

13

Record of Proceedings
of the
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The United States of America, the Republic of China,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of
Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines

-Against-

ARAKI, Sadao; DOHIHARA, Kenji; HASHIMOTO,
Kingoro; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIRO-
TA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; KAYA,
Okinori; KIDO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KOISO, Kuni-
aki; MATSUI, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MINAMI,
Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi;
OKAWA, Shumei; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHI-
GEMITSU, Mamoru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIRATO-
RI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teiichi; TOGO, Shigenori; TOJO,
Hideki; UMEZU, Youshijiro;

-Accused-

Official Court Reporters

Jack Greenberg, Chief
Fred T. Abram
James F. Barton
Antoinette Duda
Samuel Goldberg
Robert H. Morse
John J. Smith
Daphne Spratt
Elvira Whalen
Julian Wolf
Lorrain Yelden

13 SEPTEMBER 1946

I N D E X
Of
WITNESSES

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I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS

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474		Supplement to exhibit No. 469, balance sheet of Comm. of Conservators for Closed Institutions		5499
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1 Friday, 13 September 1946

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12
13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 - - -

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19
20 (English to Japanese and Japanese
21 to English interpretation was made by the
22 Language Section, IMTFE.)
23
24
25

G 1 THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
r 2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

n 3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

b 4 MR. COMYNS CARR: My friend, Mr. Hauxhurst,
e 5 has an explanation for which the Court asked two or
& 6 three days ago, which he is in a position to supply
B 7 now. And, if it is convenient for the Court, it
a 8 would be quite convenient for me that he should inter-
r 9 vene for a few minutes with that explanation.
t 10

n 11 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hauxhurst.

12 MR. HAUXHURST: If the Tribunal please, the
13 additional information to enlighten the Court on the
14 figures of exhibit 469, which was under consideration
15 last Tuesday, as far as they are available have now
16 been obtained by me. In that connection, if it
17 please the Tribunal, I would like to introduce into
18 evidence prosecution's exhibit with the next number
19 for the purpose of showing the explanations which I
20 expect to make with reference to exhibit 469.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
23 supplementing exhibit 469 will receive exhibit No.
24 474.

25 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
26 No. 474 was received in evidence.)

1 MR. HAUXHURST: In connection with the se-
2 curing of these certificates from the Chairman of the
3 Committee for Closed Institutions in Japan, Mr. W.
4 N. Rogers, Assistant Chief of the Liquidation Branch,
5 Finance Division, who is acting under a SCAP direct-
6 ive dated September 30, 1945, has asked me to say
7 that these certificates are made only from such
8 records as the Committee of Conservators for the
9 Closed Insitutions have in their possession in Tokyo,
10 Japan; and that the Committee of Conservators for
11 Closed Institutions had nothing to do with the opera-
12 tions of the Central China Development Co. Ltd. or the
13 North China Development Co. Ltd. prior to the issuing
14 of this directive.

15 This exhibit consists of two certificates,
16 one by Mr. SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Committee, cer-
17 tifying to the balance sheets of the Central China
18 Development Company and the North China Development
19 Company as of March 31, 1945. In view of the fact that
20 the figures which were in exhibit 469 can be easily
21 explained by following the balance sheets, I would ask
22 your attention to the balance sheet of the Central
23 China Development Co. Ltd.

24 The first item on the Assets side, "Invest-
25 ment and Loan account" of 4 billion, 971 million,

1 713 thousand, 250 yen is divided into three parts:
2 Investment in subsidiaries, 144 million, 61 thousand,
3 390 yen; that item appeared in exhibit 469 in exact
4 figures. The next two, loans and advances, which
5 aggregate 4 billion, 827 million, 651 thousand,
6 860 yen, is the figure that also appeared in exhibit
7 469.

8 On the liability side of the Central China
9 Development Company, at the top of the page, appears
10 "China Development Company debenture account,
11 ¥ 352,600,000.00." That was the item that the Court
12 was inquiring about.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hauxhurst, you told us
14 that these were loans by the companies, and we asked
15 you to ascertain where the companies obtained the
16 funds from which the loans were made. That is all
17 we want you to explain, if you can do so from this
18 document.

19 MR. HAUXHURST: I can, sir. On that debenture
20 account just referred to, 334 million, 600
21 thousand yen was sold in Japan. In the next item, if
22 the Tribunal please --

23 THE PRESIDENT: Do not read **any** more long
24 figures if you can avoid it. You can use the expres-
25 sion "four billion odd," or something like that.

1 MR. HAUXHURST: The next item, "Borrowing
2 account" of five billion yen.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better make
4 a statement or write out a statement, Mr. Hauxhurst,
5 and give it to us this afternoon. Make it as brief
6 as possible and avoiding long figures.

7 MR. HAUXHURST: I could make this one
8 explanation.

9 THE PRESIDENT: My colleagues, who have
10 been reading the document, say that on its face it
11 indicates the source of these moneys. If we need
12 further assistance, we will let you know, Mr. Haux-
13 hurst.

14 MR. HAUXHURST: Thank you.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Do you take the view -- I
16 do not know whether you do or not -- that on its
17 face the documents disclose the source of the loans?

18 MR. HAUXHURST: Yes, sir, except that there
19 are certain items, for instance, overdrafts of
20 thirteen billion dollars, that they do not have the
21 information here in Tokyo because the North China
22 Development Company was located in Peiping, and they
23 do not have the figures available. There are certain
24 items --

25 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, on the part of

1 the defense, on the first part of this certificate
2 it shows the custody of the original records that
3 this is taken from is only a partial group of orig-
4 inal documents, that some of them have been de-
5 stroyed; but I think the defense will agree that
6 in the bottom part that the question the Court was
7 deciding on that first page of where the money that
8 they loaned came from, a large quantity of it has
9 been borrowed from the banks as set out in the last
10 paragraph thereof: started borrowing accounts,
11 Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of
12 Japan.

13 MR. HAUXHURST: May I leave two figures
14 with the Court, taken as summarized from exhibits
15 471 and 470: that in China, 419 business bodies
16 plus the investment of the Japanese Government in
17 these two companies amounted to round figures of
18 298 billion yen, and in Manchukuo, 18 billion yen,
19 a total of 316 -- 317 billion yen.

20 I wish to thank the Tribunal for this
21 privilege and to say that that will close any further
22 testimony on this phase of the case unless the Court
23 should require further information which we will be
24 very glad to furnish.

25 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, we believe that

1 the prosecution should have placed more material on
2 the exports from these areas into Japan, or the im-
3 ports into Japan from either side of the ocean, to
4 show the relationship between the amount being re-
5 ceived and the amount of capital investment going
6 in as shown by the imports. I believe that would be
7 very material, and defense will try to bring that
8 out.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Well, if it be material,
10 the balance sheet reveals that most of the money --
11 nearly all of the money -- loaned by the companies
12 was borrowed in China, and it suggests Chinese funds
13 are the source of the loans. That can be corrected
14 by the defense later if they have the material.

15 Mr. Carr.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: When the Tribunal ad-
17 journed last night, I was reading exhibit 473, and I
18 was about to read a portion of it on page 10. I
19 think it is clear that this is one of the replies
20 to the demand for information on page 3 which I read
21 yesterday and which one of my friends pointed out to
22 me is dated July 29, 1944. The document I am going
23 to read is undated but bears the receipt stamp
24 "October 4, 1944."

25 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

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1 MR. FURNESS: I would like to inquire from
2 the prosecution whether or not these documents which
3 are being introduced, document 1810-A, are part of a
4 general file or whether they purport to be all the
5 documents dealing with this particular subject.'

6 MR. COMYNS CARR: The answer to my friend's
7 question is that they are part of a large file
8 obtained from the prisoner of war information bureau.
9 We have not been able to find on that file any other
10 documents bearing on this particular matter.

11 MR. FURNESS: I make inquiry, Mr. President,
12 because the certificate or statement of source and
13 authenticity refers to the file, "Concerning Treatment
14 of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam," consisting of
15 572 pages, dated February 3, 1944, which is a date
16 prior to the date of any of the documents which are
17 now being referred to.

18 THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution should make
19 the whole file available to the defense, if the de-
20 fense so desire.

21 MR. COMYNS CARR: We have not the slightest
22 objection. Indeed, I was going to suggest it myself.

23 Now I propose to read the document.

24 "From: Chief of Prisoner of War Camp in
25 Siam.

1 "To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information
2 Bureau.

3 "Subject: Information re British prisoners
4 of war in Burma.

5 "I am sending you a report regarding the
6 facts A and B in Item No. 1 of the British protest
7 as stated in the Prisoner of War Supply No. 36.

8 "This matter concerns the sacrifice of the
9 administration of the prisoners of war for strategic
10 reasons and contains no material for refutation against
11 the enemy protest.

12 "Item following 'C' has no relation to us.

13 "Branch Camp No. 3 was opened in Burma
14 September, 1942 to intern 9,535 prisoners of war
15 transferred from Java. Branch Camp No. 5 was opened
16 in January, 1943 to intern 1,946 prisoners of war.
17 These camps are under the command of the Fifth Railway
18 Regiment and the prisoners of war were engaged in
19 constructing a railway between Burma and Siam. At
20 that time, provisions and rations were scarce. Quar-
21 ters and establishments were poor and medical facil-
22 ities were inadequate. Moreover, for strategic
23 reasons, it was necessary to complete the railway by
24 August, 1943, and the work was pushed forward at a
25 terrific pace, with the result that many prisoners

1 of war became ill and many died, as per attached
2 sheet.

3 "Following the opening of the railway to
4 traffic in October, 1943, all prisoners of war in
5 Burma were concentrated in Fanchana, Buri, Nonbodog
6 (phonetic) and Termacam, except a few who were to
7 assist the Railway Unit. Both the quarter facilities
8 and provisions have been improved at present and both
9 the number of patients and deaths have decreased
10 considerably."

11 And then follow two attached tables of
12 figures. The first is described as "Prisoner of
13 War Patients during the period between January, 1943
14 and July, 1944. (Investigated by Siam Prisoner of
15 War Camp.)" It purports to give for each month the
16 total number of prisoners of war employed, the number
17 of patients in Siam and their ratio to the total
18 number employed, the number of patients in Burma and
19 their ratio to the total number employed, and then
20 in total the number of patients and their ratio to the
21 total number employed. I will only call attention to
22 the first and last columns, the percentage of the
23 total number employed, who on their own showing were
24 patients or sick, in 1943, varied from 63.2% to 79.4%.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. FURNESS: I would like to point out to
2 the Court that that figure is obviously an error, an
3 addition to the two ratios and is not a ratio of the
4 total number of those employed.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: My friend has not under-
6 stood the scheme of these figures. The column for
7 the ratio in Siam is the ratio of the sick persons in
8 Siam to the total number stated to be employed not
9 only in Siam but in Burma as well. In the same way,
10 the ratio given for Burma is the ratio of the sick in
11 Burma to the whole number employed. It is natural,
12 therefore, that the final figure in the last column
13 should be arrived at by adding the two ratios together.
14 It will be important to note that the worst month of
15 all was the month of October, 1943.

16
17 C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D,
18 called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
19 resumed the stand and testified as follows:

20 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

21 BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

22 Q Now, Colonel Wild, have you any comment to
23 make on that table of figures? Does it seem to you
24 to be approximately correct in accordance with your
25 experience?

WILD

DIRECT

1 A It would appear to me to be approximately
2 correct.

3 Q Can you tell us whether in this report which
4 is made by the Siam Prisoner of War Administration,
5 the total figures given by him include F and H Forces
6 which were under the Malaya Prisoner of War Adminis-
7 tration?

