INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

SEPTEMBER 17, 1946

(pp. 5698--5766 inc.)

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DAVID NELSON SUTTON

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WITNESSES

Prosecution's Witnesses	Page
Wild, Cyril Hew Dalrymple (resumed)	5699
Cross by Mr. Blewett (cont'd)	5699

INDEX

Of

EXHIBITS

(none)

1	Tuesday, 17 September, 1946
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5	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
	Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building
6	Tokyo, Japan
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8	The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9	at 0930.
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13	Appearances:
14	For the Tribunal, same as before.
15	For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
16	For the Defense Section, same as before.
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19	(English to Japanese and Japanese
20	
21	to English interpretation was made by the
22	Language Section, IMTFE.)
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Spratt	

MAH	RSHAL OF 1	HE COURT	: The	Internati	ional
Military Tri	hunal for	the Far	East id	a now in	gaggian

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKAWA, who is represented by counsel. That shall be taken to be the case in the future until I announce otherwise.

Mr. Blewett.

CYRIL HEW DALRYMPLE WILD, called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows: CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. BLEWETT:

THE WITNESS: May I request permission to correct an inadvertent inaccuracy in something that I said yesterday, having found out the correct facts since?

THE PRESIDENT: You may.

THE WITNESS: I stated in my evidence yester-day that the POW Investigation Committee was formed on the orders of Lieutenant General WAKAMATSU. I said that he did so acting in the capacity of Minister for War because Lieutenant General SHIMOMURA was at that time detained in Shanghai. I derived this information from Lieutenant General KAWAMURA, who at the end of

the war was in Hiroshima and did admit -- say that he wasn't entirely certain of his facts. I, therefore, saw Lieutenant General WAKAMATSU yesterday evening after the Court rose. He told me that in fact Lieutenant General SHIMOMURA, the Minister for War, was in Peiping at the end of the war, and came back at the end of August. Lieutenant General WAKAMATSU told me that Lieutenant General SHIMOMURA gave him the orders to form the POW Investigation Committee, and that he, himself, General WAKAMATSU, was appointed as Chairman of the Central POW Committee by General SHIMOMURA.

Q Are your dates correct, Colonel, as you testified yesterday, as to the formation of that Gemmittee?

A September to November was what I said.

I didn't check the point again last night; but General WAKAWATSU told me that as Chairman of the Central Committee he received the sub-Committee's report on General HOMMA, which was transferred to the American forces. That was in October; and he told me that he understood -- he volunteered the information that the report on the Burma-Siam Railway was handed over to GHQ of the American Occupation Forces, probably in November, he thought; but how long the Committee tent

on sitting, he didn't know, because he, himself,
gave up the chairmanship in November. At that time
there were, he said, about fifteen sub-committees
sitting. But, I am afraid I forgot to ask him what
happened to the sub-committee's report on the Chinese
massacre in Singapore, although he mentioned that
Colonel SUGITA was the Chairman of it. On the other
hand, Colonel SUGITA did tell me that he personally
handed the report on the Chinese massacre to General
WAKAMATSU.

Q Yesterday you testified that the Committee was appointed by the Vice-Minister in September or October, 1945. Can you now be more specific as to the date?

A Only in the sense that General WAKAMATSU told me yesterday that General SHIMOMURA ordered the appointment of the POW Investigation Committee soon after his return from China, which, he said, was about the 23rd of August; certainly not before the beginning, certainly not later than the end of August.

Q Well, are we to believe, Colonel, that this Committee was appointed in August, 1945?

A No, I think September is the likelier month, because that also tallies with what Colonel SUGITA

1	told me.
2	Q What was the medium of your information as
3	to your testimony yesterday that it was formed in
4	September or October?
5	A Colonel SUGITA. It was entirely on the
6	basis of what Colonel SUGITA told me that I first
7	suspected that a document on the China massacre
8	was in existence; and having found it, and mentally
9	compared it with the Burma-Siam Railway report, it
10	was a natural deduction that there might be other
11	reports also in existence.
12	Q I should like, Colonel, to get that date
13	with a little more accuracy, if possible.
14	THE PRESIDENT: Why so, Mr. Blewett?
15	MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, the
16	testimony yesterday was from September to October.
17	. This morning the witness believes that it was some-
18	time in November.
19	MR. COMYNS CARR: September.
20	THE PRESIDENT: "September," he said.
21	MR. BLEWETT: I am sorry.
22	THE PRESIDENT: You suggested August. He
23	said, "No, September."
24	MR. BLEWETT: I am content to have the
25	evidence show it was September, sir.

1	Q From what source did you obtain information
2	that Changi Prison had been built for seven hundred
3	convicts?
4	A From a warder of Changi Prison, who was one
5	of my fellow-prisoners. Also, there were officers
6	of the Malayan Prison Service in Changi Camp as
7	prisoners of war. Also, when I, myself, was immured
8	in Changi Prison we had a book of the prison regula-
9	tions. Also, in trying to fit five thousand prisoners
10	of war into the prison I was naturally interested in
11	the amount of accommodations.
12	Q What was the construction of the prison?
13	A Solid concrete. It is an improved model
14	of Sing Sing.
15	Q How long had it been built at the time of
16	the surrender?
17	A It was practically new.
18	Q Were there any special accommodations made
19	for European civilians?
20	A As convicts, you mean?
21	Q No, European civilians after the surrender.
22	A I am not sure that I quite understand your
23	question.
24	Q After the surrender
25	A Of the British?

	,
7	Q Of the British, in February, 1942. Were any
2	special accommodations placed in Changi Gaol for the
3	European civilians?
4	A Yes, there were two atap huts in one of the
5	courtyards; but whether those were built before the
6	surrender or after, I don't know.
7	Q Do you know if any of the European women in
8	Shanghai in Singapore requested to be placed in
9	Changi Gaol rather than remain in the neighborhoods
10	where they had formerly resided?
L1	A I never heard of it.
12	Q Do you know, of your own knowledge, how
13	these Europeans were treated by the Japanese in
14	Changi Gaol?
15	A I saw for myself that the women, when they
6	went past to seek waters, and the children, had to
7	bow as low as it is humanly possible to bow.
8	Q That is not quite an answer to my question,
9	Colonel.
20	A I am sorry. I thought you were asking my
21	personal knowledge, and that was the only thing that
22	I saw for myself.
23	Q What treatment was accorded to Lieutenant
24	General Percival by General YAMASHITA following the
25	surrender?

- 1	
1	A General Percival was himself shut up in a
2	cell in Changi Prison from Monday to Thursday, and
3	from breakfast on Monday I beg your pardon
4	from lunch on Monday until breakfast on Thursday he
5	was given no food to eat. That was because General
6	Percival refused to obey an order from General
7	YAMASHITA's headquarters that he should provide
8	British gunners to teach the Japanese how to use
9	our weapons. That, if I remember rightly, was in
10	March, 1942.
11	Q How do you know that?
12	A I was told by his Brigadier General Staff.
13	Q Was that correct, by his staff officer, was
14	that what you meant, Colonel?
15	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{A}}$. $\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{c}}$
16	Q What was his name?
17	A Brigadier Kenneth Torrence.
18	Q How long did that treatment persist?
19	· A I have already mentioned from Monday to
20	Thursday.
21	Q One instance, is that correct? One time?
22	A That happened on one occasion.
23	Q Do you know of any courtesies extended to
24	General Percival as a result of the illness of his
25	wife?

