

## The Excerpt from the Diary.

February 18th.

I was appointed the commander of the guards in Singapore and was ordered to command the 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, and military police including assistant gendarmes, and to take charge of the defense of Singapore.

At 10 a.m. I reported at the army headquarters and received orders and instructions on defense and also received news of the attachment of the extra staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.

I have issued orders concerning the general guarding.

February 19th.

I heard reports from the OHASHI unit, military police, which was in charge of guarding and inspection of the city.

The pillaging by citizens is still going on.

Towards evening, the defense headquarters were removed to Fort Canning in the city, the former general headquarters of the British forces.

The same evening, according to instructions, I issued orders requiring the wholesale rounding up of undesirable Chinese residents, which is to be enforced from the 21st.

Especially I urged the gathering of Chinese malcontents in a certain restricted area to be separated from the rest of the citizens.

February 21st and 22nd.

The wholesale round up was enforced.

February 23rd.

At 11 a.m. the meeting of commanders was held and we heard the various reports from each party, on the conditions of arrest and later reported the information to the army commander.

February 24th.

From today, extending over three days, the meeting of the branch directors of the military administrations is to be held. I have today attended the meeting.

February 25th.

The commander of the forces made a round of inspections, and examined the defense situations in the city.

March 1st.

I have received orders to take charge of the guard of Changi district from today. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment was assigned for this purpose.

March 4th.

I have received an order to take charge of the defense of the entire island of Singapore. In accordance with the instructions of the army, I have issued orders for the refugees in Singapore to go back from where they came from.

March 5th.

We received information from the garrison on Bintan Island, telling of the landing of 1,000 Dutch troops on the neighboring island.

Immediately I dispatched the HAYASHI battalion (the former assistant military police) of the 18th Division.

March 7th.

In accordance with the removal of the Imperial Guard Division, Staff-officer HAYASHI who was attached to us, was ordered to be attached to the Guard Division.

March 8th.

Since the gendarmes were reverted to their original duties we have given orders to both air forces and railway corps for local defenses.

March 9th.

It became clear that the news of landing of enemy on Bintan Island and its vicinity was false, HAYASHI battalion dispatched to the spot returned here today.

March 13th.

The brigade headquarters and the 4th Infantry Regiment have been decided to be used for some other purposes in accordance with the new duties, and today I have received an unofficial announcement to prepare for this.

March 17th.

Handing over the defense duties to the succeeding brigad commander, Major General SUGIURA began.

March 18th.

At noon, the relief of the defense was completed.

Extracts from the diary of Major General  
KAWAMURA, the 9th Infantry  
Brigade Commander.

February 16.

Despatched Major KOBAYASHI and approximately 100 officers and men under his command as an Emergency MP unit to the Raffles college by 10 a.m..

Got all units to clean the battlefield. This day, despatched the unit under Major MISHIBA's command to handle the PWs' matters.

February 17

Our headquarters were removed to the Clubhouse for the reason of inconvenience in command.

Late at night I was ordered to take command of both battalions of the 11th and 41st Infantry Regiments and the Emergency MP unit as the newly-appointed commander of the Singapore Guard Force, and to take charge of the guarding of the city.

February 18.

Presented myself to Army headquarters at 10 a.m. to receive the order appointing me to be Guard Force Commander.

At 12 a.m. I went to Raffles College and issued the necessary orders. Staff Officer HAYASHI was assigned to me.

February 19.

Inspected the general situations within the city from 10 a.m. Listened to the report concerning the situations from MP Unit Commander OISHI and his men. (p.1)  
(Was impressed with the imperfection of the military discipline of our officers and men.)

In the evening, our headquarters were removed to Fort Canning.

Issued an order to make wholesale arrests of delinquent Chinese from the 21st and thereby advocated their assembly in a certain area.

February 20.

Held a memorial service for those who laid down their lives and a ceremony of awarding certificates of merit.

February 21.

Started the wholesale arrests today. Held a memorial service in the Division. Later, inspected the situations of searching by the Central Area Unit.

February 22.

In the morning, inspected the situations of the East Area Unit, the camp for British non-combatants and the North Area.

In the afternoon, attended the memorial service of the OKABE Unit and later inspected the situations of the Central Area Unit.

February 23.

Held a Unit Commander meeting from 11 a.m. and listened to the reports concerning the situations of searching to the effect that those who had been punished numbered approximately 5,000, of which important persons are continuing to be detained and are under investigation.

In the evening, was invited to the dinner in the Division. Heard that the Division will shortly be dispersed to various areas. It was a farewell party for me.

Memory: It is in my memory that on the 23rd I went to the Army headquarters to report after the Unit Commander Meeting had adjourned.

February 24, 25, 26.

Held a meeting of chiefs of the Military Administration Department on 25th, the Army Commander called on us during his inspection tour.

On 26th, the Army Commander gave a speech to the effect that we should take up a far more positive attitude, instead of the heretofore internal guidance.

March 1.

From this day, the guarding of Changi was taken over by the 3rd Division, 11th Infantry Regiment.

March 2.

Inspected the PWs in Changi. Today, concerning the security precautions throughout the Shonan Island, I gave necessary orders.

March 4.

The guarding units throughout Shonan Island were changed, at 12 p.m. today. From this day, ordered the refugees to leave the place.

March 5.

Early in the morning I received information from natives that about one thousand Dutch troops had landed from Bintang Island, so I ordered the increase by half of the HAYASHI Battalion of the 8th Division, in order to prepare for their suppression. On the 6th we learned that it was a false alarm.

March 7.

HAYASHI changed his position as a staff on the Imperial Guard Division unexpectedly.

March 8.

According to the enactment of the M.P. Service Regulations, I ordered that status of M.P.s be changed so that they would be dispatched and hold an additional post in every District detachment.

March 9.

The HAYASHI Battalion in Bintang Island returned.

March 11.

Past 12 o'clock a captured Powder Magazine exploded. To prevent plotting by rebels, we enforced an emergency guard, and did our best to relieve the refugees.

March 13.

Today I and the 41st Infantry Regiment received an Army Order to depart again in the near future to fulfill new duties.

March 14.

For the purpose of gathering the troops together, I issued an order that ICHIKAWA Battalion should substitute in the position of emergency guard from the 15th inst.

March 16.

Major General SUGIURA arrived at Singapore.

March 17.

Transfer of duties.

March 18.

The relief finished at 12, and I reported to the  
Commander in Chief about it.

Abstracts of the Subjects Concerned from the  
Greater East Asiatic Top Secret Operation  
Diary of the Imperial Headquarters

The following descriptions are what were reported to the Imperial Headquarters by the 25th Army, excepting the 2nd clause of March 13th, which is the report from the Southern General Army.

February 7.

The army enters at once into the next operation without the ceremony of triumphal entry.

February 18.

1. The army made about three battalions of infantry and the second field gendarmerie under the command of Brigadier KAWAMURA mount guard over the city of Singapore, and the main force located in its vicinity are engaging in cleaning the battlefield and preparing for the coming operation.

2. Each one company of 5 D successfully landed on the islands "Bukum" and "Sambo." /phonetic equivalents/

February 20.

SASAKI Battalion of 5 D landed on Bintang Island without bleeding.

February 21.

There are fairly many volunteers and Malaysians who joined the enemy's force as a volunteer army and the fifth column. The army is now in search of them.