8 A I think that they do because I do not believe
9 that the total number of prisoners of war went in
10 excess of fifty thousand during 1943.

11 Q Now, will you look at the next table, No. II.
12 I need only ask you about the totals at the bottom,
13 which purport to show the total number of deaths in
14 Siam as 6,500, in Burma as 1,246, and in total,
15 7,746. What have you to say to those figures?

16 A It is quite clear to me that the total
17 figure of the deaths in Siam is an understatement.

18 Q If it does not purport to include the figures
19 for F and H Forces, you told us yesterday, I think,
20 the deaths there would add another four thousand; is
21 that right?

22 A Correct.

23 Q It would still leave it about four thousand
24 under the figure you gave us yesterday of sixteen
25 thousand?

WILD

DIRECT

1 A Yes, it would.

2 Q Are you sure that all the deaths were
3 actually reported in the way you described yesterday?

4 A Certainly, in all areas where I was in Siam.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: Now would the Tribunal
6 kindly turn back to page 7 of this document, which is
7 the last in order of dates and which is the reply of
8 the Chief of Staff of the Southern Army to the same
9 demand for information as the last one. (Reading):

10 "Dated 23 October 1944.

11 "From: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army.

12 "To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information
13 Bureau.

14 "Subject: Information re treatment of
15 British prisoners of war in Burma.

16 "I send you a report regarding the subject
17 mentioned above by the Prisoner Supply No. 36 dated
18 July 29, as I have received the following report:

19 "Dated 6 October 1944

20 "From: Commander of the Southern Army Field
21 Railway Unit.

22 "To: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army.

23 "Subject: Report re British prisoners of
24 war in Burma.

25 "I am sending you a report in reply to 'I'

WILD

DIRECT

1 SAN 3 Secret No. 336 concerning British prisoners
2 of war in Burma (districts allotted for the con-
3 struction of railway connecting Siam with Burma.)

4 "1. The number of patients and deceased
5 prisoners of war who were engaged in the construction
6 of the railway connecting Siam and Burma are as in
7 Tables I and II. The prisoners of war include both
8 British and Dutch and there is no way to investigate
9 the British prisoners of war separately. For stra-
10 tegic reasons the completion of this railway was
11 most urgent. Since the proposed site of the railway
12 line was a virgin jungle, shelter, food provisions
13 and medical supplies were far from adequate and much
14 different from normal conditions for prisoners of
15 war.

16 "During the rainy season of 1943, transportation
17 was frequently interrupted and both Japanese soldiers
18 and prisoners of war were obliged to put up with much
19 hardship. The Japanese army Medical Corps tried in
20 vain to stem the violent outbreak of malaria and sick-
21 nesses of digestive organs. However, with the opening
22 of the said railway in October, 1943, both the number
23 of patients and deaths diminished with the completion
24 of provisions and facilities.

25 "2. I know nothing about the insulting of

WILD

DIRECT

1 British prisoners of war in Moulmein since Moulmein
2 is out of the work area."

3 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

4 Q Colonel Wild, what do you say about the
5 efforts there alleged of the Japanese Army Medical
6 Corps to stem the violent outbreak?

7 A I saw no signs of them.

8 Q And what do you say about the suggestion that
9 both Japanese soldiers and prisoners of war were obliged
10 to put up with much hardship?

11 A That is true in the sense that being in the
12 Siamese jungle in the monsoon is not pleasant for
13 anyone. In fact, there are many hardships, but these
14 hardships were not equally shared because the Japanese
15 had many facilities for overcoming them.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: Now I desire to tender in
17 evidence prosecution's document No. 1509.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

19 MR. FURNESS: Before we leave exhibit No. 473
20 I would like to ask that the translation be checked.
21 I have already talked to the Language Section and they
22 say there is room for controversy and I therefore ask
23 that it be checked and referred to the arbiters in
24 accordance with the rules of the Court.

25 THE PRESIDENT: We direct it be checked.

WILD

DIRECT

1 This is a report by the Japanese Government
2 on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Admitted on the usual
3 terms.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: I should have said No.
5 1509-A, I am told.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 1509-A will receive exhibit No. 475.

8 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
9 No. 475 was received in evidence.)

10 MR. COMYNS CARR: This was a document pre-
11 pared by the Japanese War Ministry immediately after
12 the surrender of Japan and forwarded by them on the
13 19 December 1945 to the Supreme Commander, but prepared
14 of their own motion and not on demand. I need not
15 read the whole of it today at all events and there
16 can be no controversy about the translation because
17 the Japanese and English versions were supplied to-
18 gether by the Japanese War Ministry. There are,
19 however, in the English version, as supplied by them,
20 one or two mistakes in date which I will correct.
21 There are references in it to orders by Imperial
22 General Headquarters and I should like to state now
23 that it will be the prosecution's case that the
24 following accused were members of that body at the
25 material dates: TOJO, KIMURA, SATO on the military

WILD

DIRECT

1 side, and SHIMADA, NAGANO and OKA on the naval
2 side.
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1 MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): Reading now
2 the first half of page 3:

3 (Reading):

4 "1. The so-called brutal treatment of
5 Allied prisoners of war during the construction of
6 the Siam-Burma Railway shall be divided into two
7 categories; (1) Misconduct in the form of direct
8 cruelty to the prisoners of war (the cases known as
9 maltreatment of prisoners), and (2) incidents involv-
10 ing a considerable number of deaths from illness
11 among the prisoners during the work. Cases coming
12 under the first category shall be dealt with as cases
13 of ordinary maltreatment of prisoners, whereas the
14 unfortunate incidents coming under the second were
15 caused under the circumstances that were unavoidable
16 during the waging of war. It should, therefore, be
17 noted that there is a distinct difference in charac-
18 ter between cases(1) and (2).

19 "2. In the present report, a plain state-
20 ment will be made of the actual state of affairs and
21 of the treatment of the prisoners of war which have
22 led to the comparatively large number of deaths from
23 sickness during the construction of the railway
24 under (1).
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 "Under Part 1 of this report the protests
2 made by the Allied Powers will be dealt with; under
3 Part 2 a description will be given regarding the in-
4 vestigations conducted into general affairs relative
5 to the prisoners' treatment and the special cases of
6 those under protest, and finally Part 3 will give the
7 measures taken by the Japanese authorities in respect
8 to the foregoing (2) (judicial decisions).

9 "With regard to cruelty directly inflicted
10 on prisoners under (1), no data are available in Tokyo,
11 and liaison with the Japanese troops on the spot is
12 at the moment virtually impossible, for which reason
13 the cases under (1) are excluded from this report. Ac-
14 cordingly it is hoped that inquiries will be made on
15 the spot by the Allied Powers in respect thereto."
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WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): Then I need
2 not read the next one and a half pages, but I come
3 down to the middle of page 5.

4 (Reading): "Tentative Translation of the
5 Oral Message dated July 4, 1944 from Swiss Legation,
6 Tokyo.

7 "By the letter dated September 15, 1944" --
8 '1944' should be '1942', correct date -- "addressed
9 to His Excellency General Hideki TOJO, the then
10 Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by the letter dated
11 December 9, 1944" -- '1944' should be '1942' -- "to
12 His Excellency Masayuki TANI, the Swiss Minister had
13 the honor to communicate the apprehensions which the
14 British Government entertained as to the maltreatment
15 accorded the prisoners of war at the Rangoon Camp.
16 The London Government furnished, at the same time,
17 a certain number of detailed facts relative to the
18 same treatment.

19 "By letter No 33/C R., dated February 1945" --
20 '1945' should be '1943' -- "His Excellency Foreign
21 Minister answered to the Swiss Minister that the
22 facts as mentioned on the above letter did not exist.

23 "The Swiss Minister never failed to convey the
24 contents of this letter to his Government in behalf
25 of the United Kingdom Government.

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARE (Continued):

2 Q Colonel Wild, was it true that the monsoon
3 began earlier than usual in that year?

4 A I believe it was the usual time.

5 Q Was that a subject of discussion between
6 yourself and the Japanese officers with whom you
7 had to deal on the spot?

8 A On information we had from officers who
9 had been in Burma and Siam before the war, we warned
10 the Japanese again and again that the monsoon was
11 about to break.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
13 fifteen minutes.

14 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
15 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
16 were resumed as follows:)
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WILD

DIRECT

1 "The Swiss Legation has the honor to
2 acquaint the Minister of Foreign Affairs" -- that
3 is to say, the accused SHIGEMITSU, "with the fact
4 that the British Government has, in a new communi-
5 cation made the following request to the Imperial
6 Government for information as regards the treatment
7 of the prisoners of war in Burma.

8 "'1. First complaint concerns area of Moulmein
9 and falls under three headings:

10 "A. Notifications: According to postcards
11 printed by the Japanese Authorities, about 20,000
12 British and Allied prisoners of war are detained in
13 or near Moulmein. Transfer of prisoners of war to
14 this camp has never been notified; and it is believed
15 that capture of many prisoners of war now in this and
16 other Burmese camps has also never been notified.
17 Nor has any notification been received of numerous
18 deaths that are known to have occurred there.

19 "B. Conditions: Conditions under which
20 prisoners of war in Moulmein camp are detained are
21 known to His Majesty's Government to be at least as
22 bad as, if not worse, than those which existed in
23 Thailand (compare the letter of the Swiss Minister
24 to His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, dated 5 July
25 1943).

WILD

DIRECT

1 "During October and November 1942, prisoners
2 of war in Moulmein itself are known to have died at
3 rate of approximately 10 per diem; the principal
4 cause of death being dysentery. In other camps ad-
5 ministered by the Japanese authorities in or near
6 Moulmein an even more appalling rate of mortality
7 has occurred amongst prisoners of war working on
8 that Burmese railway. These deaths are direct and
9 inevitable result of conditions in camps and in
10 particular of the wholly inadequate rations provided
11 by the Japanese authorities, of the latter's failure
12 to provide medicines or equipment in hospitals, of
13 almost complete lack of adequate clothing or even
14 footwear and of severity of labor exacted from
15 prisoners of war.

16 "C. Exhibition of prisoners: In February
17 of 1944, 25 prisoners of war were paraded through the
18 town of Moulmein. They were in an emaciated condition
19 and were forced to carry notices in Burmese stating
20 that they had recently been captured on the Arakan
21 front (which was not the case.) They were further
22 held up to ridicule and contempt by a Japanese officer
23 who accompanied the parade. Such proceedings are
24 clearly contrary to honorable standards of warfare
25 and unworthy of a nation calling itself civilized,

WILD

DIRECT

1 apart from being a breach of Article 2 of the Pris-
2 oners of War Convention.

3 "Letter dated December 4 1944 from Swiss
4 Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs -- again
5 SHIGEMITSU -- (Protest by British and Australian
6 Governments) Tentative Translation of the Letter
7 dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Mini-
8 ster of Foreign Affairs.