I never met his wife. She was in England. Α 1 Was not his wife sent to a hospital in 2 Singapore during the confinement of the General to 3 the Changi Gaol? 4 A No, she was in England. 5 Q Colonel, were there facilities available in Singapore at that time to effect changes in comforts 7 at Changi Gaol? 8 You mean for the civilian internees? 9 Q Right. 10 Α I am afraid I don't know about that at all. 11 Did you make any recommendations to the Q 12 13 Japanese as to providing additional comforts for the civilians in Changi Gaol? 14 15 We got permission from the Japanese to contribute some of our pay as prisoners of war for the 16 women's and children's fund in the jail. Apart from 17 that, as prisoners of war, we were told by the Japanese 18 19 that we were not permitted even to discuss their af-20 fairs. On my many liaison visits to the Japanese 21 Administration Office, I was never allowed to discuss 22 questions concerning the internees except, as I said 23 yesterday, for negotiating a yearly interview of a 24 few minutes, half an hour perhaps, between near 25 relations. We did, in fact, have unofficial contacts

with the internees, but we were compelled to leave them to fight their own battles themselves.

Who do you mean by we? 1 We prisoners of war. 2 How many troops were transferred to Sime Road 3 Camp in April, 1944? 4 Everyone who was in Changi Prison was trans-5 ferred there in April, 1944, but I don't remember the total number. I know that somewhere about that time 7 the number of internees was swelled by the addition 8 9 of Jews. I did see the internees own book, record, of internees myself from which I derived my information 10 regarding the number of nationalities incarcerated, 11 but I can't remember the total number. 12 13 Where were you located at that time? I had just moved into Changi Gaol myself with 14 15 the advance guard of prisoners. 16 What was the condition of the internees, if 17 you know? They complained of a certain number of defici-18 19 ency diseases and I was very sorry for the unfortunate 20 children who looked rather washed out, having been in prison for two years. Q What was the Sime Road Camp, if you know? 22 I regarded the accomodations there as abso-23 24 lutely disgraceful. The wife of the Governor General, 25 for instance, had a minute partition of an atap hut

to live in and was dressed in an old blouse and a
skirt of sacking, with bare feet.
Q When did you see that camp?
A About ten days before the British landing in
Singapore.
Q What time in April, 1944, or thereabouts, did
you see it?
A I did not see Sime Road Camp in April, 1944.
I saw it last in December, 1943.
Q What is the source of your information as to
the conditions which you just described?
A The civilians in Sime Road Camp.
Q And when was that investigation made?
A I have just said I saw the conditions in that
camp for myself in August, 1945, about ten days before
it was officially relieved. It was unofficially re-
lieved on that day by a Canadian Lieutenant Colonel,
who had been operating in Johore across the straits,
and by two subalterns who had parachuted into Changi.
At that time I had left captivity myself and joined
the Canadian lieutenant colonel as his interpreter.
O But you don't know of your own knowledge what
conditions prevailed between April and August, 1945,
April, 1944 to August, 1945?
A Not from my own knowledge.
Q What was the general food situation in the

locality in August 1945, just prior thereto?

A The food situation in Japanese occupied territory was bad.

Q In what manner did you obtain information concerning the situation of the Indian troops?

A Throughout the whole of our captivity at Changi we, the prisoners of war, kept in practically daily contact with the Indian troops. We ran our own intelligence service and watched in detail every stage of the formation of the Indian National Army. We knew in surprising detail which of the Indians were loyal, which were wavering, and which had gone over. We were able, particularly Indian Army officers were able, to do a great deal from Changi Prisoner of War Camp to upset the Japanese plans in that respect. It was with great pleasure that we saw the Indian National Army completely dissolved a year after it started.

Q I direct your attention to the few days succeeding the surrender of the British in February, and ask you how you obtained information, personal information, regarding these Indian troops.

A There was no secret whatever about that meeting of the Indian troops in Farrar Park. I can't say exactly where I got it from. It was just something that was universally known. But I have since heard

the Japanese side of it from Colonel FUJIWARA whom I mentioned earlier, not by name, as the Japanese officer who delivered the speech.

Q Then you didn't actually hear any Japanese officers try to persuade the Indian troops to join the National Army?

A No, but I think if you will refer to the files of the Singapore Shimbun, the Japanese organ -- propaganda organ of Singapore, you will find those speeches reported.

Q We are interested now, Colonel, in your own personal testimony, if you please.

A I would like to explain again that I was GSO 2 of Third Indian Corps. I lived for three weeks at Changi, after I came back from Fort Canning, with my own corps commander, Lieutenant General Sir Louis Heath. His brigadiers and divisional commanders were in daily contact with him at Changi. He, and the other Indian Army officers, were hungry for every scrap of news they could get of the Indian troops who had been removed from them. And those were the sources from which I derived my information, the most informed that could have been found. That is why I say that happened at Farrar Park and stick to it.

Q There is no question of disbelieving your

1	story, sir. We are interested in your own personal
2	knowledge of the testimony which you place upon the
3	record. That is all.
4	A Thank you. I appreciate that remark.
5	Q May we assume, then, that the other informa-
6	tion with reference to the treatment accorded the
7	Indian troops who did join up and the ones who did not
8	was obtained in the same manner by you? .
9	A In the same manner. Certain Indian Army
10	officers with a flair for intelligence were always
11	detailed at Changi to run the Indian prisoner of war
12	information section. One of them was a close firend
13	of mine.
14	Q Immediately after the surrender of the
15	British, where were you placed?
16	A I was told to remain in Fort Canning for
17	about a week.
18	Q And you lived at Canning?
19	A On the top floor of Canning, yes, next door
20	to my present office.
21	Q Just what were your duties as liaison officer?
22	A I used to have to go to Colonel SUGITA and
23	receive orders from General YAMASHITA for transmission
24	to General Percival. I had a car allotted to me and
25	was allowed to drive without a Japanese escort to

1	Changi where I would report to General Percival or
2	Brigadier Torrance and got their answers or requests
3	and took them back to Fort Canning to hand over to
4	Colonel SUGITA.
5	Were you free to go about quite freely un-
6	guarded?
7	A I found my pass and arm band took me anywhere.
8	Q I assume, of course, that you were not obli-
9	gated to sign any agreement or have any other under-
10	standing with the Japanese as to your escape.
11	A For precisely that reason on one of my visits
12	to Changi I asked permission from my corps commander
13	to make my escape.
14	Q You weren't asked by the Japanese to sign a
15	parole?
16	A There wasn't a suggestion of it.
17	Q I take it it was a gentlemen's agreement,
18	is that correct?
19	A Nothing of the sort. The point never arose.
20	I should have felt myself quite free to attempt to
21	escape, and I wanted to do so, but for the orders which
22	I received from my own side which were particular ones,
23	addressed to me, and not general.
24	Q I take it, then, Colonel, you were given
25	special consideration by reason of your knowledge of

Japanese. Is that right? 1 Throughout the whole of my captivity I took 2 a pride in having exactly the same treatment as any 3 of my men. I should be ashamed now if I could think of one instance where I had received preferential 5 treatment from the Japanese. And that applies to the Burma-Siam Railway as much as to Singapore Island. 7 I appreciate your thoughts, Colonel, but Q 8 what I am specifically referring to now is the week at 9 Singapore immediately following the surrender. 10 During that time I was accommodated in a 11 clerk's office with five British drivers and one other 12 British officer. I found my own bedding and foraged 13 for the food which we got. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

W h	1	Q I believe you said you remained at Channing,
a	2	was it, or Canning, for one week, is that right?
1 e	3	A For about one week.
n	4	Q Who arranged the interview between Brigadier
&	5	Newbiggin and Lieutenant Colonel SUGITA on February 22?
D u	6	A There was no question of arranging it. I
d a	7	used to go down to the conference house outside Changi
	8	Prison and meet the Japanese there. We went every day
	9	at a stated time. Sometimes Colonel SUGITA was there,
	10	and sometimes not.
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	12	
	13	at that time?
	14	A During the war he was Brigadier, Administration
	15	of Malaya Command. In Changi Camp he was running the
	16	administration side for the prisoners of war.
	17	Q From the British standpoint, you mean?
	18	A From the British standpoint. The Japanese
	19	policy at Changi from start to finish was to leave the
	20	prisoners to administer themselves.
	21	Q Where was Brigadier Newbiggin billeted or con-
	2 2	fined?
	23	A With the other senior officers of Malaya
	24	Command, including General Percival, in the old garri-
	25	son commander's house.
		Q Was that at Changi Prison?

