

XXXVII

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

(Research Office)

(R/G/8/8/A)

E R R A T U M

Summary of Information

No. 37

PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY.

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C O P Y.

G.R.G.G. 315 (C)

Generalmajor WESTHOFF's (FWD) verbatim account of  
the shooting of the 50 Allied PW from Stalag Luft  
3 SAGAN, March, 1944.  
(from stenographic notes)

I was in charge of the 'General' department (Abteilung 'Allgemein') when the shooting of the escaped RAF PW from Stalag-Luft 3 took place. It was the first occasion on which Feldmarschall KEITEL had sent for me. I went with General v. GRAEVENITZ. He had been sent for and I was to accompany him. A certain number of officers had escaped from the SAGAN camp. I don't remember how many, but I believe about eighty. When we entered, the 'Feldmarschall' was very excited and nervous and said: "Gentlemen, this is a bad business!" We were always blamed whenever PW escaped—we couldn't tie them to our apron strings! "This morning GÖRING reproached me in the presence of HIMMLER for having let some more PW escape. It was unheard of." Then they must have had a row because the camp didn't come under us, it was a GAF camp. All GAF camps came directly under the GAF itself, but the inspector of PW camps was in charge of all camps for inspection purposes. I wasn't inspector yet. General v. GRAEVENITZ was inspector, and all camps came under him in matters concerning inspection and administration. GÖRING blamed KEITEL for having let those men escape. These constant escapes were a bad show. Then HIMMLER interfered—I can only say what the 'Feldmarschall' told us—and he complained that he'd have to provide another 60,000 or 70,000 men as 'Landwachen', etc.

Feldmarschall KEITEL said to us: "Gentlemen, these escapes must stop. We must set an example. We shall take very severe measures. I can only tell you that the men who have escaped will be shot; probably the majority of them are dead already." KEITEL said that to us at the conference. We were amazed as that was a conception we had never come across before. The affair must have happened in March. We were sent to the 'Feldmarschall' in BERLIN a few days after the escape, not on that account but for some other business. We knew they'd escaped and we were taken by surprise by that declaration at the conference. General v. GRAEVENITZ intervened at once and said: "But Sir, that's out of the question. Escape isn't a dishonourable offence. That is specially laid down in the convention." He raised these objections, whereupon KEITEL said: "I don't care a damn; we discussed it in the FUHRER's presence and it cannot be altered." I cannot recollect the exact details—HIMMLER and the FUHRER must have arranged it between them, as we returned after that.

Camps only report to us after escapes have been made or else when the escapees have been caught. The camp reports: so-and-so many have been caught. But in this case none of our men had shot any of the PW; I made enquiries at once. None of them had been shot by a soldier but by Gestapo men only, or else police sentries. That proves that probably HIMMLER—of course I don't know whether he made the suggestion to the FUHRER or how they arranged it—it should be possible to find that out from GÖRING who was present at the conference. Naturally I don't know. At any rate it is a clear fact that our men didn't shoot any of them; they must all have been shot by police men. They weren't handed over to the police; they were caught by them. Usually when PW were caught by the police they were returned to our camp and we passed sentence on them. But in this particular case only those caught by our people were brought back to the camp, that is, those caught by soldiers.