9 "I have the honor to acquaint Your Excell-
10 ency with the fact that the British and Australian
11 Governments have requested my Government to convey
12 the following communication to the Japanese Govern-
13 ment.
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WILD

DIRECT

1 "Some 150 Australian and United Kingdom sur-
2 vivors from the Japanese transport steamship 'Rakuyo
3 Maru' torpedoed in South China Sea on September 12,
4 have reached Australia and Great Britain. Following
5 is a brief summary of the knowledge which has conse-
6 quently come into the possession of His Majesty's
7 Governments in the United Kingdom and Australia re-
8 garding treatment of British and Australian prisoners
9 of war by Japanese military authorities; all available
10 prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved
11 early in 1942 to Burma or Thailand. Australians were
12 sent by sea to Burma crowded into ships' holds which
13 had been horizontally subdivided so that ceilings
14 were no more than 4 feet high. Prisoners from the
15 United Kingdom were sent by rail to Thailand so
16 crowded into steel cattle trucks that they could not
17 even lie down during the journey. They were then
18 marched some 80 miles. All were sent to work on the
19 construction of a railway through primitive disease
20 infected jungle in Thailand and Burma. Conditions
21 under which all these men lived and worked were in-
22 human; such accommodation as was provided gave little
23 or no protection against tropical rains or blazing
24 sun. Worn out clothing was not replaced and soon
25 many lacked clothing, boots and head covering. The

WILD

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1
2 only food provided was a pnnikin of rice and a small
3 quantity of watery stew three times a day but work had
4 to go on without respite whatever cost in human suf-
5 fering or life. The inevitable result was a dreadful
6 death rate, the lowest estimate being 20 per cent.
7 These conditions continued until the railway was
8 finished about October, 1943, when those not needed
9 for maintenance work were moved to camps in Thailand
10 and later to Singapore en route to Japan."
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1 "The rescued men were on a ship which left
2 Singapore early in September 1944. There were prob-
3 ably 1300 United Kingdom and Australian prisoners
4 of war on board. After she was sunk, the Japanese
5 deliberately picked up all Japanese survivors but
6 left the prisoners to their fate. Statements of our
7 men constitute direct and unimpeachable evidence of
8 the outrageous treatment by the Japanese of defense-
9 less prisoners of war.

10 "I add that I communicated to His Excell-
11 ency Minister Suzuki in the letter dated November 18,
12 that the rescued men from Gakuyo Maru according to
13 British information, arrived in England and Austra-
14 lia and that a public announcement would be given in
15 both countries on the basis of the accounts of those
16 men as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of
17 war in Thailand and Burma."

18 Then, "Part II MATTERS OF INVESTIGATION

19 "General Outline

20 "By order of the Imperial General Head-
21 quarters, the preparations for the construction of this
22 railway were commenced in June 1942 by the South
23 Army with the view of using it as a ground supply
24 route and a trade and traffic one between Thailand
25 and Burma, being urged on by the proposal of the

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1 South Army and the construction work was virtually
2 begun in November 1942 in hopes of completing it by
3 the end of 1943. But while counter attacks, partic-
4 ularly bombings, of the British Indian Army rapidly
5 became fierce and the situations in this area con-
6 siderably serious since the end of the rainy season
7 of 1942, our sea-transportation from Malay to Burma
8 gradually became hard. As there could be found no
9 ground transport route for its substitute, it was
10 clearly estimated that, if the situations were left
11 as they were till the end of the next rainy season,
12 transportation to Burma would be almost entirely
13 interrupted and even the defence of the area, not
14 to mention positive actions, impossible and further-
15 more the work itself quite difficult. For these
16 reasons the Imperial General Headquarters ordered
17 early in February 1943 to shorten the term of the
18 work by 4 months. With this the South Army, to-
19 gether with the leading staffs of the General Head-
20 quarters, urged the work on, taking the best possible
21 measures and the working troops also did their best,
22 so that the work made favorable progress for the time
23 being. However, as the rainy season earlier than
24 usual set in, in addition to the bad conditions in
25 jungles since April or March of 1943 which the Jap-

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1 anese Army had never encountered before, victims of the
2 work gradually increased, not to speak of the delay of
3 scheduled work. Confronted with these bad conditions,
4 the Imperial General Headquarters ordered at last to
5 postpone the period of the work by 2 months in spite
6 of the fact that this order had a grave influence upon
7 the operations in Burma, considering the general
8 situations of Burma front at that time, and that the
9 prospect of communication with Burma was becoming clear
10 with the partial completion of the railway and local
11 employment of newly constructed roads and waterways
12 paralleled with the railway."

13 I will pause here.
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now
2 resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr.

4 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

5 Q Colonel Wild, you were telling us that you
6 had warned the Japanese authorities in Siam with
7 whom you were dealing that the monsoon was about to
8 break, and I asked you what answer they gave to that.

9 A From two Japanese officers on two separate
10 occasions I had the same answer: "Not this year."

11 Q Now, with regard to the statement here that
12 in 1943 Imperial General Headquarters ordered at last
13 to postpone the period of the work by two months in
14 spite of the fact that this order had a grave influ-
15 ence upon the operations in Burma, what do you say
16 about that?

17 A We were told --

18 DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, is this an
19 inquiry -- is this asking for the witness' opinion?

20 THE PRESIDENT: He is just asking him to make
21 a statement of fact, whether there was any justifica-
22 tion for the Japanese claim. Even if it involved
23 giving an opinion, it would be unobjectionable coming
24 from this witness.

25 A From the time we arrived in our labor camps

WILD

DIRECT

1 in May, 1943, we were told again and again by the
2 Japanese that the work had got to be finished by
3 August. This was quite obviously a physical impos-
4 sibility because my force alone had thirty miles,
5 approximately, virgin jungle to cut through. Also,
6 the railway itself, the lines, the tracks, had only
7 reached Tasoa, which was a hundred miles to the south
8 of us. From August onwards we were told by the POW
9 Administration that the engineers had lost face because
10 they had not finished the railway on time. From August
11 the pressure was immensely intensified and the Japanese
12 railway engineers appeared to be in a permanent rage
13 with the troops working under them, and from that time
14 onward the form of abuse used by the engineers toward
15 the prisoners altered from saying that we were lazy
16 to saying that we were sabotaging the Japanese war
17 effort.

18 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing now to read:

19 "It is not unnatural that a great many persons
20 should be employed in such construction work in order
21 to strengthen operation capacity. Though the South
22 Army levied laborers on the spot and employed them in
23 the work besides Japanese troops, it was so difficult
24 to gather a great many laborers immediately that the
25 South Army asked permission to employ prisoners of war
in the work of the Imperial General Headquarters.

WILD

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1 Considering that the work was carried on in the rear
2 far away from the first front, and that the railway
3 would serve in the future as a trade route between
4 Thailand and Burma, the Imperial General Headquarters
5 complied with the request and sanctioned the employment
6 of prisoners of war. Then the forced construction
7 work was carried out in precipitous jungles spreading
8 over 400 kilometers conquering natural hindrances such
9 as influence of bad weather, particularly that of the
10 rainy season and the environment injurious to health,
11 et cetera, and surmounting technical hindrances, such
12 as time-limit due to operational needs, imperfect pre-
13 peration due to it, inadequate accommodations along the
14 Lines of Communication and inferior technical skill of
15 the Japanese Army.

16 "Though the Japanese Army did its best in
17 taking the best possible measures conceivable at that
18 time in order to improve the treatment of the prisoners
19 of war cooperating with the Japanese troops, laying
20 stress on billeting, ration and health, many prisoners
21 of war fell victim of the work at least much to our
22 regret.

23 "We should like to declare the Japanese troops
24 participated in the joys and sorrows of the prisoners
25 of war and native laborers in the construction work,

WILD

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1 and by no means completed or intended to complete the
2 work only at the sacrifice of prisoners of war."

3 Pausing there -- or reading just the next
4 words:

5 "NOTE: The Director of construction cherished
6 the motto "Prisoners of war and laborers are Fathers
7 of Construction," and consequently endeavored to
8 improve the treatment of prisoners of war."

9 Pausing there, Colonel Wild, I am afraid if
10 I were to ask you to comment at large on those two
11 paragraphs it would take a lot of time, but would you
12 just deal with any special points arising there?

13 THE PRESIDENT: Is it worth while?

14 MR. COMYNS CARR: If your Honor thinks not,
15 I will pass on. (Reading)

16 "General outline of construction progress.

17 "Details of the Construction and State of
18 Affairs in the Earlier State (from June 1942 to the
19 middle of February 1943.)

20 "The preparations of the constructions are
21 summarized as follows:

22 "Route: About 400 kilometers from Nonpradoc
23 to Tambisaya, along the River Keonoi.

24 "Transportation capacity: About 3,000 tons
25 a day to each direction.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "Period: Scheduled to complete by the end of
2 1943.

3 "Materials: Mainly to use the materials on
4 the spot and a part is transferred from the home
5 islands.

6 "Military strength: The Railway Inspection
7 Office, two railway regiments, the Railway Material
8 Depot and some other auxiliary troops.

9 "Labor (auxiliary personnel): Laborers levied
10 on the spot and prisoners of war.

11 "In conformity with the above preparation items,
12 the South Army, setting about survey along the railway,
13 negotiations with Thailand, establishment of construc-
14 tion bases, preparation of construction materials,
15 arrangements for laborers, survey of military geography
16 and sanitary arrangements, moved the railway units in
17 Burma to the construction bases one after another and
18 made them deploy. Thus it prepared for the construc-
19 tion.

20 "As the negotiations with Thailand were con-
21 cluded at the beginning of November of the same year,
22 the order of the Imperial General Headquarters concern-
23 ing execution of the railway construction was issued
24 and soon after, in accordance with the above items the
25 order concerning the construction was issued by the

WILD

DIRECT

1 South Army."

2 Pausing there, the accused TOGO was Foreign
3 Minister down to September 1, 1942. Continuing:

4 "The Chief inspector of the Second Railway
5 Inspection Office (staying in Bangkok) took command of
6 the following units of which the South Army Railway
7 Corps was composed. The 5th Railway Regiment (its base
8 was in Tambisaya) was allotted the duty of construc-
9 tion on the Thailand-side, and the 9th Railway Regiment
10 (its base was in Kanchanaburi) that on the Burma-side.
11 The main part of the 1st Railway Material Depot was
12 deployed in Nonpradoc and the other part in Rangun.
13 Thus the preparations made progress step by step, and
14 virtual construction work was begun in December, comply-
15 ing with the above mentioned orders.

16 "The South Army Railway Corps.

17 "The Chief Inspector of the Second Railway
18 Inspection Office Major General Shimoda."

19 I need not read the list of units. Continuing
20 paragraph 5:

21 "The Thailand Interment Camp, having finished
22 preparations, cooperated in the construction work from
23 the beginning by order of the South Army

24 "Allotment of duties, business system, system
25 of prisoners of war and outline of duties, concerning

WILD

DIRECT

1 the construction are shown in Annex 1, 2 and 3.

2 "Allotment of Duties Concerning the Railway
3 Construction.

4 "Imperial General Headquarters. Its responsi-
5 bilites were directions concerning the Railway Construc-
6 tion. And its duty and business, negotiations with the
7 Ministry of War concerning estimate and materials;
8 diplomatic negotiations through the Ministry of War;
9 orders concerning the railway construction (directives
10 of the Imperial General Headquarters); to help supply
11 of materials necessary for the construction; direc-
12 tions of the construction complying with the operational
13 needs; to decide whether the employment of prisoners
14 of war is appropriate.

15 "The South General Army. Chief Supervisor of
16 Railway Construction. To estimate and concentrate
17 military strength and labor necessary for the railway
18 construction. Supply, maintenance and sanitary arrange-
19 ments for them. To make prisoners of war cooperate
20 with the construction units or to allot them to the
21 units. Directions concerning the employment of
22 prisoners of war. Planning of the railway construction .
23 To keep harmony between the railway construction units
24 and cooperating attached units. Maintenance of traffic
25 routes and waterways necessary for the construction.

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1 "Then the Railway Inspection Office. Commander
2 in Charge of Railway Construction. Inspection survey
3 and construction of the route according to the rail-
4 way construction plan. Employment of the railway units
5 and attached units. To make prisoners of war and
6 laborers cooperate with the railway units or to allot
7 them to the units. Directions concerning the employ-
8 ment of prisoners of war. Negotiations with the Intern-
9 ment Camp concerning the employment of prisoners of
10 war. To take care of billeting, maintenance and health
11 of prisoners of war.

