


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THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

RESTRICTED

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS**

**A.P.O. 500
1 December 1945**

Published for the information of all concerned.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

**R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.**

**OFFICIAL:
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G.2.**

**ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS**

SUBJECT: THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

I.G. No. 6909
6913
B.I.D. No. 0100.0100
0811.0200

DATE OF ISSUE 1 December 1945

No. 132

SUMMARY:

1. This is the second of a series of research reports solely based on documentary evidence held at ATIS, GHQ, prior to 1 January 1945, treating of the planning and execution of the several Japanese strikes which initiated the present hostilities. It was preceded by ATIS Research Report No. 131, entitled "Japan's Decision To Fight."
2. It is the purpose of the present report to collate all evidence available at ATIS, GHQ in respect to the planning and execution of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 8 December 1941.
3. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from Japanese sources. Consequently dates used are East Longitude Time, except where the contrary is specifically stated.

HNB/REW/JWW/lg

Distribution H

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR
COLONEL, S.C
CO-ORDINATOR

SOURCES : Captured Documents
Statements by Prisoners of War
Intelligence Reports

[INFORMATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED ACCORDINGLY]

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT

SUBJECT: THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

I.G. No. 6909

6918

B.I.D. No. 0100.0100
0811.0200

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Section I. THE PLANNING STAGE

1. COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

The following excerpts from an account based upon the testimony of an unnamed prisoner of war and published in "Weekly Intelligence" provide a fairly comprehensive insight into the planning of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR:

"When Japanese planes struck clustered United States warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pinpointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

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"During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between Commander in Chief Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly 'definitely much keener' than members of other fleet staffs.

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THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

"UMPIRES:

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:

NAGANO, Osami
FUKUTOME, Shigeru

RANK
Admiral
Rear-Admiral

OFFICIAL DUTIES

Head of First Section (War Plans and Operations).
Member First Section
Head of Sub-Section, First Section
Member Sub-Section, First Section
Member Sub-Section, First Section
Member Sub-Section, First Section
Member Sub-Section, First Section

UOZUMI, Jisaku
YAMAMOTO, Chikao
MAYUZUMI, Harue
TAMURA, Saburo
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi
UOZUMI, Yoriichi

Captain
Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander

NAVY MINISTRY:

TAKATA, Toshitane
SHIKI, Tsuneco
TOIBATA, Kurie
FUJII, Shigeru

Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander

Member of Military Affairs Bureau
Member of Military Affairs Bureau
Member of Office of Military Supply
Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).

N-TEAM:

COMBINED FLEET:

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
ITO, Seiichi
KUROJIMA, Kameto
GOTO, Shigeru
ISOBE, Taro
SUGI, Toma
SASAKI, Akira
WADA, Yushiro
NAGATA, Shigeru
WATANABE, Yasuji
ARIMA, Takayasu
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi
OTA, Kanai

Admiral
Rear-Admiral
Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Staff Adjutant
Staff Engineering Officer
Staff Gunnery Officer
Staff Air Officer
Staff Communication Officer
Staff Navigation Officer
Staff Operations and Plans Officer
Staff Torpedo Officer
Staff Supply Officer
Meteorologist attached to Staff

FIRST COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro
ARISAWA, Naosada

Rear-Admiral
Commander

Commander
Deputy Chief of Staff

E-TEAM:

SECOND FLEET:

KONDO, Nobutake
YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke
OISHI, Tamotsu

Admiral
Captain
Commander

Commander
Deputy Chief of Staff
Staff Navigation Officer

FOURTH FLEET:

INOUE, Semi

Vice-Admiral

Commander

FIFTH FLEET:

HOSOGAYA, Boshiro

Vice-Admiral

Commander

ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:

TSUKAHARA, Nishizo
KUSAKA, Jinichi

Vice-Admiral
Rear-Admiral

Commander
Chief of Staff

A-TEAM:

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious forces for southern invasion):

TAKAHASHI, Ibo
ISHIHARA, Hajime

Vice-Admiral
Captain

Commander
Deputy Chief of Staff

SIXTH FLEET:

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi
KANOAKA, Tomojiro

Vice-Admiral
Captain

Commander
Deputy Chief of Staff

FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet):

NAGUMO, Chuichi
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke
GENDA, Minoru

Vice-Admiral
Rear-Admiral
Commander

Commander
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff

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YAMAMOTO, Chikao	Captain	Head of Sub-Section, First Section
MAYUZUMI, Harue	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
TAMURA, Saburo	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
UOZUMI, Yoriichi	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section

NAVY MINISTRY:

TAKATA, Toshitane	Captain	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
SHIKI, Tsuneo	Commander	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
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GOTO, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Adjutant
ISOBE, Taro	Commander	Staff Engineering Officer
SUGI, Toma	Commander	Staff Gunnery Officer
SASAKI, Aki	Commander	Staff Air Officer
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GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

"On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. Prisoner of war was assigned to 'N' Team (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE—Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer—handed the prisoner of war an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November Operation Order No. 1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the prisoner of war realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

"On 5 September, the prisoner of war was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japanese apparently expected to catch all major UNITED STATES Fleet units in the PACIFIC in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the ATLANTIC. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that 'N' Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class aircraft carrier and one SORYU Class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.

"On 6 and 7 September, the conference of 'N' Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The prisoner of war, who was adept at the abacus—calculating board—was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The prisoner of war believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that—when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded—the basic plan continued as originally intended.

"These early sessions, the prisoner of war said, seemed confined primarily to two

general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, DUTCH EAST INDIES, the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central PACIFIC Islands—including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as an immediate military objective; the Japanese intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The prisoner of war heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked 'that's where friction with GERMANY will begin.'

"The conferences (and 'games') were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the staff were already on board.

"On 15 September, all the staff with four yeomen (not including prisoner of war) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The prisoner of war remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO—then still War Minister—was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

"The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Japanese Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

"On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Operation Orders No. 2 and No. 3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

"(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his Operation Order—i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct East Longitude Time.)

"The prisoner of war once knew the Operation Order intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline it is believed to be substantially as printed.

Notes in parentheses in the following order were added by the editor.

“Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY
1 November 1941

‘COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

‘The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

‘War will be declared on X-Day.

‘This order will become effective on Y-Day.

‘GENERAL SITUATION:

‘(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

‘In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self-protection for the preservation of our interests in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC Ocean, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

‘(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

‘BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES in interfering with our program of construction in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in EAST ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

‘(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

‘Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been under way with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently, she has threatened the fortunes of JAPAN which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

‘(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet

awakened from the deluding dream of “Fight the War and Save the Country” and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a “scorched earth” policy for all CHINA.

‘While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerrilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

‘(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

‘The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan Border is formidable.