Those who were taken in soon after the fall of Singapore: 16 Chinese volunteers, 360 Malayan volunteers.

February 24, 25, 26.

On this occasion when the main operation of Malay has come to an end, a meeting of the head officials of the branches of the military administrative department was held.

February 27.

With captives and captured arms was organized the Singapore Island Defense Corps. All of the seventy thousand



of captives cannot be consumed by this army. The army wishes to use them dispersed in each necessary field, and immediate instruction is desired.

February 28.

The state of activities of "de Gaulle" faction here is now being clarified by and by. "Glaire," /phonetic/ a Jew, "Remanl," /phonetic/ a spy of the military committee of the "de Gaulle" faction and "Causelle," /phonetic/ the Manager of the French Indo-Chinese Bank; have been subjected to internment and inquiry.

March 1.

As it has serious influence on the future action of the army, we wish to know if you have an intention to move the present captives here to any other places than Malay Peninsula. At present, 85,000 captives.

March 3.

The occupation of Singapore is going smoothly and the occupation business by committee members was completed at the end of February. State of affairs in the city of Singapore: Soon after the occupation, we arrested and executed about 5,000 delinquent persons as the first clearing and, further, we are preparing for the next clearing. The appeasing campaign to the citizens is as follows (the following: concerning the currency). The movement of the military administrative organs has been taking its regular course.

March 13.

The main force succeeded in landing at 0700 and YOSHIDA Detachment, at 0540.

2. The operation order of the Southern General Army No. 85: The head of the TOMI corps shall have the 41st Infantry, 2 Section/ 26 Ps under the command of the Chief of 9th Infantry Battalion enter under the command of the head of the WATARI corps.

March 17.

Since the commencement of Malay operation, we have been watching strictly the movement of the Chinese residents. After the capitulation of Singapore Island, their interest in Japan has been intensified. At the same time, rigorous measures were adopted to such anti-Japanese Chinese as the

volunteers. Thus, their movement has taken decisive direction. That is, they take an attitude to submit their lives, properties and all the rights and interests to the Japanese army and to wait penitentially for any orders, keeping these things for themselves. They propose that if the commander of the Japanese Army would exempt them from death and would give them a favor to carry on their occupations at ease, they would swear their future faithfulness and economical contribution and would contribute one half of their properties to the Japanese army. As to the offering of one half of their properties, we accept only their spirit and instead of one half we receive cash of fifty million yen. With the foregoing, the first step of the measures toward the Chinese residents in Malay is completed. Next, the second means shall be taken.

March 18.

From Colonel Tsuji:

I intend to take my post there after the inspection of battle condition of Burma and Philippine theatre about the latter part of March.

April 10.

Though the public peace of Malay Peninsula is going to recover by the activities of respective guarding units, still, secret movements of Chinese residents here have not entirely ceased yet.

March 27.

Approximately 1,500 persons in Celenban and Malacca were captured at once and a lot of arms were confiscated, and the majority who were captured were released after investigation.

March 29.

(At the distance of 16 k.m. to the north of Kwantan)  
The den of communists was crippled entirely and 15 of its members were captured (the leader committed suicide) at the end of March.

At the location of 15 k.m. to the south-east of Kagayan approximately 500 hiding communists are being searched with the attempt of ousting.

April 5.

Fifty-three anti-Japanese radicals were captured at Taipin. At Penan, we are to make a round up before long.

April 16.

As the result of the search by our Gendarmerie, we have disclosed the plot movement of British battle beaten remaining soldiers and a certain party of Chinese communists (it seems to be under the leadership of CHENG-CHIEH-MIN). Accordingly, after the further searching out of the location of the wireless apparatus, we expect to capture this group.

SECRET

A proces-verbal concerning the punishment  
of Chinese residents in SingaporeBy the 4th unit  
23 Oct., 1945

## 1. Circumstances of manoeuvres by Chinese residents in the Malay Campai

During the MALAY campaign, Chinese residents were very active in their manoeuvres from the beginning to the end around the battle-fields and especially in the rear, obstructing our campaign and causing us much difficulty. That is to say, near the battle-fields they chiefly communicated with the enemy, consequently our plan of operations was perceived. enemy, placing us in a very disadvantageous position; or areas where our troops were concentrated were bombarded, thus it was not only once that our troops had to suffer meaningless sacrifices, or in the rear our commissary lines were attacked, lines of communication, military communication lines were destroyed, and our military materials damaged, delaying the arrival of those materials, especially ammunition, at the battle-fields, consequently often the MALAY campaign, which necessitated speed, was obstructed and made difficult.

Examples are as follows:

1. Toward the end of December, 1941, in a battle near KAMPAR /phonetic/, signal bombs were fired at night near our reserve artillery position, and immediately /our position/ was shelled with enemy shells, causing many useless sacrifices on our side. We searched the vicinity and captured two Chinese residents at one place, and found out that most of the activities were done by the Chinese residents, (a part by British troops).

2. In the above battle, a battalion of the ANDO regiment intending to cut off KAMPAR /phonetic/ from the west, made a detour at night, but a signal shell was fired from a village which was passed. Consequently, not only was our plan discovered, making our rear isolation unsuccessful but when crossing the river in the southwest of KAMPAR /phonetic/ (around the place were swampy lands,) they were met by a fierce enemy counter-attack. Thus our operations went to pieces and we suffered a great loss. Immediately after the signal bomb was fired, about one company searched the village and captured a Chinese who failed to escape. Accordingly we found that the incident was done by the Chinese residents.

3. At the battles near Gemas /phonetic/ and Segamat /phonetic/ in the middle of January, 1942; at KULAN /phonetic/, YONGPENG /phonetic/ and BATU PAHAT /phonetic/ in the end of January of the same year; at Singapore in the beginning and middle of February of the same year, signal bombs were incessantly fired. Artillery positions, reserve units and higher

command posts were suddenly bombarded, causing many meaningless casualties. It was discovered that most of these acts were committed by the Chinese residents.

4. When the enemy attacked KUALARUMPUN /phonetic/ by air at night in the middle of January, 1942, a signal shell was fired from the aerodrome of KUALARUMPUN /phonetic/, using this as a target the enemy bombed /the aerodrome/, burning several of our planes, and causing many casualties among the troops. As the result of the capture of Chinese residents, it was disclosed that the signal shells were fired by Chinese residents.

5. In the middle of January 1942, when the Imperial Guard Division was crossing the River Muarh /phonetic/, Chinese residents indicated the point to be crossed and guided the night-bombing of the enemy planes, consequently crossing the river was extremely difficult and with a great loss.

6. Between the middle and end of January, 1942, during the battle around Malacca and Batobahato /phonetic/, in which the Imperial Guard Division is involved, Chinese residents communicated with enemy submarines on the sea of Malacca and other than assisting the smuggling, guiding and protecting of spies from the submarines, they indicated the location of our units and made it easier and more advantageous for naval bombardment from ships in the straits of Malacca. As a result of the above bombardment the operations of the Imperial Guard Division was not only made extremely difficult and disadvantageous, but also a large amount of munitions and weapons were damaged and many casualties among the troops.

7. While the OGAKI battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was encircling and detouring a rubber plantation to isolate the enemy's rear from the N.W. in the fighting around BATOBAHATO /phonetic/ toward the end of Jan., 1942, was discovered as a result of the Chinese residents communications with the enemy. Subsequently, they were met by a heavy enemy counter-attack and becoming isolated, the battalion commander and most of the men were killed.