12 "Then, Railway Regiment. Commander in charge
13 of Railway construction in the allotted district.
14 Construction of railway in the allotted district.
15 Employment of the allotted and cooperating prisoners
16 of war according to the directives of the commander in
17 charge of railway construction. Negotiations with
18 persons in charge of supervising prisoners of war. To
19 take care of billeting, maintenance and health of
20 prisoners of war.

21 "Then, Internment Camp. To assist and control
22 the railway construction in the capacity of the super-
23 viso of prisoners of war. They were also to make
24 prisoners of war cooperate. . . . Negotiations with
25 the railway construction units concerning the employment

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1 of prisoners of war. Chiefly to take care of billeting
2 maintenance and health of prisoners of war and to request
3 assistance to the units concerned. Execution of the
4 business of supervising prisoners of war."
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1 Now, the other two annexes on pages 12-a
2 and 12-b I do not propose to read, but it is im-
3 portant to observe the chain of responsibility as
4 shown there, particularly the one on 12-b. That
5 shows direct chain of responsibility from the Super-
6 visor of the Internment Camp to the POW Intelligence
7 Bureau and through that to the Ministry of War, and
8 also from the Commander of the Railway Regiment, the
9 Railway Unit, through the Commander of the Southern
10 General Army to the Imperial General Headquarters.

11 I will omit the first part of page 13 and
12 begin at Section II. (Reading)

13 "State of Affairs in the Period during
14 which the Construction was urged on.

15 "From the middle of Feb. 1943 to the middle
16 of July, 1943.

17 "How and why the construction period was
18 cut short.

19 "Since the end of the rainy season of 1942,
20 the counter-attack on Burma of the British Indian
21 Army became so rapidly violent and the situations
22 in this area so serious; the British Army being
23 steadily reinforced with military strength and goods.
24 Besides, the only transport route by sea became so
25 dangerous as was almost interrupted by the enemy's

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1 disturbance both from the sea and air. Hence the
2 Japanese Imperial General Headquarters keenly felt
3 the necessity of completing the railway connecting
4 Thailand and Burma and intended to urge the construc-
5 tion.

6 "Namely at that time transportation of
7 military strength and goods with which the Burma Army
8 Group was being greatly reinforced to cope with the
9 critical situations in Burma caused by the counter-
10 attack of the British Indian Army, relied on the sea
11 route from Singapore alone. But in addition to the
12 shortage of shipping this route was extremely
13 menaced both by the enemy planes and submarines and
14 thus the prospects of transportation increasingly
15 became dark. Though we tried to cut a road from
16 Rohand to Moulmein via Mesot, it was unsuccessful
17 as too many trucks were required and the labor was
18 out of proportion to the effect. At last we faced
19 such plight as we had to rely upon forced supply
20 executed by small boats.

21 "This transportation by force could be
22 barely executed by taking advantage of the rainy
23 season and was expected to be available only till
24 September 1943. Under the circumstance that sus-
25 pension of the sea transport and general counter

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1 attack of the British Indian Army were expected im-
2 mediately after the rainy season, a ground transport
3 route for its substitute was absolutely necessary
4 for the Japanese Army. Moreover, it was expected
5 that unless it was completed by the end of the next
6 rainy season, the Army group operating in Burma
7 would come to a crisis and at the same time the
8 construction of the railway connecting Thailand and
9 Burma would become quite difficult.

10 "The Imperial General Headquarters, not to
11 mention the South Army, were much anxious about the
12 circumstance and discussed the counter measures
13 and tried to find a break in the deadlock. Finally
14 they could not but conclude that there was no other
15 way than to complete by the end of the rainy season
16 the railway connecting Thailand and Burma under
17 construction at that time and intended to cut short
18 the construction period, having been driven to the
19 last extremity.

20 "Then, the Imperial General Headquarters
21 consulted with the South Army, and being aware of
22 many difficulties such as shortage of military
23 strength, labor and materials, great amount of the
24 work, destructive influence of the rainy season and
25 unhealthy surroundings, yet both agreeing upon

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DIRECT

1 speeding up of the work by all possible means and
2 shortening of the work, took necessary measures
3 respectively. Namely, estimating the whole amount
4 of the earth-work from the result of the survey
5 executed by that time and prudently examining the
6 military strength, labor and materials the Headquarters
7 lowered the construction guage (from 3,000 tons a day
8 in each direction to 1,000 tons) and as to military
9 strength, labor and material, took every measure
10 possible in the capacity of the Central office, ex-
11 pecting to shorten the construction period of 4
12 months and to complete the work by the end of
13 August 1943.

14 "They can be summarized as follows:

15 "To restore the 4th Battalion, the 5th Rail-
16 way Regiment in Kwantung to the home regiment. To
17 alter the demobilization schedule of the 4th
18 Auxiliary Railway Unit and to prepare for its allot-
19 ment to the railway construction units.

20 "To deliver 150 kilometers rails which are
21 under charge of the central office and reserved in
22 the south area, many rock-drills and a large quantity
23 of explosive.

24 "To despatch medical veterans in order to
25 intensify measures against malaria.

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1 "As the tactical situations in East New
2 Guinea were critical at that time, and breakdown of
3 the fighting front in this area expected imminent,
4 quick reinforcement to the front of West New Guinea
5 and Banda Sea areas was being carried out; transpor-
6 tation units, supply depots and airfield construction
7 units which could be diverted to this purpose, were
8 despatched or were en route to these areas. As to
9 laborers, they were insufficient to a certain degree,
10 owing to the necessity of building up self-support
11 industry on the spot caused by insufficient supply
12 to the South Army, airfield construction for de-
13 fense and despatching laborers to the above diverted
14 units; shortage of labor was rising even in the
15 over-populated Java. Then the South Army, according
16 to the order to cut short the construction period
17 of the Thailand-Burma railway, diverted the following
18 units which had been by that time employed in urgent
19 operational duties to the railway construction, and
20 at the same time ordered that each sector commander
21 of Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, Malaya and
22 Java districts should give assistance to the railway
23 construction, and took appropriate measures especially
24 in the systematic supply and maintenance of
25 laborers. As to prisoners of war, they were

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DIRECT

1 transferred there all the way from French Indo-China
2 and Java, taking into consideration the above men-
3 tioned situation. Thus we tried to increase labor
4 capacity.

5 "The 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit" -- and then
6 a list of units which I will not read.

7 "Two internment branch camps in Malaya
8 (about 10,000 prisoners of war).

9 "A motor-car company and 300 trucks."

10 Q Pausing there. Colonel Wild, can you
11 tell us anything about the epidemic prevention and
12 water supply depot?

13 A I assume that they were units working
14 with the Japanese Army and not prisoners of war.
15 I never encountered them.

16 Q Did you ever hear of them?

17 A No.

18 Q And what about the field hospital of the
19 21st Division?

20 A That would be entirely the Japanese. None
21 of our men were in Japanese hospitals.
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1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

2 "Transition of situations. Because of the
3 arrival at the construction spot of the military
4 strength, labor, POW's and construction materials
5 reinforced according to the above measures, the work
6 further progressed since the end of March.

7 "After Major General SHIMODA's death Major
8 General TAKASAKI succeeded him as the commander of the
9 railway construction, and arrived at the spot in the
10 middle of February of the same year, and the work was
11 being eagerly carried on as before.

12 "Contrary to our expectation, the rainy season
13 set in one April in Thailand and in the middle of
14 April in Burma, which influence upon the work and
15 supply were tremendous.

16 "At the same time, cholera which had been
17 prevalent in some areas of Burma, was spread over the
18 border line between Thailand and Burma, and simul-
19 taneously with the setting-in of the rainy season,
20 became increasingly prevalent. June was its most prev-
21 alent time when there broke out about 6,000 cases (of
22 which 1,200 were the POW's) of which about 4,000
23 proved fatal (of which about 500 odd were the POW's).
24 Thus many fell victim of the work in a short time. As
25 this fact inspired fear in the laborers on the spot,

WILD

DIRECT

1 many fled away and even some cases stole out of a
2 hospital. The situations, dangerous both from the
3 viewpoint of epidemic prevention and the work itself,
4 were brought about.

5 "As cholera was prevailing, the Headquarters
6 not only dispatched medical authorities there, but
7 sent some staff officers in order to make them take
8 necessary steps, and the South Army, also, often dis-
9 patched principal medical officers and some staff offi-
10 cers in order to cope with the situation: the con-
11 struction units fulfilled their duties, overcoming
12 unfavorable circumstances: the prisoners of war
13 earnestly cooperated with them."

14 Q Pausing there: Will you tell me, Colonel
15 Wild, first of all, about those figures as to cholera
16 deaths among prisoners of war?

17 A If the figure of 500 fatal cases of cholera
18 refers to June only, I should say it was about correct.
19 If it is meant to be the total figure, it is a great
20 understatement because in F Force alone we lost 700.

21 Q What about the medical authorities from
22 headquarters and from the Southern Army?

23 A I recall seeing a Japanese major going around,
24 medical major going around one of the camps on one
25 occasion. But that was the only visit he paid to our

WILD

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1 area.

2 Q Would this be a suitable point for you to
3 tell us about Dr. Woolfe?

4 A We heard at the Niki Camp at the end of March
5 that about twelve of our men were still at Konquita
6 Camp. Konquita was the cholera camp which I mentioned
7 earlier about thirty miles south of us. We, there-
8 fore, got permission from the Japanese to send Assist-
9 ant Surgeon Woolfe, an Anglo-Indian, to Konquita. He
10 found eight of the twelve men in a small tent. Four
11 of them were suffering from cholera. They had had no
12 food or attention from the Japanese for several days,
13 and were lying in their own filth.

14 Woolfe paid three visits to the Japanese med-
15 ical major whom I have mentioned whose hut was in that
16 camp. He asked for medical supplies from quite a
17 well-stocked dispensary there. All he was given was
18 some disinfectant to wash his own hands with. He
19 made a strong appeal to this Japanese medical major,
20 saying that the men would die without medical atten-
21 tion. The Japanese major said, "It can't be helped;
22 if they die, they die." Woolfe then tried to move
23 these men to a neighboring Australian camp. He
24 offered to pay for the transport out of his own money.
25 This was refused. He then carried the men, one by one,

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3 tell us about Dr. Woolfe?

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21 tion. The Japanese major said, "It can't be helped;
22 if they die, they die." Woolfe then tried to move
23 these men to a neighboring Australian camp. He
24 offered to pay for the transport out of his own money.
25 This was refused. He then carried the men, one by one,

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1 because of the long heavy rain, the ground transporta-
2 tion was apt to be tied up, and as it was impossible
3 to sail up the Keonoi to the upper reaches for one
4 month, its rising being slow, we were frequently
5 faced with a crisis.

6 "Particularly, the construction unit on the
7 Burma-side, having no parallel waterways, toiled and
8 milled at the construction of a rain-tight road, by
9 which it could transport necessary materials. For
10 this reason, the railway construction work was inevi-
11 tably suspended for a while. The construction unit
12 on the Thailand-side, waiting the rising of the Keonoi,
13 made use of it and narrowly escaped starvation. At
14 that time though rations to units in the innermost
15 regions was below the standard owing to such circum-
16 stances, yet considering the characteristics of the
17 prisoners of war food, scores of cattle were driven by
18 land in order to supply them with meat.

19 "The above-mentioned difficulty of transporta-
20 tion caused delay of supply and gave rise to malaria,
21 endemic, and gastroenteric disorder, together with
22 malnutrition. Coupled with difficulty in medical
23 supply, the number of the patients increased in spite
24 of the toil of medical units.