‘The UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

‘OUR SITUATION:

‘The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has 11 Air Fleet (Naval Shore-based Air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

‘STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:

‘To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater EAST ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the “Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof—HAKKO ICHIU”), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

‘STRATEGY:

‘The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

‘If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

‘If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with “Strategy

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

'In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

'Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

'Precaution: Disposal of this Order:

'This Order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

'Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order
No. 1

'ANNEXED VOLUME

'1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

'2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having 1 Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 day and will set course, by way of TANKAN Bay (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American Pacific Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

'X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

'3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

'4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR".
—"The fate of the Empire".

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR"—
"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".

"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack".—

"Climb Mount FUJI".

"The time to commence the attack is 0520".—"The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".

"All forces attack".—"Climb Mount NII-TAKA!"
etc.

'5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force Commander.

'The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstance whatever.

'6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack, either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION):

'(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

'(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

'(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force Commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

'7. The commander of the Surprise Attack Force (submarine Force), having 6 Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

'8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

'The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupation Force will probably be PALAU.⁽¹⁾

'9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2 China Expeditionary Fleet.

'10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

'Soviet shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

'It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

'11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of 1 Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND Sea.

'After Y-Day has been determined, the JAPAN Steamship Company passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-PACIFIC liner scheduled to sail in this period).

⁽¹⁾ The prisoner is in error on this point. The forces for the invasion of MALAYA departed from HAINAN, while a sizeable portion of the PHILIPPINE Expeditionary Force embarked at MAKU.

'When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another prisoner of war confirms this).

'12. The Commander in Chief of 4 Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of 11 Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

'It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, UNITED STATES, NETHERLANDS bases were then listed in this paragraph—a few of which follow:)

(1) GUAM—about X plus 2.

(2) WAKE—about X plus 7.

(3) (The dates for the invasions of RA-BAUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJI, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

'13. The date for the seizure of MID-WAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN Islands is scheduled for October 1942."

"Herewith are two of the above referenced documents:

"THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

'The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to prisoner of war, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows):

'1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.

'2. Plans for escorting large Army con-

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

voys and the place, time and date for landings.

'3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare, Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes, and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy.

'4. Supply plans.

'Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

'5. Communications Plans.

'6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The Bandjermasin Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy."

"MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(Prisoner of war does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and stated in effect):

'It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, 5 Fleet (Northern Force) will counter-attack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy.

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku

Commanding, Combined Fleet"

"Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 1. (Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.):

'1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

'That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

'2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

'3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

'4. That the campaigns in the NETHER-

LAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

'The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

'5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

'This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

'Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "Waterloo" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

'All of the planes of Carrier Division 1, Carrier Division 2, and Carrier Division 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6 Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (Destroyer Squadron 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of Battleship Division 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the main body of our fleet.

'6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. 6 Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

'7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

will take at least several months for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

'8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.'

"Communications Plans:

(Prisoner of war does not know about these; no details.)

"Supply Plans: (outline):

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

"5 November

"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 2

"Y-Day will be 23 November."

"10 November

"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 3

"X-Day will be 8 December."

(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence, Volume 1, No. 22, pages 1-14)

Section II. ASSEMBLY AND OUTWARD PASSAGE

2. ASSEMBLY AT TANKAN BAY⁽¹⁾

a. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1

The unnamed Prisoner of War quoted in Paragraph 1 above reproduced from memory "Striking Force Operation Order No. 1", specifying the assembly at HITOKAPPU Bay, as follows:

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI Bay
10 November 1941

STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

- "1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
- "2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN Bay. (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island KURILES).
- "3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
- "4. Break-down of attack plane units:
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX
1st Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by Prisoner of War).
- "5. Fleet cruising formation
(Including retiring formations)

(1) TANKAN Bay is also referred to as HITOKAPPU Bay. The latter name represents an alternative manner of reading the ideographs. The bay is located on ETOROFU Island in the KURILES.

- "6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO, Chuichi
Commanding
Striking Force "

(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Vol I, No. 22, page 11)

b. Assembly of Task Force

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), a third class seaman who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the aircraft carrier KAGA, gave the following account of the assembly of the task force at HITOKAPPU Bay. Upon reinterrogation, the prisoner revised his estimates of time in the manner set forth in Paragraph 2d below. All times are East Longitude Time.

"Assembly of Task Force:

"Task force assembled at TANKAN (indicated by prisoner as HITOKAPPU Bay), ETOROFU Island in the KURILES about the middle of November 1941 under the command of Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi. The aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO on 7 November, proceeded south of KYUSHU, up the east coast of JAPAN, and arrived at TANKAN on 15 November 1941. The aircraft carrier SORYU, three oilers and one supply ship arrived on 17




Figure 1. Sketch showing disposition of Japanese task force at anchor in HITOKAPPU Bay.

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
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(TN Exact tracing from original document)

Figure 1. Sketch showing disposition of Japanese task force at anchor in HITOKAPPU Bay.

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

November. The battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA, the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU, a heavy cruiser (thought by prisoner to be of TONE class) and two destroyers arrived at TANKAN before 20 November.

Three "I" Class submarines joined the

task force upon its departure from TANKAN. At TANKAN units anchored in the position shown in Figure 1, a sketch drawn by the prisoner,

Prisoner of War also sketched the terrain and installations surrounding HITOKAPPU Bay. This sketch is set forth as Figure 2.




Figure 2. Sketch of terrain and installations in HITOKAPPU Bay Area.

"HITOKAPPU Bay was surrounded by hills, the highest peak being about 500 meters high. Southwest coast was low lying with a rocky foreshore as far as the center of bay. Low cliffs began here, rising to a maximum of about 200 meters at northeastern side of entrance. Hills were covered with low scrub, not higher than two or three feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or ashore. Prisoner of War saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in three houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of center or northeastern side of bay from KAGA, and view beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.

"Prisoner of War estimated width of bay to be 6,000 meters and distance between

entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 meters. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near center of bay. Bay was deeper than most harbors, but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.

"Wind was from northwest.

"There was only one pier, situated at southwestern side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 meters long, 4 meters wide, 2 to 3 meters high, and steps out at the end. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high alongside. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 meters. Prisoner of War had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowed to leave its immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when he landed.

ASSEMBLY AT TANKAN BAY

"Ground inshore of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.

"There were three fishermen's houses inshore and a little to south of pier. They were not visible from KAGA's anchorage, but could be seen from pier. Behind houses earth embankments had been constructed, about 10 feet high. Nothing could be seen beyond embankment except three radio masts. Prisoner of War could not see whether there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no smoke or other sign of habitation.

"Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. Prisoner of War did not know where road led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.

"Landing would be difficult between pier and southwestern side of entrance, as there were a number of rocks offshore, height above water about 2 feet. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. Prisoner of War saw no sand or beach in this area.

"Prisoner of War considered that landing from MLC would be easy between pier and center of bay. There were few rocks offshore, and height of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 meter. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but Prisoner of War saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.

"From center of bay to northeastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffs. Prisoner of War saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KAGA's anchorage.

"A radio station was situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of building were visible. Three masts could be seen, but Prisoner of War could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He saw none of its personnel, but thought it was a naval radio station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.