8. In the end of December, 1941, in a forest to the north of Taipin /phonetic/, a hundred odd armed Chinese residents were planning to disrupt our supply lines, and burn our munitions. As this was discovered beforehand, /the area/ was cleared of Chinese residents.

9. In the middle and end of January, 1942, the Chinese residents often felled trees and laid them across the road between GEMAS-SERENGBAN /phonetic/ and RABIS-SEGAMATT /phonetic/, so that our vehicle transportation was stopped, and making good use of these opportunities fired from the forests on both sides. As a result many men were killed, the valuable munitions being stolen, thus preventing munitions being sent forward, and made our operations very difficult..

10. There were often destruction of the railroads, but as the destruction of the railroad in the forest south of IBO /phonetic/ and in the

forest between SERENGBAN and GEMAS /phonetic/ happened just at the time when munitions were to be forwarded most urgently for the Singapore campaign, it had a tremendous effect. As a result, not only did the commencement of the Singapore campaign have to be postponed from the 8th Feb. to the 9th Feb., but the forwarding of supplies, especially ammunition, after the commencement of the campaign did not operate as desired. Therefore front line ammunition was so scarce that temporarily the campaign was endangered -- /omitted/ -- and brought about -- /omitted/. In each case of obstruction the offender was captured and it was discovered that this was mainly the work of Chinese residents.

11. There were numerous cases of the destruction of military communication lines that there was not time to arrest the culprits. The aforementioned are only a few examples, the manoeuvres of the insurgent Chinese residents during the MALAY campaign are beyond description and have cut deep down into the heart of our troops.

2. The state of public peace in and around Singapore after the surrender of the British forces.

The British forces in Singapore surrendered on the 15th of February and the island immediately after the fighting actions was covered with uneasy atmosphere. Especially what is to be noted is the fact that there was a two-three day gap between the day of the British surrender and the day of the Japanese entry into that city. Thus, during this interval, implements of war such as rifles, ammunitions, machine guns, revolvers, wireless equipment, light automobiles, etc. were moved away and concealed in the houses of Chinese and natives. Such state became clear gradually, and it transpired that frequently the telegraphic wires running between the headquarters of all the army corps in the suburbs and the city were cut off intentionally, rendering it impossible to maintain the communication between them. And it became clear that the Chinese in the suburbs or in the urban districts of the city plundered provision clothes and fuel, etc. and concealed those things in their store-houses or above the ceiling or under the floor of individual houses, etc.

In the meanwhile, what constituted our primary consideration was that it was impending to draft a major proportion from our forces to prepare for the approaching operation, and that we were to maintain the public peace in the occupied area with a minor force. The advance towards the south of our army was very speedy. On the other hand, there were still number of bases in the west coast of Malay peninsula left for hostile groups plotting brigandage; on top of this, the hostile Chinese dispersed in the Rhio islands, south of Singapore, Lingu island and the Anambu islands after the fall of Singapore seemed to be preparing for their future action in cooperation with their comrades in Singapore and Malay peninsula and the rumors about the British reinforcements to arrive were circulating. So we feel keenly the necessity to secure public peace with some drastic measure and control to check the false rumors in Singapore island. (Reference).

The status of the activities of De Gaulle's group was likely to have been made clear gradually by the 28th of February; Klay /phonetic/, a Jew, Lumor /phonetic/, a spy of the military commission of the DeGaulle's party, and Coceil /phonetic/, the manager of the French India China Bank, were then arrested and detained.

3. Regarding investigation and execution of Chinese residents in "Singapore".

Under the consideration that simultaneous advance of the various corps of the expeditionary forces into the city of Singapore should rather cause a difficulty in keeping peace and order of the city, the military order was given, on Feb. 17, to detail a force in a size of nearly three infantry battalions plus the 2nd detachment of Field Militia Police /KEMPEITAI/ under the command of Major-General KAWIMURA, commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade; while the major part of the military operation forces was placed back to station at the northern suburb of "S" city, thus to have only small number of the unit put on duty for the guard of the city. The said guard commander, on the following day, viz. the 18th, visited the General Headquarters and did the required liaison.

(1) Posting

The posting at the beginning was as shown on the attached map showing the status of disposition, but afterward the guard was extended all over the island on March 2nd with a movement of military strengths occurring since then.

(a) Search for hostile Chinese. The investigation was executed during the 4 days period from Feb. 17 to 20 mainly on the basis of "a list of the anti-Japanese Chinese" which had been secured at "IPOH" and with reference to search materials of the roster of the detective bureau criminal lists of the Police Office and the statement made by rescued Japanese. The police officials of the Malay detective bureau were caused to attend to this occasion.

(b) The number of persons searched during the first series lasting for 3 days, Feb. 21-23, about 5,000 persons; the second series, Feb. 18-March 3, about 1,500 persons; the third series at the end of March, about 300 persons. Among them, about 2,000 persons were released after the investigation.

(c) Reason for the search and the execution. There exists no written order given to the Guard Commander; it is, however, almost clear that the Guard Commander had issued orders to cope with the idea of the Army, and in the light of the situation of the hopping up operation throughout the MALAY peninsula, it is clear that the Guard Commander did not issue orders based on his own personal view. It is, however, very doubtful whether the mass execution of Chinese was due to the order of the commander-in-chief or not.

As Lieutenant-Colonel HAYASHI who was Chief of Staff in charge at that time died on the field, it is impossible to find the fact.

(d) Execution of the punishment. The objectives of the punishment constitute mainly those who communicated secretly with the enemy; those who led the hostile bombing of our airfields; those who did marking of targets of artillery gun fire; those who disturbed rear transport line; those who did not change the attitude of opposition to Japan and self confessed the continuance of the act to oppose Japan at our investigation. These were the leaders of the Federated Association of Chinese Volunteers to oppose Japan, and member of Communists party in Malay; those who were punished strictly total about 5,000 up to the end of March.

#### 4. The Present Situation of Regulating Operation in MALAYA Peninsula.

##### (1) The Present Situation of the Public Peace in MALAYA Peninsula.

We have already mentioned the conditions of the Chinese manoeuvring during our MALAYA operation. Even after the surrender of SINGAPORE many anti-Japan Chinese have entered secretly into cities and jungles and declaring communism and communicating with each other, some of them have continued to be active in order to develop the systematic anti-Japan movement under the strict and strong system and try hard to obtain weapon ammunition, provisions, money and members, while looting our stock of weapons obtained in the battle field, killing secretly our soldiers and officers, and were acting independently in destroying the networks of communications and traffic and killing, threatening, looting good citizens. Though the battle was over there was great anxiety about the public peace in MALAYA.

##### (2) The Present Situation of Regulating Operation.

Our Army has recognized the importance and necessity of subjugation operations after the surrender of SINGAPORE and till nearly the end of February despatched the 18th Division to "JOHORE" Province, the 5th Division to other provinces in MALAYA outside of "JOHORE" Province from SINGAPORE Island and made each of them stand guard over the public peace in the district in charge also carrying out the subjugation operation against the anti-Japan Chinese.

The 5th Division divided the districts in its charge into several parts and made detachments take charge of portion.

