

26 SEPTEMBER 1946

I N D E X
of
WITNESSES
(none)

I N D E X
of
EXHIBITS

<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
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1 Thursday, 26 September, 1946

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12
13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

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18 - - -

19
20 (English to Japanese and Japanese
21 to English interpretation was made by the
22 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Caudle.

4 MR. CAUDLE: If it please the Court, may I
5 call the Court's attention to prosecution document
6 No. 4029-F, which is in evidence as exhibit 548.
7 This document purports to be a telegram from Ambassador
8 Ott to the German Foreign Office. In the second para-
9 graph of said document, Mr. Ott refers to a 24-man com-
10 mission of which the defendant SHIRATORI was a member
11 as a representative for foreign political matters.

12 We have endeavored to try to learn the names
13 of the members of this commission, but have been unable
14 to do so. I wonder if I would be out of order in request-
15 ing that the prosecution afford the Court and the defense
16 the name of the commission, its members, and president,
17 if anyone had that position.

18 THE PRESIDENT: The less they say about it the
19 better for you. Why do you want to supplement their
20 evidence?

21 MR. CAUDLE: Well, sir, I just wanted to know
22 what we had before us and what to do to controvert it,
23 if anything.

24 THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution can please
25 themselves about that. We give them no direction.

1 Mr. Cunningham.

2 MR. CUNNINGHAM: If the Tribunal please, yes-
3 terday I made an objection to the introduction of
4 political documents and telegrams, and in response to
5 the inquiry addressed to the prosecution as to what
6 provision under the Charter the documents were intro-
7 duced, the Court volunteered the information that the
8 documents are admitted under authority of Article 13,
9 Section b, Item (1).

10 THE PRESIDENT: Well, "c," I think I said. That
11 may be wrong, too. I did not look at it. I relied on
12 my memory. I think I said "c."

13 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Now, I respectfully call the
14 Tribunal's attention to the specific wording of
15 Article 13, Section b, Item (1).

16 THE PRESIDENT: Not "b;" "b" is about
17 relevance.

18 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Well, now, wait until I check
19 here.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We will have to check you first.

21 MR. CUNNINGHAM: I believe the Court said
22 Article 13, Section c, Item (1).

23 THE PRESIDENT: That is one heading. There
24 may be others. However, we stand on that.

25 MR. CUNNINGHAM: May I submit one--

1 THE PRESIDENT: By the way, before you go
2 any further: If the Charter said nothing about the
3 rules of evidence or what could be admitted, it is the
4 law, as I understand it, after taking the advice of
5 the most highly placed counsel in the country, Ex-
6 Lord Chancellors, Ex-Lord Masters and Attorney
7 Generals, that the rules of evidence do not apply in
8 these proceedings against enemy property or against
9 enemy subjects. The rules of evidence, the strict
10 rules of evidence, have no application in prize pro-
11 ceedings. My information was given to me before I
12 became a member of this Tribunal; so that even if you
13 were right on this point you are raising, and you are
14 probably wrong, the matter would be purely academic.

15 In any event, we are not going to allow our
16 decision to be reopened by you.

17 I will read Article 13c(1). It applies to a
18 document without proof of its issuance or signature
19 which appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or
20 issued by any department of any government, whether it
21 be the Japanese or any other government.

22 At page 6,323 of the record, I am reported
23 to have said: "The document is clearly within
24 Article 13c(1) of the Charter."
25

 MR. CUNNINGHAM: With all due respect to what

1 your Honor has just said, may I make the point which I
2 had in view, and that is to emphasize the one feature
3 of this article which I think is very pertinent, which
4 your Honor has passed over?

5 THE PRESIDENT: We will read Article 13 first.

6 Article 13 provides: "Evidence. Admissibility.
7 The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of
8 evidence. It shall. . . admit any evidence which it
9 deems to have probative value." Any evidence which it
10 deems to have probative value. Then it goes on in
11 Article c to state: "Specific evidence admissible.
12 In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope
13 of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence
14 may be admitted."

15 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Now, may I now read the
16 sentence which I believe embraces my point?

17 THE PRESIDENT: You may.

18 MR. CUNNINGHAM: I respectfully call the Tri-
19 bunal's attention to the specific wording, and empha-
20 size that the documents permitted therein are armed
21 forces documents and not governmental or political docu-
22 ments.

23 THE PRESIDENT: The members of the Tribunal
24 have already discussed that particular phrase, and come
25 to the conclusion that the interpretation I put on it

1 is correct. But I repeat again, we have a duty to
2 admit any evidence we think has probative value; and
3 the documents specified in Article 13c(1) are only
4 instances and are not an exhaustive category.

5 I further emphasize that if the Charter was
6 silent, if Article 13 did not appear in it, the rules
7 of evidence would not bind us.

8 Mr. Hyde.

9 MR. HYDE: May it please the Tribunal, prose-
10 cution documents 4042-A, 4037-A, 4037-C, and 4038-A
11 are offered in evidence.

12 Document 4042-A is a telegram from the German
13 Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 21 November 1940. The per-
14 son to whom it was addressed is not indicated. It was
15 found in the files of the German Foreign Office.

16 Document 4037-A is a telegram from the German
17 Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 6 February 1941. The
18 addressee is not indicated. It was found in the files
19 of the German Foreign Office.

20 Document 4037-C is a telegram from the German
21 Ambassador in Tokyo for the Reichs Foreign Minister
22 personally. It is dated 17 February 1941.

23 Document 4038-A is a telegram from Boltze, an
24 official in the German Embassy in Tokyo, dated 12 March
25 1941. The name of the addressee does not appear. This

1 telegram was found in the files of the German Foreign
2 Office.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 4042-A will receive exhibit No. 563; document 4037-A,
6 exhibit No. 564; document 4037-C, exhibit No. 565;
7 document No. 4038-A, exhibit No. 566.

8 (Whereupon, the documents above
9 referred to were marked prosecution's exhibits
10 No. 563, 564, 565 and 566, and were received
11 in evidence.)

12 MR. HYDE: These documents relate to French
13 Indo-China and Thailand, and are used in this phase
14 of the case to show the execution with German aid of
15 strategic plans which finally culminated in the use of
16 French Indo-China and Thailand as a springboard for the
17 launching of an attack against Singapore, as will be
18 shown by documents presently to be offered.

19 I will read exhibit 563, telegram from Ott,
20 dated 21 November 1940.

21 (Reading) "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process).
22 "Tokyo, 21 November 1940. Arrival, 21 Novem-
23 ber 1940."

24 It is marked "Urgent" and "Secret."

25 "I. The Vice Foreign Minister informed me

1 today regarding the situation in Thailand, that
2 the Thailand Prime Minister, as well as the American
3 Government have denied alleged negotiations for an
4 alliance. However, British and American Amba-
5 sadors in Bangkok are working energetically to win
6 over Thailand for the Anglo-Saxon Powers. The
7 Japanese Government has to-day proposed to Thai-
8 land that she limit her territorial claims on
9 Indo-China in some points, and would then be
10 ready to mediate between Thailand and Indo-China.
11 Should the occasion arise, Japan will request the
12 support of the German Government in dealing with
13 the French Government.

14 "II. The Vice Foreign Minister informed
15 me most confidentially that the Japanese Govern-
16 ment intends to send warships to Saigon. The French
17 Government will be informed that this will be a
18 friendly visit, but it will be, in fact, aimed as
19 a demonstration against Thailand.

20 "III. In the opinion of the Vice Foreign
21 Minister, if Thailand were to turn towards the Anglo-
22 Saxon camp there would be no considerable military
23 harm to Japan in consequence. This move could be
24 countered by the occupation of Saigon, and thereby
25 be compensated.

(Signed) "OTT"

1 I will now read exhibit 564, marked "To be
2 kept in locked file," dated "Tokyo, 6 February 1941;
3 Arrival, 6 February 1941." It is marked "Secret."

4 "Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now
5 that Japanese Government intends to obligate France
6 and Thailand by a secret agreement, during the negotia-
7 tions beginning here on February 7 concerning settle-
8 ment of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to
9 make no political or military agreement with a third
10 power. Vice Foreign Minister added that this obliga-
11 tion, as far as it concerns France, would, of course,
12 apply only to Indo-China. He supposes that the Govern-
13 ment of the Reich welcomes the Japanese action because,
14 in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, it is directed
15 towards eliminating the British-American influence in
16 an important area of the Greater East Asia sphere, as
17 much as possible. The Vice Foreign Minister requested
18 notification of the Reichs Government, particularly for
19 the reason that the French Government might possibly
20 raise objections by referring to the German-French
21 Armistice Agreements.

22 "The Vice Foreign Minister will give the same
23 information to the Italian Ambassador."

24 I will now read a part of exhibit 565.

25 "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process). To be kept

1 in locked file. Tokyo, 17 February 1941; Arrival,
2 17 February 1941.

3 "For the Reichs Minister personally."

4 Now I will turn to the end of the next to
5 the last paragraph, the second sentence from the end.

6 "Negotiations proceeded not without difficul-
7 ties on account of the excessive demands of Thailand.
8 The Japanese Government is at present working on a
9 proposal of a compromise which through me will be placed
10 at the disposal of the Reichsminister in the next few
11 days with the request to influence the Vichy regime
12 in the direction of acceptance of the proposal through
13 mediation of the Reich Government."

14 It is signed "Ott."

15 I will now read exhibit 566.

16 "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process). To be
17 kept in locked file.

18 "Tokyo, 12 March 1941; Arrival, 12 March 1941.

19 "Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI just visited
20 me and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister
21 the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for
22 the extraordinarily valuable and effective support of
23 the Japanese mediation in the dispute between Thailand
24 and French Indo-China.

25 "Signed Boltze."

1 Prosecution document 4042-C, a telegram
2 from the German Ambassador in Tokyo for the Reichs-
3 minister, dated 19 December 1940; 4042-D, a telegram
4 from the German Ambassador in Tokyo for the Reichs-
5 minister, dated 13 December 1940, and 4037-B, a tele-
6 gram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo to the Reichs-
7 minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 10 February 1941,
8 are presented for introduction in evidence.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
11 No. 4042-C will receive exhibit No. 567; document
12 No. 4042-D, exhibit No. 568; document No. 4037-B,
13 exhibit No. 569.

14 (Whereupon, the documents above
15 referred to were marked prosecution's exhibits
16 No. 567, 568 and 569, and were received in
17 evidence.)

18 MR. HYDE: These documents are used for the
19 purpose of showing that the execution of strategic
20 plans in the area south of China was coordinated with
21 an unprecedented trip by the Japanese Foreign Minister
22 to Germany for conferences with leading German diplo-
23 matic, military and industrial leaders.

24 I will read exhibit 567.
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1 "Telegram

2 "(Secret Cipher Process)

3 "To be kept in locked file

4 "Tokyo, 19 December 1940 11.30 hours

5 "Arrival, 19 December 1940 22.15 hours

6 "Most urgent!

7 "For the Reichsminister

8 "The Foreign Minister is considering, so
9 he told me, to accept in the near future the invitation
10 of the Reich Foreign Minister to come to Berlin.
11 He is thinking of arriving there in the second
12 half of January, to make a short visit to Rome
13 from Germany, if possible stay in Moscow and return
14 to Tokyo at the end of February. Prime Minister
15 approves plan and would like to obtain the Emperor's
16 sanction for a longer absence of the Foreign Minister.
17 The Foreign Minister emphasized to me his need to
18 make a strong gesture in favor of the Tripartite
19 Pact and if possible, to personally overcome the
20 deadlock in the negotiations with Russia and China.
21 The Diet /session/ beginning in January could post-
22 pone its foreign policy debate until the return of
23 the Foreign Minister.

24 "I have the impression that the Foreign
25 Minister would like to enhance the weight of his

1 policy and himself through the conversation with
2 the Reichs Foreign Minister and an eventual recep-
3 tion by the Fuehrer and hopes with German help to
4 set into motion the stalled negotiations with
5 Russia. In my opinion his plan is entirely in
6 our interest. The journey would make a strong
7 impression on world politics, add weight to the
8 Tripartite Pact centered in Berlin, would strengthen
9 the attitude of the Foreign Minister towards America
10 through the conversation in Berlin, and strengthen
11 the German impression and would open up the possi-
12 bility of a conversation with Moscow. Against this
13 advantage, in my opinion, the extended absence of
14 the leader of the Japanese foreign policy would
15 not be of consequence since the armed forces,
16 especially the army, will meanwhile reliably heed
17 the policy of the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign
18 Minister would presumably be thankful for German
19 encouragement of his plan. I, therefore, suggest
20 to empower me to transmit a corresponding attitude
21 of the Reichs Foreign Minister."

22 (Signed) "OTT"

23 I will now read exhibit 568:

24 "Telegram

25 "To be kept in locked file.

1 "(Secret Cipher Process)

2 "Tokyo, 31 December 1940 9.10 hours

3 "Arrival, 31 December 1940 16.55 hours

4 "No. 1459 of 31 December

5 "Most Urgent!

6 "Re Telegram No. 1171 x) of the thirtieth

7 "x) BRAM

8 "For the Reichsminister.

9 "I transmitted to the Foreign Minister
10 on 24 December according to instructions No. 1154 x)
11 the information of the Reichs Foreign Minister, x)
12 RAM 381 which visibly delighted him himself, and
13 asked for a speedy reply. The Foreign Minister
14 today, after the conclusion of the cabinet changes
15 of the last few days, made a report to the Emperor,
16 who received the plan kindly but reserved his
17 decision. The Foreign Minister, who again assured
18 me what great store he sets by the accomplishment
19 of the journey, plans to get himself given the most far-
20 reaching possible authority from the cabinet, and
21 above all the War Minister. He held out the pros-
22 pect of a final answer in the middle of January.

23 "The Foreign Minister holds it expedient
24 that before his arrival in Berlin Ambassador OSHIMA
25 should have already presented his credentials. As

1 OSHIMA informs me, he will probably arrive in
2 Berlin at the end of January. The Foreign Minister
3 would then follow after an interval of 7 to 10 days."

4 (Signed) "OTT"

5 I will now read exhibit 569:
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1 "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

2 "To be kept in locked file

3 "Tokyo, 10 February 1941 01.10

4 "Arrival, 10 February 1941 2400

5 "No. 196 of 10.2.41 Most Urgent

6 "For the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs."

7 I will now eliminate the four lines of references
8 in the telegram and read the body of the telegram.

9 "Foreign Minister MATSUOKA has just told me
10 with obvious joy that the Emperor, on the Prime
11 Minister's representation, granted him permission
12 to accept the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation
13 to visit Berlin. He intends presuming an agreement
14 to this from the other side to depart after the
15 conclusion of the Thailand negotiations about 25
16 February and to reach Berlin between 12 and 15
17 March. He has set aside 12 days in all for the
18 conversations in Berlin and a supplementary visit to
19 Rome and Moscow. Consequently he would arrive in
20 Tokyo again about April 10. If need be, his stay in
21 Europe could be prolonged a few days. However, the
22 Foreign Minister would have to be in Tokyo again at
23 the latest by April 15.

24 "He will probably be accompanied by the head
25 of the European Division, Ministerial Director,

1 SAVALOTO, Director NAKANISHI, of the South Manchurian
2 Railway Co., whom he knows intimately, further by
3 the Legation Secretaries KASE and HOGEN, Attache
4 SAIONJI, grandchild of the last GENRO who died
5 recently, one younger officer from the army and the
6 navy each, as well as two cipher operators.

7 "The Foreign Minister gave me the following
8 details re the most important questions which he
9 would like to discuss in Berlin:

10 "I. Attitude of the partners of the Tri-
11 Partite Pact towards America.

12 "1.) Diplomatic influence against entry into
13 war."

14 That is marked "1.)" under the "I." I just
15 read.

16 "The Foreign Minister is endeavoring to
17 prevent America's entry into the war in the spirit
18 of the pact. To this end he has instructed Ambass-
19 ador NOMURA to dwell most emphatically on Japan's
20 unconditional loyalty to the pact and her military
21 and economic might/in talks/ with President ROOSEVELT,
22 and point out the senselessness of an American entry
23 into the war. America could not stop the defeat
24 of England by entering the war. On the contrary,
25 by fighting Germany and Japan, who alone are able to

1 create an order in Europe and East Asia necessary
2 even for America in the long run, she would act against
3 her own interest.

4 "2.) Preventative attack against SINGAPORE.

5 "Should, in spite of this, America's entry
6 into war appear unavoidable the Japanese Government
7 considers a preventative attack against Singapore
8 to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's
9 waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view
10 of the far reaching political and military consequences
11 of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained
12 that Japan would undertake such a decision only in
13 complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime,
14 the armed forces are taking the measures necessary
15 to be ready for war.

16 "II. Termination of the China conflict.

17 "The Foreign Minister has continued his
18 highly confidential sounding of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.
19 The latter was showing signs of greater readiness
20 for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing
21 danger from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign
22 Minister expects favorable progress in his secret
23 negotiations with Chiang-Kai-Shek from the Berlin
24 conversations, although Japan had to decide to rec-
25 ognize WANG-CHING-WEI."