25 "It is clear that the prisoners of war who

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1 were not used to wild life, would greatly suffer."

2 Q Pausing there: Just tell us about this
3 question of the River Keonoi, would you, Colonel Wild?

4 A The rivers rose when the monsoon started, and
5 our river was fully navigable up to Niki from May until
6 October.

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

8 "Towards the end of April, Major General
9 TAKASAKI, the commander of the railway construction,
10 caught malaria, and yet he continued to fulfill his
11 duty until he fell down on bed. The situations came
12 to the worst.

13 "The working units, however, endeavored to
14 fulfill their duty, overcoming all difficulties.

15 "How and why the period of construction work
16 was delayed by two months and state of affairs during
17 that period. (From the middle of July to October, 1943.)

18 "Confronted with the state of affairs above-
19 mentioned, the Imperial General Headquarters dispatched
20 the Director of Transportation and Communication and
21 members of the General Staff to the scene of construc-
22 tion work to observe the state of affairs there, and
23 came to the conclusion that if the forced work were to
24 be continued with the aim of completing the plan by
25 the end of August, nothing but unnecessary sacrifice

WILD

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1 would follow; and considering the general situations
2 of Burma front at that time, the prospect of communi-
3 cation with Burma becoming clear with the partial com-
4 pletion of the railway, and local employment of newly
5 constructed roads and waterways parallel with the rail-
6 way, order was at last given to delay the completion
7 of the construction work by two months in order to
8 reduce victims, in spite of the fact that this order had
9 a grave influence upon the operations in Burma area.

10 Major General Ishida was newly appointed to the director
11 of construction for perfect realization of this scheme.

12 "Major General Ishida, the new director of
13 construction, arrived at his post on the sixteenth of
14 August 1943. He aimed at the completion of the work
15 by the end of October, renewed the organization of the
16 staff, endeavored to stimulate the morale, and was always
17 in the van of the party, the main object of reorgani-
18 zation being in the innovation and improvement of the
19 supervision of working conditions.

20 "He cherished the slogan, 'Prisoners of war
21 and laborers are fathers of construction,' corrected the
22 erroneous idea of 'mastership' prevailing among the
23 officers and men, and was foremost in making personal
24 inspection and improvement of the normal life of the
25 prisoners of war."

WILD

DIRECT

1 Q Pausing there: Colonel Wild, did you ever
2 see Major General ISHIDA at the time?

3 A No, never. He was never in my area or any-
4 where in my vicinity.

5 Q Did you come across any trace of an improve-
6 ment of conditions of the prisoners of war between
7 July and October 1943?

8 A The worst months from the point of view of
9 treatment and driving of the men were August and
10 September.
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1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

2 "The rainy season which culminated in August,
3 gradually reduced the amount of rainfall, and the work-
4 ing party did their best for the completion of the work,
5 surmounting ever increasing difficulties in the inner-
6 most regions. The activities of the water line of
7 communications making use of the River Keonoi and the
8 strenuous efforts of the working troops and the coopera-
9 ting units in carrying on forced work favored the
10 coordination between the preservation of military
11 strength and labor (completion of supply work begun at
12 the ending of the rainy season in September at the ends
13 in the inner regions) and the execution of tasks.

14 "Thus, on the seventeenth of October, 1943,
15 the two railways, started from east and west, 415
16 kilometers in length, were joined together at Konkaiter
17 and the formal ceremonies for the opening took place on
18 the 25th of the same month.

19 "Conditions after the completion of the Con-
20 struction (from Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1945).

21 "With the completion of the construction work,
22 the South General Army, in accordance with the general
23 situation at that time, took greatest care in restoring
24 the health of the prisoners of war, enlarged and
25 improved the sanitary arrangement at Thai Internment

WILD

DIRECT

1 Camp and endeavored to concentrate prisoners of war at
2 salubrious quarters where billeting and supply were
3 easily accessible, two branch camps of the Malay Intern-
4 ment Camps being merged to the Main Internment Camp in
5 Singapore.

6 "The railway working troops cooperated in the
7 concentration activities, rendered services in sending
8 back invalid prisoners, in accommodating billet facili-
9 ties, and employed not more than one thousand healthy
10 prisoners in urgent and indispensable supplementary
11 construction work, the rest being left with lessened
12 labor. By special order of the Director of Construction,
13 a monument was erected each in Thailand and Burma to
14 console those departed spirits of the prisoners of war
15 and ordinary laborers engaged in this construction work,
16 a mass was held and their souls (deeply venerated in
17 the fasion of Imperial Japanese ceremony.)"

18
19 Q Did you attend that ceremony, Colonel Wild?

20 A No, but certain British and Australian prison-
21 ers of war were told to attend it.

22 Q What was their report when they came back?

23 A The average comment was, "If the Japanese
24 think they are going to get away with it after the war,
25 with this sort of humbug, they are very much mistaken."

MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing:

WILD

DIRECT

1 "The railway working troops also wheeled round
2 successfully into Burma, and from March 1944 on, the
3 remaining work was carried out entirely by a party
4 mainly composed of the 4th Special Railway Unit, and
5 part of the staffs of the Thai Internment Camp cooperated
6 in the remaining work while the main body tried to
7 regain their physical strength, only making preparations
8 for sending prisoners back to Japan.

9 "From that time on, thousands of prisoners of
10 war were employed for maintaining railway services until
11 the end of the war, being taken special care of the
12 preservation and improvement of their health.

13 "During this period, there were no small
14 casualties suffered by the Allied air bombing."

15 Passing over several pages to page 20, para-
16 graph 3, in the middle:

17 "Bad sanitary conditions. Malignant malaria
18 is prevalent in those regions where the construction
19 work was carried on. Moreover, such epidemics as
20 cholera, pest, small-pox, etc., are raging all the
21 year round. The influence of the rainy season and the
22 native laborers brought into these regions made worse
23 the sanitary conditions there.

24 "Another hindrance to be specially noticed is
25 the fact" -- oh, I need not read that. We have had it

WILD

DIRECT

1 before. And then passing over to the middle of page
2 23:

3 "But with the rising of waters in the River
4 Keonoi since June, land traffic was superseded by
5 water traffic, the water line of communications was
6 stretched, and by the end of July, establishment of
7 the water line of communications was completed be-
8 tween Pannon and Niike (270 km); on the other hand,
9 the Government of Thailand was urged to offer ships ;
10 from March on, ships were gradually gathered together
11 and by the end of July more than 700 tugboats and
12 1200 lighters were secured, by which critical situa-
13 tion of supply could be entirely swept away.

14 "During this period, the activities in the
15 upper rapids of the Water Transportation Corps of the
16 Imperial Guard Engineer Regiment, the activities on
17 the water of the personnel from the company serving
18 on land and from the motor car company, the efforts
19 of the line of communication troops in the unified
20 employment of these activities, together with the
21 water transportation supply carried out by the intern-
22 ment camp itself, enabled to discharge the duties of
23 supply work during the rainy season.

24 "During the time when transportation and
25 communication both on land and on water had been sus-

WILD

DIRECT

1 pended, shortage of supply was locally covered by
2 sending and receiving stocks accumulated in various
3 parts of the inner regions. Special consideration
4 was given to the daily food especially the side
5 dishes, of the prisoners of war, and from the middle
6 of May on, herds of cattle were driven by land into
7 the inner regions every several days. This was suc-
8 cessful and nearly one thousand of cattle were se-
9 cured on the Thai side alone.

10 "On the Burma side, where there were no
11 waterways available, supply had been going on smooth-
12 ly until the middle of April, but with the rainy season
13 setting in about that time, its influence was consi-
14 derable, and in June, railway bridges and road bridges
15 on the Mezari and Winyau were swept away. The working
16 troops concentrated their efforts on relay inter-
17 communication and maintenance of the road, held to
18 the line of supply desperately and could barely con-
19 tinue supply, but near Niike in the inner regions
20 motor trucks broke down one after another, the supply
21 was suspended and some of the troops were withdrawn
22 from that region. But with the rising of waters,
23 waterline of communications was stretched from the
24 side of Thailand and in July, supply could be made as
25 far as Niike.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "As is evident from the above-mentioned
2 circumstances, difficulty of transportation in supply
3 arose from the influence of the rainy season, and dis-
4 tress existed in various parts of the inner regions.
5 All the Japanese working troops and a little less than
6 one third of the prisoners of war were suffering from
7 the influence. Details of supply for the prisoners
8 of war are given below.

9 "Japanese army stationed in Thailand and
10 Burma Army Group were responsible for supply to the
11 internment camps, but since the establishment of line
12 of communications early in April 1943, the task of
13 supplying provisions was assigned to the railway unit.

14 "In supplying provisions to the prisoners
15 of war, special attention was paid for allotting fixed
16 rations in accordance with various prescriptions of the
17 law, and at the beginning of 1943 an addition of 50 gr.
18 in the supply of both staple food and supplementary
19 rations was decided upon by the South Army. Further-
20 more, provisions were revised and several times the
21 amount of the fixed rations for the POW's was in-
22 creased on account of their being engaged in heavy
23 labor.

24 "As is mentioned above, the branch intern-
25 ment camps situated innermost regions suffered from

WILD

DIRECT

1 shortage of rations in the same degree as the Japan-
2 ese soldiers during the rainy season. In order to
3 facilitate the supply work at the ends, executed by
4 the internees themselves, the construction party de-
5 livered 30 motor trucks and scores of boats succes-
6 sive since the latter part of March 1943.

7 "Besides this, the internment camp had
8 about 50 motor trucks and about the same number of
9 boats, and was actively engaged in transporting
10 supplies."
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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

- - -

CYRIL HEW DALRYMPLE WILD,
called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
resumed the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Might I mention to the Tribunal that I am not pausing at every statement which Colonel Wild might comment on or refute. Where he has already given evidence which is contrary to the statements in this document, I don't think it necessary for him to repeat that, unless there is something special.

I was at the bottom of page 24: (Reading)

"(1) Acquisition in large quantity of supplementary rations, especially vegetables, was difficult, and during the dry season they were liable to be spoiled while they were being carried a long dis-

WILD

DIRECT

1 tance; while during the rainy season, they were al-
2 ways lacking owing to the difficulty of transport-
3 ation. To cope with these situations, a great effort
4 was made to encourage growing of vegetables so as to
5 be able to do without the supply of supplementary
6 rations, and considerable results were obtained in
7 this way. Fishing in the River Keonoi had to be pro-
8 hibited for a long time (from May to September) as
9 cholera was prevailing along its banks, which was a
10 great hindrance to better nourishment.

11 "(j) Articles of luxury for internees
12 (butter, cheese, sugar, coffee, black tea, etc.)
13 were specially supplied by the South Army.

14 "(k) Spare suits of clothes were supplied
15 by the South Army, but were not by any means enough.

16 "(l) The difficulties of supply work dur-
17 ing the rainy season were as above-stated. Enemy
18 counter-attacks in Burma with the end of the rainy
19 season could clearly be foreseen. Therefore, an army
20 group en route to Burma (two divisions, part of troops
21 under direct control of the Army, individual soldier
22 and civilian employee) marched along the railway under
23 construction from April to September 1943. It was
24 natural that the construction troops assisted them
25 with munitions and there occurred no small shortage

WILD

DIRECT

1 in the store of provisions.

2 "To sum up, under the circumstances in
3 that period, billeting and supply could not be any-
4 thing but unsatisfactory, and both Japanese Army
5 and prisoners of war were obliged to endure hardships
6 and privations."
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Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, what do you say about this question of growing of vegetables and fishing?