"MALACCA" Province.	
"NEGRISEMBILAN" Province	11th Infantry Regiment
"SELANGOR" Province	41st Inf. Reg.,
	5th Artillery Regiment,
	5th Transport Regiment



"PERAH" Province	42nd Inf. Reg.
"PAHANG" Province	5th Cavalry Regiment
"KEDAH" Province,	
"TRENGGANU" Province,	
"KELANTAN" Province	21st Inf. Reg.

The 5th and 18th Division commenced the subjugation operation from nearly the beginning of March. Carrying out the research and subjugation of anti-Japan Chinese in cities and jungles we caught wicked Chinese till the end of April; about 1,000 in "JOHORE" Province, about 1,500 in "SEREMBAN", "MALACCA", about 300 in "SELANGOR", about 100 in "PERAH", about 50 in "PAHANG", and about 200 in "KEDAH" and "PENANG", and confiscated many weapons, but after investigation released most of them the same way everywhere. There were, however, many cases in which at the arrest the Chinese resisted by firing guns, which induced us to return fire and persons on both sides were injured and killed. Many people (leaders) were there who committed suicide, recognizing their unfavourable circumstances

Since the beginning of May also, the anti-Japan Chinese still continued anti-Japan activities, hiding themselves from the eyes of the Japanese, and the public peace was often jeopardized. Our Army carried on subjugations and tried to keep the public peace, often traversing jungles and meeting with great difficulties and suffering considerable damages, but never succeeded in entirely sweeping away the anti-Japan Chinese.

The subjugation which is noted among those since May is that in the forest to the north of KWALA LOMPUR. Finding out a report that about 300 anti-Japan Chinese were planning the assassination of Japanese soldiers and the burning of Japanese barracks, we sent a punitive force to subjugate them, taking the initiative against them. After a battle the defeated Chinese fled away deep into the forests. In this battle, the bodies left dead in the field numbered 200.

(3) Conclusion.

In short, the regulating operation in the Malay Peninsula was not only for the Japanese Army itself, but was an action for the purpose of guarding the public peace which was carried on for the protection of the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens (including the ordinary Chinese, Malaysians, Indians, etc.) and though it is to be regretted that the circumstances in details, are not clear on account of lack of material it is plain enough that all those dead Chinese died by the bullets during the battles of subjugations. During these difficult subjugations a considerable number of victims appeared on our part also.

V. About the handling of this investigation of punishment of the Singapore Chinese.

I. The enemy's protest has not yet come, but the reports concerning this problem is as follows:

(1) The story by Major Moris Deeton /phonetic/ and Captain Thomas Ellis /phonetic/

"We were pushed into freight-cars and brought to Siam, after the fall of Singapore and were used in the construction of the railroad between Bangkok and Mouimein. Many died on account of hunger and the tropic diseases, the medicines for which were very scanty. According to the talk of a member of the Australian advance-party, all of 1840 in number except 34 members died before they reached the spot 130 miles off to the west.

(2) The report sent from London on Sept. 5. The announcement of the terrible cruel actions of the Japanese toward the prisoners of the allied powers and those detained people have caused the anxiety of thousands of families in the world. Every evening papers in London has

reported, "the Singapore radio has said that when a complete document is made public, the civilized world will be against the cruel deeds of the Japanese. A Chinese was forced to drink petrolcum and a Japanese threw a kindled match into the mouth of the Chinese."

A great massacre of the Chinese troops and civilians by machine-guns took place in Singapore, and Dr. Bedler /phonetic/ the former physician of the Sultan of Johore believes that more than 150,000 Asiatics (not including military men) were punished or tortured to death by the Japanese secret police. The largest majority of them are Chinese and the doctor said that, in the small area of Dabon /phonetic/ alone, some 30 thousand were killed by the Japanese secret police, and that it was a matter of course that the Chinese hated the Japanese so much.

Telling the story of the ill treatment, the PWs released in Hongkong said that they received only a small portion of the packages sent by the Red Cross. (San Francisco Sep. 5.)

A correspondent on board of an American hospital ship reported the barbarism of the Japanese toward the Australian, British and Dutch prisoners who worked in oil-refineries and machine-factories.

Atrocities committed while the road construction was under way in Burma and Siam were also reported to the effect that "Even invalids were forced to walk to the place of constructional work and brock stones." (Sept. 5. Australia.)

According to the report reached the Army Headquarters in South-Eastern Asia, allied power prisoners were greatly suffering from malaria, beri beri, consumption and dysentery. (Sept. 5. San Francisco.)

### 3. Singapore internment camp.

A London broadcast reported on Sept. 6, about the Japanese atrocities at the Singapore internment camps as follows:-

(1) In Singapore 4,500 persons of all nationalities including men, women, and children were interned, but Red Cross has never been permitted to visit there. All males above 10 years old were compelled to undergo heavy labor and were supplied with rations even less than half of that issued by the "Malay" Prison Bureau as punishment before the war. When the rescue arrived at, all persons have just begun to roast snails.

(2) During the period of more than 3 years, there was only a single perive when a logical control was prevailed; this occurred in the period when the commandant was a Japanese "civilian."

3. There existed always the terrors of many atrocities and everybody was beaten day and night for not saluting properly.

4. Spy suspects were especially ill-treated. On October 2nd, 1943, the police started a barbarous search to find evidences of spy suspects in the camp. 57 men and women were confined in a small guard-room, and for many hours they were made to sit with their legs bent in Japanese style and without being given even a minimum of decency they were forced to stay there for many months. One European was tortured for 55 hours and the other was struck 144 times. There was a record with the full particulars of the devilish torture, which Richard Sharp, B. B. C. correspondent saw and recorded in which a Japanese poured water into the mouth and nostrils of one of the suspects and then pressed the swollen stomach of the latter with his foot or jumped on the upper part of the stomach. Some of the prisoners of war will bear the scars of the Japanese torture forever.

5. The captives released at Singapore talked of the ill-treatment: forced labor, worst food ration and beating.

(2) Judging from the attitudes adopted by the United States and British especially the public opinion prevailing in those countries the British protest against Japan is not so bitter as the United States at present, but Britain will file a protest on completion of further close investigation after the recovery of the ex-occupation area. It is, therefore, necessary for us to take a measure to cope with the situation.

1. Though it is not necessary to produce these investigation materials at present as long as Britain or the United States does not make any request and yet preparation should be made so as to meet the changing situation.

2. The execution of Chinese residents at Singapore to some extent was unavoidable considering the circumstances which arose at that time, but since the execution had reached a considerable number, Britain, (the United States) and China will announce it as a big massacre and will lodge a protest with us. So that it will also be necessary to make a preparation for the punishment of those responsible.

SECTION III

OUTLINE OF THE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING INHUMANE  
ACTS (PRINCIPALLY AGAINST THE CHINESE PROBLEM)  
DURING THE MALAYA (SINGAPORE) OPERATIONS

22 November 1945

Group No. 4

Addressed to: POW Affairs Investigative Dept.  
POW Affairs Central Investigative Committee.

I

The Outline of the Protest and Reports by Great Britain  
on Inhumane Acts in Malaya (Singapore) Area.

Although there were almost no protests from Great Britain, there were some highly exaggerated and superficial reports made in England after the conclusion of the war.

1. On 10 March 1942, British Foreign Minister Eden gave a formal explanation in the House of Commons on the outrageous acts of the Japanese following the surrender of Hongkong, of which the gist is as follows:

GIST: According to the reports of those who escaped from Hongkong, prisoners of war and citizens in Hongkong were treated inhumanly regardless of race. Fifty British soldiers were bound hand and foot and were then bayoneted to death.