1	A No. It was in Changi cantonments, which I
2	call Changi Camp.
3	Q I should have said Changi Camp.
4	A Yes.
5	Q Did he have freedom to go about on official
6 .	business?
7	A Within the limits of the camp, yes; and
8	carrying a ferry flag from the camp to the conference
9	house. It was about two miles away.
10	Q Did you also reside at the commander's home,
11	at the house?
12	A No. I stayed with General Heath and Third
13	Corps officers in the barrack block about half a mile
14	away. It was all inside the same camp.
15	Q Where did Brigadier Newbiggin obtain the
16	information, if you know, that one hundred Chinese
17	had been shot?
18 19	A Because in his official capacity as a prisoner
20	of war, he had received the orders to send a working
20 21	party out and bury them. The burial party was drawn
	from the British members of the volunteer forces, which
22 23	was why we knew that many of those who had been shot
2 <i>5</i> 24	were Chinese members of the same force.
25	Q Who, if you know, reported the incident to
	the Brigadier?

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A Really, I have no idea on that point. It was not a matter in doubt.

Q Then, are we to understand, Colonel, that one of the members of the burial party or more related the story to the Brigadier and the Brigadier related it to the Colonel in your presence?

A Not at all. I came into the thing because I went with Brigadier Newbriggin and heard him make his protest. I also had derived my information from one of the Chinese who was shot. The burial party found him alive among the bodies with four bullet wounds in his body, so they put him on a stretcher and covered him up with a sack and told the Japanese guards that he was a British soldier who had fainted. They brought him into the camp and then put him in our own hospital, where our doctors cured him. He was a Chinese private, British subject, in the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force. We renamed him Private Leonard, and gave him a regimental number and included him in the nominal rolls which we gave the Japanese. He is one of my witnesses in Singapore now.

Q I gathered from your testimony, Colonel -- I may have been mistaken -- that these one hundred Chinese were civilians.

A I don't recall saying that.

1	Q You may have given that impression?
2	A If so, accidentally.
3	THE PRESIDENT: If I recollect rightly, he
4	gave the other impression.
5	MR. BLEWETT: I will look that up, sir.
6	Q When did you first speak to the Chinese
7	soldier?
8	A I just spoke to him, passing the time of day,
9	when he was officer's batman. He was a well-known
10	figure around the camp, but I never bothered to ask him
11	about the story. It was too well known. Of course, we
12	got a statement from him since.
13	Q Was that since last September?
14	A Probably.
15	Q I thought I understood you to say that you
16	spoke to this witness and that that was the basis on
17	which your testimony relied.
18	A Indeed, no. I was saying one of the sources
19	from which the information regarding this massacre
20	was derived was that. I derived it from familiarity
21	with his report.
22	THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen
23	minutes.
24	(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
-	taken until 1100, after which the proceedings

	1	were resumed as follows:)
G	2	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
r e e n	3	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
	4	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett. The evidence
b e	5	in chief of the witness relating to the killing of
r g	6	the one hundred Chinese on the beach outside the
&	7	Changi Prisoners of War Camp appears on pages 5366
В	8	and 5367 of the record.
a r	9	MR. BLEWETT: I have it, your Honor.
t o	10	THE PRESIDENT: He refers to them simply as
n	11	"Chinese," but he says there was one survivor of the
	12	shooting. That could only be the so-called Private
	1 3	Leonard, I take it.
	14	MR. COMYNS CARR: On page 5372, where he is
	15	referring to the whole number of five thousand, he
	16	says that the great majority of them were civilians
-	17	but there were some of the Straits Settlement volun-
	18	teers amongst them.
	19	THE PRESIDENT: The point is, who was in-
	20	cluded in the one hundred, not in the five thousand.
	2 1	MR. COMYNS CARR: I agree, your Honor.
	2 2	MR. BLEWETT: I might so state, your Honor.
	23	My opinion that civilians were meant was derived from
	24	preceding testimony on page 5362.
	25	THE PRESIDENT: What page?

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MR. BLEWETT: Near the bottom of page 5362. That is the preceding day's testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not have that.

MR. BLEWETT: If the Court may recall, the witness testified as to cordons being arranged around the streets in Chinatown and all the male Chinese being segregated.

THE PRESIDENT: But you must concentrate on the one hundred, and that included a survivor. And no one suggests the survivor was a civilian, unless you invite us to discredit the Colonel.

MR. BLEWETT: I am stating to the Court, if your Honor please, that I reached my conclusion and my opinion, that it was my thought that these were civilians, from this previous testimony which preceded it by just a few pages.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you could honestly have been under a misapprehension as to the effect of his testimony.

MR. BLEWETT: Thank you, sir.

BY MR. BLEWETT (Continued):

Q Just how much time, Colonel, did you spend, after the surrender and during the week that you were at Canning, in driving about the city of Singapore?

A An hour or two a day, I should say.

Q Did you spend any time at night driving about the city?

A Yes, I did. I lost my way one night in the blackout. I had to go to a Japanese sentry post to ask it.

Q You did not see any looting or disorder, I understand; but did you hear of any then or later?

A I never saw any myself, but I do know that there were -- I did hear of one or two isolated instances of it. At night, the place was like a city of the dead, without a soul in the street except for an occasional Japanese Army truck and frequent Japanese sentry posts.

Q At that time were the five hundred armed British troops on duty?

A My recollection is that they were taken off duty and disarmed on the 16th of February, 1942, the reason being, as I have told you, the Japanese had already moved in by first light on the morning of the 16th of February. There were, however, a few British police officers and some British other ranks on point duty still, with Japanese accompanying them. During the daytime, also, the streets were practically deserted and most of the shops were closed.

Q What did you do or what was done to you after

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1 the week at Canning?

A I was told by Colonel SUGITA to report back to Changi Camp and stay there.

Q And did you live there at headquarters?

A I lived there in the Old Gunner mess with my corps commander and officers of 3rd Corps.

May I explain? I think it might assist you. At Changi we maintained a form of military command. Malaya Command - the officers of Malaya Command were in control of the camp and of the prisoners of war. The chain of command was from them to the corps commander who, naturally, had lost most of his troops, being an Indian formation, and to the 18th British divisional headquarters, and the other divisional headquarters in Changi Camp, thence down as far as battalion commanders. When an incident happened in the camp, trouble of some sort, it was reported up through usual military channels to Malaya Command where it was investigated and, if accurate, officially represented to the Japanese. With necessary modifications, we maintained the same system in River Valley Road Camp, and even on the Burma-Siam railway.

Therefore, when I, as liaison officer for a force of 50,000 or 9,500 or 7,000, made a representation to the Japanese, it was an official military one

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Another point was that one could not afford to make a mistake. If the Japanese could prove that a complaint was false, not well grounded, then it was I who got into the trouble; and, although I think I'm as good as the next man in taking corporal punishment, I preferred, if possible, to avoid it. So, one rejected numerous complaints made by one's own side and represented those which one knew were true and accurate.

Q Do you mean, Colonel, that the 3rd Army -- 3rd Indian Army was in command of the Changi Camp?

A The Malaya Command was, but I worked with them for purposes of interpreting and liaison. The parallel formations immediately under Malaya Commandwere 3rd Indian Corps, the combined 9th and 11th Indian divisions, 18th British division, and forteress troops.

Q Who was in command of the Malaya Command, General Percival?