"Prisoner of War saw no defenses, guns, or torpedo tubes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of anti-submarine nets or boom defense. There were no indications of minefields, either across entrance or outside, and no buoys which might mark channels. There were no buildings visible at either side of entrance.

"Prisoner of War saw no airplanes while at TANKAN, and did not know of existence of any airfields or seaplane bases. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from pier, whether there were any suitable sites

for airfields; ground near southwestern side of entrance was, however, low lying.

"There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He thought, but was uncertain, that storm signals were displayed in vicinity of radio station.

"Prisoner saw no airplanes or patrol vessels while at TANKAN, except six torpedo boats which anchored southwest of entrance for about one day. Provisions were embarked in KAGA on 19 November. Prisoner thought she oiled, but was not certain. No shore leave was granted. An order was given however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by pier near southwestern side of entrance. Prisoner landed once, on 20 November, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to leave immediate vicinity of pier. Prisoner saw, but did not speak to, about three fishermen who lived in houses nearby. He saw no army or naval shore personnel nor staff of radio station further inland." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 2-7)

c. Greatest Operation Force in History

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote out an account of the operation. His written account has been supplemented in respect to several details by additional interrogation:

"Farewell, many memories of the home port. After leaving YOKOSUKA Harbor on the 15th of November our crack 18 Destroyer Division progressed directly towards HITOKAPPU (TANKAN) Bay in the KURILE Islands with the destroyer FUCHIKA leading and followed consecutively by the KASUMI, ARARE, and the YOEN.

"In the early dawn of the 21st we entered TANKAN Bay, our destination. Aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships entered the bay the following day. This is where our Imperial Navy organized her greatest operation force in history.

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

d. State of Readiness

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), (the same prisoner who gave the information quoted in Paragraph 2b above), upon interrogation, revised his version of the time schedule kept by the task force during the PEARL HARBOR operation as follows:

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

"15 November 1941—Aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO. Proceeded south of KYUSHU and up the east coast of JAPAN...

"22 November—The battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA and the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU arrived at TANKAN, ETOROFU Islands in the KURILES.

"23 November—Aircraft carrier KAGA arrived at TANKAN.

"24 November—Aircraft carrier SORYU arrived at TANKAN.

"25 November—Aircraft carriers ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU arrived at TANKAN.

"27 November—Task force left TANKAN for Hawaiian Area. Three submarines joined it on leaving the harbor.

"28 November—KAGA assumed Number 2 State of Readiness and antiaircraft look-outs were posted." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 268, page 8)

c. Task Force Completed

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki stated that:

"He was aboard the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU, when it participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack and gave the following account (all hours in TOKYO time):

"On 20 November 1941, the SHOKAKU sailed from OITA to an anchorage in the north called TANKAN (Prisoner not sure of location). It arrived about the 25th to find

the battleships KIRISHIMA and HARUNA, the aircraft carriers KAGA, AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, ZUIKAKU: two or three cruisers and several destroyers.

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

3. OUTWARD PASSAGE

a. Map Showing Date Task Force Departed

Undated captured map establishes the task force's date of departure from ETOROFU Island as 27 November 1941. The authority responsible for the issuance of this map is not specified, but the source is obviously official.

(SOPAC Translations, Serial No. 04180, Item 643)

b. Sketch Showing Formation of Task Force

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, a member of the crew of the aircraft carrier KAGA, quoted in paragraph 2b above, gave the following description of the task force's outward passage. Upon reinterrogation, the prisoner revised his estimate of the dates involved in the manner set forth in paragraph 2d above:

"Task Force sailed at 1400, 22 November 1941, being joined by three submarines upon leaving. Formation on leaving and during passage is depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Formation of Japanese task force during outward passage.

"Task Force proceeded east until 4 December, when course was altered to south. It did not zigzag. Speed was 13 knots. JAPAN time was kept throughout. No airplane patrols were carried out during outward passage. From 23 November antiaircraft look-outs were posted—three men in each of seven antiaircraft machine gun positions on either side. Tricks were two hours. No binoculars were issued to look-outs.

"On 28 November KAGA assumed No. 2 State of Readiness. Gun crews were closed

up in two watches. Ships were darkened from now on.

"On 2 December the Commanding Officer of the KAGA, Captain OKADA, Jisaku, addressed ship's company. He announced that Commander in Chief Combined Fleet had been summoned by the Emperor, who informed him that war would be declared against AMERICA on 8 December; the KAGA was now proceeding towards HAWAII; that at 1 a.m. on Saturday, airplanes would be flown off to attack PEARL HARBOR.

OUTWARD PASSAGE

Prisoner stated that he was a little frightened on hearing this, but as a Japanese, he took war for granted.

KAGA oiled 27 November, and again 3 December. Prisoner did not know when other ships of Task Force oiled. Oilers and supply ship left Task Force during night of 4 December and prisoner did not see them again.

"Task Force altered course to south on 4 December."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 3-4)

c. Approached PEARL HARBOR

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987), who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote the following account of the task force's outward passage:

"On the morning of the 26th the operational commanding officer, Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi passed the brief order, 'Attack PEARL HARBOR.'

"Thus, we left our Fatherland behind and advanced through high waves of the PACIFIC. Our advance was led by the destroyer OBORO consecutively followed by the 16 destroyer division; the light cruiser ABUKUMA; the battleship, Hiei; the aircraft carriers, AKAGI, KAGA, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, SORYU, and HIRYU; the battleship, KIRISHIMA; the 18 destroyer division; 2 submarines; 1 heavy oil tanker; and the heavy cruisers, TONE and CHIKUMA on both flanks.

"First the destroyers fired their ball ammunition, followed by the fire of the cruisers and then by that of the battleships ending with the take-off and landing practice of the airplanes from the aircraft carriers at dusk. After 10 or more days of traveling through rough weather and sea in an easterly course on the Northern PACIFIC, we finally approached PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII."

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

d. Men Informed of Strike

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, gave the following account of the task force's outward

passage:

"On 27/28 November the fleet sailed, taking a northerly course south of the ALEUTIANS. On December 4 the Captain of the SHOKAKU informed the crew of the intended strike, and prisoner says that he was worried because he feared that an American counterattack would follow. On the night of 5 December the ships turned south.....

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM 101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

e. Method of Fueling

The article quoted at length in Paragraph 1 above summarizes the task force's outward voyage as follows:

"The Task Force sortied from ETOROFU Island, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (East Longitude Time), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral NAGUMO (Commander in Chief First Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5 less HOSHO); two battleships; Hiei, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8, plus ABUKUMA); elements of Destroyer Squadron 1; and about twenty submarines.

"One of the Japanese' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a chief petty officer on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. Oilers coming alongside the Task Force to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use."

(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 13-14)

Section III. THE ATTACK

4. THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE

a. Task Force Sails

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in paragraph 2b above, a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier KAGA, described the attack on PEARL HARBOR as follows:

"During the night of 7/8 December, the three submarines proceeded on independent patrols in vicinity of Task Force. They were not seen again by prisoner.