Even after ten days from the surrender of Hongkong, the wounded were left on the battlefields, and the dead were not buried. Europeans and Asiatics alike were abused and killed without discrimination.

The Chinese quarters of the city became a nest of prostitutes. These outrageous acts can be compared to that of the great Rape of Nanking in 1937.

There were no windows, doors or lights in the prisoners' camps which were mere huts without sanitary facilities. Food was very poor, mortal diseases broke out, and deaths continuously occurred. Furthermore, the Japanese Government would not allow the representatives of the

Protecting Powers and the International Red Cross to visit the district.

We do not possess any information concerning the prisoners in Malaya. We only know that 75,000 Chinese had been captured in that area.

It is not true that the Japanese army act on the spirit of chivalry.

2. We have been notifying and protesting that we have deliberately studied the great quantity of evidence concerning the treatment of detained British nationals in East Asia which were obtained by the British Government on 2 September 1942 and which hold no ground for refutation, but there is nothing concerning Malaya.

3. Reports concerning Malaya (Singapore) are as follows although there is no protest against this area from the hostile power:

(1) Conversations of Major Morris Dayton and Captain Thomas "Epris":

"After the surrender of Singapore we were crowded into a freight car and were taken to Siam where we were employed in the construction of a railroad from Bangkok to Moulmein, but many died of tropical disease and from scarcity of medicine. According to what was related by the advance party of Australians, all but 34 of 1,840 soldiers died before reaching a point of 130 miles west. "

(2) The appalling announcements of Japanese atrocities towards prisoners of war of the Allied Powers and interned civilians, in the reports despatched from London on 5 September 1945 has given anxiety to many thousands of families throughout the world. Every evening paper in London reported that Singapore radio announced that "if the complete document is made public, the civilized world will protest against the atrocities of the Japanese. Chinese were compelled to drink petroleum and the Japanese threw lighted matches into their mouths".

Mass executions by machine-gun of Chinese army units and civilians were carried out in Singapore, and Professor "Patsudora" who was the former physician of the Sultan of Johore, believes that over 150,000 Asiatics

(not including soldiers) were executed by the Japanese secret police or died of torture in Singapore. The greater part of these people were Chinese, and the professor further states that in the small area of "Dabon" thirty thousand were killed by the Japanese secret police and it is natural that the Chinese should abhor the Japanese as they do.

According to the tales of ill-treatment told by the prisoners set free in Hongkong, they had received only a very small part of the Red Cross parcels. (San Francisco, 5 September).

Correspondents on an American hospital ship have reported on the barbarous actions of the Japanese towards the Australian, British and Dutch prisoners working in oil refineries and machine factories. The atrocities committed on road construction in Burma and Siam were also reported. Even the sick were compelled to walk to the place where the road was being made and to break stones. (Australia, 5 September).

According to reports received at the South East Asia Headquarters, it seems that the prisoners of the Allied Powers had been suffering severely from malaria, beriberi, consumption and dysentery. (San Francisco, 5 September).

(3) London broadcasts of 6 September 1945 reported as follows on the atrocities of the Japanese in Singapore internment camps:

(a) "There were 4,500 men, women and children of every nationality interned in Singapore, but the Red Cross were never allowed to visit them. All men above ten years of age were forced to work but were given less than a half of the amount of food which the Frison Bureau of Malaya has given as a punishment before the war. When rescue came, they had begun roasting snails for food.

(b) "During the three years, it was only once that reasonable administration was exercised, and that was when the commander was a Japanese civilian.

(c) "There was always the constant fear of all kinds of atrocities and they were constantly being beaten for such simple crimes as not bowing correctly.

(d) "Those who were suspected of espionage received worse treatment. On 2 October 1943, the Japanese police commenced barbarous searches as evidence of suspected espionage was discovered in the camp. Fifty-seven men and women were locked up in a small guard room and were deprived of every decency. They were compelled to sit with their legs bent in the Japanese way for a long time and they were confined in that room for several months. A certain European was interrogated for fifty-five hours, and another was beaten a hundred and forty-four times. There is a minute record of the demoniacal tortures, and Richard Sharp, a correspondent of the B.B.C. who had read this record says that the Japanese, after pouring water into the nose and mouth of the prisoner, would press the swelling stomach with the foot or jump up and down on top of it. Some of the prisoners will carry the marks of Japanese tortures throughout their lives.

(e) "Prisoners set free in Singapore tell about their life of forced labour, terrible food rations, blows and ill-treatment.

"In short, this has caused no great problem until today, but considering the tendencies of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, especially the public opinion of both countries, England will thoroughly investigate this matter as soon as she regains her former territories and there is strong possibility of her launching protests against Japan. So we must also investigate and announce the true facts concerning these matters."

II  
in Malaya (Singapore)  
General Situation/and the Management of the Natives  
by the Military before War

Before the Greater East Asia War broke out, Malaya, Singapore, in particular, was the center of policy and strategy in the south and was the nucleus of pressure against Japan. The activities of the natives in general, especially the Chinese, were very vigorous and the pressure was carried out in every sort of form, such as demonstrations, boycott and threats, so that there were soon more and more Japanese returning to Japan.



Thus Singapore naturally began to draw the attention of all the Japanese.

The military were keenly aware of the necessity of a speedy occupation of Malaya, especially Singapore, and as the operations in Malaya were the first to be started in the Southern operations and in view of the aim of the Greater East Asia War, it was necessary to assume an attitude of endearment towards the natives so as to exalt the justice of the Imperial Army throughout the world, and a determined attitude was taken towards those who interfered with the activities of the army. The military adopted the policy of strictly observing merits.

### III

#### General Situation during the Operations

In our Malaya operations, we at first had nothing to give us trouble in the rear though we had much in China, but from Central Malaya on, Chinese emigrants began to be active in making trouble near battle-fields and specially in the rear and consequently our soldiers were very watchful against them.

#### (1) Trouble-Making of Chinese Emigrants in our Malaya Operations.

Near battlefields, the enemy got to know our plans of operation chiefly through frequent information from the Chinese emigrants, and our troops were placed at a great disadvantage or were shelled or bombed while in mass formation, the result being that we often lost a large number of soldiers to no purpose. In the rear of battlefields, our lines of communications were attacked; our lines of transportation and lines of military communication were destroyed; our munitions were destroyed; and our munitions, especially ammunition were delayed on their way to the battlefields and thus our Malaya Operations, much pressed for time, were often obstructed and beset with difficulties.

Examples are as follows:

(a) At the end of December, 1941, more than one hundred armed Chinese emigrants, assembled in plantations north of Taiping, attempted to put our line of communications out of order and to burn our munitions, but we got to know of it and dealt with them before

they could try anything.

(b) Towards the end of December, 1941, in a battle near Kanbahru, signal shells were often fired at night near our various artillery positions upon which the enemy concentrated their fire, killing a lot of our soldiers. We made a strenuous search and succeeded in finding two Chinese emigrants and putting them in custody they proved to be guilty.

(c) In the above battle, one battalion of the Ando Regiment took a very circuitous route by night from the west in order to cut off "Kanbahru" from the rear, but a signal shot was fired when they were passing a village and, our plan being thus known to the enemy, we were not only unsuccessful in cutting off "Kanbahru" from the rear, but also sustained a severe counter-attack while crossing the river southwest of "Kanbahru" (the neighbouring basin was swampy), and sustained heavy losses, our operation being a complete failure. No sooner had the signal shot been fired than a platoon was sent to search the village. They caught a Chinese emigrant who had failed to make a get-away, and who proved to be guilty.