I don't know whether the 'Landwacht' came under HIMMLER in such a case or not. I can't tell you exactly, as I'm not sure. HIMMLER calls out the 'Landwacht'—it is not our responsibility. HIMMLER gave them their assignments as they have police functions. We had no authority to give them orders. I can safely say that the military didn't shoot any of them; I had a report sent me at once and told General von GRAEVENITZ: "Sir, the only thing we can do is to see that no dirty business is carried out where we are in charge." The 'Landwacht' under HIMMLER, is the Gestapo's responsibility, and we could do nothing about it. We were faced with a fait accompli. General v. GRAEVENITZ who was the man concerned immediately pointed it out to the 'Feldmarschall' and said: "That's quite impossible, we can't shoot any people." And how the shooting was carried out I heard from the representative of the protecting power, Herr NAVILLE (?) of SWITZERLAND. He then drove there and it was only through him that I found out that the people were apparently in prison at GÖRLITZ. Herr NAVILLE (?) told me that he had been in the camp and had been told by the camp leader that the people were supposed to be in prison at GÖRLITZ. The FW had expressed their opinion about it and had said it would have been quite impossible for these people to have escaped again. They were closely watched and were, I believe, shackled or something. It would have been impossible for them to escape again. Then we turned to the Gestapo, because we had to find out the order of the events, also for the Foreign Office, and asked them to give information as to how the men met their death. I still haven't got that information to this day. I myself went to the Gestapo and said: "I need the documents." Then I set the Foreign Office on to it only after the subject had been forbidden. We exchanged correspondence with the Gestapo. Afterwards I think Gruppenführer MÜLLER at the Gestapo dealt with the affair. At any rate we didn't get any news and so it was pointed out to the 'Feldmarschall' that such a state of affairs was impossible; that we had to get in communication with the Foreign Office. Then he emphatically stated that it was forbidden to get into touch with the Foreign Office. Then the affair was raised in the House of Commons in ENGLAND and then a note was sent by our side. Then I was quite suddenly called up by Admiral BIRKNER (?) of the Foreign Department (Amtsgruppe Ausland) in the OKW, which keeps contact with the Foreign Office. He called me up by telephone at night and said: "The 'Feldmarschall' has given me orders to prepare an answer for ENGLAND immediately. What is it all about? I don't know anything about the case." I said: "Herr Admiral, I'm sorry, but General von GRAEVENITZ received strict orders not to talk to anyone about it. Nothing was allowed to be put down in writing either. Apart from that we ourselves were faced with an accomplished fact. This order was apparently issued by HIMMLER and the position was such that we could do nothing more at all about it. Then he wanted me to tell him about the affair. So I was only able to say to him: "I only know what Herr NAVILLE (?) told me, that's all. I made various attempts to approach the Gestapo to get the reports for the Foreign Office. I'm sorry, but I can't get them." Then the Foreign Office itself got into touch and took charge of this affair. Then another of my men, Oberstleutnant KRAFFT, went to BERCHTESGADEN while I was on a journey. At that time a note to ENGLAND was to be prepared. Then when we read this note to ENGLAND in the newspaper we were all absolutely taken aback. We all clutched our heads: Mad! We could do nothing about the affair.

Generalinspekteur General ROETTIG had nothing to do with it, nothing at all. He did not have any hand in the affair at all. He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these matters were taken out of his hands, apparently at that conference with the FÜHRER in the morning, that's to say the conference between HIMMLER, Feldmarschall KEITEL and GÖRING, which took place in the FÜHRER's presence. The FÜHRER himself always took a hand in these affairs when officers escaped. For that reason it was always a frightful battle for us, we were put under frightful pressure. Then the matter was always so handed that the OKW got blamed from above for our being too slack with the FW, and for allowing them much too much freedom. We always said

the ...



the Geneva Convention was binding for us. That was the perpetual struggle. The affairs went so far that if we ever received reports from American or Canadian camps, or from English camps for Germans, and there were any points in the report which could possibly lead to trouble, as is the case in every PW camp, I always told my departmental staff: "For heaven's sake, don't let's pass that up any higher", unless it was one from higher authority. "We won't pass it up any higher; we'll deal with it here, for otherwise it will only lead to unnecessary friction!" So, as far as my office was concerned, everything was done with respect to PW matters which could be done. Unless we were absolutely forced to do otherwise, the 'Inspekteur' of PW camps certainly used to keep to the Convention. The protecting power will be able to prove that. All the officers who have worked with me could prove that. We always held those courses in VIENNA, the point of which was to acquaint the officers with the Convention and to tell them of the difficulties, that we were bound to keep to the Convention, but that as everyone interfered in matters relating to PW, our life was made extremely hard. That was the two-year long struggle which I carried on.