"The same night Task Force increased to full speed of 26 knots and commenced zig-zagging. Ship's company of KAGA went to action stations and remained closed up all day. Prisoner was at 20 centimeter gun and saw nothing further. He thought Task Force remained in formation throughout 8 December and did not scatter and that battleships were stationed one on either beam of leading ships.

"Airplanes were flown off at 0100 hours, 8 December 1941 (JAPAN time), and returned about 0500 or 0600. About 30 airplanes failed to return, 15 of which belonged to KAGA. Prisoner of War attributed high proportion of losses from KAGA to fact that her airplanes were last to take off." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, page 4).

b. Glorious Success

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi, quoted in paragraph 3c above, wrote the following description of the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

"On the early dawn of December 8, we reached a point 400 kilometers off-shore of the HAWAIIAN Islands. As the sun rose the wide expanse of the sky cleared and the sea was calm. The weather was good as if planned for the great initial victory of YAMATO's airplanes.

"As the battle flag rose on the mast of the flagship AKAGI, the carrier-borne planes left the decks one after another from each of the carriers and in a magnificent formation of approximately 300 airplanes disappeared in the direction of PEARL HARBOR. Immediately, reports of glorious

successes came in.

"Again, the second attack unit made up of approximately 200 attack and fighter planes of the ship departed bravely to conquer.

".....another great and glorious victory. However, who would know of the remembrances of the holy sacrifices of the Imperial Army behind the glories. Approximately 15 of our planes and 5 special submarines failed to return. Only one enemy flying boat came to attack."

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published).

c. General Quarters

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the PEARL HARBOR strike as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, stated that:

"General quarters came at 2300 hours, 7 December 1941, and the planes took off at 0200 hours, 8 December. As soon as the last plane had taken off the fleet turned northward. Planes returned between 0600 and 0900 hours. Ten planes of the SHOKAKU failed to return."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6).

d. Succeed in Surprise Attack

Commander NAKAYA, Kenju, commander of the leading air formation in the attack on PEARL HARBOR, wrote an account of the strike which was subsequently edited by the Naval Information Department and published by BUNGEI SHUNJU SHA. A full translation follows:

"WE SUCCEEDED IN THE SURPRISE ATTACK"

"We received the orders to attack the Island of OAHU at sea. At the time, my ship was sailing directly eastward. The long-awaited orders finally came. Notwithstanding all, when I received these orders, I experienced the sensation of becoming hot from excitement and deep emotion. All hands formed ranks on the deck and received these orders. At this time, the signal flag, which went up high on the masthead,

THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE

was truly the 'Z' flag. The 'Z' flag which went up 36 years ago in the JAPAN Sea, when the fate of the Empire was at stake, floated again; this time on the PACIFIC. While all hands were looking up at the 'Z' flag waving in the strong wind of the ocean, unawares their eyes were running with tears. Our air unit commander intimately issued the following order:

'Each member of the crew make a vow to exert yourself to the utmost in carrying out your duties.' At that time, the rapture of being able to take part in an important, unique battle rose up within me.

"Soon after the 'Z' flag was lowered, I became conscious, for the first time, of the charging speed of the aircraft carrier which was going eastward at full speed. The morale of the officers and men rose up high, verging on the point of suggesting the engulfing of the enemy.

"The weather at that time was poor and variable. However, the triumphant officers and men took no notice of it. The maintenance crew, saying that they would also fight with the aircraft crew, gave us white head bands. The orders to start finally came. The orders of the commander at the time were: 'Succeed in the surprise attack operation; all hands charge.' The large waves just before dawn caused the aircraft carrier to roll and pitch sideways. The sea was still gloomy; the wind which went whistling by my ears was strong, and the weather was as bad as usual. This was to be expected, for a 17-meter northeasterly (sic) was blowing hard and strong. Vast, dark clouds hung over from an altitude between 1500 and 2000 meters. It wasn't the best situation for the large formation of airplane groups to leave the aircraft carrier to rush into that narrow PEARL HARBOR. If this had been the customary practice or training, flying would have been postponed; but, this morning, the training of many years was continued. It made no difference whether the weather was good or bad.

"Starting time 0 hour 00 minutes. One plane after another left from the unsteady deck which was pitching and rolling lengthwise and sideways. As they were arranging their formation in the air, my eyes unconsciously followed the friendly planes which were going up one after the other, and looked up at them encouragingly as if they were saying: 'Go to it!' Our planes which had already organized their formation rushed, at full speed, straight for HAWAII. However, the greatest anxiety of the com-

mander was during the time it took for them to reach HAWAII. Could there have been an error in the position of the aircraft carrier, after it had made a surprisingly long-distance journey of nearly 4000 miles to near the shores of HAWAII where the weather is bad? If there was a mistake, our airplanes would be unable to reach OAHU Island. Before long, the men in the airplanes greeted a magnificent sunrise. Usually in the South Seas area one can see over 30 miles, or even a long distance view of 50 miles when the view is clear. But at this time, a screen of vast, dark clouds almost cut off the view. Since HAWAII is ridged by mountains of a height of 1000 meters, the island should be seen at least 20 minutes before reaching it.

"Thinking that we should soon be reaching the Hawaiian Islands, I was straining my eyes through a telescope, when suddenly the shoreline appeared distinctly before us. Now! Now was the time for all hands to attack! The formation immediately deployed. Each unit, depending upon its duties, some at a high altitude, some at a lower altitude, changed over into a resolute attack formation. PEARL HARBOR was still asleep in the morning mist. It was calm and serene inside the harbor, not even a trace of smoke from the ships at anchor. The orderly groups of barracks; the wriggling white line of the automobile road climbing up to the mountain-top; fine objectives of attack from all directions. In line with these, inside the harbor, were capital ships of the PACIFIC Fleet, strung out and anchored two ships side by side in an orderly manner. The torpedo airplanes cut through the scattered clouds and went charging through in a straight line. A formation torpedo attack was very difficult because PEARL HARBOR is so shallow and narrow. Thereupon, the torpedo airplanes separated individually, some flew so low they skimmed the surface of the waters, others approached within 200 to 300 meters of the belly of the battleships, and discharged their torpedoes when they thought, this is it. Instantaneously, two white streaks of the wake of the torpedoes went rushing along the surface of the water. As I was feasting my eyes upon this scene, a terrific column of water flew up into the air from the side of a capital ship. It was an excellent hit upon the capital ship's side. The column of water went up high enough to compete with the altitude of the clouds. Columns of water continued to gush forth

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one after another. If it were to be timed, it was an incident of three to four seconds. Notwithstanding this, the antiaircraft defense guns were still asleep. Even the fighter planes did not come up to challenge us. The surprise attack was a complete success. The great success of the surprise attack should be said to have been accomplished spectacularly. A message — 'We succeeded in the surprise attack' — was radioed to the aircraft carrier.