1 I will omit reading the paragraphs under the
2 heading, "III. Relations to Russia," as they will be
3 considered in a later phase of the case.

4 The telegram I just read is signed "OTT."

5 I offer in evidence prosecution documents
6 4037-D and 4037-E. The former is a report of a con-
7 versation between Ambassador OSHIMA and Weizsacker,
8 and the latter is an extract from a report of a con-
9 versation between Ambassadors OSHIMA and Ribbentrop.
10 They are used for the purpose of demonstrating
11 how close the collaboration between Japan and Germany
12 was and how far the execution of the aggressive plan
13 had advanced at this early date.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
16 4037-D will receive No. 570, and document 4037-E
17 will receive exhibit No. 571.

18 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 570 and No. 571 were received in evidence.)

20 I will read exhibit No. 570:

21 "Berlin, 22 February 1941"--

22 In the upper right hand corner appears the
23 word "today."

24 "Secret

25 "(To be presented before OSHIMA's arrival)

1 "The Japanese Ambassador visited me this
2 morning. We briefly developed his viewpoints regard-
3 ing the future Japanese foreign policy. OSHIMA
4 arranged the three tasks of Japan in East Asia
5 according to their urgency from north to south.

6 "1.)

7 "Russia

8 "OSHIMA emphasized the emotional side of this
9 question with the Japanese public. The latter would
10 not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with
11 Russia if real sacrifices were to be brought for this.
12 But perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia could be
13 reached without sacrifices and would also be sufficient
14 to relieve Japan in the north.

15 "Speed is required.

16 "2.)

17 "China

18 "OSHIMA deplored that Japan had not settled
19 matters with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK long ago. A settlement
20 should now be found. There were two schools at present
21 in Tokyo, one which would directly agree with CHIANG
22 KAI-SHEK, the other which would put pressure on
23 CHIANG KAI-SHEK by giving preference to WANG CHING-
24 WEI. OSHIMA himself inclines toward the latter procedure.

25 "3.)

1 "British Possessions in East Asia."

2 "In this connection OSHIMA made military
3 statements concerning which it may be sufficient to
4 mention that OSHIMA considers it necessary to take
5 Hongkong first, which should not be very difficult.
6 Singapore has to be seized in grand style from the
7 sea and from the land.

8 "I expressed doubts to OSHIMA whether the
9 order of the problems, which he had mentioned, fits
10 the demand of the historic hour which would probably
11 never return. OSHIMA replied that he had energetically
12 advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should
13 not let slip by opportunities that would determine
14 the fate of Japan for centuries.

15 "I suppose that OSHIMA's trend of thought
16 when he visits Fuschl will be within the framework
17 depicted above.

18 "(Signed) WEIZSACKER."
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1 I will read exhibit No. 571. It is marked,
2 "To be kept in locked file," and there is a marginal
3 note indicating it was transmitted under No. 223 to
4 Tokyo.

5 "Telegram" ,

6 (Open)

7 "Special train, 28 February 1941.

8 "Fuschl 27 February

9 "Diplogerme Tokyo*)

10 "Secret note for department heads.

11 "For your purely personal information!

12 "The Japanese Ambassador OSHIMA visited me at
13 Fuschl on February 23. The discussion, as always,
14 proceeded particularly friendly and intimately. As
15 regards details, it took the following course:

16 "To start with, I made a review of the general
17 political situation. After war with England had become
18 inevitable, the Fuehrer decided upon an agreement with
19 Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. In the long run,
20 the agreement also lay in the interest of Japan,
21 which is interested in the speediest possible victory
22 for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-
23 Japanese alliance, the further development of this
24 /agreement/ must follow. For Germany, there are no
25 more military problems of any kind on the continent.

1 Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm
2 foothold anywhere on the continent - in the Mediter-
3 ranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's hopes for
4 blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain. England
5 must be forced to realize that she had no prospects
6 of victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely
7 watching developments in France, was not interested in
8 occupying the whole country, also lest French Africa
9 should fall to De Gaulle. France's might was broken
10 for all time. Garrison the Occupied Countries was
11 merely a police function. Peace reigned everywhere
12 and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had
13 sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw mater-
14 ials had no practical significance. In spring 240
15 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive
16 divisions were ready for use. Rumania, Hungary and
17 Slovakia had already entered the Tri-Partite Pact.
18 Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand. The Turkish-
19 Bulgarian declaration demonstrated a definite Turkish
20 withdrawal from military developments in the Balkans
21 and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would
22 take any action in the event of a German intervention
23 in Greece. Jugoslavian statesmen had recently expressed
24 their desire for peace by their visit to Germany.
25 Jugoslavia must come over to our camp sooner or later.

1 Consequently the Balkans were in our hands. The
2 English would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had
3 suffered reverses. She had attacked Greece without
4 our knowledge and with poor military preparation.
5 However the Italian front in Greece was now stable.
6 General WAVELL's advance in North Africa was to be
7 explained by the fear of tanks among the Italians, who
8 had not been sufficiently schooled for fight against
9 tanks. We had not sent an organization /verband/ to
10 Libya, to bring about a change there if possible.
11 The Italian people stood firmly behind the DUCE: we
12 were helping with the supply of raw materials. We
13 stood on good and intimate terms with Spain. Sooner
14 or later she would come over to us openly; she hes-
15 itated still at present because of the difficulties
16 of her food supply. With Russia relations were good.
17 Moreover, in view of our military strength, she would
18 beware of taking any action against us! STALIN was a
19 cool and clever politician. Germany was viewing
20 matters in the East with supreme ease. A Russo-German
21 conflict - not wished by us - would mean a gigantic
22 German victory and an end to the Soviet regime.

23
24 "In the war against England our bombs had created
25 serious destruction, despite bad weather, which was
having a strongly retarding effect on English war

1 production, etc. We hoped to continue to destroy
2 much more with our bombardment than America could
3 replace. From the beginning of March onward the use
4 of U-boats will be increased many times. We would
5 then deliver fearful blows on England through a com-
6 bination of the Luftwaffe and U-boats. English imports
7 must be reduced to a definite minimum, below English
8 subsistence level, through sinkings, to render the
9 situation catastrophic. Invasion of England was pre-
10 pared, but depended on various factors. ROOSEVELT
11 was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan.
12 However it was in our interests to keep America out of
13 the war. If America did come in to the war despite
14 this, she could not wage it militarily. The vast
15 extent of the oceans lying between us and America made
16 this impossible. Practically it would amount only to
17 the building of American air bases in England. However
18 in air warfare we were in a strategically more favor-
19 able position vis-a-vis England. We were not only
20 equal to a combination of the British and American
21 air forces but superior at any time. The number of
22 pilots was unlimited, likewise the aircraft production
23 potential. Giant reserves of material were stored up,
24 likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated
25 on U-boat fleets, air fleets and flak. The war was

1 won today, militarily, economically, and politically;
2 we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and for
3 England to ask for peace soon. In this connection
4 co-operation with Japan was important. In her most
5 personal interests she should attack as soon as pos-
6 sible. The decisive blow would be an attack on
7 Singapore, to eliminate England's key position in
8 East Asia and to secure for Japan a position in East
9 Asia which it could only win in war. The occupation
10 of Singapore must take place with lightning speed, if
11 at all possible without a declaration of war and in
12 the middle of peace, to contribute to a speedy termin-
13 ation of the war and to keep America out of the war.

14 "Ambassador OSHIMA replied, that preparations
15 for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by
16 the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must
17 be made not only for war against England but also
18 against America. Japan's supply of raw materials,
19 especially re: steel and iron, was difficult. Con-
20 struction of 45,000 ton ships had been suspended and
21 instead they were building submarines, torpedo boats
22 and speed boats for the defense of the islands. The
23 moment for the occupation of Singapore must be co-
24 ordinated with operations in Europe. The attack must
25 come from the land, as it was too difficult from the

1 sea. The occupation of Hongkong and the Philippines
2 had been provided for in case of need.

3 "I remarked that it would be better to delay the
4 Philippines project and to proceed with the surprise
5 capture of Singapore alone. In case of a corresponding
6 explanation and motivation of the occupation, America
7 would stay out of the war. Three reasons for speedy
8 action were of importance:

9 "(1) Occupation of Singapore would mean a
10 decisive blow against the core of the British Empire.

11 "(2) America would remain out of the war, as
12 she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet
13 west of Hawaii. If American interests were respected,
14 even ROOSEVELT's argument re: prestige for entering
15 the war would be eliminated. If she did enter the
16 war, America would have to look on powerlessly, how
17 Japan would take away the Philippines from her.

18 "(3) Japan must secure for herself for the
19 coming New Order in the world that position which she
20 hoped to have at the conclusion of the peace. England
21 would never give up Singapore through negotiations,
22 but rather continue fighting to the last. Ambassador
23 OSHIMA agreed completely with this line of thought.
24 He declared himself willing to do everything to realize
25 this policy. He remarked that he had asked the

1 Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the
2 most concrete possible proposals. I told OSHIMA it
3 would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister brought
4 with him a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so
5 that we could then discuss all the details here. I
6 explained further that the closest co-operation in all
7 spheres, particularly re: news service and the press,
8 was necessary for the common prosecution of the war,
9 such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania,
10 Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria in an exemplary. The
11 Ambassador intends to set up a program with out repre-
12 sentatives for the intensification of Japanese propa-
13 ganda. Concerning the U.S.A., I remarked that blunt
14 speaking should be employed appropriately vis-a-vis
15 them. The U.S. people did not like National Socialism,
16 but on the other hand, were against entering the war,
17 so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U.S. people
18 felt instinctively that ROOSEVELT and the Jewish wire
19 pullers wanted to pull them into war without reason.
20 Therefore a clear and strong, but not aggressive,
21 policy should be pursued toward the U.S.A. The U.S.
22 people must know that if they had aggressive desires,
23 an iron front of determined peoples, which practically
24 embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must
25 meet the English propaganda of misrepresentation with

1 the closest co-operation. For this a continuous
2 exchange of ideas in speeches and utterances about
3 principles was necessary. In this connection I
4 referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's
5 readiness for mediation for peace and the declaration
6 of the Jap. ambassador in Washington NOMURA, on
7 Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the
8 war. To my reference that we had already made a
9 great contribution to the shaping of the fate of the
10 Allied Nations through the victory on the continent,
11 also that in the future, on account of geographical
12 factors, we would have to bear the brunt of the war,
13 while Japan would only have to fight against the
14 periphery of the British Empire, and that Japan must
15 now seize the gigantic opportunity being offered her,
16 and should not evade the final consequence - OSHIMA
17 replied that Japan was determined to maintain her
18 Imperial position. As he confidentially told me,
19 KONOYE and MATSUOKA thought as he did and were for an
20 early attack on Singapore.
21

22 "I then discussed the tasks of reconstruction in
23 Europe and East Asia facing the powers of the Tri-
24 Partite Pact after the war. Over centralization was
25 to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution
on the basis of equality must be found. A free

1 exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take
2 place between the great spheres of interest, the
3 European-African sphere of power under the leadership
4 of Germany and Italy and the East Asia sphere of
5 interest under the leadership of Japan. Japan could
6 conduct direct trade and conclude trade agreements
7 with the independent states of the western hemisphere
8 as before, and likewise Germany and Italy with the
9 independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power,
10 such as China, Thailand, Indo-China, etc. In both
11 economic spheres preference should be given over
12 third powers. Ministerial Director SOHLTAT's task
13 was limited to concluding a trade agreement. The
14 general outline of the new trade policy would be
15 determined in Berlin according to agreement by the
16 Economic commission of the Tri-Partite Pact. Following
17 this up, I pointed out the possible necessity on the
18 grounds of renewed U.S. impudence for common action
19 to open the eyes of the U.S. people to the situation
20 and possibly bring about a change in public opinion
21 in favor of isolation. I indicated the problem express-
22 ly as being theoretical and in no way acute at present.
23 A common break in diplomatic relations with the U.S.
24 by the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact was to be
25 considered should the occasion arise in the course of

1 this action.

2 (Signed) "RIBBENTROP."

3 I offer in evidence prosecution document
4 4037-G. This is a telegram dated 27 February 1941
5 from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Tokyo.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 4037-G will receive exhibit No. 572.

9 ("Whereupon, the document above
10 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 572 and was received in evidence.)

12 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 572:

13 "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

14 "To be kept in locked file.

15 "Fuschl, 27 February 1941

16 "Arrival, 27 February 1941

17 "R.A.M. 49/R to Foreign Office Berlin

18 "1. Diplogerma Tokyo

19 "2. For Cipher Bureau.

20 "Secret note for department heads.

21 "For the Ambassador personally.

22 "I ask you to work with all the means at your
23 command to the end that Japan takes possession of
24 Singapore as soon as possible by surprise. You will
25 learn everything else from the information telegram

"Concerning Collaboration with Japan"

"The Fuehrer has issued the following directives for the cooperation with Japan:

"1. The aim of the cooperation based on the Three-Power Pact, must be to bring Japan, as soon as possible, to active operations in the Far East. Large English forces will hereby be immobilized, the center of the U.S.A. interest will be diverted to the Pacific.

"In view of the still undeveloped state of war mobilization on the part of her opponents, the prospects of success for Japan will be the greater, the earlier she intervenes. The 'Barbarossa' enterprise provides especially favorable political and military prerequisites for this purpose.

"2. For the preparation of the cooperation, it is necessary to strengthen the Japanese war potential by all means.

"For this purpose, the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces must meet in a comprehensive and generous way, the demands of the Japanese concerning the communication of German warfare and combat experiences and assistance in matters of war economy and technics. Reciprocity is desired, but must not render the negotiations more difficult. Those requests by the Japanese which might effect the

1 conduct of the war in a short time must naturally be
2 put in the foreground.

3 "In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the
4 decision for himself.

5 "3. The alignment of the mutual plans of oper-
6 ation is a matter for the High Command of the Navy.

7 "For this, the following guiding principles are
8 to be followed:

9 "a. It must be emphasized that it is the common
10 goal of the war to force England down rapidly in order
11 to keep the U.S.A. out of the war. As for the rest,
12 Germany has neither political nor military or economic
13 interests in the Far East, which might give rise to
14 reservations with regard to the intentions of the
15 Japanese.

16 "b. The great successes achieved by Germany in
17 economic warfare, makes it particularly advisable to
18 employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose.
19 Moreover any possibility of assistance for German
20 economic warfare must be utilized.

21 "c. The raw material situation of the Treaty
22 Powers requires that Japan seize those territories
23 which she needs, especially if the U.S. intervenes,
24 for the continuation of the war. The deliveries of
25 crude rubber must be carried on even after Japan

1 enters the war, since they are of vital importance
2 for Germany.

3 "d. The conquest of Singapore, England's key
4 position in the Far East, would mean a decisive
5 success for the active warfare of the Three Powers.

6 "Besides, attacks on other systems of bases of
7 the English sea power -- of the American sea power
8 only if the entrance of the U.S.A. into the war cannot
9 be avoided -- will serve to shake the enemy's power
10 system there and, just as in the case of attacks on
11 the sea lanes, will bind essential forces of every
12 kind. (Australia).

13 "A date for the beginning of discussions on
14 operational matters cannot as yet be set.

15 "4. The military committees to be formed in
16 accordance with the Three-Power Pact are to deal only
17 with such questions which concern equally the three
18 participating powers. In the first place the tasks
19 of economic warfare will belong into that group.

20 "It is up to the 'Main Committee' assisted by
21 the High Command of the Wehrmacht to make decisions
22 in individual cases.

23 "5. No hint must be given to the Japanese con-
24 cerning the operation 'Barbarossa'.

25 "The Chief of the High Command of the

1 "Wehrmacht

2 "Draft signed by Keitel."

3 The distribution indicates the following:

4 "Commander-in-Chief of the Army (General Staff
5 of the Army), 1st copy; Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
6 2d copy; Commander-in Chief of the Air Forces, 3d
7 copy; Wehrmacht Operations Staff, 4th copy; Office of
8 Foreign Counter Intelligence, 5th copy; Chief, Foreign
9 Countries, 6th and 7th copies;" then there is indicated
10 distribution for the 8th, 9th, 10th to 14th copies.

11 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
12 fifteen minutes.

13 (Whereupon, at 1047, a recess
14 was taken until 1105, after which the pro-
15 ceedings were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: I present prosecution's document
5 4013 for introduction into evidence. It is a report
6 of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy to
7 Hitler.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
10 No. 4013 will receive exhibit No. 574.

11 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned
12 document was marked prosecution's exhibit
13 No. 574 and received in evidence.)

14 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 574.

15 It is marked, "Top Secret," (Naval Operations
16 Staff), Only by Officer."

17 (Reading): Report of the Commander-in-Chief
18 of the Navy to the Fuehrer on 18 March at 1600 hours.

19 "(Present: Chief OKW, General Jodl, Com-
20 mander von Puttkamer).

21 "Examination No. 2.

22 "11.) Japan.