General ROETTIG, as far as I know, was only once with Feldmarschall KEITEL altogether, although he came directly under the 'Feldmarschall'. General ROETTIG came to see me about three months before the post was abolished, and complained that he never saw the 'Feldmarschall' at all, and that he was treated altogether like someone entirely superfluous. So I said to him: "Sir, I consider that you are just being used for window dressing. That's my opinion. If Feldmarschall KEITEL is attacked he can say to HIMMLER: "There you are, I can't do more than that. I even appointed a GOC whose sole job that is, and who has to see to it that no PW escaped. He has to check up on the camps to see that everything is in order, and to see that there's no negligence there." That's my personal opinion of General ROETTIG's position. When he heard about the shooting, ROETTIG clasped his head in his hands, as we all did. I didn't sleep a wink for nights on end. After all, one does have one's feelings of honour. But we couldn't do anything about it. When we came home, so-and-so many people had been shot already. As it was done by the Gestapo, what could you do? Hand in your resignation? It wouldn't have been accepted. I went to see General SCHMUNDT and begged him to release me from the job. But it couldn't be done.

I only know an order existed that only officers and, I believe, only those who were caught by the Gestapo should be handed over to them. This must have happened whilst General von GRAEVENITZ was still there. Intelligence wasn't my department; it was a separate OKW branch. The Intelligence branch provided Intelligence officers for PW camps. They came under the Intelligence Branch of the OKW. They were attached to us. I know that the order existed, but I can't say for certain whether all men were to be handed over or whether the Gestapo could only keep those they caught themselves. These orders were always issued at HIMMLER's instigation.

I received a report from the camp saying so-and-so many men had been shot whilst attempting to escape. I didn't hear from the Gestapo at all. It's like this: the reports are sent to the camp. Then the camp informed us that a certain number of men had been recaptured and a certain number shot. Things are reported in that way. The Gestapo sent me no information whatsoever; they merely told us casually, whenever we made enquiries, that they'd recaptured a certain number. The 'Feldmarschall' (+) gave us detailed instructions to publish a list at the camp, giving the names of those shot, as a warning. That was done. That was a direct order which we couldn't disobey. We used to object to such cases, but if we had opposed all the constantly-recurring orders we should always have had rows.

Apparently ...

(+) Keitel.



Apparently the bodies were burnt and the ashes put into urns and sent to the camp. For the burial the PW arranged with the protecting power that they should be allowed to erect a nice monument, which they made themselves. Before the burial the Camp Commandant sent me a photograph of the monument. I kept the photograph and didn't pass it on as I feared it would give rise to more difficulties. I said to Oberstleutnant KRAFFT: "We shall only send the report regarding the arrival of the urns to Higher Authority. Matters of this sort were always passed to Higher Authority. They went to the Party Chancellery and then there was hell to pay. The cremation of dead PW is forbidden. There were always instructions to that effect. Whenever anything was done or was planned to be done contrary to the Convention I used to go to the department above and say: "That is contrary to the Convention. I should like to draw your special attention to it. We cannot do this," However, difficulties were laid in our path from all sides. Whenever I addressed the officer's corps and said: "Gentlemen, we only act according to the Convention," someone from Higher Authority, from the Party Chancellery, arrived the following day and said: "Gentlemen, the Convention is a scrap of paper, which doesn't interest us." I was at a conference at the Party Chancellery. BORMANN's deputy was present. We were discussing the Convention and I told BORMANN's deputy, who was an 'Obergebietsleiter' or something of the sort, called FRIEDRICH: "For me the Convention is valid. The FUHRER ordered it and I shall adhere to it. Unless I receive different orders from higher authority I cannot disregard the Convention. Incidentally it is utter nonsense for you to tell me"—it was a large conference, including members of all the Ministries—"that I should disregard the Convention when, on the other hand, the protecting power never takes its eye off me. Then I have to make a report to the Foreign Office, in order to straighten matters out. It is quite out of the question." Whereupon FRIEDRICH said: "Gentlemen, that is of no importance." That was typical of them. They could do as they pleased. None of us had any say in matters, and fear of the concentration camp was always at the back of our minds, as they'd put us in their black books.