A The area that F force was in, there were no men to grow vegetables even if we had been encouraged to do so because anybody who was anything approaching fit was taken out to work on the railway. As regards fishing, the Japanese occasionally threw hand grenades into the river Keonoi, and our men were sent in to swim for the fish.

Q Who got the fish?

A The Japanese used to give one of them usually to the swimmers.

Q What about these articles of luxury?

A We got tea at the regular issue, sugar very occasionally; but the butter, cheese and coffee were quite unknown.

MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)

"Billeting.

"Billeting facilities in Thailand were somewhat different from those in Burma.

"On the Thai side, the working party had the advantage of utilizing the watercourse for supply during the rainy season, and employed the method of deploying on the whole line and of

WILD

DIRECT

1 working all along the line simultaneously; curtail-
2 ment of the construction period, however, necessi-
3 tated quick deployment in the inner regions, and
4 there was no time to build enough cottages (a kind
5 of hut made of bamboo poles and 'chaku' -- roofplant
6 -- called nipper-house to billet the working party.
7 Tents were generally used, only key points of con-
8 struction having billeting facilities. The South
9 Army, therefore, issued almost all the campaign
10 tents on hand to the construction party, to acco-
11 modate nearly fifty thousand men, and afterwards
12 ten odd thousand for supplementary use.

13 "On the Burma side, consideration had
14 from the outset been given to the supply work
15 during the rainy season, and method of working
16 from the ends had been taken in order to steadily
17 push forward working sectors by gradually esta-
18 blishing supply from the starting point. Groups
19 of billeting huts (nipper-houses) were built at
20 intervals of from 5 to 10 km, tents being some-
21 times used for carrying about during movements.

22 "The POW's in the Internment Camp,
23 following the example of the construction party,
24 built huts by themselves, and the construction party
25 cooperated with them when necessary. Considerable

WILD

DIRECT

1 working personnel were allotted for the work of the
2 Internment Camp itself and for the improvement of
3 its supervision and maintenance. (Attached Table I)

4 "Since May, after the setting-in of the
5 rainy season, camp life proved defective: a wet
6 pit was especially unwholesome; every effort was
7 made to raise floors and spoiled beddings were ex-
8 changed for new ones. At the same time, nipper-
9 houses gradually took the place of tents. Only
10 bamboo poles could be obtained on the spot, roof-
11 plant (chaku) being imported from other districts.

12 "But the supply of chaku was not suffi-
13 cient owing to the difficulties of securing and
14 transporting them in large quantities. Thus,
15 nipper-houses were built almost everywhere excepting
16 the inner regions about 100 km. along the line of
17 construction. But even these nipper-houses were not
18 complete to bear the heavy rain coming down every
19 day.

20 "In order to accommodate the marching
21 troops, (into Burma) preparation were made for
22 arranging resting places with tents (standard capa-
23 city 250 men) and billeting areas (standard capacity
24 500 men) were almost completed early in May.

25 "These facilities were utilized by the

WILD

DIRECT

1 working party and the prisoners while they were
2 shifting places within the construction area."

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1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Pausing there, did you see anything of
3 these tents they speak of?

4 A We, ourselves, got certain amount of rotten
5 canvas -- pieces of tents which were used for roofing
6 material as there was no atap palm. One detached
7 party of ours of about six hundred men were accommo-
8 dated under canvas which they carried about with them.
9 Otherwise, I saw none except tented camps used by
10 the Japanese alone -- staging camps -- on the way up,
11 and there was a POW tented camp at Kanburi.

12 MR. COMYNS CARR: Resuming reading:

13 "Sanitary arrangements.

14 "Outline of Medical service.

15 "1. Taking into consideration the character-
16 istics of this construction work area, preservation
17 of health of the working party was a matter of great-
18 est concern, success of this railway construction
19 depending upon it. The South Army, therefore, at-
20 tached greatest importance to the service of sani-
21 tation, and, following the example of building a
22 canal at Panama, made reenforcement in sanitary
23 organization. The main body of the South Army Epi-
24 demic Prevention and Water Supply Corps, which was
25 the only standing epidemic prevention water supply

WILD

DIRECT

1 corps throughout the South Area, was allotted the
2 duties of service of sanitation; at the same time
3 almost all the sanitary organizations under the
4 direct control of the South Army were exhaustively
5 concentrated and were placed under the control of
6 the Director of Railway Construction.

7 "Moreover, necessary medical service corps
8 were extracted from the army corps engaged in first
9 line operations and were allotted to the medical
10 organization. Considering the situation of the
11 general operations at that time, this effort can
12 never be underestimated.

13 "In taking care of the health of the
14 prisoners of war, the system of the supervising
15 organization of prisoners of war was mainly fol-
16 lowed, and about 900 medical personnel of the
17 Allied captives and some of the Japanese medical
18 personnel were engaged in the service. About
19 fifty-five invalids were in charge of one medical
20 personnel, and this ratio was high compared with
21 those of Japanese army (100 cases to one medical
22 personnel attached to a unit) and ordinary work-
23 ing party (200-300 cases to one medical personnel).
24 But the composition of sanitary corps belonging
25 to the Internee camp was not suited to field

WILD

DIRECT

1 maneuverability and could not be made to display
2 its ability to the full.

3 "At the outset, the Thai Internment Camp,
4 was in cooperating relationship with the construc-
5 tion party, and the service of sanitation was
6 being carried out by the corps itself, Japanese
7 medical corps going to its assistance when nec-
8 essary. But there arose the necessity of inten-
9 sifying the general control of the medical ser-
10 vice, and in July, 1943 this camp was placed
11 under the control of the Director of Construction,
12 after which unification of medical service was
13 realized, resulting in the innovation of medical
14 activities."

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Pausing there, Colonel, is there any
3 truth at all in all these statements about the
4 sanitary arrangements and the medical assistance
5 provided by the Japanese?

6 A None whatever that I saw, and I should
7 like to point out that some medical officers and
8 orderlies were invariably treated as ordinary
9 prisoners of war, which accounts for their lack
10 of field maneuverability.

11 MR. COMYNS CARR: Omitting paragraph 4
12 and continuing: (Reading)

13 "Why there was a difference in the number
14 of casualties between the POW's and Japanese Army.

15 "Japanese army, especially railway units,
16 were only about 4,000 in number, even when two
17 regiments were put together. Naturally enough
18 they were employed mainly for supervision of con-
19 struction work and in the delicate technical work,
20 POW's being mainly engaged in usual tasks.

21 "The result was that the decline of phys-
22 ical strength on the part of the Japanese army was
23 not so remarkable as in the case of the prisoners
24 of war; this is why some differences is noticed
25 in the figures indicating the results of medical

WILD

DIRECT

1 working personnel were allotted for the work of the
2 Internment Camp itself and for the improvement of
3 its supervision and maintenance. (Attached Table I)

4 "Since May, after the setting-in of the
5 rainy season, camp life proved defective: a wet
6 pit was especially unwholesome; every effort was
7 made to raise floors and spoiled beddings were ex-
8 changed for new ones. At the same time, nipper-
9 houses gradually took the place of tents. Only
10 bamboo poles could be obtained on the spot, roof-
11 plant (chaku) being imported from other districts.

12 "But the supply of chaku was not suffi-
13 cient owing to the difficulties of securing and
14 transporting them in large quantities. Thus,
15 nipper-houses were built almost everywhere excepting
16 the inner regions about 100 km. along the line of
17 construction. But even those nipper-houses were not
18 complete to bear the heavy rain coming down every
19 day.

20 "In order to accomodate the marching
21 troops, (into Burma) preparation were made for
22 arranging resting places with tents (standard capa-
23 city 250 men) and billeting areas (standard capacity
24 500 men) were almost completed early in May.

25 "These facilities were utilized by the

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Now, pausing there, Colonel, is there
3 really any substance in this suggestion that the
4 Japanese were better suited to meet these hardships
5 than your men?

6 A I think that was successfully disproved by
7 the Burma Campaign which followed.

8 Q What do you say about the dress of your men
9 causing them to be exposed to tropical ulcer?

10 A It is true that the mistake was discovered
11 by the British Army that covering the knees was
12 better than wearing shorts in the jungle, but it is
13 a ridiculous remark here because men were wearing
14 nothing below the knees. They had no boots or
15 shoes or stockings.

16 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please --

17 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

18 MR. LOGAN: The defense does not quite
19 understand the purpose of the prosecution in intro-
20 ducing a document, and we assume they vouch for its
21 credibility, and then examining the witness on the
22 stand concerning that document. They are, in effect,
23 anticipating a defense of all the defendants by so
24 doing. This matter should more properly be brought
25 out in rebuttal rather than on direct examination

WILD

DIRECT

1 such as this kind.

2 MR. COMYNS CARR: This document is the con-
3 fession of the Japanese Army with regard to the
4 Burma-Siam railway. It also incorporates such ex-
5 cuses as they could think of. I rely upon the docu-
6 ment for the confession. I rely upon this witness
7 to destroy the excuses.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled.

9 MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)

10 "1. Outbreak of cases and its counter-measures.

11 "(a) How malnutrition occurred.

12 "In November 1942, after the prisoners of
13 war had begun their work, members of the South Army
14 Medical Corps were despatched to the scene of their
15 activity in order to inspect and further improve
16 their treatment in respect of supply and maintenance.
17 Increase of fixed rations was made (50 gr. both in
18 staple food and meat) and additional mosquito-nets
19 and blankets were delivered. But since the setting-
20 in of the rainy season, in May 1943, traffic was
21 sometimes suspended, and in the inner regions fixed
22 rations had to be reduced by half, while the con-
23 struction work was forcibly carried on. The work
24 made such rapid progress that the workers had no
25 leisure; either time or material was not found enough

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DIRECT

1 to complete billeting facilities and sanitary condi-
2 tions were anything but satisfactory.

3 "Under such unfavorable conditions, and as
4 a result of forced work, since the middle of 1943 de-
5 cline of the physical strength of the POW's was
6 conspicuous, many cases of malnutrition appeared and
7 the number of deaths increased. Therefore, serious
8 cases were gradually transferred to the vicinity of
9 Bangkok to receive treatment. Those who were in a
10 stage of convalescence were assembled near Kanchana-
11 buri, given small work and were allowed to recuper-
12 ate there. For the rest, less amount of work was
13 allotted, as much ration as possible was provided and
14 every effort was made to restore their physical
15 strength. Thus in 1944, they gradually regained
16 their physical strength and the number of deaths
17 dwindled."
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1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

2 Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, did you ever
3 see this increase in rations, both in staple food
4 and meat, that is spoken of?

5 A One of our chief complaints was that our
6 rations were always below, well below, any scale
7 which we were supposed to be getting. The only
8 increase of rations which occurred was when we got
9 back to Kanburi in November, 1943.

10 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

11 "2. How Cholera broke out.

12 "Prevention of acute infectious diseases,
13 together with precautions against malaria, was a most
14 painstaking task, and in order to prevent infection
15 through water all the sanitation water filters avail-
16 able by the South Army were assembled in this con-
17 struction area and they numbered 454 (including 7
18 motor-car filters).

19 "Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Section
20 composed of one Allied medical officer and four non-
21 commissioned medical officers and privates, equipped
22 with a set of sanitation water filter (B or C) and
23 considerable amount of epidemic prevention and
24 emergency sanitary materials, were allotted to every
25 working company of the Prisoners of War and every

WILD

DIRECT

1 necessary measure was taken for prevention, medical
2 examination and attendance. The headquarters of
3 the medical corps was at Kanchanaburi, and was active
4 in coaching the prevention, in the examination and
5 disinfection of bacteria and in other precautions.