"Following this, the dive-bombers rushed straight on in a bee-line. Shortly after this, reddish-black flames were flaring up from the hangars of the enemy airdrome, and from the airplanes which were lined up on the airdrome. When these torpedo airplanes and dive bombers were about to deal freely their first blow and were seemingly standing on their noses about to dive, enemy antiaircraft fire began to burst around us. Next, finally came our large bombers. I was in the spearhead of the formation, and I fixed my sights on a giant battleship below. Since the air currents were rough, I could not fix my sights for horizontal bombing. Thinking that I could not afford to waste any bombs, I began all over again. As we circled midst the antiaircraft fire, the following formations did the same, and circled calmly midst the antiaircraft bursts. This time we succeeded. Just as we were about to release our bombs, our plane received a severe jolt. As I glanced backwards, there was a column of smoke rising into the sky 500 meters high.

"This is something which we learned later. But this was one of the successes of the battle which was the result of close co-ordination tactics between the fighter plane formations, torpedo plane formations, dive bomber formations and special submarines which carried out an extremely difficult undersea attack. The powder magazine of an enemy warship had exploded, and the bottom half of it had already burst open, spreading a wide oil film on the surface of the water. It was definitely of the ARI-ZONA class. The enemy antiaircraft fire finally became intense, and shells burst around our formation in such large numbers that it seemed as though they were throwing rocks at us. Presently a large hole was torn on the port side of the fuselage of the flight commander's plane. Following this, it appeared as though No. 5 plane had been hit; fuel was leaking from its tanks. Nevertheless, it continued in the formation. It seems that he was determined to crash

his plane after fulfilling his mission. When I signalled, 'Let me know your situation;' he calmly answered, 'It is only the auxiliary tank.' His attitude was completely serene, which seemed to ignore life and death.

"Next, we directed our attention upon Target No. 2, WHEELER AIRFIELD, which was situated in the center of the Island. Over 200 fighter planes and bombers were lined up here, but our dive bombers and fighter planes had already bombed and strafed them. Red flames were rising from the planes which had been wheeled out on the airdrome, and dense, black smoke rose from hangars. It was a scene of complete destruction. It was probably gasoline which was burning. Black smoke was spreading to the extent of almost screening the sky. This situation was the reason why the enemy planes could not take off to counterattack. Since these enemy objectives were in such a condition, we again turned our attention to the enemy capital ships.

"Two warships which were anchored side by side offered an excellent target, one which could never be repeated. While one formation aimed at the first ship, the other attacked the second ship. After the torpedo-airplanes and dive bombers had attacked, our large bombers would attack; it was a continuous attack. When No. 1 bomber attacked, a column of water 100 meters in height rose up. If the succeeding planes should dive then, they would be damaged, so they calmly waited until the column of water subsided. Therefore, the period of time during which they would be troubled by enemy antiaircraft fire would be prolonged. Nevertheless, they waited calmly in the air. Just about this time, the torpedo airplane attack reached its height of intensity. They boldly closed in on the enemy and dropped their torpedoes, and when they were about to level off from the dive, they were fired upon. The fuselage of one of our airplanes was enveloped in smoke. The torpedo airplane which became a mass of fire still continued to accurately release its torpedoes, and finally charged directly into an enemy ship and blew itself into a burst of flames. I definitely witnessed this with my own eyes.

"Just about the time that we had accomplished our attack-mission and were about to return, the first rays of the morning sun had already touched upon PEARL HARBOR. As I glanced back, I saw one battleship cut in half surrounded with black

oil; besides that, there were two sunken ships with their ugly, red bellies showing. Then, there was another ship tilted at a 45 degree angle, gradually sinking, and three ships were burning furiously. Every enemy ship along the coast of FORD ISLAND was damaged.

"We circled over PEARL HARBOR several times, as long as our fuel supply permitted. The reason for this was that, although we had clearly seen these with our own eyes, there was a faint hope that one of our crippled airplanes might return. When we returned safely to our aircraft carrier, the second attack formation took off. The reason for the sending of successive attack formations was to thrust home the final blow to the remaining strength of the enemy PACIFIC Fleet."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 3-5)

e. Grand Air Raid

Excerpt from communique issued by the Naval Section of Imperial General Headquarters at 1300 hours on 8 December 1941 reads as follows:

"1. At daybreak of the eighth, the Imperial Navy made a desperate, grand air raid upon the American fleet and military strength in the HAWAII Area....."

This communique was supplemented on 18 December 1941 by the following estimate of damages inflicted by the strike:

"Sunk—five battleships, two A or B-class cruisers. Severely damaged—three battle ships, two light cruisers, two destroyers. Medium damages—one battleship, four B-class cruisers. Besides these, 450 enemy planes were burnt by bombing and strafing, and 14 planes were shot down. Moreover, it was reported this day that our special assault unit, organized with special submarines, torpedoed and sunk a battleship of the ARIZONA class. However, word that five special submarines have not yet returned, and our losses were 29 airplanes greatly impressed our people."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, page 2).

f. Propaganda Photographs

Various captured propaganda pamphlets and photograph albums have contained aerial photographs of damages inflicted by Japanese air attacks on PEARL HARBOR. These were given wide circulation for publicity purposes in JAPAN. A selection of these are reproduced as Appendix A. Translations of the captions are attached in each case.

5. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

a. PEARL HARBOR Scouted Before Attack

Captured book entitled "Characteristics of Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations" undated, issuing authority not specified, contains the following passage.

"Reconnaissance and Scouting:

Before the surprise attack on HAWAII, JAPAN's best submarines (about thirty of them) had been assigned to scouting and reconnaissance duty at PEARL HARBOR." (ATIS Document No. 15807, not previously published)

b. Chart of Proposed Submarine Activities

The Japanese plan of operations called for an attack on American naval units inside the harbor by midget submarines.

"This submarine beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the prisoner but it is believed that the submarine was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this submarine's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear failed.

"The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a UNITED STATES Navy Hydrographic Office chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The submarine also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the submarine was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

"At least three Japanese midget submarines were lost by our counteractions at this time. One submarine actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japanese admitted the loss of five of these undersize submarines."

(CINCPAC-CINCPHA "Weekly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 14-15).

c. Special Attack Unit

Captain HIRAIDE, Hideo, Chief of the Naval Information Section of Imperial Gener-

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al Headquarters wrote and issued the following account entitled "Heroes of the Special Attack Unit:"

"At the time of the iconoclastic blow against outrageous AMERICA, which disregarded our great motive and mission of world peace and even attempted the life of the Japanese Empire, we furiously struck the first blow at the heart of the enemy at the risk of our lives. With all reverence to those of the Special Naval Attack Unit who lost their lives in this great accomplishment, I make this report.

"Imperial General Headquarters communique (1500 hours, 6 March 1942).

"The glorious, incomparable, strong attack upon PEARL HARBOR by the Special Naval Attack Unit has already been officially published. The plans of attack, which struck terror in the hearts of all the nations throughout the world, were conceived and executed by Lieutenant IWASA and several other officers. The plans were conceived by these men out of their sense of patriotic and loyal duty, several months in advance, in case of such an emergency; and were secretly submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets through their superior officers.

