. That is a situation with which courts are confronted everywhere. Where a witness testifies in another language and there is a translation of that language, that does not mean that the trial is not being conducted in the language required either by the statute or fundamental law creating the court.

The Chinese phase of this case has already been presented to the Court. There was no difficulty

in this fine presentation made by the Chief Prosecutor for the government of China and by his able assistant, Mr. Henry Chiu.

tinguished Chief Prosecutor for the United States as to whether or not, in his opinion, the Court could exercise a discretion under the Charter. We insist, Mr. President, that there is no construction open under the terms of the Charter. I need only suggest to the Court the rule of law that where the language is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to construction. We are not merely insisting upon a technical construction of the Charter, but we are asking the Tribunal to construct it for the purpose for which the Charter was created, and that is to try these alleged defendants; and that as part of the fair trial which the accused are guaranteed under this Charter, it does not permit ad libitum fundamental changes.

Article 7 of Section II provides:

"Rules of Procedure. The Tribunal may draft and amend rules of procedure consistent with the fundamental provisions of this Charter."

Article 7 above gives the Court power to amend the rules of procedure. However, they must be consistent with the fundamental provisions of the Charter.

And I am interpolating my prepared memorandum to state that the change in the rule would be a violation of the terms of the Charter, because it is only the rules of procedure that the Court is permitted to change, and not the terms and conditions of the Charter.

So, Mr. President, it seems to us clearly beyond peradventure that in view of the provisions of the Charter, and especially in view of subdivision b, Section III, that the Court has not the power to amend the rules to authorize the conduct of this case other than in the English language and in the language of the accused.

Mr. President, I should like to reply to a portion of the argument made by Mr. Comyns Carr. He refers to the provision of the Charter, subcivision b of Article 8, to the effect that it provides for associate counsel of Allied Nations. I should like to suggest, in the first place, that if it was contemplated by the framers of the Charter that those portions of this case which were being presented, which were to be presented by the Allied Nations, were to be presented in their language, then there would have been a provision to that effect.

However, Mr. President, as I read subdivision a of this article, the entire trial is under the

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jurisdiction of the Chief of Counsel for the prosecution. Subdivision a provides as follows: "The Chief of Counsel designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of charges against war criminals within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and will render such legal assistance to the Supreme Commander as is appropriate."

Nations to appoint associate counsel. But it seems to me in the plain reading of subdivision a of Article 8 that the entire jurisdiction and conduct of the trial is in charge of the Chief Prosecutor; and the exigencies of the situation where they determine to present these phases by the various governments does not change either the provisions of the Charter or the rights of these accused to have a fair trial under the terms of the Charter.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there no further argument?

Dr. KIYOSE.

DR. KIYOSE: The opinion of Japanese defense counsel on this matter is, on the whole, the same as that presented by Mr. Levin. However, we had based our defense on the assumption that the trial would be

conducted in English and Japanese. But now, suddenly,
we are faced with the prospect of having these accused
prosecuted in a language other than English or Japanese.
It will be very difficult to correct the translations
and to see whether the translations are correct or not.

On this point I believe that the rights guaranteed to the defense under the Charter would be changed. I believe that to conduct this trial in English and Japanese, as is so clearly provided in the Charter, is one of the great beings which assure the defendants a fair trial.

Therefore, not only from the point of expeditious trial, as the President stated, but also from the point of view of conducting a fair trial, we sincerely hope that the prosecution's objections will be dismissed and the Tribunal's original decision to carry on the proceedings in English will be sustained.

That is all.

MR. KEENAN: If the Court will permit me to bring one fact to its attention that I have been unable to do with the exigencies of the various duties evolving upon me for the moment: Full preparations, if the Court please, have been made to furnish the interpreters with the explanations of the documents to be offered in evidence in this phase, and for simultaneous concurrent

transmission through the IBM machines, so that no time whatsoever would be consumed other than the normal procedure of the Court in that instance. The documents, the ontire phase, will be presented with no speaking witnesses, only by documents. All of those documents are in either the English or Japanese or German, originally, and they have all been processed into the two languages, Japanese and English, and will be read only in the English language, in any event.

The only other delay in the proceedings would be that necessitated by translations into French and English, and vice versa, of any questions from the Court or any objection of opposing counsel.