The Air Force PW camps were under GAF administration. I always regretted this. Apparently, when PW administration was being set up, GÖRING said: "No, Air Force PW are a GAF concern. We shall put them in our own camps. All Air Force PW camps had GAF commandants. They came under GAF but they also came under the 'Wehrkreis' Director of PW and also of the Chief of PW camps, in matters regarding treatment. For instance, PW in operational zones didn't come under us, but under the 'Oberquartiermeister'. However, in matters concerning treatment they came under us because the OKW had issued all these instructions, regarding the treatment of PW. As a result we also sent them instructions as regards treatment. They were tied by these instructions but we couldn't get at the PW as such. Our relations with the GAF camp at SAGAN were always of the best. Oberst von LINDEINER, an old GAF officer, was Camp Commandant at the time. He came a cropper over this business. He was brought before a court-martial because those people escaped. In that particular camp 101 tunnels had been dug. He found 100 of them but not the 101st, by which they got away. I told the PW: "Well, gentlemen, the Convention allows you to attempt an escape, we admit that much, but you mustn't think the country in which you are imprisoned won't try and prevent this." There was a basic rule which was actually an order by the 'Feldmarschall': "Any commandant who has a mass attempt at escape in his camp shall be brought before a court-martial." We had commandants who had been before courts-martial on four or five occasions. The Air Force PW camps came under the REICHSMARSHALL, because he appointed the commandants himself. The Naval and Army camps came under our command. The GAF had its own camps, also in matters of administration. We didn't build them, the GAF did. At the time it was their construction branch or something of the sort. Oberst WÄLDE was head of GAF PW administration at the time. He only had a few camps. We also got the reports from their camp. GÖRING and the 'Feldmarschall' can give information regarding the essentials of his matter, as they discussed it with the FUHRER. The 'Feldmarschall' instructed us to work out detailed orders, as we had to confirm the fact that our guard troops were not concerned. This decision, presumably

coming ...



coming from the FÜHRER, gave the matter into the hands of HIMMLER and the Gestapo. Things were now out of our hands. We insisted immediately, and said: "Not one of our men touch the PW. The PW whom we catch are sent back to our camps." We issued orders to that effect. I reported to the 'Feldmarschall' on three occasions in all, always in the presence of any superior officer. On one occasion with General von GRAEVENITZ; that was on that occasion. The second occasion was when I was ordered to see HIMMLER by Feldmarschall KEITEL, when I saw him subsequently on account of the recruiting of British PW and he reproached me for opposing the recruiting. The third occasion was when General REINECKE and I saw KEITEL about the handing over of PW to HIMMLER; KEITEL was intending to hand the whole show over to HIMMLER when I drew his attention to the following fact: "Sir, that is out of the question; that can't be done. The protecting power and enemy states will object to having anything to do with HIMMLER. I think it a very risky thing for the OKW to withdraw from PW administration." General REINECKE raised the same objections. Whereupon KEITEL decided to let us retain a small section.

We were told: "all men who get away are to be shot!" The 'Feldmarschall' prohibited anything concerning this to be put into writing. Nothing at all. Only the camp was to be informed in order to put them in the picture. I discussed the matter with GRAEVENITZ once more. I can't tell you the exact details any more. We contacted the Gestapo regarding the return of the bodies. We had to have them back. Then von GRAEVENITZ left for the front. I then said to Oberstleutnant KRAFFT: "I won't do it like that. I'm going to cover myself at all costs, so that we're not involved in it afterwards. It's true the 'Feldmarschall' has forbidden it to be put in writing, but I want to have it in writing. It must be signed by the FÜHRER." Contrary to Feldmarschall KEITEL's orders—I pretended that I hadn't understood properly—I worked the thing out on paper. I said to Oberstleutnant KRAFFT: I want to have the word 'shoot' included, so that KEITEL can see it in writing. He may adopt a different attitude then." When I got the thing back he had written the following in the margin: "I didn't definitely say 'shoot', I said 'Hand over to the Police or hand over to the Gestapo.'" So that was a partial climb down.