A Yes, until June, 1942.

Q How many officers were in Changi Camp at the time you speak of?

A I have no precise figure in mind, but over 1500, at a guess.

Q What was the policy of the Japanese towards

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1	these officers?
2	A Contemptuous to us and offensive. They took
3	our badges of rank off us soon after we arrived.
4	Q I shall ask you about the living conditions
5	at that time pertaining to the officers only.
6	A The officers lived in huts or barrack build-
7	ings in Changi. If they'd brought camp beds into
8	Changi Camp, they had them. The conditions were,
9	in my opinion, nothing to complain about during the
10	early weeks.
11.	Q Now, about how many complaints did you re-
12	ceive while you were at Changi Camp in the early days?
13	A Myself, personally?
14	Q Yes.
15	A None to me, personally. Complaints
16	Q Well, just a moment. What do you mean by
17	your statement that on the spot instances of ill
18	treatment were settled by you?
19	A I cen't recall settling one during the two
20	or three weeks that I was in Changi at the start. I
21	did, of course, have them to settle during the last
22	eighteen months of the war when I was back there.
23	But, in the working camps where I was, such incidents
24	were a frequent occurrence.
25	Q Your testimony, to which I refer, was given

early in your examination and was an explanation of how the whole procedure was handled by you.

A In the more closely concentrated working camps, I, naturally, used my initiative to settle any dispute with a guard on the spot without troubling the commander of the camp. I could quote from my personal knowledge instances of that in illustration until the end of today, if you required it.

Q We have not quite reached that point, Colonel. What I have specifically in mind is the handling of complaints at Changi Camp during your confinement there.

A Then the procedure in that enormous camp was the daily visit to the conference house of the Japanese where the Brigadier would go through ten or twenty different points with the Japanese officer, some of which were requests and some of which were complaints. Some of it was just routine daily duty. These things were either dealt with on the spot by the Japanese officer, or an answer was promised next day after investigation.

Q May we assume that in the main it was the regular official routine that happens in any large military camp?

A Much the same, I should say.

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Q Now, were complaints received there from other camps outside Changi?

When satellite camps were thrown out from Changi over the island, officers -- senior officers -were put in charge of them by Malaya Command. passed from those commanders to Malaya Command regularly and the other way. A second instance was the very large number of troops who came into Changi Camp from outside, particularly from the Netherlands Senior officers of those parties were East Indies. required to report to Malaya Command on arrival. In case of serious matters reported, the Judge Advocate General's Department of the prisoners of war and General Staff Intelligence officers held a special inquiry into the incidents related. Those records were then buried underground for the duration of the war. I recovered them personally at the conclusion of the war and took them with me to E Group of Supreme Allied Command, Southeast Asia. big official investigation at Changi was into the Alexandra Hospital massacre and the longest report was made by Colonel Craven, whom I mentioned.

- O These, of course, were all made since September, 1945, were they not?
 - A Indeed, no. The inquiries were held at the

1	time in captivity by the appropriate officers of
2	the Judge Advocate General's Department or the
3	General Staff Intelligence Section.
4	Q Was that part of your job?
5	A The investigation side, no; not at that
6	time, I should say.
7	O How many crime investigations have you
ន	made, Colonel, since September, 1945?
9	A I would not care to hazard a guess; a
10	large number.
1 1.	Q I think you testified yesterday that you
12	had participated in forty trials; is that right?
13	A I have given evidence in, I think, only
14	four or five. I have had no connection whatever
15	with a number of those that were included in that
16	figure. It is just the number that have been tried
17	in Singapore.
18	MR. COMYNS CARR: The number he gave yester-
19	day was four hundred, not forty.
20	Q Does the witness state that you have testified
21	in four hundred trials?
22	THE PRESIDENT: No. You said forty and he
23	said four hundred four hundred trials. He did not
24	say how many he testified in yesterday. That comes
25	out today for the first time.

1	A I said I have personally testified in four
2	or five, never for more than two or three hours at
3	a time.
4	Q We may take that then as a little ironic,
5	Colonel. We are here to obtain all the information
6	we can on your experience.
7	A I did not mean to be ironical at all.
8	Q Quite all right. Where were you detained
9	and what were your duties from February 20 until
10	March 13, 1942?
11	A I was living with my Corps Commander at
12	Changi and attached to Malaya Command as an inter-
13	preter and liaison officer in Changi POW Camp.
14	Q What did you do or where did you go on the
15	13th of March or a few days after that?
16	A I marched from Changi twelve miles into
17	Singapore with fifteen hundred men.
18	Q Then what did you do?
19	A Then I lived for eight months in River
20	Valley Road Camp where I served as interpreter and
21	liaison officer of the combined camps of River
22	Valley Road and Havelock Road.
23	Q Will you describe the circumstances of
24	your going to River Valley Road?
25	A A written order was received from the

1	Japanese by Malaya Command ordering a party of
2	fifteen hundred to go, nominating me by name as the
3	interpreter to accompany them.
4	Q Where is it located?
5	Ar It was reclaimed land, reclaimed marsh land,
6	within the limits of Singapore City.
7	Q Was it newly erected for that purpose?
8	A The huts themselves had been built before
9	the war.
10	Q Do you know whether or not the Japanese at
11	that time had any more suitable quarters?
12	A Yes, in Changi Camp.
13	Q What was the reason that these fifteen
14	hundred were moved from Changi?
15	A For labor purposes.
16	Q Do you know if the Japanese had bedding or
17	sleeping mats on hand at that time when you reached
18	River Valley Road?
19	A They had themselves and they had also taken
20	over the whole supplies of the British forces in
21	Malaya.
22	Q Did they have a supply adequate or nearly
23	adequate for your purposes which were refused issuance?
24	A Certainly, they had. They had the whole of
25	the ordnance supplies of the British forces in Malaya

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and Singapore.

With whom did you take up this matter?

With the officers of the Ikari Butai, Japanese officers who were in control of us at that time.

Q What was the answer to your request?

The answer was that we didn't get them. A

Can you give a reason for that refusal?

No.

Did the Japanese at that point have equipment for the digging of latrines which they refused to issue?

I was promised personally by the Japanese when I left Changi Camp that tools would be supplied to us -- tools and cooking gear -- would be supplied to us on arrival and that we need not take them our-The Ikari Butai had an enormous store of spades, picks, chunkels and everything else within fifty yards of the camp. The troops used to draw them from this store every day and take them to work and had to return them to the store again in the evening. There was one week, in spite of my best efforts, before I could get any out of Lieutenant FUKADA for use in the camp.

Did any of the prisoners of war work around

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1	the camp?
2	A Yes, they did.
3	Q Were they furnished tools?
4	A After a week, yes. They were kept in a
5	Japanese storehouse inside the camp and we drew them
6	on demand. I was even able to get the place drained
7	about a fortnight after we got in there.
8	O Just how did you go about getting these
9	buckets from the municipal authorities?
10	A At that time some of the British civilians
11	were still at large in the city carrying on with the
12	central services. Some of the prisoners of war knew
13	them. It was therefore fixed up by prisoners of war
14	officers with the municipality with the municipality
15	officials over the wire the wire around the camp.
16	After that, after it had been arranged, I got the
17	approval of the Japanese officer.
18	Q Did not the British armies lose or destroy
19	any equipment or supplies in the course of their
20	defeat or prior to the surrender?
21	A Yes, they did.
22	Q Were you at any time a prisoner of war in
23	Havelock Road Camp?
24	A Practically every day that I was in River
25	Valley Road Camp. We built a wooden bridge between