23 "Japan must take steps as soon as possible
24 to eliminate Singapore since the opportunity will
25 never again be as favorable (whole English fleet

1 contained; unpreparedness of the USA for war against
2 Japan; inferiority of the U. S. fleet to the Japanese
3 fleet). Japan is making preparations for this action,
4 but according to all statements made by Japanese of-
5 ficers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds
6 to land in England. Germany must therefore concen-
7 trate all her efforts on inducing Japan to act imme-
8 diately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East
9 Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England
10 are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch
11 East Indies).

12 "Japan wishes to avoid war against the USA
13 if possible. She can do so if she determinedly
14 takes Singapore soon.

15 "According to a statement of Admiral
16 NOMURA, Minister MATSUOKA has great misgivings about
17 the Russian question and will make inquiries particu-
18 larly about that.

19 "The C-in-C of the Navy recommends (in a
20 personal conversation with the Fuehrer) that MATSUOKA
21 be advised regarding the designs on Russia."

22 Prosecution's document 4038-C and 4038-B
23 are offered in evidence. The former is a report to
24 Ribbentrop outlining the course of the contemplated
25 conference with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, which it

1 was expected would take place in a few days. The
2 latter is a report to Ribbentrop concerning military
3 preparations in Japan by the German Ambassador to
4 Japan who had been recalled to Germany to be present
5 during the MATSUOKA conference.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 4038-C will receive exhibit No. 575; and document
9 No. 4038-B will receive exhibit No. 576.

10 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
11 ments were marked prosecution's exhibits Nos.
12 575 and 576, respectively.)

13 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 575.

14 (Reading): "Memorandum from WEIZSACKER
15 to the Reich Foreign Minister dated 24 March 1941.

16 "Confidential.

17 "Regarding the memoranda concerning MATSUOKA's
18 visit I note the following:

19 "1. The most important topic is naturally
20 the time of Japan's entry into the war against Eng-
21 land.

22 "In order to expedite this decision we still
23 have valuable concessions in our hands.

24 "(a) Our renunciation of claims to the
25 Netherland East Indies.

1 (b) Our renunciation of claims to our
2 former possessions in the South Sea, including those
3 under British mandate.

4 (c) Increased support of Japan's policy
5 in China (either attempts at mediation, or the
6 recognition of WANG-CHING-WEI).

7 "But I have the impression that Japan's
8 entry into war against England depends basically on
9 our further successes against England, and that the
10 above mentioned concessions would not play any great
11 part in it.

12 "2. MATSUOKA is still following the line
13 of an understanding with Russia and claims German
14 encouragement for this. A clear statement, which
15 course our relations to Russia may take is unavoi-
16 dable in order to protect him from surprises, and in
17 order to control Japanese policy through him after
18 his European journey. Private conversations with
19 other Japanese sources should be deferred.

20 "To the Reich Foreign Minister.

21 "Signed, WEIZSACKER. 24 March 1941."

22 I will now read exhibit No. 576.

23 In the upper left-hand corner appear the
24 words, "Ambassador Ott."

25 (Reading):

1 "Note on situation of Japan

2 for Reich Foreign Minister.

3 "According to inquiries with the Chief of
4 the Navy General Staff Admiral KONDO, the Navy is
5 vigorously preparing for an attack on Singapore.
6 Preparations were expected to be concluded by the
7 end of May. He expressed misgivings re:

8 "a) American guerrilla warfare by means
9 of submarines and aircraft from the Philippine Arch-
10 ipelago against the long route for raw materials
11 from Netherland East Indies and the Malay States to
12 Japan;

13 "b) The threat of two-fleet warfare,
14 should British fleet be able to transfer from the
15 Mediterranean to the Pacific.

16 "According to inquiries with Chief of the
17 General Staff, General SUGIYAMA, the Army was also
18 making preparations for an attack. Conclusion pre-
19 sumably also end of May.

20 "Conditions for accomplishment of this is
21 a free rear towards Russia.

22 "Ambassador SHIRATORI stressed also the
23 necessity to tie up the English fleet.

24 "Summarizing: The will to attack is present
25 in the Army and Navy, preparations for attack are in

1 progress, accomplishment possible if the Army's and
2 Navy's objections could be eliminated. Military
3 prospects favorable. Type of attack was not by a
4 naval attack from the sea, but by creation of a base
5 on shore, from where the air forces could smoke out
6 Singapore. In this way a first, quick result can be
7 achieved. Then the time needed for the actual capture
8 of the fortress would play a minor part. The effect-
9 iveness of the air forces is to be enhanced by the
10 allocation of a few experienced German dive bomber
11 specialists to the Japanese naval air forces. The
12 need for her rear to be left free by Russia, plays
13 a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and
14 was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia.
15 The possibility of creating this free rear by other
16 means is to be suggested to MATSUOKA. By this means
17 it could be avoided that, should the occasion arise,
18 the decision of an action against Singapore would be
19 put in the background, and that prominence be given
20 to the Russian question. As the rapprochement with
21 Russia is also sought in the interest of new crea-
22 tion of commercial relations with Germany, the des-
23 patch of the economic mission of WOHLTAT is quickly
24 to be carried out, in order to show Germany's good
25 will in economic relations.

1 progress, accomplishment possible if the Army's and
2 Navy's objections could be eliminated. Military
3 prospects favorable. Type of attack was not by a
4 naval attack from the sea, but by creation of a base
5 on shore, from where the air forces could smoke out
6 Singapore. In this way a first, quick result can be
7 achieved. Then the time needed for the actual capture
8 of the fortress would play a minor part. The effect-
9 iveness of the air forces is to be enhanced by the
10 allocation of a few experienced German dive bomber
11 specialists to the Japanese naval air forces. The
12 need for her rear to be left free by Russia, plays
13 a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and
14 was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia.
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16 means is to be suggested to MATSUOKA. By this means
17 it could be avoided that, should the occasion arise,
18 the decision of an action against Singapore would be
19 put in the background, and that prominence be given
20 to the Russian question. As the rapprochement with
21 Russia is also sought in the interest of new crea-
22 tion of commercial relations with Germany, the des-
23 patch of the economic mission of WOHLTAT is quickly
24 to be carried out, in order to show Germany's good
25 will in economic relations.

1 "Apart from this it might be recommended
2 to place German specialists for putting in working
3 order enterprises connected with war economy in con-
4 quered areas, at the disposal of Japan, in order to
5 maintain uninterruptedly the supply of raw materials
6 from Netherland East Indies and the Malay States,
7 should Japan occupy these areas.

8 "In the train, 25 March 1941."
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1 MR. HYDE (Continuing): Prosecution's docu-
2 ment 1340-B, an excerpt from the minutes of the con-
3 ference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign
4 Minister MATSUOKA on 27 March 1941; 4005, an excerpt
5 from the record of the conversation between the Reich
6 Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister
7 MATSUOKA in Berlin on 27 March 1941 --

8 THE PRESIDENT: Better complete the tender-
9 ing of these! They will not be accepted until
10 Mr. Cunningham is heard.

11 MR. HYDE: Document 4022, notes on the
12 conversation between the German Foreign Minister and
13 the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on 28 March 1941;
14 527, extracts from the report on the conversation be-
15 tween the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
16 Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in Berlin on 29
17 March 1941; 1376, extract from the report of the dis-
18 cussion between Reich Marshal Goering and the Japanese
19 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA at Karinhall on 29 March 1941;
20 532, extract from notes on the conversation between
21 the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA,
22 at which the Reich Foreign Minister was present in
23 Berlin on 4 April 1941; and then 528, an extract from
24 notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister
25 and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in Berlin

1 on 5 April 1941, are offered in evidence.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham.

3 MR. CUNNINGHAM: If the Tribunal please, it
4 would be much more convenient for the defense if the
5 prosecution would introduce the documents one at a
6 time instead of four or five. That is the first ob-
7 jection that I have; and the second is -- the second
8 objection is that I would like to call the attention
9 of the Court to the discrepancy in dates and to the
10 same objection that I had on Paul Schmidt's trans-
11 cription of the document that he took notes and
12 transcribed them from literal notes some time later.
13 The discrepancy in the dates and the documents as
14 the prosecutor read them would be very difficult to
15 detect unless it is called to your attention.

16
17 The third objection that I have is that the
18 documents are German documents and not Japanese, and
19 I call your attention to the distribution, which is
20 only to German and not to Japanese participants in
21 the conferences.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, your first objection is
23 really a protest with which we have considerable
24 sympathy, Mr. Cunningham. We do not favor a lot of
25 documents being put in at the same time, but there
may be some explanation why that should be done here.

1 Ordinarily, the prosecution do not follow
2 that course; so we will assume for the time being
3 that they have some good reason for following it
4 now. As to the dates, of course that is not really
5 a ground for objection, but a matter for noting by
6 the Court and for correction, if necessary.

7 Your third ground, that these German docu-
8 ments may never have come to the knowledge of the
9 accused, is met by the consideration that the ac-
10 cused are alleged to have conspired with others, and
11 that the acts and declarations of co-conspirators in
12 the course of carrying out the conspiracy are admissi-
13 ble against all.

14 The documents tendered are admitted on the
15 usual terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
17 No. 1340-B will receive exhibit No. 577; document
18 No. 4005 will receive exhibit No. 578; document No.
19 4022 will receive exhibit No. 579; document 527 will
20 receive exhibit No. 580; document 1376 will receive
21 exhibit No. 581; document No. 532 will receive exhibit
22 No. 582; document No. 528 will receive exhibit No. 583.

23 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
24 ments were marked prosecution's exhibits Nos.
25 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, and 583,

1 respectively, and received in evidence.)

2 MR. HYDE: If the Court please, these docu-
3 ments were grouped together and offered at one time
4 because they relate to the same general subject mat-
5 ter.

6 THE PRESIDENT: That is not convincing,
7 Mr. Hyde.

8 MR. HYDE: Each of these documents, your
9 Honor, is supported by the affidavit of the official
10 German interpreter, Dr. Paul O. Schmidt, although
11 many essential facts and numerous incriminating
12 inferences will appear from these documents. There
13 are two principal purposes for their introduction
14 into evidence.
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THE PRESIDENT: You realize now that we view with disfavor the introduction of a number of exhibits at the same time unless it is highly desirable that you should tender them all at the same time.

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MR. HYDE: If your Honor please, may I state the two reasons for which these are offered?

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THE PRESIDENT: Briefly.

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MR. HYDE: One, to show that the contemplated military aggression was planned in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, and, two, that the plan for the establishment of the so-called new order included the destruction of Great Britain and all countries which dared oppose them.

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15
THE PRESIDENT: It is so clear from earlier documents as to be hardly worth while re-stating.

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MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 577.

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"Minutes of the conference between the 'Fuehrer' and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the German Foreign Minister as well as Ambassadors Ott and OSHIMA on 27 March 1941.

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"America has three alternatives: She can arm herself, help Britain or wage war some place else. If she would help Britain she could not arm herself. If she would neglect Britain, this country would be knocked out and America would find herself alone

1 opposed to the powers of the Tri-partite Pact. But in
2 no case could America wage a war some place else.

3 "Therefore, a better opportunity for a joint
4 action of the Tripartite power than the one established
5 today will in all human possibility never again arise.
6 On the other hand it is clear to him that with every
7 historical act a risk has to be taken into consider-
8 ation."

9 I will omit reading the next full sentence.

10 "Such a moment will never occur again, it is
11 unique in history. He (the Fuehrer) admits that there
12 is a certain risk involved, but it is an exceptionally
13 small one at a time when Russia and Britain are elim-
14 inated and America is not yet prepared. If this
15 favourable moment would pass by and the European con-
16 flict would possibly end in a compromise, France and
17 Britain would recover in a few years. America would
18 join them as Japan's third enemy and Japan would sooner
19 or later be faced with the task after all of defending
20 the security of her living space in a battle against
21 those three nations.

22 "Militarily, too, there has not been since
23 the memory of man a situation relatively as favourable
24 as now, although the military difficulties resulting
25 from action should not be underestimated.

1 "Especially favorable is the fact that there
2 exists no conflicts of interests between Japan and
3 her Allies. Germany, which would satisfy her colonial
4 demands in Africa, is just as little interested in East
5 Asia as Japan is in Europe. This is the best basis for
6 cooperation between a Japanese East Asia and a German-
7 Italian Europe.

8 "On the other hand the cooperation of the
9 Anglo-Saxons never meant a real coalition but always
10 only a playing off of one against the other. Just
11 as much as Britain does not put up with the hegemony
12 of one nation in Europe, she would in East Asia play
13 off Japan, China and Russia against each other to
14 promote the interests of her own empire. The United
15 State would act just like Britain, she would inherit
16 the empire and replace British imperialism with
17 American imperialism.

18 "A better situation for joint action would
19 hardly ever again exist for a personal reason also. He
20 (the Fuehrer) has full confidence in himself, the
21 German nation stands unitedly back of him as with nobody
22 also in her previous history. He has the necessary
23 power of resolution in critical situations and, finally,
24 Germany is experiencing a tremendous series of suc-
25 cesses which is also unique in the world but need not

1 be repeated.

2 "In conclusion the Fuehrer pointed out that
3 his attitude toward Japan did not originate in the
4 year 1941. He has always been for cooperation with this
5 country. Ambassador OSHIMA knows that he (the Fuehrer)
6 has worked unflinchingly toward this goal for many years.
7 He is determined never again to deviate from this line.
8 As already mentioned, especially favorable for cooper-
9 ation is the fact that there are no conflicts in interest
10 between Japan and Germany. For interests in the long
11 run are indeed stronger than personalities and the will
12 of a Fuehrer, therefore they always endanger anew the
13 cooperation between nations if they are turned in op-
14 posite directions. In the case of Japan and Germany,
15 therefore, one can plan for the longest time on account
16 of the non-existence of such conflicts. This has been
17 his firm conviction since earliest youth. The Japanese,
18 German, and Italian nations would be highly successful
19 if they would draw the consequences from this present
20 unique situation.

21 "MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for his frank
22 statements which made the whole situation very clear
23 to him. Although he already has occupied himself
24 thoroughly with the arguments advanced by Hitler, he
25 would once again consider most thoroughly the arguments

1 mentioned.

2 "On the whole he agrees with the views men-
3 tioned by the Fuehrer. Especially he is also of the
4 opinion that any resolute action involves a certain
5 risk. MATSUOKA declared with reference to the report
6 of Ambassador Ott and the German Foreign Minister
7 through which the Fuehrer will probably be accurately
8 informed about the present situation in Japan, that he
9 wants to present the situation personally and very
10 frankly. There are in Japan, as in other countries,
11 certain intellectual circles which can be kept in
12 check only by a strong man. This is the type which
13 although he would like to have the cubs of the tigress,
14 is, however, not prepared to go into the cave to
15 snatch them away from their mother. These trends of
16 thought, were presented by him using the same picture
17 at a conference at headquarters in the presence of two
18 princes of royal blood. It is regrettable that Japan
19 has not yet rid herself of these circles, indeed that
20 some of these people are even in influential positions.
21 Confidentially, however, he can say that, after a
22 violent discussion, he prevailed with his view at the
23 conference at headquarters. Japan will act, and that
24 decisively, when she has the feeling that she would
25 otherwise lose a chance which might only return after

1 a thousand years; and that Japan will advance regardless
2 of the condition of her preparations, because there
3 would always be some people who would consider the
4 preparation insufficient. This point, he, MATSUOKA,
5 carried successfully also against both the princes.
6 The timid politicians in Japan would always hesitate
7 and would act partly because of a sympathetic pro-
8 British or pro-American attitude.

9 "MATSUOKA then pointed out that he had ad-
10 vocated the alliance already long before the outbreak
11 of the European war. He greatly exerted himself at
12 that time on behalf of its conclusion, but regrettably
13 had had no success. After the outbreak of the European
14 war he personally held the view that Japan first should
15 attack Singapore and put an end to British influence
16 in this district, and only then should conclude the
17 Tripartite Pact, because the thought of Japan joining
18 the alliance without simultaneously making a contri-
19 bution toward knocking-out Britain was unpleasant to
20 him. Because, while Germany has already waged a
21 gigantic battle against Britain for a year, Japan, at
22 the time of the conclusion of the Pact, had not yet
23 contributed anything. Therefore, he had very strongly
24 insisted on a plan of attacking Singapore, but did not
25 push it through and then, by force of circumstances

1 reversed his program and put joining of the pact in
2 first place.

3 "He did not have the least doubt that the
4 South Sea problem could not be solved without the
5 capture of Singapore by Japan. One has only to intrude
6 into the cave of the tigress and take out the cubs by
7 force.

8 "It is only a matter of time until Japan will
9 attack. According to his opinion the attack should
10 ensue as soon as possible. Unfortunately he does not
11 govern Japan but has to convert the rulers to his opin-
12 ion. He will surely also succeed in this some day.
13 But at the present moment he cannot, under these circum-
14 stances, assume any obligation to act for his Japanese
15 nation.

16 "Upon his return, he would give these matters
17 his most serious attention after his conference with the
18 Fuehrer and the German Foreign Minister and after having
19 personally examined the situation in Europe. He could
20 not praise anything definite but promises that he
21 will personally advocate to the utmost the goals indi-
22 cated.

23 "MATSUOKA then also urgently requested the
24 statements just presented by him to be held strictly
25 confidential because upon their becoming known in

1 Japan the members of the cabinet differing in opinion
2 would probably turn pale and try to get him out of
3 his office.