(d) In battles near Gemas and Segamat in the middle of January, 1942, in battles near Kluang, "Yompen" and Batubahat at the end of January, 1942, and in the battle of Singapore at the beginning of February of the same year, signal shells were very frequently fired and our artillery positions, reserve units and higher headquarters often received concentrated enemy fire and sustained heavy losses. It was found that most of this was the work of Chinese emigrants.

(e) In the middle of January, 1942, when the enemy made an air-raid on Kuala Lumpur, a signal shell was fired from the airfield there; the enemy planes bombed it, the result being that some of our planes were burned out, and a considerable number of soldiers were killed or wounded.

(f) In the middle of January, 1942, when the Imperial Guard Division crossed the Muar, Chinese emigrants indicated the crossing-point and directed the enemy's night bombing and we consequently had much difficulty in crossing the river and sustained heavy losses.

(g) From the middle to the end of January, 1942, while the Imperial Guard Division was fighting near Malacca and Batubahat, Chinese merchants secretly communicated with

enemy submarines in the seas off Malacca. They not only secretly brought in some spies from the submarines, guided and protected them but also made indications of the positions of our troops to make the enemy's ship bombardment easier and more effective. The result was that the Imperial Guard Division had a difficult and disadvantageous operation.

(h) At the end of January, 1942, near a battle near Batubahat, the Okaki battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was taking a roundabout route through a rubber plantation to invest Batubahat with the aim of cutting it off from the rear, when Chinese emigrants secretly informed the enemy, who made a mass counter-attack upon the battalion and completely isolated it; the battalion had the misfortune to be nearly annihilated, the commander and almost all the others being killed.

(i) From the middle to the end of January, 1942, Chinese emigrants felled trees across roads between Gemas and Selembang and between Labis and Segamat, brought our MT to a standstill, and poured a hail of fired upon them from behind the trees on both sides of the roads. As a result, our valuable munitions were plundered and prevented from reaching the fort, and our operation was placed at a great disadvantage.

(j) There were many obstacles to railway transportation, but among others, the railways were destroyed in plantations, south of Ipoh, and between Selembang and Gemas, just when we had to send munitions for our Singapore operations. It had a very great effect upon us, for we were forced to postpone the attack upon Singapore until Feb. 9th, though it had previously been fixed for Feb. 8th. Moreover, after we began to attack, we could not get our munitions in the quantities we required, and for want of ammunition, we were once in a very dangerous situation. The criminals who had caused these obstacles were caught and it was found that Chinese merchants had been chiefly responsible.

(k) Our lines of military communication were destroyed on innumerable occasions.

(2) Peace and Order of Singapore after the Surrender of British Troops.

Singapore was captured on the 15th of February, and at first, after action ceased, prospects for the order and

peace of the peninsula looked very good but a rumour spread that the British and Dutch troops would come to the rescue and there was the further agitation of some communists who had been released or escaped from prison and criminals at large which produced an undercurrent of uneasiness. In particular, as there was a gap of two or three days between the surrender of the British Troops and the entry of the Japanese troops into the city of Singapore, not only were weapons such as rifles, rifle ammunition, machine guns, revolvers and motor-cars with small type radio sets dispersed and hidden in the houses of Chinese emigrants, but foodstuffs and other materials were stolen; and moreover our lines of communication between our various Corps HQ in the outskirts and the city itself were frequently and deliberately severed, to the great disadvantage of our troops. It was also found that many Chinese emigrants in the outskirts and the center of the city had stolen foodstuffs, clothing and fuel and concealed them in the warehouses of their residence, in the ceiling and under the floor. As our forces were approaching the next stage in their operations and were very soon to withdraw the main strength of their troops, there was only a small number of our soldiers to be responsible for maintaining the peace and order of the city after the occupation. The rapidity of our Army's southward march had left a great many guerilla bases scattered on either side of the road, along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. There were clear signs, moreover, that after the fall of Singapore many anti-Japanese Chinese emigrants who were scattered among the Riouw, Lingga, and Anambas Islands situated south of the Peninsula, were making bases of these islands from which they were preparing for future activities in concert with their sympathizers on Singapore Island and the Malay Peninsula. In view of the rumours of British Troops coming to the rescue once more, that kept sweeping the city, our troops felt it very important to strictly suppress all unfounded rumours and wild tales in Singapore Island and maintain the peace and order of the island of Singapore with all possible speed.

(Reference)

Details of the activity of the DeGaulle faction in Singapore since Feb. 28th have been clarified by degrees. Clare, a Jew, and Lumor, an agent of the Military Committee of the DeGaulle faction, and Colceil (?), manager of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine were detained and interrogated.

## CHAPTER 4

Clearing of battle-fields and mopping-up operations after the capitulation of the enemy.

Believing that it would not only answer the purposes of our "Sacred War", but also bring about good results in further operations in the southern areas especially in the Sumatra and Andamans operations, which were our army's next tasks at that time—to set up a firm military administration in Malaya and especially in Singapore, as soon as possible after the capitulation of the British Army, our army at first stationed only Kempei in Singapore itself and avoided sending big units into the city. Major-General KAWAMURA Saburo was given command of No. 2 Kempeitai (with about 2 companies of auxiliary Kempei and armoured car and tank company from No. 5 and No. 18 Imperial Guards Divisions attached to them, and the necessary troops, and put in command of Singapore city, while the mainforce of the Imperial Guards Divisions were put in Charge of Singapore island (excluding the greater part of the city) and continued their work of clearing the battle fields rapidly and their mopping-up operations. By these means, our army tried to establish public order and at the same time prepared for the next round of operations.


Considering the importance of Singapore to the forces and the fact that it was infested with plain clothes bandits who had obstructed our military operations for the whole period of our operations in Malaya, our army decided on a strict attitude in dealing with the Chinese emigrants. On Feb. 17th, our army issued an Army Order and dispatched Major HAYASHI Tadao, a staff officer to Singapore garrison headquarters, mainly for the purpose of dealing with this matter.

In the latter part of February the main strength of the 5th and the 18th Divisions successively moved to Northern Malaya and Johore State and assumed the same duties as those mentioned above.

1. The clearing of the battlefields and the mopping-up operations on Singapore Island.

Major-General KAWAMURA, Commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade, who had been newly appointed as the commander of the Singapore Garrison Forces, appeared at the army headquarters on the 18th. Besides making the necessary contacts, he issued, in view of the above-mentioned situation, an order to the 2nd Field Gendarme Unit, it mainly to clear the battlefields and mop up the enemies within the city. Moreover, the main strength of the Imperial Guards Division was transferred from its operational area to the key points on the island where it continued the clearing up of the battlefields and mopping-up operations.

(a) Outline of command system and detailing/of troops/



(Detailing of troops as per attached chart)

However, with the participation of the Imperial Guards Division in the Sumatra Campaign, the Singapore Garrison Forces assumed the patrol of the entire island on March 2.

(b) The outline of the clearing up of the battlefields and mopping-up operations.