"After the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets had carefully studied these plans, he found that they would be successful and could be followed; so he accepted the fervent desires of the submitters. The non-commissioned officers who took part in this great enterprise were the most superior personnel in the Imperial Navy. All of the men had unshakeable faith in the officers who took part in the battle, and hoped and prayed that they would be able to live and die with their officers. In these plans, there were no volunteers because each officer submitted a request for the non-commissioned officers to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets, which he approved. As a result of the preparatory training and manufacturing experiments, which were carried out night and day without sleep and rest within a short period of time, both by the tacticians and technicians, and even by the workers, —while maintaining strict secrecy within the department,—they were able to complete their work before the beginning of this battle. The spirit of patriotism and loyalty of the officers and men taking part in the attack, the enthusiasm of those connected with the technical work, together with the distinguished ability of the Imperial Navy can be boasted throughout the world.

"Although, at the time of the attack, every available means would be utilized, security measures would have to be made more firm after the attack upon the main forces of the enemy. It is almost impossible to even imagine the extreme difficulties encountered in skirting about the widely scattered sunken hulls of ships within the narrow channel, and to escape and return from the fierce counterattack by the enemy. It is natural that sailors of the Imperial Navy should make preparation for the self-destruction of their ships if the worst should come to the worst.

"Thus, the Special Attack Unit, which was confident of the divine grace of the August virtue of His Majesty, undertook this daring enterprise with sealed lips on 0 day of 0 month, and rushed into PEARL HARBOR. It was through calm and clever maneuvering that they were able to break through the strict enemy security net and the complicated water route; all the ships were able to penetrate into the harbor from a pre-arranged disposition. Some attacked during broad daylight, while others made a night attack, and executed a daring enterprise unparalleled in history. After the completion of their duties, their fate rested with their ships. The sinking of the ARI-ZONA class battleship during the night attack was even clearly established by friendly naval units, which were far outside of the harbor. At 1631, 8 December (Hawaiian time 2101, 7 December), two minutes after the moon rose, a great explosion took place within PEARL HARBOR. Flames went high up into the sky and incandescent fragments of steel scattered high through the air. In a short time the blaze became extinct. It was established that, at the time, the enemy, thinking that the attack was being made by our air units, opened up a fierce fire. And on the same day at 1811 (Hawaiian time 2241), a radio message that the attack was a success was sent by one of the ships of the Special Attack Unit. After 1914, the radio message was interrupted. There was some belief the ship was self-destructed or sunk. Although it has been reported that the result of the daylight attack against the enemy fleet was slight, we strongly believe that it was a huge success. However, because of the confusion within the harbor, it was very difficult to discriminate between the successes gained by the air unit and the Special Attack Unit. At the time of their departure, they received orders to return upon the completion of the attack, but none of them returned because

they had no such intentions. Some approached (within a proximity unprecedented in history) and attacked enemy ships under the hail of bombs and torpedoes from friendly air units; others remained concealed in the water until the moon rose. Thus, the entire personnel of the unit made a definite attack upon those enemy capital ships which were slightly damaged during the daylight attack. Their concentration upon contributing to the success of the attack transcended beyond life and death.

"The unprecedented, peerless, sacrificial spirit of attack thoroughly demonstrated the tradition of the Imperial Navy, and should be recognized as one of the greatest achievements of the outbreak of this war.

"Furthermore, I wish to add that, as I recall the great achievements of the guardian spirit of our nation at this third month death commemoration of the Special Attack Unit, which our population of 100,000,000 cannot forget even though they might try, there is another new inspiration.

"These young men were always warmly received by their officers; they were subjects of respect by their comrades and subordinates. They all had excellent characters. But without the thought of fame, promotion, pleasure, and even without self-interest, they cast aside the thought of 'self', and only presented their whole body and soul to their Emperor and country; they bravely died for their country at the age of twenty some years.

"This attack, as in the report, was conceived by Lieutenant IWASA and other officers. They elaborated a plan by themselves. Wishing to do their loyal and patriotic duty, these men planned this achievement which was regarded as humanly impossible. Thereafter, during a period of several months, these men secretly carried out difficult training, indescribable beyond mere words, in order that there might not be any chance errors.

"Thus, as the battle began, they rushed into PEARL HARBOR and carried out the fierce attack, in which they all but threw themselves against the bottoms of the enemy ships; after which they calmly met their deaths. I wish to give my impressions of the situation of the attack, considering the reports from the American side today. When the Special Attack Unit attempted to slip into the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, they found submarine nets stretched across and many mines laid there; indeed, the enemy security measures were very thorough.

But, this group of well-trained young men of the Special Attack Unit, through calm and clever maneuvering through these obstructions, easily penetrated into the harbor.

"At the same time, I believe these young men said, "Our mission is already completed,"—and smiled at each other. The commander and his subordinates were truly of one mind, and the ships and personnel were one. The confusion of the water route within the harbor was nothing; controlling their beating hearts, trying not to become delayed behind the others, all the ships penetrated on deeper into the harbor.

"Wasn't it the group of enemy capital ships, lined up orderly in two rows, which was presently reflected in their periscopes? We can easily imagine the satisfaction of these young men. Each ship finally began the attack. Some ships closed in on a large warship located in the middle of the row of ships, and inflicted the first fierce blow; other ships bored into the bellies of other ships nearby. At this time, a glimpse of the activity of friendly planes in the sky was seen in the periscope. The friendly planes appeared to be in the midst of a daring attack. The courage of the young men had grown a hundred-fold; they clenched their teeth and stood fast, determined not to allow even one ship to escape. It was time to begin the next attack. An enemy destroyer, probably having seen our periscope, was coming to crash into our side. There were some submarines, not having time to resist, which dived deeper to escape disaster.

"At this time, enemy shells rained down and our air unit attack became fierce; torpedoes and bombs flying around inside the harbor caused great confusion. I believe that the underwater attack by each vessel was a gigantic success; however, it is a difficult situation to discriminate between the success of the air units and the underwater attack.

"The members of a submarine of the Special Attack Unit which awaited the sunset, restrained themselves on the bottom of the sea, while listening to the fierce daylight battle; they passed the time away by occupying themselves with jig-saw puzzles which they had brought along. This is truly something which cannot be easily done. Finally, after nightfall and waiting for the moon to rise, the situation changes over to the attack. That submarine approached within close quarters looking for enemy capital ships which might have been slightly

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damaged during the daylight attack. The large hull of an enemy ship, flooded by moonlight, became a clear silhouette and an excellent target of attack. At the command, "Open fire!" by 00 commander, the final attack was carried out. There was no error in the attack which was full of the spirit of certain death for the enemy within sight. A thunderous explosion shook the interior of the harbor and columns of flames, several hundred meters in height, scorched the sky. Simultaneously, a conning tower began to calmly appear above the surface of the water, kicking up white-crested waves. The calm and courageous commander confirmed the last moments of the enemy ship, which broke in two, crumbled and began to sink.