For the record, I am reliably informed that there is no other person available from the French group in the prosecution, members of the bar, who have any more facile knowledge of the English language than that possessed by Mr. Oneto.

THE PRESIDENT: My attention has been drawn to the fact that in the appearances for the International Prosecution Section as announced by the Chief Prosecutor at the opening of the trial, the following name appears:

Mr. Jacques Gouelou, representing Associate Counsel, acting on behalf of the Republic of France. MR. KEENAN: That, Mr. President, was a matter

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of courtesy only; and the record does not show it, but it is a fact that Mr. Oneto at that time was not in Japan but had made a trip to some point in the southern Pacific for the purpose of gathering evidence.

Mr. Gouelou is not a lawyer by profession, has never been admitted to the bar of any country, and we have attempted to confine the presention of evidence before this high Tribunal to members of the bar in every instance.

THE PRESIDENT: He was held out to us as a lawyer, no doubt unwittingly, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. You would have assumed he was one, no doubt, as we did.

MR. KEENAN: I am sorry, Mr. President. In the interests of the truth, I must reply that the Court is in error on one of the assumptions. I at no time assumed him to be a lawyer, because I knew better. He told me he was not. And he was introduced only because he was the only available member of the French prosecuting staff present, only male member present, at the time that these proceedings --

(The balance of Mr. Keenan's statement was not transmitted over the IBM system.)

THE PRESIDENT: We assumed he was a lawyer; we were justified in that assumption. And we were not aware of the contrary until this afternoon.

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We will recess now for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1540, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal by a majority has decided to allow the use of French to the extent indicated or suggested by the learned Chief Prosecutor. As regards objections by the defense, we understand, of course, that they will have to be translated into French and into Japanese or English as the case may be, and so, too, the answers thereto. Those are the terms imposed by the Tribunal; and, of course, they may be altered to suit the exigencies of the case and to enable compliance with the Charter from time to time.

Consistent with a just trial we are bound to conduct a prompt and expeditious trial.

MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, in view of the present ruling of the Court may we take an exception to the ruling simply for the purpose of the record?

THE PRESIDENT: You may, but the position is already covered by a general ruling.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, might I state that Mr. One to has requested me to inform the Court that he is desirous of carefully perusing the record that he may make clear his explanation to the Court; and since it is three:forty-five, I ask if there be

objection to the proceedings being adjourned at this time until tomorrow morning?

THE PRESIDENT: We are satisfied that Mr.
Oneto should appear before us at nine-thirty tomorrow
morning with any explanation he may have.

I have been advised, Mr. Chief Prosecutor, that part of a statement you made this afternoon was not transmitted over the IBM System. Are you aware of the fact?

MR. KEENAN: I was advised by one of the court reporters late in the recess that there had been some failure to transmit the statement completely so the reporter was unable to get it. I don't know what part it is. I have not been advised yet. In the interest of speed, unless there is some particular purpose, I have not been informed that there is anything of consequence omitted or anything I know of, but I shall be very glad to see that part of the record or have it referred to me now by the reporter. It is possible that I, perhaps, can recall what I said.

(Whereupon, a paper was handed to Mr. Keenan.)

MR. KEENAN (Continuing): Oh, I have the
part before me.

THE PRESIDENT: Before you you have the part that was recorded, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. The dots

at the end of that paragraph before you indicate the place at which the reporters ceased to report.

MR. KEENAN: The rest of the sentence was in substance, I am quite sure, although I would not make a representation it was in hace verbae -- the last line, I am reading for the continuity:

"...only male member present at the time of these proceedings..." representing a part of the French prosecuting staff.

The record shows, Mr. President, of 3 May 1946, in presenting Mr. Gouelou, the following by myself, line 10, page 24, "Mr. Jacques Gouelou, Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Paris representing Mr. Robert Oneto."

THE PRESIDENT: We always knew that.

I suppose the French case cannot be presented again today.

MR. KEENAN: I think in the several moments left it would take us more time to get the papers together in this exigency before the Court's ordinary time for adjournment.

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the intention is that Mr. Oneto shall present it, subject to the decision in his own personal matter.

MR. KEENAN Does the Court make an inquiry

or an observation? THE PRESIDENT: We will treat it as an inquiry, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. MR. KEENAN: That is the intention of the prosecution at present. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until half-past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1550, an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, 2 October 1946, at 0930.)