4 "While endeavoring to bring about the pact,
5 he had also kept strictest silence until the very
6 last moment and frequently and purposely created the
7 impression of a pro-American or a pro-British attitude
8 for the deception of his adversaries.

9 "Shortly before conclusion of the pact it was
10 reported to him that the British Ambassador made
11 strong propaganda among the Japanese that Japan was
12 playing a very risky game by joining the Tripartite
13 pact. The American Ambassador also expressed himself
14 similarly. A few days after conclusion of the pact he
15 asked the American Ambassador whether the reports about
16 the propaganda were based on fact. The ambassador
17 admitted everything and, moreover, stated that every
18 Japanese he had met since publication of the conclusion
19 of the pact, had expressed the opinion that Germany
20 would win the war. This, according to the opinion of
21 the American Ambassador, is untrue, Germany has no
22 chance to win the war and therefore it would be in his
23 (the American Ambassador's) opinion actually a very
24 risky game for Japan if she had concluded the pact per-
25 haps with the assumption of a German victory.

1 "MATSUOKA declared further that he had
2 thereupon replied to the American Ambassador that
3 only God knows who would win the war in the long run.
4 But he (MATSUOKA) did not conclude the pact on the
5 basis of the victory of this or that power, but
6 based on his vision of the new order. He had listen-
7 ed with interest to the statements of the Fuehrer
8 about the new order and was fully and entirely

1 convinced by them. If he would for once, assume
2 purely hypothetically, that the fortunes of war would
3 turn at a given moment against Germany, he must state
4 to the American Ambassador that Japan would then im-
5 mediately come to the assistance of her ally.

6 "His visions of the new order were laid down
7 by him in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact. That
8 is an ideal which has been transmitted from one
9 generation to another since time immemorial. For
10 him, personally, the realization of this ideal is
11 his life objective to which he has devoted all his
12 labor up to now, in order to make a small con-
13 tribution on his part toward its realization. This
14 Tripartite Pact, Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, is also a con-
15 tribution toward this realization. The execution of
16 these trends of thought, MATSUOKA emphasized further,
17 stands moreover with the motto: 'No conquest, no
18 oppression, no exploitation.' This was not yet
19 understood everywhere in Japan. However, if Japan
20 should ever deviate from this line, he (MATSUOKA)
21 would be the first to fight against it.

22 "In this connection MATSUOKA also reminded
23 of the other principle of the preamble to the Tri-
24 partite Pact according to which every nation was to
25 take the place due it. Although Japan, too, will

1 proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the
2 new order, and although she sometimes would have to
3 lead with a strong hand the nations affected by this
4 new order, she nevertheless keeps the previously
5 quoted motto constantly before her eyes: 'No con-
6 quest, no oppression, no exploitation.'

7 "During the further course of the conversa-
8 tion MATSUOKA came to speak about his discussions
9 with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owes an ex-
10 planation about it to the German Foreign Minister
11 and would have given it at the morning conference
12 if the German Foreign Minister had not been called
13 away prematurely. Now he intends to give this in-
14 formation to the leader.

15 "First of all he intended to pay a con-
16 plimentary visit to Molotov on his trip through
17 Moscow. After some reflection, however, he decided
18 to ask the Japanese ambassador to find out in a mild
19 way from the Soviet government whether there exists
20 any interest in a conference between Stalin and
21 him. However, before the Japanese ambassador could
22 follow his instructions with the Soviet government,
23 the proposal was made by the Russian government
24 itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and
25 Matsuoka. He spoke with Molotov for about 30

1 minutes, Stalin for one hour, so that due to the
2 necessary translations he spoke perhaps 10 minutes
3 with Molotov and 25 minutes with Stalin.

4 "He explained to Stalin that the Japanese
5 are morally communists. This ideal had been passed
6 on from the fathers to the sons since time im-
7 memorial. But at the same time he stated that he
8 does not believe in political and economic communism
9 and rather assumed that his Japanese ancestors had
10 already early given up every attempt in this direc-
11 tion and had devoted themselves to moral communism.

12 "For that which he called moral communism,
13 MATSUOKA then quoted some examples from his own
14 family. This Japanese ideal of moral communism
15 had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism
16 and egoism introduced from the West. At present
17 the situation in Japan in this respect is extremely
18 confused. However, there is a minority which is
19 strong enough to fight successfully for the re-
20 surrection of the 'old ego' of the Japanese. This
21 ideological struggle in Japan is extremely bitter.
22 But those who fight for the restoration of the old
23 ideal are convinced of their final victory.

24 "The Anglo-Saxons are basically res-
25 ponsible for the penetration of the above-mentioned

1 prevailing ideology; and for the restoration of the
2 old traditional Japanese ideal Japan is compelled,
3 therefore, to fight against the Anglo-Saxons just
4 as well as in China she is fighting not against the
5 Chinese but only against Great-Britain in China and
6 capitalism in China.

7 "MATSUOKA stated further that he had ex-
8 plained to Stalin his ideas about the New Order and
9 thereby emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons constitute
10 the greatest obstacle to the establishment of this
11 order and Japan, therefore, of necessity has to fight
12 against them. He explained to Stalin that the
13 Soviets also on their part are advocating something
14 new and that he believes to be able to settle the
15 difficulties between Japan and Russia after the
16 collapse of the British empire. He pictured the
17 Anglo-Saxons as Japan's, Germany's and Soviet
18 Russia's common enemy."

19 I will not read the next paragraph. Con-
20 tinuing:

21 "MATSUOKA, in the further course of con-
22 versation, made some remarks about the nature of the
23 TENNO. The TENNO is the state, and the life as well
24 as property of each Japanese belongs to the TENNO,
25 that is the state. This is so to speak the Japanese

1 version of a totalitarian state structure.

2 "In conclusion MATSUOKA spoke admiringly
3 about the way in which the Fuehrer is leading the
4 German nation, which stands behind him in complete
5 unity, with determination and power through this
6 great time of revolution unequalled in history.
7 Each nation has such a leader but once in a thousand
8 years. The Japanese nation has not yet found its
9 Fuehrer. But he would surely appear in the hour of
10 need and take over the leadership of the nation with
11 determination.

12 "Berlin, 1 April 1941. Signed: SCHMIDT,
13 Ambassador."

14 MR. HYDE: I will now read exhibit 578,
15 marked "Top Secret." (Reading)

16 "Record of Reich Foreign Minister.

17 "Record of the conversation between the
18 Reich Foreign Minister (RAM) and the Japanese Foreign
19 Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of Ambassadors OTT
20 and OSHIMA in Berlin on 27 March 1941.

21 "The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed
22 MATSUOKA with cordial words as a man who has shown
23 by word and deed that he has the same attitude to-
24 ward the problems of his country as the Fuehrer and
25 his co-workers must have for Germany, and who made

1 possible the conclusion of the pact with Japan as
2 the responsible Foreign Minister of his country.
3 The Tri-Partite Pact is a very important instrument
4 for the future of the three countries, and represents
5 the foundation on which the future of the three nations
6 can be assured in a manner that has always been
7 imagined by German and Japanese patriots.

8 "In this connection, the Reich Foreign
9 Minister gave a survey of the situation as it appears
10 from Germany's point of view.

11 "In reference to the military situation, he
12 pointed out that Germany today is in the final phase
13 of her fight against England. During the past win-
14 ter, the Fuehrer prepared everything further so that
15 Germany stands today completely ready for deployment
16 in order to meet England everywhere she can be
17 reached. The Fuehrer has at this moment at his dis-
18 posal perhaps the strongest military might which
19 has ever existed in the world. Germany has ready to
20 strike 240 divisions, 186 of which are first class
21 attack divisions of young soldiers. 24 of them are
22 armored divisions to which must be added more motorized
23 brigades.

24 "The Luftwaffe has increased greatly, and
25 has introduced new models so that in the future as

1 in the past it will be a match for any combination,
2 that is, Germany is not only a match for England
3 and America in this field, but is absolutely
4 superior.

5 "The German navy owned at the outbreak of
6 the war only a relatively small number of battle-
7 ships. In any case, the battle ships under con-
8 struction have been completed so that even the last
9 one of them could be commissioned within a short
10 time.

11 "In contrast to the world war, the German
12 navy does not stay in port this time, but has been
13 committed against the enemy from the first day of the
14 war. MATSUOKA probably saw in the news of the last
15 weeks that German dreadnoughts disturbed the supply
16 routes between England and America with extraordinary
17 success.

18 "The number of submarines, committed until
19 now, is very small. At most 8 or 9 boats have been
20 in contact with the enemy each time. In any case,
21 these few submarines in cooperation with the Luft-
22 waffe during January and February sank 750,000 tons
23 per month, exact proof of which Germany can show at
24 any time. This figure, however, does not include
25 the great additional losses which England suffered

1 from floating and magnetic mines. At the beginning
2 of April, the number of submarines will increase 8
3 to 10 fold so that 60 to 80 submarines could then be
4 in contact with the enemy constantly. The Fuehrer
5 here followed the tactics of committing only a few
6 submarines at first, and to use the remaining ones
7 for training the personnel necessary for a larger
8 fleet in order then to attack the enemy like a stroke
9 of lightning by the commitment of a larger number of
10 units. Therefore, the expected number of sinkings
11 by German submarines would in the future probably be
12 considerably above what has already been reached.
13 Under these circumstances, the submarine arm alone
14 can be described as absolutely deadly.

15 "Turning to the military situation on the
16 European continent, the Reich Foreign Minister re-
17 marked that Germany practically had no longer any
18 enemy worth mentioning because of the subjugation of
19 the countries of the continent, except for the
20 small English forces in Greece. Germany will re-
21 pulse every attempt by England to land on the con-
22 tinent or to gain a foothold there. She would there-
23 fore not tolerate for the English to remain in Greece.
24 Viewed militarily, the Greek problem is of secondary
25 importance. The only factor of practical importance

1 is that the advance toward Greece which probably
2 will become necessary, will obtain a dominating
3 position in the Eastern Mediterranean which will be
4 of considerable importance for the further develop-
5 ment of operations in these areas. In Africa, Italy
6 has had bad luck during the past months because the
7 Italian troops there were not familiar with the modern
8 methods of tank fighting and were not prepared for
9 anti-tank defense so that it was comparatively easy
10 for the English armored divisions to capture the
11 rather unimportant Italian positions. A final ob-
12 stacle has been placed in front of further advance
13 by the English. The Fuehrer has sent General ROMMEL,
14 one of the most capable German officers, to Tripoli,
15 with sufficient German forces. Unfortunately, the
16 hope that General WAVELL would attack was not ful-
17 filled. In several outpost skirmishes, the English
18 encountered the Germans, and then gave up all fur-
19 ther offensive intentions. Should they still under-
20 take an attack against Tripoli then they would meet
21 an annihilating defeat. Here as well, the tables
22 certainly will be turned one of these days, and the
23 English will perhaps disappear from North Africa
24 even faster than they came."

25 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde! We will adjourn

1 now until half past one.

2 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
3 taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

1 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,
2
3 at 1330.

4 MARCHAL OF THE COURT: The International
5 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

7 MR. HYDE: I will continue reading exhibit 578,
8 starting with the last paragraph on page 2.

9 (Reading)

10 "In the Mediterranean area, the German Luftwaffe
11 has accomplished good work now for two months and has
12 inflicted heavy shipping losses on the English who
13 had dug themselves in there. The Suez Canal has been
14 blocked for a long time and would be blocked anew af-
15 ter removal of the obstacles. It is no longer a
16 pleasure for the English to be obliged to stick it
17 out in the Mediterranean. He (the Reich Foreign
18 Minister) believes that the Mediterranean would still
19 be blocked off during the course of this year in
20 such a manner that the English would no longer re-
21 present practically any danger. Their fleet would
22 be tied down for the protection of their position
23 in Africa.

24 "If one calculates the sum total of the mili-
25 tary situation in Europe one arrives at the conclusion

1 that the Axis is practically master of the situ-
2 ation in all of continental Europe in the military
3 field. A gigantic army is at the disposal of Ger-
4 many, which is practically unemployed and can be
5 committed at any place where the Fuehrer deems it
6 necessary.

7 "The political situation is characterized by
8 the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the
9 Tri-Partite Pact. News about a putsch and a change
10 of government arrived from Belgrade this morning,
11 however all details are lacking so far. Also the
12 political situation in Europe and in the whole world
13 has contributed to the strengthening of the Tri-
14 Partite powers. Germany continues to strive to
15 win over this or that state which still stands out-
16 side of the pact, to the cause of the three powers.
17 He (the Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUOKA
18 confidentially that Spain at least in spirit is in
19 the Tri-Partite Pact. Of the two or three countries
20 remaining, Sweden and Turkey are especially interest-
21 ing. He can tell MATSUOKA confidentially that here
22 too, attempts would be made to win these countries
23 for the Tri-Partite Pact.

24 "Certain feelers have already been aimed at
25 Turkey. Even if this country formally has an

1 alliance with England, it is at least not entirely
2 impossible that Turkey will in the future perhaps
3 draw closer and closer to the Tri-Partite Pact.

4 "During the further course of the conversation,
5 the Reich Foreign Minister spoke about the economic
6 and the food situation. Although it is possible
7 that individual food items are temporarily scarce,
8 yet he could report that regardless of how long
9 the war lasts no food difficulties would arise in
10 Germany. Germany has enough space to produce in
11 her own area the necessary food for the duration
12 of the war.

13 "In regard to raw materials, there are cer-
14 tain bottlenecks, as shown by the raw rubber ne-
15 gotiations with Japan. Fundamentally, however, one
16 must say here as well that serious danger to the
17 Reich is completely out of the question. The
18 Fuehrer has accumulated war materials to such a
19 great extent that German economy would proceed to
20 reconversion. The German ammunition stockpile is
21 so full that not the slightest shortage would arise
22 for years. Therefore, during the next months, a
23 great reconversion process would be carried out
24 in the economy, and the main power of the German
25 war potential would be used for the production of

1 submarines and airplanes. Since the German army
2 with the possible exception of Russia, practically
3 has no more opponents on the continent, a high per-
4 centage of the German productive capacity can be
5 used for these two weapons.

6 "In summary, the Reich Foreign Minister stated
7 that the war has already been won for the axis
8 without doubt. In any case, it can by no means be
9 lost any more. It is only a question of time until
10 England will admit having lost the war. When
11 this will happen, he can naturally not predict.
12 This time under certain circumstances could, however,
13 occur very quickly. It depends on the events of
14 the next three or four months. However, there is
15 the greatest probability that England will capit-
16 ulate in the course of this year.

17 "In this connection, the Reich Foreign Min-
18 ister spoke about America. No doubt exists that
19 the English would have given up the war a long time
20 ago if ROOSEVELT had not given CHURCHILL new hope.
21 There is precise and clear information about this
22 in Germany from England. It is hard to say what
23 ROOSEVELT ultimately has in view. It is not clear
24 whether he wants to enter the war or not. It is
25 only certain that the armament assistance promised

1 to England, cannot be produced out of thin air.
2 It will take a long time until this help will actu-
3 ally become effective. But even then, the question
4 of quality will be very problematical, especially
5 in the delivery of airplanes. The individual mo-
6 dels become obsolete very rapidly during present
7 developments. Improvements on German models are
8 made from month to month on the basis of daily com-
9 bat experiences, and it is doubtful, whether a
10 country, remote from the war, can produce the high-
11 est quality in airplanes. In any case, whatever
12 German flyers have met so far of American machines,
13 they designated as 'old junk'. Therefore, he (the
14 Reich Foreign Minister) believes that a very con-
15 siderable time would pass before the American help
16 for England could even take effect. Germany in any
17 case, also in the interest of her allies and friends
18 is striving to finish the war as quickly as possible.

19 "The Tri-Partite Pact has followed mainly the
20 aim of frightening America from continuing on the
21 course taken, and to keep her out of war. This
22 goal is absolutely clear and appropriate. Further-
23 more, the Tri-Partite Pact is to serve to secure
24 the cooperation of the signatories in the new order,
25 in case of Germany and Italy in Europe, and in the

1 case of Japan in East Asia, for the future. The
2 main enemy met in the establishment of the new or-
3 der, is England. She is in the same manner the
4 enemy of Japan as she is the enemy of the axis
5 powers. America must be prevented by all means
6 from entering the war actively or from helping
7 England too actively.

