PUBLIC Official Transcript Judgement (Open Session) Page 1 1 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2 In the case against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and 3 Mr. Ibrahim Mohamed Ali Al Amin STL-14-06 4 5 Presiding Judge Nicola Lettieri - [Contempt Judge] Friday, 15 July 2016 - [Judgement] 6 7 [Open Session] 8 --- Upon commencing at 4.00 p.m. 9 JUDGE LETTIERI: Good afternoon, everyone. Would the Registrar 10 please call the case. 11 THE REGISTRAR: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is sitting in an 12 open session in the case against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Mr. Ibrahim 13 Mohamed Ali Al Amin, case number STL-14-06. 14 JUDGE LETTIERI: We take the appearances. We begin with the 15 Amicus Curiae Prosecutor. 16 MR. SCOTT: Good afternoon, Your Honour. Ken Scott, 17 Amicus Prosecutor, and I am joined today by Ms. Gaia Guastella and 18 Mr. Hugo Lagace. Thank you.

JUDGE LETTIERI: The Defence.

MR. ABOU KASM: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence team is composed today of Ms. Lucia Sipala, case manager, and Ms. Marina

Yetongnon Edwards, legal officer, and myself, Antonios Farouk Abou Kasm, lead counsel assigned by this Court.

Your Honour, allow me first of all to present my deepest condolences and sympathy to the French people after the horrendous

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JUDGE LETTIERI: Yes, our Tribunal is a Tribunal which deals with another case of terrorism. It's appropriate in here to remember the victims of another kind of terrorism.

Mr. Abou Kasm, have you had any communication with the accused about today's hearing?

MR. ABOU KASM: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. There has been no communication.

JUDGE LETTIERI: And we have the chief of the Office of Defence.

Maitre Roux, Maitre François Roux.

I am sitting today to deliver the judgement in this case. I will summarize the procedural history, the applicable law, and finally my findings. I emphasize that this is a summary only and that the authoritative account of my findings is contained in the written judgement, which will be made available at the close of this hearing.

My full reasoning is contained in that judgement, which speaks more extensively about the issues at stake. The judgement will be in the working languages of these proceedings, English, but Arabic and French versions will be made available soon. However, the summary is available in all three languages. I also note that the judgement comes in a confidential version and a public version. The public version contains a number of redactions to protect confidential Tribunal information as well as the identity and the safety of certain witnesses who testified in these proceedings.

This case concerns the publication in Al-Akhbar newspaper of two

articles in Lebanon in January 2013 on purported confidential Tribunal witnesses and the articles' subsequent availability online. Akhbar Beirut company, headquartered in Beirut Lebanon, that owns the newspaper Al-Akhbar, and Mr. Ibrahim Mohamed Al Amin, who was at all relevant times Al-Akhbar's editor-in-chief and Akhbar Beirut chairman of the board, are alleged to have been responsible for the publication of the articles. For this conduct, they are charged with interfering with the Tribunal's administration of justice.

I now summarize the procedural history of this case.

On 31 January 2014, Judge David Baragwanath charged Al-Akhbar Beirut and Mr. Al Amin each with one count each of contempt pursuant to the Rule 60 bis of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedures and Evidence.

Mr. Al Amin appeared via video conference link from Beirut for the initial appearance on 29 May 2014. In that appearance, Mr. Al Amin confirmed that he was appearing on behalf of both himself and the corporate accused Akhbar Beirut, before declaring that he would remain silent during all the proceedings and refused to appoint any lawyer to represent either of the accused and then left the hearing.

I subsequently found such conduct, in addition to previous correspondence he had sent to the Tribunal, constituted not guilty pleas for both accused and then ordered the head of the Defence Office to assign counsel to represent both accused, in application of Rule 59(F), which permits such a possibility when "it is necessary in the interests of justice and to ensure a fair and expeditious trial." Mr. Abou Kasm was assigned as counsel for the accused on 3 July 2014.

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The trial commenced on the 24th February 2016 and concluded on 8 April 2016. Eleven witnesses testified live in court or by video conference link, including a proposed Amicus expert and a proposed Defence expert. The parties filed their final trial briefs on 28 April 2016, and made closing arguments on 13 May 2016.

I now turn to the applicable law.