We arranged with the 'Feldmarschall' to have the matter submitted to the FÜHRER. We had the feeling that there was something not quite in order. It was to be done in such a way that the Gestapo, that is to say, HIMMLER, was to do it in his way and we were to do it in our way. The 'Feldmarschall' didn't want to go to the FÜHRER alone, he wanted HIMMLER to do something from the other side at the same time, and that was to be done simultaneously. So on instructions from the 'Feldmarschall' we worked out this order and then said to the Gestapo: "Here, this is to be put before the FÜHRER, because it's impossible on any lower level." But that kept on being drawn out, and at that time I had an ever-growing conviction that something was not in order. Nobody wanted to approach the FÜHRER with this affair. In the end I couldn't get where I wanted with this affair. So I went to BERLIN myself—it was the only time I ever saw KALTENBRUNNER—and I said to KALTENBRUNNER: "This matter is still outstanding. It should be submitted to the FÜHRER. It can't carry on like this. A decision must be made sometime, but apart from that I am of the opinion that the whole affair should be dropped. The whole thing is madness. It has already let us into so much unpleasantness, and is so monstrous that I am still of the opinion that this affair should either be stopped in some way, or the FÜHRER be dissuaded from continuing it any further. Then nothing more was done about it, and no order was issued either. KALTENBRUNNER was a very quiet person, he hardly ever spoke at all. I said to him: "We're all clear about it, and the English in particular only escape for the fun of it. The English have never yet made difficulties for us by mass escapes; they have their escape committee in the camp." We all knew that. No one was allowed to attempt escape without informing the escape committee. He had to inform them and was then prepared by them for the escape. After that he had to get away and if he was caught he put up with that and gave no trouble.

I cannot ...



I cannot remember having received any reports saying the PW having committed any sabotage or espionage after they escaped. I also always opposed the idea of, for instance, English officers going for walks with a sentry after they'd given their word of honour not to escape. The English officers complained, as this was against their sense of honour. I immediately saw their point of view and said: "That's nonsense. Either they give their word of honour and we let them go out on the strength of that, or else I don't ask them to give their word and send them out under guard."

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ANNEXE II ...



SECRET.

ANNEXE II.  
(R/G/16/7A)

FREE.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Reference: DE421/DIS202

Disseminated by FWD on 27.6.1945.

The following material is released by SHAEF authorities FREE.  
NO RESTRICTIONS ON USE.

Subject: CEW ORDERED CONCENTRATION CAMP SHOOTINGS OF ALLIED PWs.

By order of the German High Command (OKW), quoted in a top secret Gestapo decree of 4 March 1944, Allied officers and NCOs escaping from PW. camps (ex. 3pt British and American PWs whose treatment was to be decided individually) were upon recapture to be handed over to Security Police (Sipo) and Security Service (SD) offices. The OKW was fully aware of this gross violation of International Law, as can be seen from the precautions taken to guard against news about this order leaking out, or action taken upon it, to other PWs, to the general public, the International Red Cross, representatives of the protecting power or any other inquirer.

The Gestapo decree based on the OKW order directs the transfer of recaptured PWs to Concentration Camp Mauthausen, where they were to be treated under "Aktion Kugel". Again, significant security measures are ordered along with the decree.

Affidavits furnished by French officers who were detained as PWs at Camp Mauthausen during 1944, give details of the fatal treatment meted out under "Action K or Kugel" (Bullet Action). "K"-PWs were not registered at the camp, but upon arrival were taken to the so-called "bathroom" where they were shot individually by means of a measuring apparatus (automatic release of a bullet upon touch), or exterminated in groups by gas.