"The long-cherished objective was now realized. What were the thoughts of these brave, young men in the moonlight? They were thinking about the several months of hardships which they underwent for this day; and now, these young men stood before the glory of death. The thunderous sinking of this enemy ship was distinctly confirmed by our units outside of the harbor; they even distantly saw, at the same time, flames shoot up and fragments of incandescent steel fly high up into the air. The time was 8 December (HAWAIIAN Time 2101, 7 December); two minutes after the moon rose.

"The battle was over. However, the young men of the Special Attack Unit did not return. The final message from one of the submarines—"We succeeded in the attack."—was at 2241 Hawaiian time. The members of the unit, surpassing life and death, devoted themselves to the annihilation of the enemy ships to the ultimate end; they had no thoughts of returning alive. It is confirmed that some of them were sunk, while others destroyed themselves. There were not a few instances of going into the jaws of certain death. However, they calmly attained the deep-rooted conviction of the noblest and purest region of self-effacement (non-egoism). This great spirit of complete sacrifice, which even makes the gods weep, is indeed the flower of BUSHIDO (Chivalry) and the essence of our racial (national) spirit. There isn't even one instance of such in world history. As we recall these meritorious services, we experience a quivering of the blood throughout our bodies.

"The unequalled, pure loyalty of the daring enterprise by the Special Attack Unit has graciously reached His Majesty's ears. When the spirits of these young men now under the ground, who came into this

world to protect His Majesty and to be the corner-stone of peace of the Fatherland, hear about this—how they must be choked with tears of joy! Although these young men were on the threshold of death, and not life, they carried on calmly and self-possessed, no differently than as though they were on a march during their daily training.

"Just before the departure, these young men gathered together with their comrades in arms to chat. One young fellow saying,—"After the attack I will go ashore and make this talk,"—innocently pulled out a pistol and palmed it. Another, after changing his underclothing said,—"I should wear my uniform, but since it is hot, I shall be excused in my fatigue clothes,"—and placidly continued to dress himself. Another young one, in reply to,—"Be careful not to be caught in any bombing and torpedo attack,"—by one of this comrades, replied, "No fear, by that time there will be a big hole in the enemy's hull!" He carefreely engulfed them in smoke and laughed. There was even one who had enough improvised amusement in reserve to recite a stanza, "I heard ROOSEVELT whimpering before the King of Hell the following day!"

"It was said that another chap who liked his liquor, in reply to an encouraging remark,—"Let's celebrate after your return from a successful battle,"—by one of his comrades, did not smilingly reply, as he usually did,—"Yes, let's drink." These young men probably thought that they should not utter remarks such as 'return' or 'if I should live.'

"Another young fellow, it is said, tapping the shoulders of his comrades who were remaining behind, encouraged them by saying, "Let's hold out together until the ultimate end; we will meet next at YASUKUNI SHRINE!"

"Presently, it was the time of departure. It is usually the custom when leaving for ordinary battle, to report to the superior officer, "I am leaving (with the intentions of returning)." However, these young men boldly reported, "Lieutenant So and So or Sub Lieutenant So and So, I go now! (to death, without the intention of returning)". And they did not say, "I am leaving (with the intention of returning)."

"Go to it!"

"O. K."

"Greetings were exchanged with those going to great achievements. It was a moment of deep, heroic emotion to those leaving, those remaining, those who were

sending the others off, and to those who were being sent off. Even at a time like this, when these young men were about to leave, they remained self-possessed. It is said that one young officer spiritedly climbed into the boat after saying, 'Carrying lunches, soda water, and receiving chocolates is just like going on a hike.' At this time, the happy memory of excursions during his childhood probably flickered in the thoughts of this young man. Heaving their breasts with dear memories of excursions and dancing with joy, these young men jumped into the jaws of death. It was learned later that these young men had disposed of their personal matters in perfect order. There were some who had left written expressions of gratitude to superior officers and comrades, and official recordings of their viewpoints; however, there was very little which appeared like wills. Among them is a swan song by some youth.

"If it be for the Emperor,

Why regret the lives of young warriors?
If their deaths be not in vain.

Now we go through the nets and mines,
Smashing into pearly gems after the strike.

Ah! The happiness of this morning sky,
Meeting again at YASUKUNI SHRINE.

(TN YASUKUNI SHRINE is a Shinto Shrine in TOKYO where the spirits of the dead soldiers and sailors are enshrined).

"I believe that this expressed the deep emotions of all the young men. This understanding, this faith is easily expressed in words. However, these young men actually executed these in a tacit manner.

"I believe that, from the speech and behaviour of these young men, they not only desired to win in battle, but also to execute this with the belief that they had to oust and destroy American and British principles and ideas of selfishness, which penetrated the spirit of the Japanese people through their culture and thoughts over a long period of years.

"Isn't the first step towards the success of the Greater EAST ASIA War dependent upon the ousting of the visible American and British tyrannical power from EAST ASIA, and, at the same time, the sweeping away of the invisible, egotistic, materialistic American and British ideas from our thoughts? It probably can be said that the actions of these young men, from this standpoint, were shining examples.

"At this time, we must bear in mind that the great spirit of self-sacrifice, in which one destroys oneself and dies for one's

country is largely due to the powerful influence of mothers. Everyone of these young men were famous, as if by common consent, for their filial piety. It is said that a certain young man always returned to his home when he had a leave, even when it was but a short period, and derived great pleasure by spending the day with his mother. But this is enough to give you a general idea of the matter. The power behind the scene of the mothers of these young men, who tenderly raised them, is immense. Especially when she continued to work, disregarding herself, for her home, husband, and children. The supreme happiness which these mothers sought in their self-sacrificial, spiritual influence, became a great power which grew within these young men. How could these pure and loyal heroes be born without these great mothers of JAPAN? These mothers, who efface themselves to live only for their children, are mothers who live for the nation. What a great difference there must be when the morale of these young men should be compared with the enemy American and British soldiers, who immediately run at the sight of superior opponents, and who actually keep their distance when they realize that their lives are in danger. Behind this scene, the casualness of the relationship between the selfish, pleasure-seeking American and British mothers and their children, should not be overlooked.

"In AMERICA, a sailor's occupation is defined as one in which a person travels around the world for nothing, receives an enormous pay, and leads a pleasant and happy life. It has even been clearly shown by the speech and actions of survivors from several naval battles up to this time that they are strongly influenced by the self-first idea; that is, 'while there is life, there is hope.'

"Isn't there all the difference in the world between the young men who loyally gave their lives for their country, and the natures of the American and British soldiers who make it their philosophy of life to further their own happiness?

"Since the outbreak of the Greater EAST ASIA War, the entire world can only remain amazed at our continued victories. But, behind all this, if they could understand the continuous flow of traditional spirit of first giving their valuable lives in the defense of their country, they would undoubtedly lower their heads in respect for the blood of the YAMATO (Japanese) race.