1	the two camps and they both came under the command
2	of our little POW headquarters; that is to say,
3	Colonel Heath was the senior British officer of both
4	camps and administered them both and I was liaison
. 5	officer and interpreter therefore for the prisoners
6	of both.
7	Q So then, you knew from your own knowledge
8	as regards the conditions prevailing in Havelock
9	Camp?
10	A Yes, indeed. As so-called brigade major
11	to Colonel Heath and in my other capacity I was
12	responsible for both equally.
13	Q Do you say that these camps were adjoining,
14	Colonel?
15	A There was the Singapore River between the
16	two, a very narrow stream, and about a quarter of a
17	mile of open ground. We built a road and a bridge
18	to connect them and they became in effect one camp.
19	Q Did you have your headquarters at Valley
20	Road or Havelock?
21	A We built a little hut for the purpose in
22	River Valley Road Camp.
23	O And the work was carried on from River
24	Valley Road?
25	A The combined headquarters work, but, of course

1	there was a Lieutenant Colonel commanding River
2	Valley Road, the Major commanding Havelock Road,
3	and the same chain of command as in the other camps
4	I was in, both of them being responsible to Colonel
5	Heath and under his orders.
6	THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
7	half-past one.
8	(Whereupon, at 1200, a recess
9	was taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
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           The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1334.
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           MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
 5 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
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           THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.
 7¢YRIL
              HE W
                      DALRYMPLE WILD.
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       called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
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       resumed the stand and testified as follows:
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                   CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)
11 BY MR. BLEWETT:
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           Did you know Major General SAITO?
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           I did.
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           Where and when?
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           I saw him occasionally, and also met him
16 bace or twice during the period February, 1944 until
  the end of the war.
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           Do you know where he is now located?
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           In Changi Prison, Singapore.
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           How was it, Colonel Wild, that all the other
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camps were permitted to draw upon the rice mills for
22 rice polishings and your camp was refused?
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           It was not for want of asking for permission
  to draw it. We pointed out on numerous occasions that
  these other camps were getting it, but the Japanese
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1	officer concerned never condescended to explain his
2	refusal. Therefore, I do not know what the reason was.
3	Q To whom did you make the application?
4	A Successively to Lieutenant FUKADA and to
5	Lieutenant KOTANI, particularly after the officers
6	and men of the Great World Camp next door to us had
7	come into our camp and were therefore no longer able
8	to get their supplies. Lieutenant KOTANI informed
9	me that he had put up the application to Major General
10	FUKUYE's headquarters at Changi. General FUKUYE at
11	that time was G. O. C. Prisoners of War, Malaya.
12	KOTANI said that FUKUYE's headquarters had turned it
13	down.
14	Q Did you press for a reason?
15	A Indeed, yes.
16	Q And you got none?
17	A None.
18	Q Do you know if the Japanese at this time who
19	were in River Road Camp had boots or clothing suitable
20	to fit your troops.
21	A I am sorry. Would you mind repeating that
22.	question?
23	MR. BLEWETT: Will the Stenographer please
24	reread it?
25	(Whereupon, the last question was

1	read by the official court reporter.)
2	A We did make shift later in the war with
3	issues of cast-off Japanese boots. Clothing presented
4	no difficulty had we received it. We had our own
5	tailors.
6	Q Did your own Quartermaster Department draw
7	these stores?
8	A On the rare occasions when such stores were
9	issued, they were normally issued to our Quarter-
10	master's Department.
11	Q Do I understand you rightly that the Japanese
12	did not have boots when you first entered River Road
13	Camp?
14	A I never saw a barefooted Japanese during my
15	three and a half years' captivity except from his own
16	choice.
17	Q Would the ordinary boot worn by the Japanese
18	troops have been suitable as to size for your troops?
19	A They could be worn by men with feet up to
20	medium size.
21	Q How about the clothing?
22	A We had plenty of trained tailors who could
23	alter any clothing that was given to them.
24	Q Well, did the Japanese have this clothing and
25:	refuse to issue it to your man?

1	A All I can say on that point is that throughout
2	my captivity the Japanese were properly clothed and
3	properly shod. What their difficulties in supplying
4	us were, I do not know. All I know is that we were
5	not properly clothed or shod ourselves.
6	9 From what camps were the men assigned for
7	dock work in Singapore obtained?
8	A The largest numbers were drawn from River
9	Valley Road Camp and Havelock Road Camp.
10	O Did you accompany these men as one of the
11	officers?
12	A Sometimes I did, sir, but my duties normally
13	were in the camp.
14	Q How many times did you actually see prisoners
15	of war unloading munitions at the dock?
16	A Never myself.
17	Q Now, Colonel, when you referred to hospital
18	facilities during the period from March to later
19	in 1942, to what camp do you have reference?
20	A I do not remember referring to hospital
21	facilities during the period February to March, 1942.
22	Q I do not have the page, so I am unable to
23	refer you to your testimony at this time.
24	A The only camp on the island at that time was
25	Roberts Hospital at Changi.

1	Q During that period of time to which I
2	refer, you were at the River Valley Road. What
3	information, then, did you have about this hospital
4	referred to by you?
5	A I am sorry. I thought you were referring
6	to some particular remark about a hospital in March,
7	1942. I did, I know, refer to hospital facilities
8	from 13th of March, 1942 until 24th of December, 1942.
9	Q I did not have that in mind. I shall ask
10	you about that later.
1 1	What was your job exactly while you were
12	at River Valley Camp?
13	A I think I explained that this morning. I
14	was interpreter.
15	Q Well, I think perhaps you did cover that.
16	What was the procedure concerning the prepa-
17	ration of nominal rolls?
18	THE MONITOR: Is that a proper name?
19	MR. BLEWETT: Nominal rolls, n-o-m-i-n-a-l
20	r-q-l-l-s.
21	A The system was that, regarding ourselves and
2 2	officers in charge of our men, we kept our own nominal
23	rolls ourselves. Secondly, as soon as we arrived in
24	River Valley Road Camp, we were required to provide
25	the Japanese with nominal rolls by huts.

Thirdly, when the POW Administration took over, in September, 1942, we were required to supply more reports. These took the form of name, rank, number, unit, et cetera; in addition, the completion of a printed card for every man. They were in duplicate, one to stay with the man, and the other to go to Tokyo. The long nominal rolls were similar to those which we had been ordered by the Japanese to complete at Changi in February and March.

Q Were you in charge of the work?

A No, but it was done by an officer in this little headquarters hut, assisted by the British officers who were battalion commanders, company commanders, platoon commanders, and so on. My job as liaison officer was to present the completed forms to the Japanese.

Q And what camps did that data cover?

A All camps on Singapore Island.

Q What camps were directly concerned with your responsibility?

A Directly concerned, I was directly concerned with River Valley and Havelock Road Camp. Also, I paid frequent liaison visits to the headquarters of the prisoners of war at Changi of which all labor camps on the island were satellites.

1	Q Who were the Japanese who told you why
2	these lists were required?
3	A I think Lieutenant KOTANI, or else his
4	interpreter, who also fulfilled the duties of some
5	sort of staff officer.
6	Q What was the position of this officer that
7	you mentioned?
8	A An officer of the POW Administration of
9.	Malaya, commanding my camps under the directions
10	of General FUKUYE.
11	Q To whom was this delivered by you?
12	A To Lieutenant KOTANI, or a member of his
13	Japanese staff.
14	Q Do you know, from your own knowledge, whether
15	or not these lists were delivered to Tokyo?
16	A No.
17	Q Do you know whether they were forwarded to
18	Tokyo?
19 20	A I only know from my friend, Captain Underwood,
21	who worked daily for three and a half years in the
22	Japanese headquarters of the POW Administration in
23	Malaya.
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	1	Q When was the POW Administration Department
A	2	created?
b r	3	A September, 1942, it took over.
a m	4	Q And at that time you were at River Valley
&	5	Road River Road Camp, correct?
М	6	A I was.
r	7	When did the construction begin on the
5 e	8	military airdrome at Changi?
	9	A In 1942.
	10	Q · Were you there at that time.
	11	A No, the work had started, if I recollect
	12	rightly, when I got back in December, 1942. It is
	13	difficult to say exactly when it started, because we
	14	did not know what we were doing at the beginning. The
	15	story from Japanese was that it was ground leveling
	16	to improve the amenities at Changi Camp.
	17	Q How many times were you actually at the scene
	18	of the work.
	19	A I should say about a dozen times.
	20	Q Did you personally witness any acts of mis-
	21	treatment?
	22	. A Not on the occasions when I was there.
	23	Q Did you personally make a complaint to
	24	General SAITO, which resulted in his withholding
	25	troops for an entire afternoon?