The Gestapo document is translated in full.

Extracts from the French officers' sworn statement are appended.

Translation:

GESTAPO - Cologne Office  
Out-station Aachen.

Nr.26/44. g.Rs.

Transmit as Secret. Treat as Top Secret.

DOR. BERLIN NUE 19 507 4. 3. 33. 1430 - WF-

To all Stapo Branch offices, with the exception of Prague and Brno,-  
Sipo and SD inspectors.

Subject: Measures against recaptured PW officers and non-working NCOs.,  
with the exception of British and American PWs.

The OKW has issued the following order:

1. Every escaped PW officer and non-working NCO with the exception of British and American PWs, no matter whether he escaped in transit or whether the escape was made en masse or individually, is to be handed over upon recapture to Chief, Security Police (Sipo) and Security Service (SD) under...



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under "Grade III".

2. The handing over of PWs to Sipo and SD will in no circumstances be made known officially. Other PWs must, therefore, in no case gain knowledge of fellow PWs having been recaptured. Recaptured PWs are to be reported to the Wehrmacht Information Office as "escaped and not recaptured". Their mail is to be treated accordingly. Representatives of the protecting power, the International Red Cross and other welfare organizations are to be given the same information upon inquiry.

3. Recaptured British and American PW officers and non-working NCO's are at first to be kept under guard away from PW-camps and out of sight of other PWs. If suitable accommodation is not available in Wehrmacht buildings they will be kept under Police arrest. In individual cases Army Commands will at once apply to Chief/PW matters, OKW, for a decision about the handing over of such PWs to Chief Sipo and SD.

With reference to the above I order the following:

1. Stapo Branch offices will take over recaptured PWs from Stalag Commandants and transfer them to Concentration Camp Mauthausen in the usual manner, unless circumstances indicate transfer by special transport. PWs are to be chained en route, but not on the way to the station where the public has access. Camp Commandant Mauthausen is to be notified that transfer is taking place under "Aktion Kugel". Stapo branch offices will make mere statistical reports about transfers every six months, beginning 5 July 1944 (precisely). These reports are to be headed "Treatment of recaptured PW officers under "Aktion Kugel". In exceptional circumstances reports will be made immediately. Stapo branch offices have to keep exact lists.

2. OKW has been asked to direct PW camps that in the interest of camouflage recaptured PWs be first handed over to local Stapo offices and not to Mauthausen directly.

3. Recaptured British and American officers and non-working NCOs are to be taken under police arrest at the Stapo office locality, if suitable Wehrmacht premises are not available. As police prisons are already overcrowded, Stapo offices will take over recaptured PWs only if the Wehrmacht is really unable to make suitable premises available. The matter of accommodation will be discussed with Stalag commandants immediately after receipt of this order. For security reasons it is not admissible that recaptured PWs be accommodated outside police prisons, e.g., in labour reform camps.

4. In the event of escaped PW officers and non-working NCOs, with the exception of British and American PWs, being recaptured by Police authorities, they need not be handed over to Stalag Commandants after their cases have been cleared. Stalag will be notified of recapture and will be asked to arrange for transfer under "Grade III". Recaptured British and American officers and non-working NCOs will always be handed over to Wehrmacht authorities.

5. Local and Kreis Police authorities will not be informed of this decree.

Chief Sipo and SD, IV D 5 d, B.Nr.61/44 Grs.

Signed (for): Mueller  
SS-Gruppenfuehrer.

Appendix .....



SECRET.

Appendix:

Extracts from affidavit subscribed and sworn to on 13 May 1945:

"In Mauthausen existed several treatments of prisoners, amongst them the "Action K or Kugel" (Bullet Action). Upon the arrival of transports, prisoners with the mention "K" were not registered, got no numbers and their names remained unknown except for the officials of the Politische Abteilung..."