8 "Examining the possibilities which exist for
9 further cooperation between Germany and Japan, the
10 questions arose again and again during conversations
11 with the Fuehrer whether in view of the new order,
12 that is the defeat of England which is necessary
13 for the establishment of the new order, an active
14 participation of Japan in the war would not be use-
15 ful. The Fuehrer has thought about this question in
16 detail, and he believes that it actually would be
17 very advantageous if Japan would arrive at the de-
18 cision to participate actively in the war against
19 England, as soon as possible. Germany believes that
20 for instance an attack against Singapore in the near
21 future would be a very decisive factor for a rapid
22 overthrow of England. He (the Reich Foreign Min-
23 ister) believes it would be possible to work from
24 there much more closely with Japan in the maritime
25 and other fields. It is also certain that the

1 seizure of Singapore would be a very serious blow
2 to England. This is especially of importance in
3 view of the already rather bad moral state of the
4 British Isles. He also believes that the seizure
5 of Singapore would perhaps be most appropriate to
6 keep America out of the war because the United
7 States could hardly risk sending her Navy into
8 Japanese waters. If Japan today would succeed in
9 a war against England with a decisive blow, such as
10 attack on Singapore, ROOSEVELT would be in a very
11 difficult position. Practically it is difficult
12 for him to attempt anything against Japan. If he
13 were to do it anyhow and declare war on Japan, then
14 he must realize that for instance the solution of
15 the question of the Philippines would take place in
16 accord with Japanese intentions. This would mean a
17 serious loss of prestige for the President so that
18 he would probably think about an action against Ja-
19 pan for a long time.

20
21 "On the other hand, Japan, by the conquest of
22 Singapore would be put in a position to operate in
23 an entirely different manner than until now, since
24 she will then have the absolutely dominating position
25 in East Asia. Thus Germany believes that, if Japan
can decide on such an action, this would mean the

1 solution of the Gordian Knot in East Asia.

2 "In summary, the Reich Foreign Minister stated
3 that in case of an action by Japan in this direction,
4 the war against English tonnage can be waged with
5 much greater force in East Asia as well, that by
6 the courageous step of Japan, America will probably
7 be kept out of the war, that Japan can secure her
8 position in East Asia from which, according to Ger-
9 man opinion, she cannot refrain in the long run in
10 the new order of the Greater East Asia Area. In
11 this connection, a number of other questions will
12 certainly arise for the discussion of which he
13 would be available at any time.

14 "In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister
15 stated that the Tri-Partite Pact could do justice
16 in the best manner to its true idea, that is, to
17 prevent the spread of the war or in other words the
18 entry of the United States into the war, in that the
19 parties to the treaty conclude at the proper time
20 mutual agreements for the final suppression of Eng-
21 land in addition to the present assurances. In this
22 manner, the spirit of the pact can be proven by deed
23 in the most emphatic manner by all participants.

24 "At this moment, the Reich Foreign Minister
25 was called to the Reich Chancellery. Contrary to

1 his original assumption that it would only be a
2 question of a brief absence, the conferences were
3 prolonged for a longer time so that the conversa-
4 tions with MATSUOKA were not continued any more
5 before breakfast.

6 "In connection, the breakfast proved on the
7 program took place in the smallest circle, at first
8 in the absence of the Reich Foreign Minister, who
9 only appeared later.

10 "Berlin 31 March 1941

11 "Signed: SCHMIDT."
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1 I will now read exhibit No. 579.

2 "Notes on the conversation between the German
3 Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister,
4 MATSUOKA, on 28 March 1941.

5 "The German Foreign Minister expressed his
6 satisfaction at being able to speak with Matsuoka a
7 second time. The Fuehrer would have like to express
8 his attitude to the questions at hand more fully,
9 but was much occupied for the time being with the
10 developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however,
11 were not so important. The essential part was the
12 question of possibilities and prospects of closer co-
13 operation between Japan and Germany, that is, con-
14 cerning the transition from the passive to the active
15 cooperation of Japan in the common task. The Germans
16 had heard with great satisfaction how spiritedly Mat-
17 suoka was proceeding on this matter. It was actu-
18 ally the best opportunity that had ever been granted
19 /Japan/ to achieve her objectives, and it would be
20 better to make use of this opportunity before it
21 slipped away. The Tripartite Pact was one of the most
22 important agreements and it formed the basis of re-
23 lations between Japan and Germany for centuries.
24 There were no clashes of interest.

25 "The situation was such that a new order

1 could only be established if Great Britain were
2 utterly defeated. This was true in even greater
3 measure for Japan than for Germany, which already
4 dominated the European continent and which would
5 within this year draw into her dominion the Medi-
6 terranean area and Africa, insofar as she had in-
7 terests. Germany would then have all she needed.
8 She did not seek world domination as Roosevelt had
9 falsely asserted. The Fuehrer wanted to get the
10 war over with as soon as possible in order to turn
11 back to his task of construction. The goal which
12 he had assigned himself, namely, to assure the
13 Reich the utmost security, had really already been
14 achieved.

15 "In contrast, the new order in the Great-
16 er East Asia sphere could only be achieved if Japan
17 also controlled the south. For this, however, the
18 capture of Singapore was essential.

19 "Regarding Russia, the German Foreign
20 Minister declared that the Germans did not know
21 how things would develop in this direction. It
22 was possible that Russia might take the wrong course,
23 although he really didn't expect this of Stalin.
24 No one could know. At any rate Germany would in-
25 stantly strike if Russia undertook anything against

1 Japan and would thereby cover Japan's rear with
2 respect to Russia. In this fashion the first of
3 the misgivings of the Japanese statesmen, and espec-
4 ially of the Japanese army, reported by Ambassador
5 Ott, would be set at rest by the help of the Ger-
6 man army. The second misgiving, which the Japanese
7 Navy in particular had expressed with regard to
8 the English Home Fleet and the English Mediterranean
9 Fleet, he (the German Foreign Minister) could answer
10 by saying that both these English fleets would be con-
11 tained by Germany within European and Mediterra-
12 nean waters. Finally the Japanese anxiety regarding
13 America had been expressed. The United States, how-
14 ever, would not risk her fleet against Japan, and she
15 would not send it out farther than the Hawaiian Is-
16 lands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would,
17 on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality.
18 Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything
19 at all imprudent.

21 "Although he (the German Foreign Minister)
22 thoroughly understood the situation in Japan, which
23 Matsuoka had illustrated by his tale of the tiger and
24 her young, yet he must allude again to the fact that
25 two of the strongest countries in the world, who are
possessed of a youthful, powerful, and fearless

1 spirit, had been granted by Providence an opportunity
2 that perhaps recurs only once in a thousand years.
3 Germany's great opportunity lies in her Fuehrer,
4 whose co-workers are merely implements to carry out
5 his will. He (the German Foreign Minister) had
6 again and again explained to the English and French
7 Ambassadors that they must never fall into the error
8 of comparing the Germany of Today with the Germany
9 of 1914 and 1918.

10 "Even then the Reich had stood up for four
11 years against a world of enemies, and only through
12 its disunity and its inner weakness had it lost the
13 war. Now, however, it was unified and had thereby
14 double strength, which, through the highly gifted
15 leadership of Adolf Hitler, would be redoubled so
16 that henceforth Germany must be regarded as having
17 four times her strength in the /First/ World War.
18 The ambassadors had thrown this warning to the
19 winds. However these predictions had been fulfilled
20 and there was nothing in the world which would stop
21 Germany and Italy from ruling absolutely the Euro-
22 pean-African hemispheres. If such an opportunity
23 should present itself to Japan under such circum-
24 stances, she must consider these things very care-
25 fully and not let the opportunity slip from her

1 grasp.

2 "To be sure when the present war would
3 end, could not be prophesized with certainty, but
4 the German Foreign Minister had the feeling that
5 perhaps England might collapse sooner than was gen-
6 erally expected. If the English were to beg sudd-
7 enly for peace, it would be most desirable if Ger-
8 many and Japan were able together to determine that
9 peace.

10 "The German Foreign Minister then spoke of
11 his family traditions, which had always been pro-
12 Japanese. Moreover he had already in 1934 had an
13 important talk with the Fuehrer on German-Japanese
14 collaboration. The Fuehrer's high respect for Japan
15 had begun with the Russo-Japanese war. Now the most
16 important thing was not to let slip the joint oppor-
17 tunity which offered itself in 1941.

18 "Matsuoka replied that he was of the same
19 opinion. He too believed on the basis of reason and
20 intuition that 1941 would appear in history as a
21 decisive year. In it the greatest tragedy, the coll-
22 apse of the British Empire, would take place. He
23 felt that the German nation in Europe and the Japan-
24 ese nation in the Far East acted almost under a
25 divine order to break up the British Empire and to

1 establish a New Order.

2 "Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany
3 would assume toward the United States if England
4 were brought to her knees in summer, but America
5 were not as yet at war.

6 "The German Foreign Minister answered that
7 this depended on the attitude of the United States
8 herself. Of course, the possibility of an occu-
9 pation of the British Isles required a good-weather
10 period, and the British might possibly try to set
11 up a new government in the United States. But in
12 his opinion this could not be carried out.

13 "Matsuoka thereupon made his question more
14 specific in the following way: If England were beat-
15 en to the ground, the United States would not, in
16 his opinion, go on supporting the British Empire.
17 Canada would be merely more or less annexed. Would
18 Germany, under these circumstances, leave the United
19 States alone? The German Foreign Minister replied
20 that Germany had no interest whatsoever in a war
21 against the United States. Matsuoka acknowledged
22 this with satisfaction and the remark that one had to
23 reason with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if we did
24 not succeed in converting America to our ideas, a
25 New Order could not be established. The German

1 Foreign Minister replied, that each would exercise
2 control in his own sphere. Germany would do this,
3 together with Italy, in the European-African sphere,
4 the United States would have to limit herself to
5 the American continent, and the Far East would be
6 reserved for Japan. As regards Russia, she would
7 have to be watched closely and revolutionary pro-
8 paganda would not be permitted on any account. In
9 the future only the aforementioned three spheres of
10 interest would remain as great centers of power.
11 The British Empire would disappear."

12 I will omit the entire next paragraph.

13 (Continuing:)

14 "Matsuoka furthermore talked of the long-
15 term commercial treaty, which would be concluded
16 with Russia. He then put before the German Foreign
17 Minister the question, if he should on his return
18 trip stop over a little longer in Moscow, to neg-
19 otiate with the Russians regarding the Non-Agression
20 Pact or the Neutrality Pact. Here he emphasized
21 that immediate admission of Russia to the Tripartite
22 Pact would never be allowed by the Japanese people.
23 It would on the contrary cause one cry of indignation
24 to arise throughout Japan. The German Foreign Minis-
25 ter replied that such an accession of Russia to the

1 pact was out of the question and suggested to Mat-
2 suoka, if at all possible, not to touch on the afore-
3 mentioned questions in Moscow, as it was not apt to
4 fit quite into the framework of the present situation.

5 "Upon a further remark by Matsuoka, that
6 the conclusion of a fishing and of a commercial
7 agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia
8 and Japan, the German Foreign Minister replied that
9 there were no objections to the conclusion of such
10 purely commercial treaties. In this connection,
11 Matsuoka further mentioned that America was closely
12 watching Japanese-Russian relations and for her part
13 was trying to conclude an agreement with Russia
14 against Japan.

15 "Matsuoka then again came to speak of
16 Singapore. The Japanese were not worried about the
17 British Navy. However, there were Japanese circles
18 which looked with great misgivings upon a conflict
19 with America, as they presumed that in such a case
20 it would mean a five-to-ten year war with the United
21 States. He immediately admitted that America would
22 not stake her fleet in a war against Japan, but for
23 that very reason these Japanese circles were worried
24 because under these circumstances the war would last
25 for years. The German Foreign Minister replied that

1 in his opinion Roosevelt would never let it come to
2 a war, as he was fully aware of the impossibility
3 of an advance against Japan. Japan for her part,
4 could, however, occupy the Philippines and thus deal
5 a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan con-
6 quered Singapore, the greater part of the world would
7 thus be under the control of the Tripartite Pact
8 powers anyway and America would find herself in an
9 isolated position.

10 "Matsuoka was personally strongly in favor
11 of the German Foreign Minister's line of thought.
12 If Japan did not run the risk connected with the
13 conquering of Singapore, it was his opinion that she
14 would become a third-rate power. Therefore, in any
15 case, the blow would have to be dealt one day. If
16 he succeeded at the same time in keeping the United
17 States quiet for six months, all difficulties would
18 be overcome. A nation which hesitated in a matter
19 of such fundamental national importance would only
20 prove that it lacked the most important character-
21 istic, the capability of decision.

22 "Berlin, 31 March 1941."
23
24
25

1 I will now read exhibit 580.

2 "REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER
3 FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN
4 MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN on 29 MARCH 1941.

5 "The RAM resumed the preceding conversation
6 with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with
7 the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He
8 expressed the opinion that it would probably be best,
9 in view of the whole situation, not to carry the dis-
10 cussions with the Russians too far. He did not know
11 how the situation would develop. One thing, however,
12 was certain, namely that Germany would strike immedi-
13 ately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready
14 to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan
15 could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without
16 fear of possible complications with Russia. The larg-
17 est part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern
18 frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open
19 the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however be-
20 lieved, that Russia would try to avoid developments
21 leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a
22 conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off
23 within a few months. In this case, Japan would have,
24 of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if
25 she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she
need not refrain from such an undertaking because of

1 possible fears of Russia."

2 I will omit the next paragraph.

3 (Continuing:)

4 "Next, the RAM turned again to the Singa-
5 pore question. In view of the fears expressed by
6 the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines based
7 on the PHILIPPINES and of the intervention of the
8 British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again
9 discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADMIRAL RAEDER.
10 The latter had stated that the British Navy during
11 this year would have its hands so full in the English
12 home waters and in the Mediterranean that it would
13 not be able to send even a single ship to the Far
14 East. General-Admiral RAEDER had described the U.S.
15 submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother
16 about them at all.

17 "MATSUOKA replied immediately that the
18 Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat
19 from the British Navy; it also held the view that in
20 case of a clash with the American Navy it would be
21 able to smash the latter without trouble. It was
22 afraid, however, that the Americans would not take
23 up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict
24 with the United States might perhaps be dragged out
25 five years. This possibility caused considerable

1 worry in Japan.

2 "The RAM replied that America could not
3 do anything against Japan in the case of the capture
4 of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, ROOSE-
5 VELT would think twice before deciding on active
6 measures against Japan. For while, on one hand, he
7 could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other
8 hand, there was the probability of losing the Philip-
9 pines to Japan; for the American President, of course,
10 this would mean a considerable loss of prestige and,
11 because of inadequate rearmament, he would have
12 nothing to offset such a loss.

13 "In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out,
14 he was doing everything to reassure the English about
15 Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at
16 all regarding this key position of England in the East.
17 Therefore it might be possible that his attitude to-
18 ward the British would appear to be friendly in words
19 and in acts. However Germany should not be deceived
20 by that. He assumed this attitude, not only in order
21 to reassure the British, but also in order to fool
22 the pro-British and Pro-American elements until one
23 day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

24 "The RAM declared that, in his opinion,
25 Japan's declaration of war on England should take

1 the form of an attack on Singapore.

2 "In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, his
3 tactics were based on the certain assumption that the
4 sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire
5 Japanese nation with one blow. ('Nothing succeeds
6 like success,' the RAM remarked.) He followed here
7 the example of the words of a famous Japanese states-
8 man, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak
9 of the Russo-Japanese war: 'You open fire, then
10 the nation will be united.' The Japanese need to
11 be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental,
12 he believed in fate which would come, whether you
13 wanted it or not.

14 "Later on, the discussion turned to the
15 question of the transportation of rubber. The RAM
16 asked MATSUOKA to see what the possibility was of
17 transportation by one or two Japanese auxiliary
18 cruisers to Lisbon or to France.

19 "MATSUOKA replied that, immediately after
20 the steps taken by Ambassador Ott in connection with
21 the rubber question, he had interceded in favor of
22 Japan delivering certain quantities to Germany from
23 her own rubber stocks, and later on making up the
24 resulting deficit in rubber from Indo-China.

25 "The RAM pointed out in this connection

1 that communication via Siberian railway was insuf-
2 ficient and that, moreover, 18,000 tons of French
3 rubber from Indo-China would be delivered to Japan
4 through German intervention. He here asked about the
5 size of auxiliary cruisers possibly to be used for
6 the transportation of the rubber. MATSUOKA, who
7 stated that he was not precisely informed, estimated
8 the size of 10,000 tons.

9 "Then the RAM, referring to the discussion
10 with Reich Minister Funk, turned the conversation to
11 the future trade relationship between Japan and Germany.
12 He amplified her idea that trade between the big
13 economic areas of the future, i.e., Europe and Africa
14 on one hand and the Far East on the other, must devel-
15 op on a comparatively free basis, whereas the American
16 Hemisphere, at any rate as far as the United States
17 was concerned, would remain self-sufficient, as she
18 had everything that she needed in her own territory,
19 and, therefore, did not come into question in connec-
20 tion with exchanges with other economic areas. In
21 South America, however, things were different. Here
22 exchange possibilities with other economic areas
23 actually presented themselves.

24 "MATSUOKA replied that she needed coopera-
25 tion with Germany for her own reconstruction and for

1 the development of China. He had already some time
2 ago given written instructions to the Japanese missions
3 in China to grant preferential treatment to German and
4 Italian economic interests, similar to what was al-
5 ready carried out in Manchukuo and North China. Japan
6 was not in a position to develop the extensive areas
7 in China without the assistance of German technical
8 science and German enterprise. Outwardly she will,
9 of course, declare the open door policy, in actual
10 fact, however, she will concede preferential treat-
11 ment to Germany and Italy.