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A No, but I was working in the same office with Colonel Dillon and some of his officers when that complaint was drawn up.

Q Do you know of any other examples of Japanese intervention favorable to prisoners of war?

A I do, indeed.

Q Will you tell us about some of them?

In comparison with other work undertaken by prisoners of war for the Japanese, the treatment on Changi Airdrome was fairly good. When that complaint, particular complaint, was made to the Japanese a good Japanese officer called Lieutenant TAKAHASHI asked us to list previous cases of ill treatment. They amounted, I think, to under a hundred, but of those serious ones were not many; in fact, it looked to me like a quiet day on the Burma-Siam Railway. However, on that occasion we were backed up by Lieutenant TAKAHASHI, and on several other occasions also, and General SAITO, with the very considerable power he had as GOC Prisoners of War, was able to take appropriate I have recorded that in writing and given it to our War Crimes Department in Singapore, as it is a point in his favor.

Q That work occupied approximately three years, did it not?

1	A Yes. This list covered, I think, the pre-
2	vious six months.
3	Can you give us the approximate number of
4	prisoner of war camps in the Singapore, Malaya, Siam
5	and Burma areas?
6	A In the Singapore area at all times, I should
7	say not more than ten. On the Burma-Siam Railway,
8	a very much larger number, as troops moved from one
9	camp to another and the camps were spaced out along
10	the railway.
11	Q How many, would you say?
12	A In occupation at any given time, perhaps
1 3	forty, perhaps more.
14	Q In testifying that not once were you per-
15	mitted to communicate with your own government, or
16	any Allied Governments, are you speaking for yourself
17	or for all the Allied officers throughout the many
18	camps, including the general officers?
19	A I was speaking for all the POW headquarters
20	in which I served, and therefore for the prisoners of
21	war who were controlled by those headquarters. As
22	regards the general officers, I cannot speak after
23	June, 1942, because in that month all officer of and
24	above the rank of colonel, full colonel, were re-
25	moved to Formosa, with the exception of my own corps

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commander and an Australian brigadier who followed later, and excepting one medical full colonel that remained.

Q Then out of fifty camps how many do you speak for?

A I speak originally for the 50,000 prisoners of war at Changi, because I was on their headquarters, for Changi from being there or liaining to it until April, 1943, and my own party of 7,000 men in Siam. Again, for Changi and all remaining camps on Singapore Island from April, '43 to the end of the war -- I beg your pardon, from December, '43 until the end of the war.

Q Were you not away from Changi for a period of eight months?

A I think I covered them. I was away from April, '43 until December, '43. I resumed my duties at the POW headquarters there on my return.

Q Do you know positively that no Allied officer was permitted to communicate with his government or any Allied government?

A I can remember numerous occasions when this was requested, but none on which it was agreed to.

You are speaking of your personal experience?

A Not as an individual, but as somebody who

.]	Company and the Company of the Compa
1	was privileged to remain some sort of a staff officer
2	in captivity.
3	Q You know that none, as far as you had
4	knowledge, was privileged to do so?
5	A I can't recall any.
6	4 My question was if you know positively
7	that no Allied officer was permitted to so communi-
8	cate?
9	A I know that none under the control of the
10	headquarters where I served were so permitted.
11	Q In your opinion, would it not have been to
12	the advantage of the Japanese to obtain medicines and
13	supplies from Allied governments if it could suc-
14	cessfully be shipped?
15	THE PRESIDENT: How could any answer to a
16	question like that help us in the least?
17	MR. BLEWETT: I will withdraw the question,
18	if your Honor please.
19	Q What was the name of the prisoner of war,
20	major general, that you had access to on this matter?
21	A Major General ARIMURA.
22	Q And did he refuse?
23	A No, he seemed pretty much impressed by my
24	appeal. He seemed most friendly and receptive, and,
25	having made notes of what I had told him, he put

1	the paper in his pocket and said, "Do not worry any
2	more."
3	Q And who was the colonel you spoke to on the
4	Burma-Siam Railway about communications?
.5	A The only full colonel I spoke to on the
6	Burma-Siam Railway was the regimental commander of
7	the Ninth Regiment of Engineers. I do not remember
8	his name, but I have it on record somewhere. I didn't
9	know it at the time.
10	Q What was his response?
11	A He canceled this iniquitous order that 700
12	of our sick should be ejected into the jungle in
13	the monsoon rains. The order had emanated from his
14	headquarters. I never met him before or after that
15	day.
16	Q Was there anything extraordinary regarding
17	censorship of outgoing and incoming mail?
18	A Nothing extraordinary in its being done,
19	but the delays imposed were so lengthy.
20	Q Did you suggest any remedies for that?
21	A We did. We offered to do the censorship
22	ourselves.
23	Q Was that accepted?
24	A To some extent, as regards these 25-word
25	northenda but not as morenda the incoming mail

1	Where is Major Bull now, if you know,
2	Colonel?
3	A I understand he is working as a radiologist
4	in London.
5	Q Have you been in communication with him
6	since September, 1945?
7	A Not since then.
8	Q When did you obtain the story concerning
9	the Alexandra Hospital happening?
10	A As soon as I visited Changi Camp. It was
11	a matter of discussion among all the prisoners.
12	Q To what visit do you refer?
1 3	A To my liaison visits during the week I was
14	in Fort Canning. Incidentally, I saw a few days
15	ago an excellent affidavit of Brigadier Stringer on
16	this subject.
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A I first heard of it on one of my liaison visits to Malaya Command house at Changi the week after the surrender. I had personal interest in it as Captain Allardyce, one of those killed, was my own doctor in Kobe.

Q Your entire testimony on that episode is the result of information conveyed to you by others, is it not?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal can appreciate how much of his evidence is hearsay and how much is not. No further cross-examination is necessary to satisfy us on that point.

MR. BLEWETT: I agree, sir. I think the question is unnecessary, and I shall withdraw it.

Q In April 1944 and in May, where did you live at Changi Gaol?

A During three to four weeks during April and May I lived inside Changi Gaol.

Q There is some reference to a warder's cottage in connection with your place of residence, and that is

what I had in mind.

A There was only room for 5000 prisoners inside the gaol. "Room" is rather a euphemism. So during that period we were building ourselves a hutted camp around the walls of the gaol, outside. In this we incorporated about 120 one-roomed Asiatic warders quarters. I lived in one of those with two lieutenant colonels for the last eighteen months of the war.

Q What was the food supply on Singapore Island about that period of time?

A I could only speak from hearsay, because during that time I never left Changi Camp to go into the city.

But from what I was told, it was bad.

Q Why was Changi Camp vacated in August 1944?

A I do not know for certain; but some of the buildings, a few of the buildings there, were taken over by the Japanese Army Air Force, and we assumed that they disliked us as neighbors.

Q In what manner did you obtain your information concerning prisoners-of-war work at Alexandra Ord-nance Depot -- Ordnance is the word.

A From a man who was working there who came to report to his officer about the way the sabotage was going.