Contempt of the Tribunal is described in Rule 60 bis (A). It provides that:

"The Tribunal, in the exercise of its inherent power, may hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of justice."

The Rule provides a non-exhaustive, diverse list of acts which can constitute contempt.

The sole count under Rule 60 bis (A) charges the accused with knowingly and wilfully interfering with the administration of justice by publishing information of purported confidential witnesses in the Ayyash case, thereby undermining the public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of information about, or provided by, witnesses or potential witnesses.

With respect to the actus reus of this count, the Amicus must first prove that the accused actually published information on purported confidential witnesses in the Ayyash case. The disclosed information must at least be significant enough that the relevant individual is reasonably identifiable in the circumstances.

In addition, the Amicus must show that such publication, when it

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ascertainable facts.

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occurred, created, objectively, the likelihood of undermining the public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of information about, or provided by, witnesses or potential witnesses.

This likelihood cannot be proved in subjective terms. Under the required objective test, likelihood can only be proved through tangible information substantiated by evidentiary proof, or in other words through

The mens rea for this count, and indeed for any contempt charge, is a knowing and wilful interference with the administration of justice.

Now, given that Akhbar Beirut, a legal person, is charged, I turn to the law with respect to the attributing liability to such persons.

I recall the Appeals Panel's decision holding that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over legal persons in contempt proceedings. The Appeals Panel, however, provided no clear guidance as to the applicable material elements for attributing liability to legal persons charged with contempt before this Tribunal. Because of and despite this, I had to previously identify these elements, concluding that it was most appropriate in the circumstances to look to Lebanese law on corporate liability.

The Appeals Panel later confirmed my decision that the applicable law in relation to the elements of attributing criminal liability to legal persons is Lebanese law. Thus, Lebanese law on corporate liability is applicable to the instant case. In order for the corporate accused to be held criminally responsible for the sole count, the Amicus must: First, establish the criminal responsibility of a specific natural personal; second, demonstrate that at the relevant time such natural

person was a director, member of the administration, representative, meaning someone authorized by the legal person to act in its name, or an employee who has been provided by the legal body with explicit authorization to act in its name; and third, prove that the natural person's criminal conduct was done either on behalf of or using the means of the corporate accused.

There is no doubt that this count engages the freedom of the press, and it has been raised by the Defence as constituting a justification for any alleged conduct. However, this implication in this case is properly addressed only if and after the Amicus has proved that the elements of the count beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then would I be required to consider whether the accused's conduct was justified by their right to free expression. In such an evaluation, I must account for and balance the freedom of the press and the need to ensure the integrity of the Tribunal's proceedings. The journalistic profession may not be used as an impenetrable shield. Where different legitimate interests are involved, they must be weighed in the light of the priorities in a democratic society.

Having established the applicable law, I will now address my findings with respect to Mr. Al Amin.

With respect to the actus reus for this charge, having reviewed the evidence, I conclude that on 15 January 2013, Al-Akhbar Newspaper published the first of the impugned news articles in both the English and Arabic languages, with the first entitled in English as "STL Leaks: The Prosecution's Surprise Witnesses." The second article, entitled in

English as "The STL Witness List: Why We Published," was issued in Arabic on 19 January 2013 and in English on 20 January 2013. The Arabic language articles, which were reproduced on the Arabic language web site of the newspaper, provided the photographs, names, and the significant personal information of 32 individuals identified as purported confidential Tribunal witnesses. The English language articles did not include the photographs and the personal details of the purported witnesses but, rather, provided links to the Arabic language articles where such information could be located.

I find, therefore, that the information provided in the impugned articles permitted the identification of the 32 individuals purported to be confidential witnesses.

The likelihood of undermining public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of its information must be proved through ascertainable facts. Proof of actual harm concerning an individual's business, actual loss in confidence in the Tribunal, and actions publicly taken to distance themselves from the Tribunal as a direct result of the disclosure, as well as negative public discourse in the media and in the concerned individuals' entourage, surrounding the impugned articles, constitute ascertainable facts supportive of an objective likelihood that public confidence in the Tribunal would be undermined because of the publications.