6 "Every one of those who were going to the
7 construction area, was inoculated against cholera.

8 "Cases of cholera first broke out among the
9 local laborers on the side of Burma in November 1942,
10 and in spite of desperate effort to check it, cases
11 spread into Thailand across the frontier in April,
12 1943.

13 "At the time of its outbreak, the number of
14 cases among the natives swelled and shrunk with alter-
15 nating intervals until at last, since May, there
16 broke out cases among the Japanese and POW's. There-
17 fore, the South Army often dispatched medical per-
18 sonnel to the scene to coach prevention. Every working
19 party and sanitary organ did its best in prevention
20 activities, sometimes entirely suspending construction
21 work. At last, by the end of July, the plague quieted
22 down except in some quarters. Although more cases
23 broke out afterwards, they gradually dwindled away
24 and in October completely died down. In June staffs
25 of the medical Bureau in the War Department were

WILD

DIRECT

1 dispatched to the scene.

2 "Outbreaks of cases by the end of June
3 1943 are as follows:

4	1st Period	Nov.-Dec. 1943	43
5	2nd Period	Feb.-Mar. 1943	48
6	3rd Period	Apr.-May 1943	586
7	4th Period	June 3d - June 30, 1943	<u>2046</u>
8	TOTAL		2723

9 "The grand total by August 10 was about
10 6,000, of which about 4,000 died. Among these
11 figures, about 1,200 are the cases of prisoners and
12 it is our greatest regret that about half of them
13 never survived.

14 "The main causes of such raging were:

15 "(1) Fugitives among the native laborers
16 suffering from cholera dispersed bacteria.

17 "(2) Cases broke out on the upper reaches of
18 the River Keonoi and infected the construction work
19 area.

20 "(3) Imperfect prevention instruction on the
21 part of civilian employee in charge of the POW's,
22 who was poor in the knowledge and ability and infer-
23 ior in the quality.

24 "(4) Difficulty of supplying epidemic prevention
25 materials due to pressed transportation.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "It was largely due to the activities of
2 the Sanitary Organs that the epidemic died down in
3 comparatively short period and that great bursting
4 out could be prevented, in spite of the unfavorable
5 conditions under which they had been placed."
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1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Pausing there, you dealt almost entirely
3 with -- I beg your pardon.

4 THE MONITOR: We have not finished reading
5 the translation yet.

6 MR. COMYNS CARR: Sorry.

7 Q You dealt generally with matters of cholera
8 and I do not want to repeat it, but what do you know
9 about these water filters which were supposed to have
10 been supplied?

11 A I did see one. It was permanently stationed
12 at Songkrai Bridge.

13 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

14 "3. How cases of malaria occurred.

15 "Greatest emphasis was laid on the preven-
16 tion of malaria in the service of sanitation. Malaria
17 prevention party was organized (composed of 341
18 officers and men, allotted at the ratio of one
19 party to 5,000 laborers) and allotted to each unit,
20 and was controlled by the South Army Epidemic
21 Prevention Water Supply Corps; every possible science and
22 technique was put into active use by them.

23 "The following five items were measures of
24 prevention.

25 "(a) To give complete knowledge and train-

WILD

DIRECT

ing of malaria prevention.

"(b) To prevent biting of mosquitoes,
to prepare mosquito-nets and clothing, to fumigate.

"(c) To prevent the breeding of mosquitoes
and to exterminate them, drainage, oil-sprinkling,
cleaning, etc.

"(d) To take 45 dozes of sulpher-quinine
and 3 dozes of 'Plesmohin' internally per capita per
month; every Japanese, prisoner and native laborer
is required to take the same quantity.

"(e) Early discovery and separation of
the case and keeper of 'malaria protozoan';

"Doctor Kimura, Professor in the Research
Institution of Tropical Medicine, authority on malaria-
prevention, came to the assistance of this service
as a non-regular member of the staff of the South
Army.

"The ration per month of malaria cases
occurring during this construction work is as follows:

"Japanese Army 1-7%

"Prisoners of War 0-11%

"Local laborers 10-20%

"N.B. The ratio per month of malaria cases
occurring in New Guinea area rose to about 20%.

"As is shown above, the ratio of malaria

1 cases occurring among the Japanese army is
2 comparatively low, but by the end of the construction
3 period, the ratio of the keepers of malaria protozoan
4 among the Japanese had risen to nearly 100%, and
5 only by internal use of dozes could some of the units
6 prevent the attack of malaria. Generally speaking,
7 the ratio of cases per month was about 4% throughout
8 the Japanese and prisoners of war, which was a rather
9 favorable indication compared with those of other
10 theatres of war, and we may conclude that satisfactory
11 results were obtained from the preventive measures."

12 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)

13 Q Pausing there, what can you say about that
14 list of malaria prevention methods?

15 A Firstly, it is quite incorrect for the
16 Japanese to suggest that they gave our medical officers
17 any knowledge or training. We had first class
18 medical specialists -- tropical medical specialists --
19 among our officers and the Japanese notion as to
20 tropical hygiene was purely medieval. Eight-man
21 mosquito nets were issued in fairly large quantities
22 to us after we had been in the jungle about two months.
23 They could not be used as the men were crammed
24 so closely together on the sleeping platforms. There
25 was nothing for the man to sleep on, so the mosquitoes

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2 comparatively low, but by the end of the construction
3 period, the ratio of the keepers of malaria protozoan
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20 tropical hygiene was purely medieval. Eight-man
21 mosquito nets were issued in fairly large quantities
22 to us after we had been in the jungle about two months.
23 They could not be used as the men were crammed
24 so closely together on the sleeping platforms. There
25 was nothing for the man to sleep on, so the mosquitoes

1 came up through the sleeping platform and the thing
2 became a mosquito trap. There was no preventive
3 oiling of pools whatever, and lastly, it says here
4 that the Japanese were taking prophylactic doses
5 of quinine and plesmohin, but there was never enough
6 to give preventive doses to prisoners of war.

7 Q Have you any comment to make on the figures
8 given?

9 A In my own force, apart from the three
10 thousand who died, ninety-five percent of the sur-
11 vivors had malaria when they came out. The local
12 laborers in our area had a percentage at least as
13 high.

14 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

15 "4. Tropical Ulcer

16 "Tropical ulcer which was prevalent among
17 prisoners of war was incurable and we found difficulty
18 in its remedy. As a precautional measure, we made
19 war prisoners put on leggings made of bamboo and had
20 them wear boots. As a remedy permanganic acid salvarsan
21 were used. In addition to these measures, each unit
22 made ointment from lard by itself, and used it.

23 "Inert skin, bare legs and insufficient
24 auxiliary medicine such as disinfectant due to in-
25 experience of the Japanese Army etc. were the reasons

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1 why this disease was prevalent especially among
2 prisoners of war. Though we despatched medical veterans
3 to the infected districts and made them study it,
4 a complete remedy could not be found because of
5 inexperience of the Japanese Army."

6 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued) :

7 Q Pausing there, what do you say about that?

8 A Well, the standard medical work of tropical med-
9 icine says of tropical ulcers, "This terrible disease
10 is common to white soldiers campaigning in the tropics,
11 to undernourished coolie labor and overdriven slave
12 gangs"; and we came into all three categories.

13 Q Is it true that it is incurable, or did your
14 medical officers succeed in curing it when they were
15 given a chance?

16 A They did cure them as long as the drugs and
17 dressings which we brought with us held out. In fact,
18 they cured me. But we had nothing in the later months
19 except hot water for dressings, hot water for medicine
20 and banana leaves as dressings. If we had had lard we
21 should have eaten it.

22 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:
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1 "5. Other prevailing diseases.

2 "Generally speaking, coupled with mal-
3 nutrition, many cases of dysentery, beriberi and
4 gastroenteric disorder occurred. Pestilence and
5 smallpox against which great precautions were taken
6 broke out fortunately only a little at the beginning
7 of 1943.

8 "As above mentioned, various diseases were
9 so prevalent that the percentage of the war prisoners
10 in service was from sixty to seventy percent in the
11 average. But it fell to forty percent in the inner-
12 most and most unhealthy areas. On the contrary about
13 eighty percent was maintained in good controlled and
14 healthy areas. Of about fifty thousand war prisoners,
15 about three thousand were in hospital on 8th July,
16 1943.

17 "(6) State of occurrence of war prisoner
18 cases is shown in Annex 2.

19 "3. Supply of medical supplies.

20 "The South Army layed great stress on
21 supply of medical supplies to these construction
22 units and tried to prepare abundant malaria medicine
23 and materials for epidemic prevention. Though quinine
24 which was produced in Java was sufficiently supplied
25 and materials for epidemic prevention, especially

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1 sanitary water-filters, were nearly sufficient, the
2 South Army suffered from shortage of medical supplies
3 in general, as the other medical supplies were all
4 transported from the home islands and quantity supplied
5 from the central office to the South Army was about
6 50,000 boxes (about 1700t) in 1943 and about a half
7 of 1943 in 1944, of which 20 percent were lost as
8 result of sinkings. The Bangkok Field goods depot
9 eagerly endeavored to supply the construction units;
10 nevertheless it could not supply in so large quantity
11 as was expected because of insufficient stocks and
12 difficulty of transportation. The South Army ordered
13 that ratio of supply to the war prisoners and to the
14 Japanese troops should be equal.

15 "4. To sum up, we took every measure possible
16 under the circumstances and did our best to maintain
17 the health of the prisoners of war. The main reasons
18 why such a miserable result was brought about in
19 spite of our efforts are as follows:

20 "(1) As a result of the forced construction
21 work, various defects were brewed. Especially, the
22 work was commenced without sufficient sanitary arrange-
23 ments.

24 "(3) In addition to bad conditions of the roads,
25 traffic during the rainy season was tied up, so that

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1 supply was very difficult and the standard of ration
2 fell down.

3 "(4) Mixing of the native laborers who had no
4 knowledge of sanitation disturbed sanitary tasks.

5 "5. Main body of foremen were Koreans and
6 their supervision was not proper. Accordingly, hygiene
7 could not be thorough.

8 "It is quite regretful that in spite of all
9 the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and
10 many invalids and deaths occurred."

11 BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

12 Q Pausing there, in the first place I will
13 come to ask you about the figures given when we come
14 to the table at the end of the document, but about
15 this statement that the medical supplies to the war
16 prisoners and the Japanese troops were to be equal,
17 what do you say?

18 A Japanese medical inspection rooms were gen-
19 erally reasonably well stocked and adequate for the
20 needs of their own men. We were getting no drugs.
21 (Reading):

22 "Chap. III - Outline of the Supervision and
23 Employment of the Prisoners of War.

24 "Sect. I - How the War Prisoners became to
25 be employed.

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1 "1. It is natural that the labor which is
2 primary constituent of this building requires an
3 enormous number of the assistant workers, in addition
4 to the troops. Therefore, though the local laborers
5 (Thailanders, Malayaians, Burmese, Chinese, Javanese,
6 Annamese) were raised, it was very difficult to get
7 a large number of laborers without delay, on account
8 of various circumstances, and moreover, those natives
9 who are inferior in their physical conditions and
10 ability could not be made the leading part of the
11 labor for this construction which ought to be completed
12 in a short time.

13 "2. Hereupon the South General Army requested
14 the sanction of the General Headquarters concerning
15 the employment of the war prisoners. The General
16 Headquarters sanctioned the employment of the war
17 prisoners, because this construction was partly a
18 work to be done far from the front, and partly bore
19 the mission of the trade route between Thailand and
20 Burma.

21 "At that time the Army, as a whole, had a
22 view that it is not against the Geneva Treaty on the
23 War Prisoners to employ the prisoners of war in such
24 a work.