Did you ever visit that place and see the

1	work performed as you testified? Correction: As you
2	described, not as you testified.
3	A No. But the details stuck in my mind from the
4	stories which this man told me.
5	Q Were you at Blakang Mati Island or that
6	pronunciation at any time during your imprisonment?
7	B-l-a-k-a-n-g M-a-t-i.
8	A Not personally.
9	Q Then you did not see any prisoners of war
10	performing the work you described there?
1 1	A I was given the official written report of the
12	commandant of Blakang Mati by Colonel Holmes to lodge
13	a protest with the Japanese officer. I also was
14	responsible for arranging the exchange of two hundred
15	sick men from Blakang Mati for two hundred fitter ones
16	from Changi. I met and talked to the unfit men when
17	they returned to Changi. I arranged for Lieutenant
18	Goodman, of the Irish Guards, to go there as
19	interpreter, an officer formerly under my command. He
20	was there for two years, and I had a long talk with
21	him immediately after his release.
2 2	Q Where were you located at the time of the
23	incident described by you as the "Double Tenth"?
24	A I was on the Burma-Siam Railway.
25	THE DECEMBER We will necess you for

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(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

MR. BLEWETT: Will you please read the last answer?

(Whereupon, the last answer was read by the official court reporter as follows:)

"A I was on the Burma-Siam railway." BY MR. BLEWETT (Continued):

From whom did you get the information re-Q garding the Double Tenth incident?

Among others, from my friend the Bishop of Singapore whom I had the pleasure of reintroducing to some of the Japanese who had tormented him. identified a number of my arrests for me and showed me the scars on his legs which had resulted from his beating. Another is my friend, Mr. R. H. Scott, now councillor to Lord Killearn, the High Commissioner. Mr. Scott told me, and gave evidence in court on oath, that for a long period he was suspended by his

1	thumbs from the bars of a window.
2	Q Are both these gentlemen alive?
3	A Both, I am happy to say, are alive.
4	Q And located in Singapore?
5	A Mr. Scott is. The Bishop is at present
6	in London.
7	Q How did you obtain the information that
8	the Burma-Sian railroad was constructed as a prep-
9	aration for the invasion of India?
10	A I was informed by a Japanese officer in
11	November, 1943 that, now that the railway was fin-
12	ished, the invasion of India would start in January,
13	1944.
14	Q Did you assume, Colonel, from that remark
15	that the railroad had been constructed as a prepara-
16	tion for the invasion?
17	A That remark merely confirmed what we all
18	knew already.
19	Q Who gave you the information? I withdraw
20	that question.
21	What high officials of the Japanese forces
22	gave you that information?
23	A No high officials, but many of their troops.
24	We were told it so often that it was evidently the
25	story which they, themselves, had been told by

1	their officers. I do not say that was the only
2	purpose of it. Obviously, the supply of troops in
3	Burma was another.
4	Q Then no high Japanese official with re-
5	sponsibility gave you that information?
6	A No. I should have thought it remarkable
7	if he had.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Did you see any trains
9	running over the line after it was completed?
10	THE WITNESS: I did, your Honor.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Did you notice what kind of
12	traffic or goods were conveyed?
13	THE WITNESS: While I was there, your Honor,
14	it was mainly troops going up, a number of horses,
15	anti-tank guns, and stores. The trains were running
16	through my camp at Songkrei, running very light for
17	about two weeks before we closed that camp.
18	Q Did you prepare, Colonel, the map which
19	has been handed to the Tribunal and which has been
20	admitted in evidence?
21	A Not that one, but Major Agnew and I prepared
2 2	a similar one in captivity.
23	Q When was this particular map that was intro-
24	duced in evidence prepared?
25	A It was prepared in the Legal Department of

1	War Crimes in Singapore and was printed in about
2	March or April this year. Our map was partly used
3	to supply information, but this map is much fuller
Ą	than ours.
5	Q Was this map prepared under the direction
6	or by a civil engineer?
7	A No, of the Legal Officer.
8	Q Was it done as the result of an actual
9	survey of the railroad property?
10	A No, it was not. It would have been impos-
11	sible to prepare such a map because the camps where
12	we lived, where many of us died, have now gone back
13	to jungle.
14	Q How were the locations of these various
15	camps ascertained?
16	A From the records of prisoners of war.
17	MR. BLEWETT: If the Tribunal please, it is
18	our understanding that this map, which is referred
19	to as exhibit No. 472, was received subject to the
20	usual objections.
21	THE PRESIDENT: It is open to you to show
22	that it is so defective that we should not act on it.
23	Q Were any specific measurements made, if you
24	know, as to the location of the railroad right-of-way
25	or of the camps along such right-of-way?

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A The Japanese knew the camps by their dis-
tance in kilometres; so that, apart from a camp hav-
ing a place name, it was also given a kilometre numbe
by the Japanese. If you had an opportunity of refer-
ring to many of the six or seven hundred affidavits
in Singapore, you would see that many of them bear
both designations.

Q Was this map compiled, then, from numerous documents and information, none of it scientific?

A That is so, and I am satisfied that it is far more accurate than anything produced by the Japanese.

THE PRESIDENT: One of my colleagues points out that it does not purport to be a map; it is just a diagram. In all events, complete accuracy is not necessary for the purposes of this issue. It is not a contest about the ownership of a bit of land or where two cars collided.

MR. BLEWETT: If it comes to a pass, your Honor, where some technical question may be involved, may the defense at that time have the right to make objection?

THE PRESIDENT: I cannot conceive of any such point arising, but if it does, of course, your rights will be fully protected; and you may, if you

Wish, put in another map or diagram.

MR. COMYNS CARR: The Tribunal will find the diagram prepared by the Japanese attached to Exhibit 475. I did not refer to it, although the diagram is here, because we considered the one produced by the witness more accurate, and refers substantially to the same facts, and if the Tribunal wishes the witness' own map introduced we have some copies of it here in Tokyo and it can be produced if desired.

THE WITNESS: May I just say that my map was designed to show the locations of the graves of the three thousand and eighty seven men who died in my force. The insert maps of every cemetery on it has been removed from the reproduction, but I am informed by the Graves Commission that it was sufficiently accurate for all but thirty of these graves to be discovered after the war. My informant had that map during the period of recovering these graves, but in spite of that, in spite of its apparent accuracy, it is less accurate than this one.

MR. BLEWETT: If the defense has need of the map referred to we shall avail ourselves of your courtesy.

1	THE PRESIDENT: If you know any of the
2	parts, or if you suggest that the map or diagram
3	is defective in any part, you may indicate that
4	to the witness.
5	MR. BLEWETT: This witness did not make
6	the map, your Honor, the one that was offered in
7	evidence.
8	THE PRESIDENT: He is being cross-examined
9	about it.
10	MR. BLEWETT: As your Honor pointed out,
11	there is no particular dispute as to it at this
12	particular time, but we would like to reserve
13	the right to object to it later.
14	THE PRESIDENT: I pointed out nothing
15	except if it is substantially accurate it is suf-
16	ficient for our purposes.
17	BY MR. BLEWETT:
18	Q What actual contact, if any, did you
19	have with A force during the period preceding
20	September 1943?
21	A By myself, none.
22	Q From whence did you receive the inform-
23	ation as to the description of the conditions
24	under which they worked or the treatment accorded
25	them?

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A For about a week in, I think September
1943, fivé hunred of the men of A force were
sharing our camp at Songkrai with us. I compared
notes with Colonel Anderson, V. C., and with Captain
Drower, the interpreter, formerly one of my own
officers. Also I spoke to many of the other offi-
cers and men.

Q What personal knowledge do you have concerning the building of the military airdrome at Victoria Point in Burma?

A My own knowledge is limited to what a force told me, and the fact that the sirdrome is still there. It was pointed out to me from the air the other day.

Q What do you know, actually, of the prisoners of war who were detained at camp Kanchanaburi from F and H forces?