Three witnesses for the Amicus and two witnesses for the Defence testified about their personal exposure as purported confidential Tribunal witnesses in either of the two Al-Akhbar articles. The Amicus

witnesses testified that they had been afraid or concerned that their photos and personal identifying information had been widely disseminated in print and online with their association as not only Tribunal witnesses but witnesses "whose testimonies would be used to incriminate Hezbollah." In most cases, those fears were supported by ascertainable facts.

I accept the evidence of the witness whose fears about his exposure as a purported witness were substantiated by a loss in his business, which I conclude is a negative and direct impact of his exposure as a purported Tribunal witness in the Al-Akhbar publications.

The Defence witnesses who were identified as purported Tribunal witnesses in the Al-Akhbar publications testified that they experienced no negative ramifications as a result of their exposure, and both confirmed that they maintained trust in the Tribunal's ability to maintain confidentiality.

However, both witnesses demonstrated serious concerns that the public be left with the belief that they were key witnesses against Hezbollah and sought to distance themselves from being perceived as a witness for or against any particular political party. One witness took immediate action by sending in a clarification letter that was later published in Al-Akhbar. Such conduct demonstrates that the witness feared the negative impact that the disclosure would have on his life and his letter concretely substantiated his fears. I also accept the testimony of two witnesses who testified to having lost confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of its witness information as a result of the Al-Akhbar publications.

Evidence that demonstrates the existence of negative public discourse surrounding the publications, whether true or not, is also highly relevant to the question of whether the Al-Akhbar publication were objectively likely to undermine confidence in the Tribunal's ability to maintain the confidentiality of its information. Documentary evidence admitted demonstrates overwhelmingly, the existence of large-scale negative public discourse surrounding the Al-Akhbar disclosures. Media articles detailing the criticisms and negative reactions from the public are largely supported by the 19 January article written by Mr. Al Amin himself, which acknowledge the media and the public clamour following the 15 January article, noting criticism from lawyers, journalists, government, and the civilians who, inter alia, stress that Al-Akhbar had broken the law in publishing purported confidential witness identities.

The truth of the contents of such media articles does not matter, it's the mere existence of such articles that demonstrates the negative public discourse surrounding the Al-Akhbar publications. This is furthermore supported by the evidence of several witnesses who testified that friends, families, and acquaintances approached them after their exposure as purported Tribunal witnesses with serious concerns about their safety in light of the publications.

Having reviewed the entirety of the documentary and the testimonial evidence, I find that the Amicus has proved that the publications of the 15 and 19 January articles were objectively likely to undermine the public's confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect confidential information.

The element of mens rea for this charge is satisfied if the Amicus demonstrates that the accused deliberately published information on purported confidential witnesses and, in doing so, knew that his conduct was objectively likely to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of information about or provided by witnesses or potential witnesses.

In his suspect interview, Mr. Al Amin confirmed that he was the only person responsible for granting the orders to publish any material related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. I am satisfied that Mr. Al Amin authored, approved, and published the 15 and 19 January articles. The content of both articles is clear: The photograph, name, and highly identifying personal information of 32 individuals are published in the articles. All 32 individuals were characterized as confidential Tribunal witnesses whose testimony would be used to prove the Prosecution's case. Therefore, I find that he deliberately published information pertaining to purported confidential witnesses.

Next, I must assess whether Mr. Al Amin knew that the publication of purportedly confidential witness information was objectively likely to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of witness information.

I find that the impugned articles, along with other publications issued by Al-Akhbar in and around January 2013, demonstrate Mr. Al Amin's mens rea for this offence. Indeed, I consider Mr. Al Amin's admissions in the 15 and 19 January articles concerning the confidentiality of

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witness information and the public impact of their publication to be the strongest evidence of his mens rea.

In particular, I note that Mr. Al Amin quoted various negative reactions from a wide range of individuals and groups in Lebanon in response to the publication of the 15 January article in the second article that published purported confidential witness information, issued on 19 January 2013.