25 "3. Consequent to the sanction, in the

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1 beginning of the preparation for construction, the
2 South Army ordered the railway troops to supervise
3 a part of prisoners of war and to engage them in the
4 preparation work. After that, subsequent to the
5 organization of the Thailand camp, the South General
6 Army made those of the camp be engaged in the con-
7 struction work under their control.

8 "4. And after the considerable progress of
9 the construction, especially as it became more and
10 more indispensable to increase the labor, because
11 the term for the construction was shortened, a great
12 number of war prisoners in Java, Borneo, Singapore
13 and Indo-China were transmitted to the Thailand Camp
14 and newly two branches of the Malay Camp were attached
15 to the commander of the construction troops."

16 Then I can omit down to paragraph 5 at the
17 top of page 34:

18 "5. On the employment of prisoners of war,
19 they were not attached separately to working troops
20 on the spot. As regards employing them on the spot,
21 the branch leaders of the camps and the commanders
22 of battalions and companies negotiated together and
23 regulated the working hours of employed members.
24 That means that, after the camps were put under the
25 control of construction commanders, the camps delivered

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1 the required number of persons to the required places
2 in accordance with the orders of the construction
3 commanders, who were not entitled to interfere in the
4 business of supervision itself, according to the above
5 mentioned method of employment, and the construction
6 troops cooperated in improvement of the supervision
7 as far as their circumstances permitted."

8 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may I
9 be heard a little further on that objection I made a
10 moment ago?
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1 THE PRESIDENT: I realize that this is not a
2 confession by any of the accused, but the conspiracy
3 is alleged not merely against the accused, but against
4 others as well; and this may be an admission by one of
5 those others. Such an admission may yet be regarded
6 as evidence against all, but the Court has that matter
7 under consideration. It has reserved its decision on
8 that point. Apart altogether from conspiracy, it may
9 be regarded, perhaps, as an admission by some person
10 or persons for whom the accused can hereafter be
11 established as responsible. As it stands, it may not,
12 without some connection, be evidence against any of
13 the accused, but we expect that connection to be made
14 later if this is to be used, of course. It would be
15 remarkable if in proceedings like this a document
16 emanating from the Japanese Government could not be
17 used in evidence subject to the accused being con-
18 nected with the allegations contained in it. And
19 above all, as you know, we are not bound by the strict
20 rules of evidence, but must receive every document for
21 its probative value, and hearsay is admissible here,
22 and hearsay may be contained in a document as well as
23 in any oral statement. Subject to hearing what you
24 have to say, Mr. Logan, it appears to me that only by
25 the strictest adherence to the most technical rules

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DIRECT

1 of evidence could we exclude this. Of course, the
2 prosecution has the choice of anticipating the de-
3 fense and meeting it with evidence in their case in
4 chief, or, of waiting to give evidence in rebuttal.
5 They have selected the former course.

6 MR. LOGAN: Well, if the Tribunal please,
7 may I say a few words?

8 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I invited you to do so.

9 MR. LOGAN: What we had in mind was this:
10 If the prosecution succeeds in disproving this docu-
11 ment, what have they accomplished? Certainly the
12 defense did not introduce this, and we did not expose it
13 to this proof, and it is not a confession of any of these
14 accused, as your Honor said. The prosecutor said it
15 is a confession of the Government. Now the Govern-
16 ment is not one of the defendants on trial here, and
17 certainly its disapproval cannot be used -- cannot be
18 held against any of the accused. In other words,
19 your Honor, this document was written by the Prisoner
20 of War Information Bureau after the war was over.
21 It is not connected with any of these accused, and, in
22 effect, it is setting up a straw man for the purpose
23 of knocking him down through this witness. That is
24 what we are objecting to.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

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1 DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, on the cover of
2 the Japanese version of this document it is written
3 as its author, it gives as the author of this document,
4 "Central Investigating Committee Concerning Prisoners
5 of War." I wish to state, like Mr. Logan, that this
6 Central Investigation Committee Concerning Prisoners
7 of War is not an official institution of the Japanese
8 Government; whereas, the Prisoners of War Information
9 Bureau is an official Japanese organ.

10 THE MONITOR: Slight correction there:
11 "My colleague, Mr. Logan, has stated that this was
12 prepared by Prisoner of War Information Bureau. It
13 was not. It was prepared by the Central Investigating
14 Committee, and this Central Investigating Committee,
15 unlike the POW Information Bureau, is not an official
16 Government organ.

17 DR. KIYOSE (Continuing): In the certificate
18 attached to this document it is written that the date
19 on which this document was prepared is unknown, and
20 that it was prepared by Legal Investigation Bureau --
21 Section. The Legal Investigation Section is chiefly
22 concerned with military trials, and not with the
23 prisoners of war. Judging from these facts, it
24 seems as if this document is a reference book, so to
25 speak, to keep inside the said Section, and not a

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1 document to be published -- to be made public -- and
2 that this document had been prepared by a few Govern-
3 ment officials.

4 THE MONITOR: Slight correction there:

5 "It seems to me that this document was probably com-
6 piled by two or three or probably more Government
7 officials only as a reference, and this was not in-
8 tended to be a report to be published to outside --
9 official report to be published to outside.

10 DR. KIYOSE: I overheard the interpreter
11 to use the word "public." That reminds me of the
12 fact that in the case of a document of the Japanese
13 Government which is intended to be published to the
14 outside, they are generally dated -- always dated --
15 and the name of the responsible person is written.
16 Therefore, I consider that this document should not
17 be treated as an official document of the Japanese
18 Government, and I should like the prosecution to
19 investigate about this matter further.

20 THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the ob-
21 jection is not to the evidence actually, which is
22 clearly admissible under the Charter, but to the method
23 which you are employing in examining this man on a
24 document which you rightly tendered. That is the
25 position as I understand it. Of course, it comes

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1 clearly within Article 13-c(2) of the Charter. Now
2 the only analogy that I can give is a proceeding
3 taken -- a deposition taken in a bankruptcy proceed-
4 ing which is subsequently used in criminal proceedings
5 against the bankrupt. The Crown must tender the whole
6 of the document. That has been done here. But,
7 there is no reason why the Crown should not also give
8 evidence to show that part of the document is not in
9 accordance with fact. They can accept part, and they
10 can also give evidence against the remainder -- to
11 combat the remainder. That is quite a common practice.
12 That is what I understand Mr. Carr to be doing here,
13 and I see nothing wrong with the method. The objec-
14 tion is overruled.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: I will continue to read,
16 beginning at the middle of page 38:

17 "2. Supply and sanitation during the transportation.

18 "As for the supply, the staple food was re-
19 ceived from the Army in agreement with the South
20 General Army Intendance Ordinance, the side dishes
21 were served after the menu was drawn up. The actual
22 condition was regularly reported to the Army.

23 "The side dishes of fixed quantity were ac-
24 quired with great pains from all over Thailand, Malay,
25 and French Indo-China and a great effort was made to

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1 improve the menu.

2 "Regards to the sanitation during the trans-
3 portation, an overseer sent from a prisoner camp
4 took charge of it and it was ordered that he would
5 act in concert with medical institutions concerned
6 through a commander of the nearest station. As the
7 actual instances show, the commander paid a special
8 attention to keeping up such prisoner's health as
9 it was on his arrival, and inspected the management
10 of transportation of prisoners at the station, and
11 issued orders carefully about the supply, sanitation
12 and treatment."

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BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing):

1 Q What have you to say about -- I don't think
2 you will need to say anything more about the side
3 dishes and the menu. You have dealt with those. But
4 about this -- about somebody being appointed at the
5 station to look after sanitation during the railway
6 journey?

7 A I saw no signs of any overseer during trans-
8 portation by train, as I mentioned earlier. We just
9 used the tracks.

10 THE MONITOR: What is it, "tracks"?

11 THE WITNESS: Railway tracks.

12 THE MONITOR: What do you mean by using the
13 tracks?

14 THE WITNESS: Relieved ourselves on them.

15 A (Continuing) The only sanitation provided in
16 the camps was an open trench latrine.

17 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)

18 (Reading):

19 "3. Transportation by ships.

20 "1. Since the beginning of the war, Japan lost
21 rapidly as it is known a large number of vessels.

22 "2. The counter-measure for the want of
23 vessels and the conditions of transportations were
24 as follows:

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- 1 "A. Counter-measure of transportation.
- 2 "i. From the beginning to the middle of
- 3 1942: Tonnage per head -- 5 gross tons.
- 4 "ii. From about the middle to the end of
- 5 1942: Tonnage per head -- 2.15 gross tons.
- 6 "iii. From about the beginning to the middle
- 7 of 1943: Tonnage per head -- 1-2 gross tons.
- 8 "iv. From about the middle of 1943:
- 9 Tonnage per head -- 1 gross ton."
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1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)

2 Q Pausing there, what is the allowance in a
3 British troop ship?

4 A About eight tons.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing:

6 (Reading):

7 "Since 1943, it was made a rule that the
8 horses were not transported on account of the want
9 of vessels, though the transportation of them was
10 indispensable for the operation.

11 " N O T E

12 "1. A horse cannot be dismembered to
13 reduce the tonnage, as a lorry can.

14 "2. A horse cannot be packed up as a per-
15 son can be.

16 "E. The situation of transportation.
17 The condition of the closely packed carrying of the
18 troops, owing to the rapid loss of vessels, can be
19 understood through Note I. The instances are as
20 follows:

21 "a. One division which was to be trans-
22 ported to deploy in the central pacific and con-
23 sisted of about 15,000 men, about 200 automobiles
24 and munitions of about 2 months (for example, the
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1 29th Division) was transported by only three ships,
2 each 8,000 or 10,000 gross tons in all."

3 I needn't read the name.

4 "Further in a case of a transportation to
5 be deployed in the Central Pacific, about 6,000 men,
6 about 60 automobiles and other munitions were car-
7 ried from Fuzen, Yokohama to Guam in a vessel of
8 6,000 gross tons.

9 "c. In the Southern districts (for ex-
10 ample, the Fugo-Maru, 1,900 gross tons, which were
11 vessels allotted to the transportation from Shinge-
12 pore to Rangoon.) the vessel was made the best use of,
13 by rationing banana" - I am afraid the print is very
14 bad - "and so on as a sustenance to avoid cooking in
15 a ship. Such sort of transportation was called a
16 'Banana' transportation. In a 'Banana' transporta-
17 tion, the actual situation was about 29 men per
18 'tsubo', when the whole of men on board is divided
19 by all 'Tsubo' of berths."
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1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)


2 Q Pausing there, will you explain what that
3 really means in space allotted to a man?

4 A The principle was that wooden tiers, three
5 feet -- with three feet space between them -- were
6 built right up in the holds and bunkers.

7 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
8 half past nine on Monday morning.

9 (Whereupon, at 1500, an adjournment
10 was taken until Monday, 16 September 1946, at
11 0930.)

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*Rec'd listed in
16 Oct 46
para 2 (24)*

NOTE:

The attached pages are corrected
pages and should be substituted for the
corresponding pages in the record.

16 SEP 1946

MR. LOGAN: No request for any further exceptions, except that I would like to say this, if the Court please: Most of these motions of prosecution always ask to permit the prosecutor to introduce these excerpts into evidence. I think that it should not be among evidence, but merely a motion to amend the rule, because it is up to the Tribunal at the time the document is offered in court as to whether or not it should be put in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, this is really an application for an exemption from the rule.

MR. LOGAN: That is right.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, I will treat it as such and the order will be in that form. As respects these documents, we have covered the lot of them.

(Whereupon, at 0905, the hearing was concluded.)