"The K prisoners were taken directly to the prison where they were unclothed and taken to the "bathrooms"— This bathroom in the cellars of the prison building near the crematory was specially designed for executions (shooting and gassing).

The shooting took place by means of a measuring apparatus. The prisoner being backed towards a metrical measure with an automatic contraption releasing a bullet in his neck as soon as the moving plank determining his height touched the top of his head.

If a transport consisted of too many "K" prisoners, instead of losing time for the "measurement" they were exterminated by gas sent into the bathroom instead of water.

"... Re prisoners which did not appear on the entry list of Mauthausen: In such cases the Politische Abteilung very reluctantly used to give the information that the camp services had not to take into consideration such missing prisoners because they had been transferred "In geheimer Reichssache" (Secret Affairs of the Reich) and insisted upon the complete disappearance of all traces of the names.

In many cases, due to transmission errors, the fatal "K" indication was not immediately given with the transfer and followed several days or several weeks later... As upon their arrival such "K" prisoners had, by mistake, received a camp number, they had to disappear in the Number Register of the Camp and for this purpose rectification order was made in the following hypocritical form "Prisoner X, No. ...., birth place, birth date, is actually called (heisst richtig) Prisoner Y, No. ...., different birth place and date. ..."

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NOTE:

The German text of the Order is given in the P.I.D. Report from which this is quoted.

ANNEXE III ...



(R/G/10/8)

ANNEXE III.

EXTRACT FROM EVALUATION REPORT No. 242.  
dated August 4th, 1945.

Extract from notes of a Conference at F.H.Q. on 27 January, 1945.

Translation of extract from notes of a conference at F.H.Q. on  
27 January, 1945. Goering.

Goering: "Near Sagan there are 10,000 captured air force officers.  
It is said that there are no transport facilities for them. The idea  
has been spoken of that the prisoners should be left to their Soviet  
Russian Allies. They would get 10,000 fliers."

Hitler: "Why did they not take them away sooner? That is a  
"Schlumperei sondergleichen" (vernacular for "laziness and inefficiency  
without precedent")."

Goering: "That is the B d E. We do not have to do anything with that.  
I can only report it."

Hitler: "They have got to go even if they have to march in the dirt on  
foot. The Volkssturm has to be called up for them. Whoever runs away  
will be shot. That is to be done with all possible means."

Goering: "How many cattle trucks do you need for 10,000 men?"

Hitler: "If we transport them according to German standards we should  
need at least 20 transport trains for 10,000 men; if we transport them  
according to Russian ideas we need five—or three."

Goering: "Take their pants and boots off so that they cannot run away  
in the snow."

The matter was then dropped but later at the same conference  
it was brought up again, as follows:

Goering: "The 10,000 prisoners in Sagan should be transported by  
Obergruppenführer Jüttner." (+)

Hitler: "They will have to be taken out of there by every possible means;  
the Volkssturm will have to be set up for them with the most energetic  
people. Attempts at flight will be punished with death."

Fegelein: "We have the man for them who guards the concentration camps,  
that is Obergruppenführer Gluecke, (++) he should take charge of it."

(+) Probably Obergruppenführer Hans Jüttner, Chief of SS. Operations  
Department and of SS. Operations Headquarters; permanent Deputy to  
Mimmler as CIC of Replacement Army.

(++) Evidently Police General Richard Gluecke, Commander of Concentration  
Camps.

ANNEXE IV ...



LIST OF PERSONALITIES MENTIONED IN THIS SUMMARY.

HITLER

HIMMLER

GÖRING

FRIEDRICH, Bormann's Deputy.

Heinrich MÜLLER, Head of the Gestapo Office of the R.S.H.A.

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Field-Marshal KEITEL, Head of the O.K.W.

SS. General Hans JÜTTNER, Head of Operations Branch of the Waffen SS.

SS. Lieut.-General GLUECKS, Chief of Amtsgruppe D in the W.V.H.A.,  
Commander of all Concentration Camps.

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