Mr. Al Amin acknowledged that, in response to the 15 January article that exposed 17 purported confidential witnesses, Al-Akhbar had received questions from politicians, jurists, journalists, and security personnel, as well as some of those whose personal details were published, focusing on the aim behind the decision to publish and whether it served a specific interested party, all while stressing that the newspaper was breaking the law. Mr. Al Amin described the clamour in the media and by several political parties who judged that Al-Akhbar was seeking to obstruct international justice. The same article acknowledged that powerful figures at the STL may bring legal action for contempt of court and that the 15 January article had compromised the fairness and integrity of the proceedings and also put peoples' lives at risk, all while acknowledging the potential legal ramification, the negative public discourse, and the concern that the publication was potentially harmful to people. Mr. Al Amin then released the photographs, names, and the detailed personal information with respect to a further 15 purported confidential witnesses.

Therefore, I am persuaded that Mr. Al Amin knew that the

publication of purported confidential witness information in the two impugned articles were objectively likely to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of witness information.

Now that I have determined that the Amicus has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Al Amin committed both the actus reus of the offence and possessed the requisite mens rea, I must determine whether the accused's conduct was justified by their rights to freedom of expression, taking into account that such a right must be balanced with the need to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.

As I have noted before, the journalistic profession may not be used as an impenetrable shield. Where different legitimate interests are involved, they must be weighed in light of the priorities in a democratic society. At the international level, all of the relevant principles and rules concerning the free expression impose limits on journalists in order to safeguard other conflicting and worthy interests, including Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, observations from Human Rights Committee, and Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such principles are also applied in Lebanon, and I accept that in accordance with domestic laws, Lebanese journalists are required to respect the privacy and the confidentiality of the identifying information of the parties to criminal proceedings.

In the case at hand, while I accept that the accused and all media are free to report on the Tribunal's work, and even criticize it, I see no journalistic value or pressing social need in the decision to

publish the names, photographs, and other fully identifying information of 32 purported confidential witnesses, some of whom, as the evidence at trial has shown, suffered a direct and negative impact from their identification in the publications. Furthermore, the accused did not comply with the most basic standards of investigative journalism, which prescribe a preliminary and a genuine verification of information and also prohibits the embellishment of or fabrication of facts.

In sum, the Defence has not demonstrated that the accused's decision to publish two media articles containing the photographs, names, and detailed personal information on purported confidential Tribunal witnesses was consistent with journalistic standards or ethics. Indeed, I find the prohibition on publishing this kind of information, that is objectively likely to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal, constitutes a proper limit on the freedom of the press as it protects a conflicting but worthy social need: The integrity and the proper functioning of judicial proceedings by ensuring the safety of witnesses called to collaborate with the justice system.

I will now summarize my findings with respect to the liability of the corporate accused.

As I mentioned earlier, to secure the conviction of a corporate accused, the Amicus needs to demonstrate the criminal conduct of a specific director, member of the administration, representative, or duly authorized employee of the corporation. Further, he needs to establish that this person's conduct was performed on behalf of the corporation or using its means.

Lebanese law.

1	I am satisfied that Mr. Al Amin authored both of the impugned						
2	articles and that in his capacity as editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar						
3	newspaper, he was the sole person responsible for the decision to publish						
4	and disseminate the impugned articles in print and on various web sites.						
5	As the chairman of the board of Al-Akhbar, the corporation which						
6	owned Al-Akhbar Newspaper at the relevant times, I am also satisfied that						
7	Mr. Al Amin was a director of the corporate accused and that such						
8	publications were carried out on behalf of the corporation, for the						
9	corporation's purposes, and using the corporation's means. As a result,						
10	I find that the requisite elements of the offence with which the						
11	corporate accused has been charged have been proven beyond a reasonable						
12	doubt.						
13	I will now read out the disposition of the judgement.						
14	For these reasons:						
15	Pursuant to Rule 60 bis (A), 60 bis (H), and 168 of the Rules;						
16	I find both the accused guilty with respect to the charge under						
17	the sole count of the Order in Lieu of Indictment;						
18	Order that a sentencing hearing shall be held on a date to be						
19	determined forthwith and subject to the modalities that I will set out in						
20	a separate scheduling order to be issued on 18 July 2016;						
21	Invite the accused to attend the sentencing hearing;						
22	And order that the Registry provide a copy of the Arabic and						
23	English language versions of the public redacted judgement to the						
24	Lebanese authorities to serve on both accused, in accordance with						

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I now ask the Registrar to distribute copies of the judgement to the parties. Thank you. This concludes the hearing and we stand adjourned. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.31 p.m.

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