The battlefields clearing-up and mopping-up operations which the various corps (including those corps subsequently transferred to other areas) conducted on Singapore Island following the surrender of the British Army were mainly as follows:

1. Mopping-up operations on the islands in the vicinity of Singapore Island.
2. The disposition of the wounded and dead of both sides.
3. The collection and arrangement of munitions and arms.
4. The arrangement and detention of war prisoners and internees totalling about 100,000.
5. Memorial service for the dead.
6. The disposition of enemy Chinese merchants hiding in (and out) of Singapore city.

The search for and the disposition of anti-Japanese Chinese merchants.

1. The army's policy toward the Chinese.

In view of the great obstructions to our operations put up by the anti-Japanese activities of Chinese subsequent to the operations in central Malay, we were obliged to change the original attitude toward the Chinese which we had held at the time of the outbreak of war. We were obliged to deal with the disobedient Chinese in a stern manner.

2. The collection of data concerning anti-Japanese suspects among the Chinese.

On the basis of mainly the register of anti-Japanese Chinese as well such other data as the register of the Detective Bureau, police office register of criminals, advice by rescued Japanese residents, and the information supplied by some of the anti-Japanese Chinese merchants who were arrested, a register of disobedient Chinese suspects was drawn up during the four days from February 17 to 20 and the suspects were detained at several places and detected beginning from the 21st. In making the detections we made sure of obtaining <sup>accuracy</sup> by using the above-mentioned registers as our basis and also obtaining the presence of the police from the Detective Bureau of Police Office.

The number of persons examined as suspects during the course of detections was roughly as follows:

First time	Feb 21 to 23 (3 days)	about 5,000
Second "	Feb 28 - March 3	about 1,500
Third "	End of March	about 300

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After the examination for the detection of suspects about 1,000 to 1,500 persons were released and about 5,000 persons were apparently punished as anti-Japanese spies (those who guided the enemy in bombing airfields, gave indications of the direction of artillery shelling, attacked or disturbed the rear commissary lines, or guided such activities, the leaders of anti-Japanese organizations, members of the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, and members of the Malay Communist Party)

(Annex 2)

II. The conditions in Singapore, according to the "Notes on the New Life of Chinese" by HU MAI, were as follows:

1. Field-Marshal Pophan reported on December 22 the war situation. There were criticisms among the inhabitants of Malay against the withdrawal from Penang).

2. Governor-General Thomas called a conference of the Government-General on December 25 and requested the Chinese to display their full strength in resisting the Japanese.

On the basis of this request, the HSING-HUA Anti-Enemy Mobilization General Association was established and held its inaugural meeting on December 27.

Three hundred seventy-two (372) organizations with total representatives of more than 2,000 attended this meeting.

3. Under the direction of the HSING-HUA Anti-Enemy General Association, a volunteer army with the Communist party as its mainstay, and also a defense army under the slogan of the people's three principles were established to cooperate in putting up resistance.

4. The conditions after the entry of the Japanese Army.

(A) Investigation of all Chinese between the ages of 15 and 60 was conducted from February 21.

(B) Governor-General Thomas issued the following proclamation:

Proclamation of the Governor-General of the Straits Settlements and Minister Plenipotentiary for Malay. issued

1. The commander of the Japanese Army has/the following bulletin.

(a) All existing administrative organs and economic structure will be allowed to be continued.

The personnel of these organs may hold their present positions for the time being.

(b) All enterprises affecting public welfare must be speedily restored and the employees must continue their work as usual.

(c) Communications and broadcasts by means of wireless telegraph and telephones are prohibited.

(d) Air defense regulations must be strictly observed as heretofore. This is particularly as in regard to black-out control.



- (e) All communications and connections with outside sources are strictly prohibited.
- (f) All public health organs and medical treatment works must be speedily opened and operated. If there are defects, improvements within the extent possible must be made immediately. All employees must carry on their work as usual and give protection as much as possible to the sick, wounded and prisoners.
- (g) The Japanese Army will surely protect the inhabitants. All inhabitants except those permitted to move by the Japanese Army, must remain at their present place of residence.
- (h) All hostile acts against the Japanese Army, such as spying military secrets and supplying intelligence to the enemy are prohibited.

2. The civil administration organs of this island intend to bring Singapore to a normal condition in cooperation with the Japanese Army. Accordingly, various commissions will be set up to help solve the following matters:

- (a) Administrative problems
- (b) Public health and sanitation problems.
- (c) Economic and financial problems.
- (d) War prisoners' problems.
- (e) Military administration problems, namely, the problems of peace and order, communications and the requisitioned production of munitions.
- (f) Marine problems.
- (g) Air-defense problems.

In addition to the foregoing commissions, a liaison commission will be established to handle affairs concerning the transfer of administrative rights over this island.

3. All citizens of Singapore must take the initiative to restore peace and order, hold themselves responsible for the clearing up of the filth, and prevent the spread of epidemics. This is the duty which we must not shirk for the sake of the wounded women and children and those who have no place to wander.  
I earnestly solicit your cooperation.

4. I hereby respectfully express my appreciation to you who have diligently performed your duties during the past several months and also express my deep appreciation to the citizens who have coped with the situation with calmness.

February 16, 1942          Thomas /s/

(Annex)

(C) The statement of the Commander of the SHONAN/Singapore/  
Garrison Forces.

The Chinese of SHONAN port have been misled until this day by the propaganda of the Chungking Regime, cooperated with Britain, and continued political and economic assistance to the Chungking Regime. That is, the fact that they obstructed our operations and always played an active part in the front-line of anti-Japanese operations by organizing a volunteer army which joined the British Army and serving as guerrillas and spies, constitutes an obstruction to the construction of Greater East Asia and hence they should be called the traitors of East Asia.

However, upon the fall of Singapore, a part of them fled, but it is quite clear that others disguised themselves as law-abiding citizens and awaiting the chance to conduct guerrilla activities. If they are left as they are, it would be forever impossible to bring about a cheerful Malay. It is most essential at the present time to mop-up these traitorous Chinese and establish peace and order thereby bringing peace and security to the masses.

It is the intention of the Imperial Japanese Army to arrange a new order and establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the glorious ideal of "hakko ishiu"/ universal brotherhood/ thereby hoping for the everlasting development of Malay. This is the declaration of the Commander of the Japanese Army. He who obstructs our righteousness is the arch enemy of mankind. Irrespective of whoever he may be, he will be dealt with firmly without mercy. But those law-abiding citizens who repent their past wrong and voluntarily join in the construction of a new order, which is our great ideal, and actively cooperate with us in developing a cheerful, free, and solid Malay, we will always treat them as universal brethren, irrespective of whether they are Chinese or other people. The Imperial Japanese Army will protect their property and is determined to ensure the growth and development of their posterity. Such is the true intention of the Imperial Japanese Army. If there are any persons who conduct undesirable activities, we will not forgive them but punish them sternly, whatever race they may belong to.

The masses should understand Japan's true intentions and engage in their occupations with their minds at rest. At the same time they should observe the following matters and heal the wounds of war to the best of their ability, thereby constructing a cheerful Malay and cooperating in the construction of Greater East Asia of the East Asiatic peoples.

1. Be diligent in speedily resuming work.
2. In case there are any enemy elements and other undesirable elements, they should be immediately disclosed or reported to the Japanese Army.
3. All forms of looting and outrages shall be punished.
4. Any person possessing or discovering arms and ammunition, even a single shot, must speedily hand them over to the Japanese Army.
5. Everyone should cooperate in cleaning the streets and restoring order.
6. Labour should be voluntarily furnished to the Japanese Army.