12 "He must moreover admit openly that Japan-
13 ese business circles feared their German competitors,
14 whom they considered as very competent, whereas they
15 were only amused at British and American competitors.
16 German business circles had much the same opinion
17 about the Japanese, which resulted in complaints from
18 both sides. He was, however, of the opinion that the
19 interests of both sides could be brought into harmony
20 and told Japanese industry not to be afraid of German
21 competition but rather to attempt to solve the problem
22 by equal efficiency. In any case, the Japanese
23 Government would do everything in order to equalize
24 the interests of both sides.

25 "Following this, MATSUOKA again turned the

1 conversation to Japanese-Russian relations. He
2 pointed out that he had proposed a Non-Aggression
3 Pact to the Russians, to which Molotov had replied
4 with a proposal of a neutrality agreement. There-
5 fore, during his stay in Moscow, he must adopt the
6 attitude of having been the one to make the original
7 non-aggression proposal. He also wanted to take this
8 opportunity to try to induce the Russians to forego
9 the Northern half of the Sakhalien Peninsula.

10 There were important oil resources there, against
11 the exploitation of which the Russians were making
12 conceivable difficulty. Matsuoaka estimated the total
13 maximum quantity which could be obtained from these
14 oil resources at 2 million tons. He would make an
15 offer to the Russians to acquire North Sakhalien by
16 purchase.

17 "To a question by the RAM whether the
18 Russians would be prepared to sell these territories,
19 MATSUOKA replied that this was highly doubtful,
20 Molotov had asked the Japanese Ambassador, on a sug-
21 gestion to this effect, whether 'this was supposed
22 to be a joke.' Japan was in any case prepared to
23 make other agreements as the equivalent of the Ports-
24 mouth and Peking Treaties and also to give up her
25 fishing rights. In any case he would have to take

1 up these matters and, above all, the question of
2 the Non-aggression Pact during his stay at Moscow.
3 He asked the RAM whether he should deal with these
4 questions very deeply or only just touch on them.

5 "The RAM replied that he was of the opinion
6 that these points would be dealt with only in a purely
7 formal way and would not be gone into deeply. The
8 question mentioned by MATSUOKA regarding Sakhalien
9 could be settled even later. Should the Russians
10 follow a stupid policy and compel Germany to strike,
11 he would, in view of the temper of the Japanese Army
12 in China, consider it right if this army were prevent-
13 ed from acting against Russia. Japan was helping
14 the joint issue best if she did not allow herself to
15 be diverted by anything from the action against Singa-
16 pore. With a joint victory, the fulfilment of the
17 aforementioned desires would in any case fall into
18 the lap of Japan as a ripe fruit to a large extent.

19 "MATSUOKA then introduced the subject of
20 German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a
21 subject which had been broached to him frequently,
22 and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise
23 of assistance.

24 "The RAM replied that he had already dis-
25 cussed these questions with Ambassador OSHIMA. He

1 had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order
2 that the FUEHRER - who probably must be considered
3 the greatest expert on military questions at the
4 present time - could advise Japan on the best method
5 of attack against Singapore. German experts on
6 aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they
7 could draw up a report, based on their European ex-
8 periences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-
9 bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the
10 British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet
11 would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediate-
12 ly.

13 "MATSUOKA remarked that Japan was less con-
14 cerned with the British fleet than with the capture
15 of the fortifications.

16 "The RAM replied that here, too, the
17 FUEHRER had developed new methods for the German
18 attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the
19 Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could
20 make available to the Japanese.

21 "MATSUOKA replied in this connection that
22 some of the younger, expert Japanese Naval officers,
23 who were close friends of his, were of the opinion
24 that the Japanese naval forces would need three
25 months until they could capture Singapore. As a

1 cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this esti-
2 mate. He believed he could stave off any danger which
3 threatened from America for six months. If, however,
4 the capture of Singapore required still more time and
5 if the operations even dragged out for a year, the
6 situation with America would become extremely criti-
7 cal and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

8 "If at all avoidable, he would not touch
9 the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that
10 in the event of a Japanese attack on this area the
11 oilfields would be set on fire. They could be brought
12 into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

13 "The RAM added that Japan would gain de-
14 cisive control over the Netherlands East Indies
15 simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

16 "MATSUOKA then further mentioned that the
17 desire for airbases in French Indo-China and Thai-
18 land had been divulged by Japanese officer circles.
19 He had, however, denied this, as he in no way wished
20 to undertake anything which could in any way dis-
21 close Japanese intentions regarding Singapore.

22 "Finally the RAM once more reverted to
23 the question of Germany's help to Japan. Perhaps
24 something could be done also here. Japan had, how-
25 ever, to bear in mind that, in this war, the

1 heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders.
2 The Reich was fighting against the British Isles
3 and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet.
4 Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the
5 surface. Apart from that, Russia's main weight lay
6 on the European side. These facts the gallant Japan-
7 ese Nation would certainly acknowledge.

8 "MATSUOKA finally agreed to this point
9 of view and gave an assurance that Japan would al-
10 ways be a loyal ally who would devote herself en-
11 tirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the
12 joint effort.

13 (Berlin. 31 March 1941.)"
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1 I will now read exhibit No. 581:

2 "Report of the discussion between Reichs-
3 marschall Goering and the Japanese Foreign Minister
4 Matsuoka in the presence of Ambassador Ott at Karin-
5 hall on 29th March 1941.

6 "Reichsmarschall Goering first of all
7 expressed his satisfaction at being able to greet at
8 his country residence the man who had successfully
9 acted as a strong representative of his country in
10 cooperation between the Japanese and German nations.
11 As Reichsmarschall, he was able to tell him that co-
12 operation between the Japanese and the German States
13 was popular not only in the nation itself but above
14 all among the German Army, the Navy and particularly
15 the Air Force. This strong and consciously positive
16 attitude to the alliance with Japan has its roots
17 moreover in the recognition, which the great military
18 traditions of Japan as well as the sense of sacrifice
19 and the readiness for action of the Japanese people,
20 found in Germany.

21 "Matsuoka expressed his sincere thanks that
22 the Reichsmarschall, despite the heavy claims made
23 upon him, had found time to receive the Japanese
24 Foreign Minister at his country seat. Already the
25 journey through the big forests had been for him

1 (Matsuoka) one of the finest experiences of the
2 journey he had so far made. The feelings of respect
3 for Japan of which the Reichsmarschall had just
4 spoken were fully reciprocated by Germany's Japanese
5 allies. Japan moreover was prepared to fulfil wholly
6 and entirely the obligations of her alliance, even
7 in the war, and was thus conscious of fighting not
8 only for the allied countries but for the whole of
9 humanity.

10 "In the further course of the discussion,
11 the Reichsmarschall mentioned that naturally all
12 experiences which Germany had made during the course
13 of the war would be made available to the allied
14 Japanese Armed Forces. This was particularly important
15 in the domain of the Air Force, which had acquired a
16 new technique and new tactics, without being able in
17 this connection to refer back to earlier examples.
18 It was important to apply these experiences rightly
19 so as to always remain fit for fighting and to avoid
20 unnecessary losses. These experiences were partic-
21 ularly important in connection with a category of the
22 aircraft which was actually developed only in Germany,
23 namely the dive-bomber. These could render particularly
24 valuable service to Japan in the conquest of fortifica-
25 tions.

1 "If Japan would march towards her destiny
2 as a Great Power in the Far East, she would, like
3 all politicians who desired to achieve great aims,
4 only attain her final goal by battle. These aims had
5 already been very clearly discussed, so that he (the
6 Reichsmarschall) could confine himself to stating
7 that Germany would give Japan her share of help by
8 placing at the disposal of her Ally her previous
9 experiences, as in the past so in the future.

10 "Matsuoka replied that he did not need to
11 tell the Reichsmarschall how very much German assist-
12 ance in this field had been valued in Japan so far
13 and would be valued in the future. He was expressing
14 the sincere thanks for this, in the name of his own
15 Government, to the Reichsmarschall, the German
16 Government and the German Armed Forces, that Germany
17 made available, in such a magnanimous way, the results
18 of her experiences which had been obtained with much
19 sacrifice of personnel and material. The great
20 assistance which Germany had given in this way would
21 be of inestimable value to his country if she followed
22 the call of destiny of which the Reichsmarschall had
23 spoken. Japan would thus fulfil the duties incumbent
24 upon her within the framework of the alliance in their
25 entirety.

1 "In addition the Reichsmarschall spoke in
2 his capacity as the highest responsible economic
3 authority of Germany and as Head of the Four Year
4 Plan, on the question of crude rubber. Each day on
5 which Germany could receive these deliveries earlier
6 and every increased quantity she could receive were
7 of the utmost importance. Without failing to realize
8 the difficulties which Japan herself had, he (the
9 Reichsmarschall) would, however, be grateful if the
10 increased quantities which had been agreed upon would
11 soon actually materialize. Moreover, sea transporta-
12 tion had to be mutually considered in the event of
13 difficulties in the Russian area and communications
14 via the Siberian railway being no longer in operation.

15 "The quantity of crude rubber which Germany
16 needed was comparatively small in relation to its
17 population, as the rubber was only required as an
18 admixture for the manufacture of the synthetic rubber
19 Buna.

20 "Matsuoka replied that he wished to do
21 everything within his power to meet German wishes in
22 this matter. Ambassador Ott had already previously
23 raised this question and he (Matsuoka) had immediately
24 recognized its urgency and importance and had taken the
25 necessary steps to hasten the solution of the question.

1 He had asked the competent authorities to make
2 available immediately a part of Japan's own rubber
3 stocks so as not to have to wait first for the
4 quantities expected from Indo-China. He did not
5 know how the matter stood at the moment as he was
6 not the Minister responsible for these matters. He
7 had only forwarded an urgent request to the competent
8 Department. He had also already thoroughly considered
9 the question of sea communications. From a long term
10 point of view, Germany and Japan could naturally not
11 remain dependent upon the railway communications
12 through Siberia.

13 "Berlin, 31 March 1941

14 "(signed) Schmidt."

15 I will now read exhibit No. 582:

16 "Notes on the Conversation between the
17 Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
18 in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the
19 State Minister Meissner in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

20 - - -

21 "At first MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for
22 the presents handed to him in the latter's name which
23 he would always consider a permanent treasure, and
24 honor as a constant souvenir of his stay in Berlin.
25 At the same time he expressed his gratitude for the

1 friendly reception which he had received in Germany
2 from the Fuehrer, the Reich Foreign Ministry and of
3 the entire German people. As long as he lives he
4 would never forget the friendliness shown him here
5 from all sides. Upon his return to Japan he would
6 endeavor with all his powers to convince the Japanese
7 people of the fact that the latter are treated by the
8 German people with honest friendliness and respect.

9 "MATSUOKA then also expressed the request,
10 that the Fuehrer instruct the proper authorities in
11 Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes
12 of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in
13 need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat
14 warfare, which could be given by making available to
15 them the latest experiences of the war as well as the
16 latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan
17 would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
18 States. In case the country should decide to attack
19 Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be
20 prepared for a struggle with the United States,
21 because in that case America probably would side with
22 Great Britain. He (MATSUOKA) personally believed,
23 that the United States could be restrained by diplo-
24 matic efforts from entering the war on the side of
25 Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count

1 on the worst situation, that is with war against
2 America. They were of the opinion that such a war
3 would extend for five years or longer and would
4 take the form of guerilla warfare and would be fought
5 out in the Pacific and the South Sea. For this reason
6 the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are
7 of the greatest value to Japan. It is a question
8 of how such a war would best be conducted and how
9 all the technical improvements of submarines, in
10 all details such as periscopes and the like, could
11 best be exploited by Japan.

12 "To sum up, MATSUOKA requested that the
13 Fuehrer see to it that the proper German authorities
14 place at the disposal of the Japanese those develop-
15 ments and inventions concerning navy and army, which
16 were needed by the Japanese.

17 "The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out
18 that Germany too considered a conflict with the
19 United States undesirable, but that it had already
20 made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany
21 one was of the opinion that America's contributions
22 depended upon the possibilities of transportation,
23 and that this again is conditioned by the available
24 tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however,
25

1 means a decisive weakening not merely of England,
2 but also America. Germany has made her preparations
3 so that no American could land in Europe. She would
4 conduct a most energetic fight against America with
5 her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior
6 experience, which would still have to be acquired by
7 the United States, she would be vastly superior, and
8 that quite apart from the fact that the German
9 soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

10 "In the further course of the discussion
11 the Fuehrer emphasized, that Germany on her part would
12 immediately draw the consequences, if Japan should
13 get involved with the United States. It did not
14 matter with whom the United States would first get
15 involved whether with Germany or with Japan. It
16 would always try to eliminate one country at a time,
17 not to come to an understanding with the other
18 country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just
19 the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already
20 mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between
21 Japan and America, because the strength of the tri-
22 partite powers lies in their joint action. Their
23 weakness would be if they would let themselves be
24 beaten individually.

25 "MATSUOKA once again repeated his request,

1 that the Fuehrer give the necessary instructions, in
2 order that the proper German authorities place at
3 the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements
4 and inventions, which are of interest to them. Be-
5 cause the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately
6 for a conflict with the United States.

7 "As regards Japanese-American relationship,
8 MATSUOKA explained further that he has always declared
9 in his country, that sooner or later a war with the
10 United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued
11 to drift along as at present. In his opinion this
12 conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
13 argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore,
14 not strike decisively the right moment and take the
15 risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just
16 this way would she perhaps avoid a war for generations,
17 particularly if she gained predominance in the South
18 Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who
19 hesitate to follow those trends of thought. MATSUOKA
20 was considered in those circles a dangerous man with
21 dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if
22 Japan continued to go along her present path, one
23 day she would have to fight anyway and that this
24 would then be under less favorable circumstances
25 than at present.

1 "The Fuehrer replied that he could well
2 understand MATSUOKA's position, because he himself
3 was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhine-
4 land, declaration of military sovereignty). He too
5 was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable
6 conditions and accept the risk of an unavoidable
7 fight at a time he himself was still young and full
8 of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was
9 proven by events. Europe was now free. He would
10 not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any
11 extension of the war, be it by Russia, be it by
12 America. Providence favored those who will not let
13 dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

14 "MATSUOKA replied, that the United States
15 or rather their ruling statesmen had recently still
16 attempted a last maneuver against Japan, by declaring
17 that America would not fight Japan on account of
18 China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave
19 free passage to the consignment rubber and tin to
20 America to their place of destination. However,
21 America would war against Japan the moment she felt
22 that Japan entered the war with the intention of
23 assisting in the destruction of Great Britain. Such
24 an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect
25 upon the Japanese, because of the education /oriented/

1 on English lines which many had received.

2 "The Fuehrer commented on this, to the
3 effect that this attitude of America meant only
4 that the United States had the hope, that, as long
5 as the British World Empire existed they one day
6 could advance against Japan together with Great
7 Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the
8 World Empire, they would be totally isolated and
9 could not do anything against Japan.

10 "The Reich Foreign Minister interjected
11 that the Americans precisely under all circumstances
12 wanted to maintain the position of power of England
13 in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved
14 by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint
15 action of Japan and Germany.

16 "MATSUOKA continued that it seemed to him
17 of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely
18 clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan.
19 For this reason he also had to inform him regret-
20 fully of the fact that he (MATSUOKA) in his capacity
21 as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not
22 utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he
23 had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign
24 Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him
25 serious damage in political and financial circles.

1 Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he
2 became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, telling
3 a close friend something about his intentions. It
4 seems that the latter had spread these things and
5 thus brought about all sorts of rumors which he as
6 Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though
7 as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these
8 circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon
9 he could report on the questions discussed to the
10 Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have
11 to study exactly and carefully in the first place
12 the development in Japan, so as to make his decision
13 at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of
14 his intrinsic plans towards Prince KONOYE and the
15 Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made
16 within a few days, because the plans would otherwise
17 be spoiled by talk.

18 "Should he, MATSUOKA, fail to carry out
19 his intentions, that would be proof that he is lack-
20 ing in influence, in power of conviction, and in
21 tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed,
22 it would prove that he had great influence in Japan.
23 He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

24 "On his return, being questioned, he would
25 indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the

1 Ministers of the Navy and the Army, that Singapore
2 had been discussed; he would, however, state that it
3 was only on a hypothetical basis.

4 "Besides this, MATSUOKA made the express
5 request that nothing be cabled in the matter of
6 Singapore because he had reason to fear that by
7 cabling something might leak out. If necessary he
8 would send a courier.

9 "The Fuehrer agreed and assured for the
10 rest, that he could depend completely on German
11 reticence.

12 "MATSUOKA replied he believed indeed in
13 German reticence, but unfortunately could not say
14 the same of Japan.

15 "The discussion was terminated after the
16 exchange of some personal parting words.

17 "Berlin, the 4th of April,
18 1941.

19 "Signed: SCHMIDT."

20 I will read exhibit No. 583:
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1 "Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign
2 Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
3 in Berlin on 5th April 1941.