A F and H forces were together at camp Kanchanaburi, or Kanburi, in October and November 1943.

25

22

V	1	Q How many men were assigned to maintenance
) L	2	work?
<u>.</u> 2.	3 `	A As many as we wanted. We finished our job.
	4	Q How long did you remain there?
<i>[</i> 9	5,	A Between two and three weeks by which time
1 .	6	the whole of H Force had gone to Singapore and all
1	7	F Force except for our sick.
	8	Q What were you doing between December, 1942,
	9	and April, 1943?
	10	A I resumed my duties as liaison officer for
	11	the whole of the prisoner of war camp at Changi, the
	12	only difference being that I was in a more responsible
	13	position as I had to do the liaison myself, not, I
	14	mean, act as assistant to a more senior officer doing
	15	it.
	16	Q Was F Force, through its entirety, on rail-
,	17	road construction under the Prisoner of War Adminis-
	18	tration of Malaya?
	19	A For administration, yes.
	20	Q What knowledge did you have as pertaining
	21	to the forces under the jurisdiction of the Siam POW?
	22	I should have added the word "administration" to the
	23	question.
	24	A Tiem and week to Mare 1042. I was in daile

For one week in May, 1943, I was in daily

contact with the prisoner of war headquarters

1	
1	at Tarsoe Camp which was in the same relation to
2	the GOC prismers of war of Siam as we were to the
3	GOC prisoners of war, Malaya, at Changi. Apart from
4	that, during the march my little headquarters group
5	made a point of contacting every POW camp along the
6	line, both on the journey up in April and May and
7	on the journey down in November and December. That
8	was like an unofficial inspection trip.
9	Q I take it, in the main, your work and
10	relationship was other than what you have stated
11	with the Malaya administration?
12	A- Chiefly with them and with the 9th Regiment
13	of Engineers.
14	Q What Japanese officers informed you the
15	lists should have to be changed to indicate there
16	were no deaths from dysentery?
17	A The one who informed me I don't blame for
18	it. The lists had been returned to him by the head-
19	quarters, Japanese headquarters, of F Force. My
20	more important
21	Q Just a moment, please. Would you read that
22	answer in English?
23	(Whereupon, the last answer was
24	read by the official court reporter.)
25	A (Continuing) My more important informant

1	ma
	was the interpreter called SAJI
2	unofficial Adjutant to Colonel
3	Q Have you had any exper
4	with reference to troops suffer
5	from prisoners of war?
6	A No.
7	. O Would you say it is ur
8	countries?
9	A Not in its mild form b
10	among white troops in the forms
11	Q Do you attribute all t
12	as being the direct result of J
1 3	furnish correct food and drugs?
14	A As regards the men cat
15	I could only blame the Japanese
16	place where this disease was pr
17	the appalling ravages of the di
13	had caught it, I blame the Japa
19	is no doubt whatever that reaso
20	better food would have saved th
21	hundreds of men in my force who
22	Q Were food and drugs av
23	A In small quantities fo
24	

I, who also acted as BANNO's headquarters. cience as an officer ring dysentery aside ncommon in tropical out most uncommon which it took there. he cases you mentioned apanese refusal to ching the disease, for placing us in a evalent. As regards sease after the men nese entirely. There nable nursing and e lives of many died of it. ailable at that time? r the Japanese, yes. Whether they had larger quantities within reach, I have no idea. I can hardly believe it.

reach" I mean in the area where we were.

2

What connection, if any, directly did you have with laborers of Asiatic races?

3

At Songkrai Camp, for instance, there were 4

5

several hundred Asiatic laborers in a hut about fifty

6

yards away from the long hospital hut which I described.

7

At the other Songkrei Camp the Astatic laborers'

open-trench latrine was within ten yards of the hut

occupied by the officers. They worked side by side

10

with our own men up and down the line. I saw them

11

every day. I also saw their unburied skeletons

12

lying at the side of the road with just the soles

13

of their feet left on them.

14

What camp are you referring to now, Colonel,

15

please?

evening.

16

A That was the road between Niiki and

17

Songkrai camp. Asiatics were expelled -- the sick

18

Asiatics were expelled from Niiki Camp and driven

19

up the road. My informant is Lieutenant Colonel

Dillon, then my senior officer, who was in Niiki

Camp when it happened and told me about it the same

22

23

I saw the bodies later. You were at Niiki at that time?

24

I had moved to Songkrai by then; so had

Dillon, but he had gone to Niiki to get our pay.

1	Q What month was that in 1943?
2	A August, I should say.
3	Q What officer of General ARIMURA did you
4	speak to regarding accommodations on the Siam-Burma
5	railroad camp?
6	A Captain MIYAZAKI and Lieutenant TANAKA.
7	Q Have you reason to believe that he deliber-
8	ately misrepresented the reason for the transfer?
9	A As regards the reason, I believe that he
ιο	did deliberately mislead me.
L1	Q Why should he do so, inasmuch as the orders
12	could be enforced regardless?
13	A Changi Camp was a very unusual one. There
14	were so many senior British, Australian and Allied
15	officers there; there was also there the general POW
16	administration. Sometimes so strong a collection of
17	senior officers could force an unpleasant interview
18	with the Japanese if the case was strong enough.
19	The Japanese did not, I think, relish such interviews.
20	My own impression is that they had committed them-
21	selves to sending out ten thousand prisoners of war
22	to finish the railway and when they heard that we
23	had so many sick, they weren't prepared to go back
24	on that to which they had committed themselves.
25	Anyway, it wasn't going to happen on their own

doorstep.

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guess to which we all arrived.

3

Q What was the function of the force comprising Lieutenant Colonel Harris, three other Lieutenant Colonels and yourself?

This is guesswork but the answer to the

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7

8

A When we got the orders for F Force we were told to form a small POW headquarters. The Japanese said that this POW headquarters would be placed in a central camp in close proximity to their own headquarters and that we were to administer and keep discipline among all the men of the force and make our complaints or suggestions to them.

9

Q Where did you live and how were you treated by the Japanese?

not that we asked anything else or wanted it but

after we had been making a good many protests to

Colonel BANNO during May and July, he sent us away

from his headquarters at Niiki to the Songkrai Camp

from which we continued to send our protests to him

and recommendations as opportunity afforded, but he

was troubled with us less. But we still received,

naturally, continual reports from the officers whom

Colonel Harris had appointed as POW Commanders of

Almost exactly like any other prisoners,

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each of the camps.

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/753fc8/

4 5

Q You mentioned various interviews with Japanese officials. Were you not free to make these trips?

A We did get around to the various camps but it was not made easy for us by the Japanese. Personally, I used to walk out of one camp a few miles along the road to the next one and argue it out afterwards.

Q Were you usually given a hearing by the Japanese in these matters?

A On the whole, I was. More so -- On the whole more than all but a very few others.

Q What was the manner of the cooperation received by you from the Japanese on these requests?

I never failed to stop a bashing. Ultimately I could train them -- train them up so that they stopped bashings in the particular camp where I was. The trouble was the difficulty of getting around to enough places. In the end I got the Korean guards very well trained and they appreciated that we happened to be on the same side, the argument being, of course, the obvious one that Burma had just been given her independence by the Japanese and Korea not yet. As a result, the Koreans in the last few weeks

1	we were up there made it more than a Japanese life
2	was worth to hit one of our troops. That applies
3	only to Songkrai other Songkrai camps. In other
4	places I cannot say as much for the Koreans.
5	Q In what manner did you personnaly travel
6	from Singapore to Banpong?
7	A In a steel roofed boxcar normally used for
8	carrying rice.
9	THE PRESIDENT: It is now four o'clock.
10	We will recess until half-past nine tomorrow morning.
11	(Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
12	was taken until Wednesday, 18 September, 1946,
13	at 0930.)
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