## Commander of the Japanese Garrison Forces

- (Annex) The statement of the Commander of the Shonan Garrison Forces  
(D) concerning the maintenance of peace and order on the island.

The Commander of the Japanese Army has been striving his best to restore and maintain peace and order on the island ever since the capture of Shonan Island. For this purpose, the Japanese Army authorities have permitted no Army to enter the city, but only the gendarmes, who bear the responsibility of protecting the citizens at large and distressed people. However, some rebellious elements disturbed the peace and conducted acts benefiting the enemy. Accordingly, the Army intends to strictly punish these evil and rebellious elements, persons possessing of military arms and persons who have committed outrages and looting, in order to maintain the peace of the entire inhabitants. The leader of the rebels who had been arrested, and a certain other person were killed by firing squad at a certain place on the 21st and 22nd, respectively.

The Commander of the Shonan Garrison Forces hereby serve public notice that persons who remain unrepentent and continue their evil acts shall likewise be strictly punished.

- (E) The proclamation of the military authorities concerning the return of the distressed Chinese to their homes.

In order to secure peace and order and promote the smooth adjustment of the demand and supply of necessities of life on Shonan Island, all Chinese now taking refuge should return to their original place of residence within 10 days from March 4.

Those who fail to return within this period without good reason shall be strictly punished.

III. The state of purging on the Malay Peninsula.

1. The state of peace and order on the Malay Peninsula.

The intrigues of the Chinese during the Malay campaign were as described already. Even after the fall of Singapore, numerous anti-Japanese Chinese hid themselves in cities and forests. Some of them, standing for communism, and maintaining mutual connections among them, continued active operations under a firm organization in order to carry on a systematized anti-Japanese movement. They made efforts to obtain arms, ammunition, provisions, as well as comrades-in-arms. Meanwhile, they looted the surrendered arms which we had assembled, assassinated our officers and men, destroyed our communication and transportation lines, killed, threatened and pillaged law-abiding citizens at large. Thus the state of peace and order on the Malay Peninsula after the war was still alarming.

## 2. State of purge.

Recognising the necessity of conducting purging operations of the Malay Peninsula following the fall of Singapore, the Army dispatched from Singapore by the end of February the 18th Division to Johore State and the 5th Division to the Malay Peninsula other than Johore State, to take charge of the peace and order in the respective districts and at the same time conduct purging operations against the anti-Japanese Chinese.

In the case of the 5th Division, the district assigned to it was subdivided as follows to be placed under the charge of its component units:

Mallacca and Negri Sembiran	
Provinces -----	11 I
Selangor Province ----	41 I, 5A, 5T
Perak Province -----	42 I
Pahang Province -----	5K
Kedah, Penang, Twengganu, and Kelantan Provinces ----	21 I

The 5th and the 18th Divisions generally commenced purging operations from the early part of March, conducting mopping-up operations of anti-Japanese Chinese in the mountains and forests. By the end of April about 1,000 undesirable Chinese were arrested in Johore State, about 1,500 in Selanang and Mallacca Provinces, about 200 in Selangor Province, about 100 in Perak, about 50 in Pahang and about 200 in Kedah and Penang Provinces. Numerous arms were also seized. After examination, the greater part of these persons were released. However, casualties often occurred on both sides at the time of making arrests, since the Chinese fired at us, causing us to return fire also. Moreover, a considerable number (the leaders) killed themselves when they realized the situation to be against them.

Even after May the anti-Japanese Chinese continued underground activities, with the result that peace and order remained unsatisfactory. Our forces often penetrated through jungles and with considerable difficulties and damage to our side, carried on the punitive operations in order to secure peace and order, but failed to eradicate the anti-Japanese Chinese.

Of the purging operations after May the prominent one was the punitive operations in the forests north of Kuala Lumpur. Upon receipt of intelligence that about 500 anti-Japanese Chinese were scheming the assassination of our officers and men and the bombing of our barracks, we suppressed them by a forestalling attack. Following the battle, the remnant Chinese fled further deep into the jungles. About 200 dead bodies were left in the battlefield as the result of this battle.

In short, the purging operations on the Malay Peninsula represented peace preservation patrol activities to protect not only the Japanese troops themselves but also the life and property of the people at large (Chinese, Malaysians, Indians, etc.). Although we regret to say that we have no clear idea of the detailed situation owing to lack of data, the anti-Japanese Chinese who lost their lives were principally those who fell under our bullets, etc. during battle in the course of the purging operations. Our side also suffered considerable casualties in the course of the difficult punitive operations.

(Annex)

The collection of the contributions from the Chinese, which was carried out without reference to the arrests of Chinese in Singapore, seemed to be mainly a counter measure adopted to cope with inflation following the occupation of Malay.

Since the currency in circulation reached St. \$260,000,000 following the surrender of the British troops as compared with St. \$210,000,000 in pre-war days, it was decided to have the difference, St. \$50,000,000, donated. The donations were collected about the time of the transfer of General YAMASHITA to another post.

#### 5. Judgments.

In short, it can be understood from the guiding policy of the Army Commander at the beginning of the war that utmost efforts were made to prevent and check the inhumane acts committed during the course of the Malay (Singapore) campaign.

(1). With regard to the question of the disposition of the Chinese in Singapore, it is clear that Commander YAMASHITA, following the surrender of the British Army, issued to the various commanders of the corps and of the Garrison Forces an order concerning the clearing up of battle-fields and purging operations (mopping-up operations) with the determination to eradicate spies and disturbers of peace and order, in view of the intensive obstructive measures and anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese during the campaign. However, no written order for the punishment of the Chinese alone exists. The Commander of the Garrison Forces at Singapore, on the basis of the above-mentioned order and the Army's intention, carried it out as a part of the operations for clearing up the battle-fields and of the purging operations. Judging also from the objective situation at that time and the state of mopping-up operations throughout the entire Malay Peninsula, it is clear that it was not based on the personal view of the Commander of the Garrison Forces. I should judge that, in punishing the Chinese, preparations were made beforehand and various measures adopted after entry /in to Singapore/ in order to ensure propriety.

(2) Since the arrests and punishments of the Chinese were conducted during the course of clearing up the battle-fields and mopping-up operations following intensive fighting, it is needless to say that it is difficult to judge such acts on the basis of the standard for normal times, even though efforts were made to ensure their propriety. It appears that the reports by enemy newspapers include those who died from war sickness during operations and even citizens at large who were victims of bombing. They also exaggerate things. Accordingly, it seems proper to estimate the number of spies and anti-Japanese undesirable elements who were punished at about 5,000.

In Hu HSING's "Notes on the New Life of the Chinese" it is written that there was a fairly large number of undesirable Chinese who obstructed operations and instigated and looted law abiding citizens. This gives an idea of the situation.

(3) Although it is not possible to guarantee that, in making the arrests and punishments, the staff officers concerned did not "overdo" themselves, and although it is difficult to get a clear idea of the situation then because Lt. Col. HAYASHI, who was the staff officer in charge of it (staff officer attached to the headquarters of the Shonan Garrison Forces) and Chief of Staff Lt. General SUZUKI have died in action, it may become further clear if Major General IKETANI, who was the chief of the operations section, and Colonel TSUJI, who was the staff officer in charge of operations, are interrogated.

Troop positions before entry into city  
(However, detailing was changed in the  
in the early part of March)

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