4 "The Reich Foreign Minister first expressed
5 the hope that MATSUOKA's visit -- the first ever paid
6 by a Japanese Foreign Minister to Germany -- would
7 have a good general effect. MATSUOKA had been thor-
8 oughly informed of the German point of view. He
9 would certainly have gained the impression that
10 Germany was full of vitality and absolutely certain
11 of her victory. The Reich Foreign Minister expressed
12 the hope that their Japanese friends would deduce
13 the inferences of this clearly recognized situation
14 and thus participate in our victory.

15 "MATSUOKA replied that he had been more
16 than rewarded for his long journey to Europe by
17 getting into personal touch with the German and Italian
18 statesmen. That he had seen in Germany and Italy
19 had far exceeded his expectations. It was really
20 hard for him to take his departure.

21 "Although he had had no doubt about it before,
22 he was now thoroughly convinced after his journey
23 to Germany and Italy that these two countries were
24 united and would always remain so.

25 "MATSUOKA then spoke of the general high

1 morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces
2 he had seen everywhere among the workers during his
3 recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his
4 regret that developments in Japan had not as yet
5 advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country
6 the intellectuals still exercised considerable
7 influence.

8 "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at
9 best a nation which had realized its every ambition
10 could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of
11 whom are parasites anyhow. A nation, however, which
12 has to fight for a place in the sun must part with
13 them. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany
14 they had already started their pernicious activities,
15 when National Socialism put a stop to these doings.
16 They will surely be the cause of the downfall of
17 Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

18 "In answer to a remark by MATSUOKA that
19 Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese
20 character, would take action quickly after the previous
21 lengthy deliberations, the Reich Foreign Minister
22 replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept
23 a /certain/ risk in this connection, just as the
24 Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation
25 of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty

1 of armament, and with the resignation from the League
2 of Nations.

3 "In answer to a question by MATSUOKA regarding
4 the Fuehrer's intentions concerning the smaller
5 States, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that the
6 smaller States would be incorporated in the European
7 whole; they would have their independence and would
8 undoubtedly live more happily under the New Order
9 than formerly. Great Britain, however, would never
10 again be allowed to meddle in the affairs of the small
11 States, whilst the latter would never be allowed to
12 take part in any military alliance against Germany.
13 They would be absolutely independent, it is true,
14 and even allowed to maintain small armies and police
15 forces, but their protection and their general
16 policy in the sense of the European continent would
17 be looked after by Germany.

18 "In this connection MATSUOKA repeated the
19 explanations he had already given the Reich Minister
20 of Economics as regards the cause of the present
21 difficulties. He attributed them to the clash between
22 old traditions and the conditions of living brought
23 about by modern inventions. One of the basic mistakes
24 of Versailles was to increase the number of European
25 states, whereas they should have been decreased in

1 consequence of the new conditions of life caused by
2 the development of technique. The great problem was
3 to coordinate conditions created by modern inventions
4 and old traditions, but taking care to leave a certain
5 play for old traditions.

6 "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the
7 new German Reich would actually be built upon the
8 basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman
9 Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was
10 the only ruling power on the European Continent.

11 "In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister
12 once again summarized the points he wanted MATSUOKA
13 to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

14 "1) Germany had already won the war. By the
15 end of this year the world would also realize this.
16 Also England would have to concede it, if it had not
17 already collapsed before then, and America would also
18 have to resign herself to this fact.

19 "2) There were no conflicting interests
20 between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries
21 could be regulated in the long run on the basis that
22 Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and
23 Germany in Europe and Africa.

24 "3) Whatever might happen, Germany would
25 win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan

1 would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was
2 undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than that
3 of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which
4 would hardly ever recur for the fulfilment of the
5 national objectives of Japan, a chance which would
6 make it possible for her to play a really leading
7 role in Eastern Asia.

8 "FATSUOKA replied that he himself could only
9 repeat that he had long been of the opinion that
10 every nation was offered an opportunity only once in
11 a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an
12 opportunity and she would have to assume the risk
13 connected with it. She would have to act decisively
14 at the right moment in order to take advantage of this
15 unique opportunity.

16 "In addition he asked about the Fuehrer's
17 intentions as to the conclusion of peace. Would a
18 general peace conference take place or did Germany
19 intend to negotiate peace terms with each of her
20 opponents separately?

21 "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he
22 did not know anything about that. The whole matter
23 appeared to him to depend upon the manner in which
24 Great Britain collapsed. In any case, there could be
25 no question of anything but a peace by capitulation,

1 if a new British government came into being.

2 "To that MATSUOKA remarked that that meant
3 there could be no peace based on compromise.

4 "He then requested the Reich Foreign Minister
5 to assist on his part the Tripartite Pact Commissions,
6 and especially the Economic Commission in which he
7 (MATSUOKA) was chiefly interested.

8 "The Reich Foreign Minister took the occasion
9 to stress the fact that the military sub-commissions
10 were no special institutions; they had to be subject
11 in all matters to the Chief Commission.

12 "MATSUOKA then added that the Japanese officers
13 who were at present in Germany were very pleased
14 indeed with the assistance they had received from the
15 German officials. He thanked the Reich Foreign
16 Minister for this attitude of the German authorities.

17 "Later, MATSUOKA spoke about the conference
18 of the Japanese heads of missions in Europe, which he
19 had called to Berlin. Unfortunately the ambassador
20 to London had not appeared, owing to difficulties
21 in flying; he certainly would have brought some
22 interesting news. MATSUOKA emphasized that he had
23 told the Japanese diplomats they would suffer no
24 disadvantages if they were against the conclusion
25 of a Pact of Alliance, provided they were so before

1 Japan adhered. Now that a decision had been made he
2 would unhesitatingly recall any Japanese diplomat who
3 did not work loyally with the new policy and co-operate
4 to the closest extent with the German and Italian
5 Representatives.

6 "Furthermore, he had told them they must be
7 prepared for some critical moments which were close
8 at hand. Japan was face to face with a serious
9 situation.

10 "The Reich Foreign Minister replied that there
11 had also been diplomats in Germany who had taken a
12 different attitude to certain questions. It was
13 in fact characteristic of great times that they were
14 not understood by many.

15 "Directly after this interview MATSUOKA
16 was handed a talkie-film apparatus as a present, and
17 a luncheon-party was held among a small circle of
18 people.

19 "Berlin, 7th April 1941.

20 "(signed) SCHMIDT"
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1 The Tribunal's attention is invited to
2 prosecution document 225, a basic document which is
3 in evidence as exhibit No. 45. It is the neutrality
4 pact between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
5 and Japan and was concluded on April 13, 1941, in the
6 course of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's return trip
7 from Germany to Japan. As it is desired at this
8 point only to show the fact of the conclusion of such
9 a treaty, I will not read it.

10 I now offer in evidence prosecution document
11 No. 4056-A. This is a telegram from Boltze of the
12 Staff of the German Embassy in Tokyo, dated April 14,
13 1941. No specific person is indicated as addressee.
14 It was found in the files of the German foreign office.
15 It is offered for the purpose of showing that the
16 conclusion of this neutrality pact was the completion
17 of another step in the Japanese plan of military
18 aggression in the South, and in particular the plan
19 for the advance on Singapore.

20 THE PRESIDENT: You may read it after the
21 recess. We will recess for fifteen minutes.

22 (Whereupon, at 1443, a recess was
23 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
24 were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: Your Honor, I didn't hear a
5 number assigned to the last document that I tendered
6 in evidence, document 4056-A.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9 No. 4056-A will receive exhibit No. 584.

10 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned
11 document was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
12 584 and received in evidence.)

13 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit 584.

14 (Reading): "Telegram, (Secret Cipher Process)
15 Tokyo, 14 April 1941, received 14 April 1941."

16 I will omit reading the first full paragraph,
17 commencing at the second paragraph:

18 (Reading continued): "Japan in particular
19 expects substantial advantages for the termination of
20 the China conflict from the Neutrality Pact. Even if,
21 as the Vice Foreign Minister declared, the China
22 problem had not been the subject of the Moscow nego-
23 tiations, in any case CHIANG KAI SHEK's hope of
24 eventual warlike entanglements between Japan and
25 Russia, which would have meant a substantial relief

1 for him, have come to naught with the conclusion of
2 the pact. Moreover, Japan believes that by calling
3 on the pact she can achieve a gradual separation be-
4 tween Moscow and Chungking. Furthermore, as all
5 CHIANG KAI SHEK's support from the Anglo-Saxon
6 powers has more moral than material significance,
7 Japan hopes that the Marshal, now after the conclusion
8 of the pact, will be ready for the dictation of a
9 peace which preserves Japanese prestige.

10 "The Vice Foreign Minister further declared
11 that the Neutrality Pact would substantially facilitate
12 Japan's expansion policy in the South of the Great
13 East Asia Sphere and in particular would facilitate
14 an eventual Japanese advance on Singapore.

15 "The Vice Foreign Minister said regarding the
16 realization of the Neutrality Pact that the beginning
17 of negotiations brought considerable difficulties as
18 MOLOTOV had held fast to the original Russian demand
19 by which Japan, before the conclusion of the pact,
20 should make certain concessions in the sense of a
21 revision of the Treaty of Portsmouth. MATSUOKA ex-
22 plained that he was neither ready nor empowered for
23 such concessions. In a personal conversation with
24 STALIN, MATSUOKA had finally accomplished that Russia
25 would renounce the concessions and would declare herself

1 ready for unconditional conclusion of the pact.
2 This decision took place on 12 April, that is, one
3 day before the arranged departure of MATSUOKA from
4 Moscow. In order to empower MATSUOKA's signing of
5 the pact in time, the Prime Minister, without the
6 participation of the cabinet or Privy Council, effected
7 the Imperial sanction for the signature by immediate
8 audience with TENNO. Agreement of the Cabinet and
9 Privy Council, which could not be doubted after the
10 Imperial sanction, will be obtained before the shortly
11 expected ratification. The Vice Foreign Minister
12 emphasized that it was unprecedented in Japanese
13 history that an agreement of such significance should
14 be concluded within a few days. In this connection,
15 Japan has learned much from the 'lightning diplomacy'
16 of Germany."

17 Signed "BOLTZE."
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1 MR. HYDE (Continuing): Your Honor, I desire
2 to call attention to exhibit 577. On page 5 of that
3 exhibit it is signed, "Schmidt, Ambassador." The word
4 "Ambassador" should read "Minister," so that it will --

5 THE PRESIDENT: Does "Minister" appear in the
6 original?

7 MR. HYDE: The word "Minister" appears in
8 the original.

9 I offer in evidence prosecution's document
10 526. This is an important secret instruction to the
11 Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the German Army
12 based on ~~Ex~~ report by the German Military Attache in
13 Tokyo. It is dated 24 May 19. 1.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
16 No. 526 will receive exhibit No. 585.

17 . (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
18 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 585
19 and received in evidence.)

20 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit 585. (Reading):

21 "SECRET INSTRUCTION, MOST IMPORTANT, ONLY
22 BY HAND OF OFFICER. 24 May 41. Foreign Section/ De-
23 fence/ Department for Foreign States, To be presented
24 to the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Army.

25 "The Military Attache, Tokyo, reports with

1 No. T47g of 23 May:

2 "AKITA's answer regarding the handling of
3 Japanese-U.S.A. relations in the press gave cause to
4 the wish to hear OKAMOTO on the form of the Japanese
5 opening of the war in case of a war between the U. S. A.
6 and Germany. Instead of a reception by OKAMOTO, visit
7 by AKITA who stated:

8 "1) In case the U. S. enter into the war
9 Japan at once acknowledges casus foedoris. But will
10 not yet start hostilities. Surprise attack on Singa-
11 pore, Manila remains prepared."

12 To the left of the paragraph I have just
13 read the following appears:

14 "To be presented to the Chief of the Foreign
15 Section."

16 (Reading continued): "2) Possible war
17 between USSR and Germany causes U. S. A. to enter
18 into war. Therefore Japanese attitude remains as
19 under 1) with additional preparations for a possible
20 attack on Vladivostok and Blagovestchensk.

21 "3) Conclusion of China conflict before
22 new tasks for the Japanese Army is important. In
23 the first place I emphasize that the Japanese
24 acknowledgement of a casus foederis requires
25 strengthening through immediate opening of hostilities."

1 To the left of the paragraph marked "3"
2 appears the entry:

3 "Staff of air command Ic. Signed, Brueckner."

4 The document is signed "SCHMIDT."
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1 MR. HYDE (Continuing): Prosecution's document
2 4061-A, which is a secret memorandum from Woermann
3 to the Reich Foreign Minister dated 10 June 1941,
4 is offered in evidence to show how far the execution
5 of Japanese plans of aggressive action in the Southern
6 areas had progressed by June, 1941.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9 No. 4061-A will receive exhibit No. 586.

10 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned
11 document was marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 586 and received in evidence.)

13 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit 586.

14 (Reading): "Berlin, 10 June 1941. SECRET.

15 "Ambassador OSHIMA delivered me today through
16 Embassy Secretary KASE the wish to be once again
17 received by the Reich Foreign Minister in the near
18 future. As the main topic of the conversation he
19 pointed out the following:

20 "The Japanese Government, or as he said
21 correcting himself, the Japanese Army had the desire
22 to obtain bases for the fleet and the Navy in southern
23 French Indo-China. KASE added, he personally believed
24 that this wish could be traced back to the fact that
25 the Japanese Armed Forces would like to create for

1 themselves a favorable strategic position vis-a-vis
2 SINGAPORE. Furthermore Ambassador OSHIMA would like
3 to talk with the Reich Foreign Minister more generally
4 about the German-French and French-English relations.

5 "Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign
6 Minister.

7 "Signed Woermann."

8 I respectfully request that the Tribunal take
9 judicial notice of the historical event of Germany's
10 invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 based
11 on this statement in "Events Leading Up to World War
12 II" at page 285 which is as follows:

13 "June 22, 1941, Germany invaded Russia."

14 THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal takes judicial
15 notice of that fact.

16 MR. HYDE: Prosecution's document 4033-B,
17 which is a telegram from Ribbentrop to Tokyo dated
18 28 June 1941 is now offered in evidence to show that
19 shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union
20 von Ribbentrop made a strong appeal for speedy Japanese
21 military action against the Soviets before taking
22 action against Singapore.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 4033-B will receive exhibit No. 587.

1 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document
2 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 587 and
3 received in evidence.)

4 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 587.

5 "Telegram" marked "To be kept in locked file",
6 "(Secret Cipher Process)

7 "Special Train, 28 June 1941."

8 Marked "Most Urgent!"

9 It is marked "Diplogerma" and "Cipher Bureau."

10 "No. 560 of 28 June, Tokyo.

11 "Secret note for department heads."

12 To the left of the paragraph that I am about
13 to read appears the following:

14 "Marginal Note -- Forwarded to Tokyo under
15 No. 916, TELKO, 28 June 1941, 2130 hours."

16 The telegram reads:

17 "I have reached an agreement with Ambassador
18 OSHIMA that he influence his government in the
19 direction of a speedy military action against Soviet
20 Russia, and I ask you now to utilize on your part
21 all the possibilities that present themselves to in-
22 fluence the government there and the other influential
23 circles in such a direction. In this connection I ask
24 you to make use of the following points:
25

"1.) War between Germany and Soviet Russia

1 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document
2 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 587 and
3 received in evidence.)

4 MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 587.

5 "Telegram" marked "To be kept in locked file",

6 "(Secret Cipher Process)

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18 OSHIMA that he will influence his government in the
19 direction of a speedy military action against Soviet
20 Russia, and I ask you now to utilize on your part
21 all the possibilities that present themselves to in-
22 fluence the government there and the other influential
23 circles in such a direction. In this connection I ask
24 you to make use of the following points:
25

 "1.) War between Germany and Soviet Russia

1 will not only bring with it the solution of more or
2 less limited individual problems, but will bring as
3 a consequence a solution by final war of the Russian
4 question in its entirety.

5 "2.) The destruction of the Russian power,
6 expected within a comparatively short time by our
7 military move will also make Germany's victory over
8 England an irrevocable fact. If Germany is in pos-
9 session of the Russian oil wells and grain fields a
10 sufficient supply for the whole of Europe will thereby
11 be ensured so that the English blockade will on the
12 whole be of absolutely no avail. The direct land
13 connection with East Asia will likewise be brought
14 about on this occasion.

15 "3.) In this way all the preconditions are
16 given which will render possible the New Order in the
17 European sphere as intended by the Axis Powers.

18 "4.) For Japan also a unique chance is
19 presented by the present situation. As Germany does
20 this for Europe, so can Japan now through a military
21 action against Soviet Russia create the prerequisites
22 for the New Order planned by her in East Asia. After
23 the removal of the Soviet power in the Far East also,
24 the solution of the Chinese question will be achieved
25 in the way desired by Japan without running into any

1 more difficulties.

2 "5.) From the standpoint of Japanese
3 interests, the idea of a drive towards the south in
4 the direction of Singapore is and remains also of
5 great importance. As Japan has not yet been prepared
6 on this point and a possibility for such a drive has
7 not yet been presented in the present phase of the
8 war, it lies in the urgent interest of Japan not
9 to leave unused this chance now offered to her for
10 solving the Russian question in the Far East too.
11 Thus she would be left free in the rear to make a
12 drive towards the South.

13 "6.) In view of the speedy course of events
14 to be expected, Japan should come to a decision re-
15 garding the idea of a military action against Soviet
16 Russia without hesitation. A Japanese action against
17 a Soviet Russia already beaten to the ground would
18 be quite prejudicial to the moral and political posi-
19 tion of Japan.

20 "7.) It can therefore be considered that
21 the swift overpowering of Soviet Russia, especially if
22 Japan participates in it from the East, is the best
23 means to convince the United States of the absolute
24 foolishness of entering the war on the side of England,
25 then completely isolated and set against the mightiest

1 combination in the world."

2 Signed "RIBBENTROP."

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1 MR. HYDE (Continuing): I present prosecu-
2 tion's document 1652, entitled, "Resolution Concern-
3 ing the Japanese-American Negotiations Adopted
4 Through the Conferences in the Imperial Presence,"
5 for introduction into evidence. This document con-
6 sists of four resolutions, including the resolution
7 adopted at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941.
8 The document is presented to show that, with the
9 Soviet Union involved in war with Germany, Japan
10 grasped the opportunity immediately to execute her
11 plan of military aggression in the South, which at
12 all hazards she was determined to pursue.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

14 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
15 No. 1652 will receive exhibit No. 588.

16 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
17 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 588
18 and received in evidence.)

19 MR. HYDE: I will read the title of exhibit
20 No. 588, and then the resolution adopted on July 2,
21 1941, which is marked "1" and commences about one-
22 third way down page 1, with the exception of one
23 paragraph relating to the German-Russian War, which
24 matter will be dealt with in a later phase of the
25 case.

1 (Reading): "1. RESOLUTION adopted through
2 the Imperial conferences on July 2, 1941.

3 "A summary of the Empire's POLICY accord-
4 ing to the changes in the situation.

5 "I. PRINCIPLE.

6 "a. Regardless of any change in the inter-
7 national situation, Japan will adhere to the princi-
8 ple of establishing a 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperitty
9 Sphere,' and accordingly contribute to the establish-
10 ment of world-peace.

11 "b. Japan will continue the disposition of
12 the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward
13 advance in order to establish for herself a basis for
14 self-existence and self-defense. The Northern prob-
15 lems will be dealt with according to the changes in
16 the situations.

17 "c. Japan will remove all obstacles for
18 the achievement of the foregoing purpose.

19 "II. SUMMARY.

20 "a. In order to hasten the surrender of
21 Chiang's Regime, further pressure through the Southern
22 regions will be strengthened to the changes in the
23 situations, we shall execute our rights of war against
24 the Chungking Regime at the proper time, and shall
25 confiscate the enemy concessions in China.

1 "b. For the sake of her self-existence and
2 self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic
3 negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern
4 regions and will also promote other necessary measures.
5 For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war
6 with Britain and the United States. First, we shall
7 accomplish the execution of our schemes against
8 French Indo-China and Thailand following the 'Princi-
9 ple Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand,'
10 and 'Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern
11 Policy,' thereby stabilizing our structure for the
12 Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-
13 mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a
14 war with Britain and the United States."

15 The next paragraph I will omit.

16 "d. In the accomplishment of the above,
17 all measures, especially in the case of execution
18 of arms, must be decided so that there will be no
19 great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for
20 a war with Britain and the United States.

21 "e. We shall do our utmost in preventing
22 the United States participation in the War through
23 diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes,
24 and every other possible way, but in case she should
25 participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite

1 Pact. However, the time and method of military
2 action will be decided independently.

3 "f. We shall shift promptly to the complete
4 stabilization of internal war-time structures, par-
5 ticularly we shall strive for the stabilization of
6 national defense.

7 "g. As to the definite measures we shall
8 decide separately."

9 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.
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1 MR. TAVENNER: If the Tribunal please, the
2 events between 2 July 1941 and the attack on Pearl
3 Harbor, although based in a large measure upon
4 Japan, German and Italian collaboration, appear
5 more properly to belong in the phase of presentation
6 of evidence relating to Indo-China, Thailand, the
7 Netherlands East Indies, the British Commonwealth of
8 Nations, and the United States, so reference will be
9 made in this phase of the case only to those matters
10 within this period which affect the No Secret Peace
11 Pact of 11 December 1941.

12 Before proceeding to this subject, however,
13 we will present evidence relating to other types of
14 collaboration between Japan, Germany and Italy which
15 parallel political and military collaboration between
16 the Axis Powers.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. McKinney.

18 MR. MCKINNEY: Cultural and Trade Agreement
19 Between Japan, Germany and Italy. I call the Tri-
20 bunal's attention to prosecution document 956, in
21 evidence as exhibit No. 37. That is the treaty
22 concluded on 25 of November, 1938, between Japan and
23 Germany, pertaining to cultural cooperation. I will
24 read through Article II:

25 "TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY PERTAINING

TO CULTURAL COOPERATION.

1 "The Imperial Government of Japan and the
2 Government of Germany, recognizing solemnly that, in
3 view of the fact that Japan's own peculiar spirit
4 and Germany's racial and national life constitute
5 respectively the essence of Japan's culture and
6 Germany's culture, the cultural relations between
7 Japan and Germany should be based on these factors,
8 and desiring to further strengthen the friendly and
9 mutual trust, which fortunately binds the two coun-
10 tries already, by deepening the various cultural
11 relations between the two countries and also by
12 promoting the mutual knowledge and understanding be-
13 tween the peoples of the two countries, have entered
14 into an agreement as follows:

15 "ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Powers
16 shall mutually cooperate most closely in order to
17 strive to establish their cultural relations on a
18 firm basis.

19 "ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Powers,
20 in order to achieve the object of the preceding
21 article, shall systematically promote the cultural
22 relations between the two countries in the fields
23 of learning, arts, music, literature, cinema, radio
24 broadcasting, youth movement, and sports."
25

1 MR. McKINNEY: Prosecution document 956-B --

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham.

3 MR. CUNNINGHAM: If the Tribunal please, at
4 this time I would like to object to the introduction
5 of any evidence concerning cultural agreement between
6 the nations, for the reason that such agreements are
7 purely within the right and power of nations and
8 certainly does not tend to prove any of the criminal
9 issues involved in the Indictment or in the other
10 charges in this proceeding; for the further reason
11 that this agreement, the agreement proposed by the
12 prosecution at this time, was entered into at a time
13 of peace, and certainly has no tendency to prove any
14 charge of aggressive warfare; for the further reason
15 that any inquiry into these documents would be purely
16 a political inquiry and not a judicial inquiry.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Acts taken by themselves,
18 including political acts, may be perfectly legitimate,
19 but they may also constitute preparation for war when
20 taken in conjunction with other circumstances, and
21 preparation for war, of course, always takes place
22 during peace. That covers all three objections.
23 For grounds of objection the objection is disallowed.

24 Yes. Mr. McKinney.
25

1 MR. McKINNEY: Prosecution's document 956B
2 is offered in evidence.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 956B will receive exhibit No. 589.

6 (Whereupon, the document above referred
7 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 589 and
8 received in evidence.)

9 MR. McKINNEY: It is the minutes of the Privy
10 Council meeting held 22 November 1938 regarding the
11 conclusion of the Cultural Treaty. It is presented
12 for the purpose of showing that the possibility of
13 treaty asserting political influence was recognized.

14 (Reading)

15 "Minutes of Conference on the Conclusion of
16 Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and
17 Germany.

18 "November 22, 1938 - Original.

19 "Minutes of the Privy Council on the Conclusion
20 of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and
21 Germany."

22 I will now read the members of the accused
23 that were present.

24 "Chairman: HIRANUMA. Ministers: No. 8
25 Minister of Education - ARAKI. No. 15, Minister of

1 War - ITAGAKI."

2 I will begin reading with the last paragraph
3 on page 1:

4 "For many years, on cultural matters concern-
5 ing medicine, literature, legislation and various
6 other fields, a mutual and close relationship existed
7 between the two nations of Germany and Japan but with
8 and after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Agree-
9 ment in November two years ago, national intercourse
10 between the two nations entered into a renewed amity.
11 On the later part of September of this year the German
12 Government proposed for a conclusion of a cultural
13 agreement between Germany and Japan, a recent practice
14 prevalent between the various countries of Europe, so
15 as to legalize the enlightenment of cultural relation-
16 ship between the two nations, thus leading to further-
17 ing the promotion of the cause and provoking to
18 strengthen all the more our tie of friendship. Our
19 Imperial Government approved this proposal. Thereafter
20 the authorities of both parties concerned have conducted
21 numerous negotiations and the arriving at an agreement
22 led to the realization of this definite plan of a pact.
23 However this does not mean that our Imperial Govern-
24 ment prefers such an agreement with Germany alone. If
25 conditions permit, similar agreements should be

1 concluded with other nations also, as this cultural
2 intercourse has a tendency to contribute valuable
3 service to achieve the general aims of diplomacy.
4 This was voiced by our authorized minister concerned."

5 I will omit the next two paragraphs and begin
6 reading again with the last paragraph of page 2.

7 "No. 28 (ISHIZUKA).

8 "In its introductory provision, which I
9 take forms the basis of this agreement, it is said that
10 the essence of the culture of Japan and Germany as
11 consisting of the characteristic spirit of Japan on
12 one part and the racial and national life of Germany
13 on the other. This seems somewhat out of coordination,
14 but since it is so designated, I want to hear the reason,
15 and what is embraced in the term, 'the racial and
16 national life of Germany.' According to German nation-
17 alism or Nazism and a current conception of the present
18 day, the German race is attempting to unify and assim-
19 ilate even those people who inhabit other nations
20 while banning another race even though living in her
21 own country. Whereas the characteristic feature of
22 our spirit holds equality on all races without prejudice.
23 This exemplifies the differences in view between this
24 and that nation. Although directly nothing is stated
25 relative to politics, this agreement may bring about

1 some kind of influence politically. So I deem it
2 important that special precaution be taken so that the
3 people may not be misled. However, I wish to hear
4 the government's comment on this aspect.

5 "No. 17 (ARITA):

6 "In short, the racial and nationalistic life
7 of Germany is none other than the singular spirit of
8 Germany. The reason for the adoption of the term was
9 because of the firm insistence on the part of Germany
10 at the outset of negotiations, explaining that their
11 characteristic spirit being phenominized in the racial
12 and national life of Germany, it should be made the
13 essence of her culture.

14 "On the second point this agreement proposes
15 to aid in the liaison and systematic uplifting of
16 the culture of the two nations. It recognizes that
17 cultural relations of Japan and Germany form the basis
18 of the characteristic spirits of each respective nation.
19 Therefore it is unlikely that there will be any influ-
20 ence politically. However, if there are such opinions
21 of fear in the carrying into effect of the agreement,
22 sufficient precaution shall be taken.

23 "No. 28 (ISHIZUKA):

24 "On the whole I understand, but it is conceiv-
25 able that during the long life of this agreement there

1 is a possibility that politics will be influenced.
2 In particular, a tendency to go with the German
3 stream is not at all deniable in this country of late.
4 In view of this fact, I repeat and hope that there
5 should be some means to guard against all possible
6 mistake on the part of our nation before this agree-
7 ment is concluded."

8 THE PRESIDENT: Apparently the Japanese
9 Privy Councillors, or some of them, thought that
10 the whole purpose was not purely cultural and it may
11 have been a cover for political action. You invite
12 us to hold that it was a cover for political action.

13 MR. McKINNEY: Yes, sir.

14 THE PRESIDENT: A political action that
15 ultimately led to a pact with Germany and to war.

16 MR. McKINNEY: Yes, sir. That is the
17 contention of the prosecution.

18 I call the Tribunal's attention to prosecution
19 document No. 829, in evidence as exhibit 38. This
20 is an agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan
21 and Italy, concluded on the 23rd of March, 1939. As
22 the material provisions are substantially the same as
23 the provisions of the cultural agreement between Japan
24 and Germany, I will not read the text of this treaty.
25

1 MR. McKINNEY: I present prosecution document
2 4030-B for introduction into evidence. It consists
3 of a program for the opening session of the German-
4 Japanese Cultural Committee on 3 April 1940, and
5 von Weizsaecker's opening speech. .

6 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

7 MR. BROOKS: I would like to refer, in your
8 Honor please, to these exhibits like exhibit 38 that
9 has been previously put in. As I understand, they
10 were put in for identification at that time. Are they
11 being automatically admitted into evidence by ref-
12 erence to them at this time? I just wanted to call
13 it to the Court's attention.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Do you understand it?

15 MR. BROOKS: Yes, sir. I was in error.
16 They were originally introduced in evidence.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Prosecution document No.
18 4030-B is admitted on the usual terms.

19 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
20 No. 4030-B will receive exhibit No. 590.

21 (Whereupon, the document above re-
22 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
23 No. 590 and received in evidence.)
24

25 MR. McKINNEY: I will read the first paragraph,

1 read to the first paragraph on the program:

2 "Program for the Opening Session of the
3 German-Japanese Culture Committee and the tea re-
4 ception in the Hotel Kaiserhof.

5 "1. The opening session takes place in the
6 Federal Council Hall of the Foreign Office. The
7 guests arrive at about 1600 hours. The session
8 begins at 1615 hours. It is introduced by a speech
9 of welcome from Freiherr von Weizsaecker. His Ex-
10 cellency the Imperial Japanese Ambassador replies to
11 it."

12 I will now read two excerpts from the wel-
13 coming speech. The first excerpt begins at the middle
14 of the next to the last paragraph on page 2. (Reading):
15 "In relations between Germany and Japan we cannot be
16 satisfied that knowledge of each other's country
17 should be confined to a small circle of experts.
18 Rather must a real mutual understanding between the
19 nations be extended to the widest possible circle
20 in the nations concerned, by means of real knowledge
21 and comprehension. National education and national
22 enlightenment are the most important means for the
23 attainment of the high goal we have in mind. Your
24 presence bears witness that you will do your part in
25 the spheres of your respective ministries to crown

1 these efforts with success.

2 "Following the precedent in Tokyo, it
3 seemed suitable to us that the Foreign Office should
4 itself be presiding over the committee. Therefore
5 the head of the Cultural Political Department, Envoy
6 Doctor Von TWARDOWSKI has been entrusted with this
7 task.

8 "Just in the last few years relations be-
9 tween organization and societies in the Nazi Party
10 /NSDAP/ and Japan have developed very gratifyingly.
11 As examples of this I mention the fact that the
12 Reich Board of Health has concluded an agreement with
13 the Japanese-German Medical Society and that the
14 Reich Youth Board is permanently represented in Japan
15 by OBERGEBIETS-FUEHRER SCHULTZ. As the utilization
16 of the organizations and societies of the Nazi Party
17 /NSDAP/ should follow a unified point of view, the
18 Foreign Office has asked the Fuehrer's deputy to send
19 a representative to the Committee. I am glad that
20 this proposal has been complied with, and heartily
21 welcome Herr SCHULTE-STRATHAUS to this circle.

22 "This, like the addition of advisors and
23 experts, is an innovation in the sphere of Culture
24 Committees. I expect much for the activity of our
25 committee from the effectiveness of these co-workers.

1 I thank the parties here concerned for the fact that
2 they are willing to fit their work abroad in their
3 occasional special spheres into the great frame of
4 our efforts and tasks in linking our peoples together."
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1 The second excerpt begins at the top of
2 page 4.

3 "A fundamental prerequisite, however, for the
4 deepening and broadening of mutual international
5 intercourse is the readiness of the nations themselves
6 to give spiritually as well as to take. This readi-
7 ness is in existence in wide circles of the German
8 nation. To spread it ever wider is the task of this
9 committee and the circles represented in it.

10 "A second, just as important, fundamental
11 of international cultural work has been expressed in
12 the preamble to the German-Japanese culture agreement.
13 Both governments have there declared that they are
14 impressed with the realization that the German and
15 Japanese cultures have their true basis in the German
16 national and racial life on the one hand and the innate
17 Japanese spirit on the other, and that the cultural
18 relations between the two countries are to be built
19 hereon.

20 "For the first time in the history of inter-
21 national agreements the spiritual basis on which the
22 goal set by the agreement is to be worked for has been
23 expressed and unalterably defined: the clear conscious-
24 ness of each party of its racial and national self and
25

1 the mutual recognition of this self. This is the true
2 reciprocity, such as is only possible for nations that
3 are self-conscious, national and self-contained, and
4 just on that account capable and ready to understand
5 other nations.

6 "The work of this German-Japanese Culture
7 Committee will have to be steered along these supreme
8 spiritual guiding lines.

9 "Gentlemen, to our universal satisfaction and
10 joy, there has arisen in this committee a new, effective
11 instrument which shall and will ever strengthen
12 the traditional close spiritual bonds between Germany
13 and Japan. I am however convinced that the political
14 friendship which so fortunately unites our countries
15 will also be further deepened, and that Germany and
16 Japan will set an example in the cultivation of peaceful
17 international intercourse.

18 "I declare the German-Japanese Culture Committee
19 established."

20 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half
21 past nine tomorrow morning.

22 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
23 was taken until Friday, 27 September 1946, at
24 0930.)
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