"However, when we realize that the source,

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

from which this incomparable and infinite strength gushes forth, lies in the Emperor, we cannot but be deeply stirred by the August Virtue of His Majesty.

"As we look back upon history over 2600 years, since Emperor JIMMU led his armies from MIMITSU HARBOR, the stalwart and heroic spirit of YAMATO has continued to this day! That which flares up and continues to burn is the fierce and high spirit which is exemplified in the following phrases. 'When we put out to sea, we do not intend to return.' 'Die only by the side of our Emperor.'

"The glory of this spirit increases with the advancement of the Japanese Empire. When the opportunity presents itself, this spirit will blossom forth in all its glory, just as in these young men.

"It is pre-destined that no matter how long this Greater EAST ASIA War lasts, no matter if additional strong enemies should appear, the moment the Fatherland should need them, these young men who have served their country will be reborn again and again to defend their country. There isn't the least bit of danger in the lack of such men.

"These young men of the Special Attack Unit are 'Gods of War,' and, at the same time, they are 'Gods who establish Peace.' That which follows the Greater EAST ASIA War must be everlasting peace throughout the world. Then, these 'Gods of War' will be 'Gods of Peace'. The present destruction is not destruction for the sake of destruction, but it is destruction for the sake of construction.

"These young men who defend our nation are the children, the older brothers, and younger brothers of the Japanese people. From the standpoint of the individual who is bewildered, how encouraging it is that it has been clearly shown that such pure, loyal and incomparable blood flows through the veins of our people when the nation is faced with a national emergency.

"I repeat again. It is easy to become

temporarily aroused, but it is difficult to face death calmly. This is still the beginning of one phase of a long period of war. I respectfully end this report, and I pray for the repose of the souls of the nine young men."


(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 6-11).

d. Photographs of Special Attack Unit Heroes

The Japanese admit loss of five midget submarines and their crews in the attack on PEARL HARBOR. From the tenor of the article quoted in Paragraph 5c above, it appears probable that this was the total number involved. Each submarine carried a crew of two men, or ten in all for the five ships. Nine of these men have been officially deified as 'military gods'. Their photographs, taken from a captured document, are reproduced as Figure 4. The tenth member of the crew, whose fate has been officially ignored by the Government, is the prisoner of war referred to in Paragraph 5b above.

The manner in which the Japanese had learned by 6 March 1942 that only nine of the ten crew members had died is not clear. At that time the Navy Department officially eulogized the nine young "Gods of War," and were even able to publish their photographs, indicating that they knew which of the two men manning the midget submarine beached on OAHU the day following the attack had survived. On the official publicity the fate of this survivor was pointedly ignored. In view of the fact that all radio communication from the midget submarines had ceased on the night of 8 December, it seems doubtful that the information could have been transmitted in this fashion. They may have gained it as a result of the normal exchange of prisoner of war information specified by the Geneva Convention. If not, however, this may represent an instance of successful espionage.

特別攻撃隊九軍神



稲垣 清兵衛長 (左下)	片山 義雄兵曹長 (右下)	上田 定兵曹長 (左中)	佐々木 直吉特務少尉 (中上)	横山 薫範特務少尉 (右上)	廣尾 彰大尉 (左下)	古野 繁美少佐 (右中)	横山 正治少佐 (左中)	岩佐 直治中佐 (右上)
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Figure 4. Pictures and names of the Special Attack Unit. Nine gods of the armed forces. (T.N.: These men were killed in action and were deified as gods in the national shrine for war heroes, YASUKUNI SHRINE, TOKYO, JAPAN.)—1. Commdr. IWASA, Naoji. 2. Lt. Commdr. YOKOYAMA, Masaji. 3. Lt. Commdr. FURUNO, Shigemi. 4. Lt. HIROO, Akira. 5. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. YOKOYAMA, Shigenori. 6. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. SASAKI, Naokichi. 7. W. O. KAMITA, Sadamu. 8. W. O. KATAYAMA, Yoshio. 9. W. O. INAGAKI, Kiyoshi.

Section IV. THE RETURN VOYAGE

6. THE RETURN VOYAGE

a. Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in Paragraph 2b above, described the task force's voyage home as follows:

"On completion of attack, the task force proceeded in general direction of TRUK. The weather became very hot. Full speed of 26 knots was maintained until 10 December, when it was reduced to 18 knots. Zigzagging was carried out in vicinity of HAWAII when reports of two enemy submarines were received, off WAKE Island, and on approaching JAPAN.

"WAKE Island was bombed by airplanes from carriers in passing, but the prisoner knew no details except that nothing exceptional occurred. Before reaching TRUK, plans were suddenly changed, and task force altered its course northward, proceeding direct to JAPAN without calling at any port. It arrived at KURE on 27 December 1941.

"During the return passage, continuous single airplane patrols were maintained until shortly before reaching Japanese waters. One airplane from each carrier in turn carried out patrol lasting about three hours. KAGA remained in No. 2 State of Readiness during the day and No. 3 State of Readiness (with gun crews in three watches) at night. Special antiaircraft lockouts were not posted, this duty being carried out by antiaircraft ma-

chine gun crews. Task force did not fuel while on return passage."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 4-5)

b. Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, described the homeward voyage as follows:

"The fleet headed northwest for a few days and then directly for JAPAN. A few days before arrival, the SHOKAKU left formation and proceeded to OITA."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6)

c. Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) quoted in Paragraph 3e above, gave the following account of the homeward voyage.

"Thus each ship turned back simultaneously. Enroute to our home port we passed MIDWAY and WAKE safely and sighted our islands on the night of the twentieth.

"I can remember the natural tears which came to each one's eyes. It is the soul in that figure, praying for the eternal welfare of the Fatherland for which he longs, that is the Japanese man.

"Thus to our home port on the twenty-fifth and then to the KURE Naval Depot." (ATIS Interrogation Notes, not previously published)

Section V. CONCLUSIONS

1. Available evidence indicates that Japanese plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR were finally formulated at the war games held at the Naval War College in TOKYO from 2-13 September 1941. There appears to have been a considerable amount of preliminary and partial planning, probably extending over the naval games and maneuvers of many years, but culminating in a series of games held at various fleet anchorages prior to late August 1941. It is perhaps significant to note that one source claims that the midget submarine unit had been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard for a year and a half prior to the attack.
2. The essence of Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, specifying naval activities in the opening of hostilities, was embodied in the outline of conditions under which the September 1941 naval war games were to be held. These conditions were printed on 3 September 1941.
3. From 5-7 September 1941, officers participating in the naval war games discussed in concrete terms the problems and possibilities of an attack on PEARL HARBOR. They anticipated catching all major units of the UNITED STATES Fleet in PEARL HARBOR.
4. The advisability of an amphibious landing on HAWAII at the time of the initial strike was discussed. The project was rejected because of the apparently insuperable problems of logistics involved. The eventual occupation of MIDWAY and HAWAII was contemplated, the former in the late spring and the latter in October 1942.
5. Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi, who later commanded the task force making the attack on PEARL HARBOR, participated in the September 1941 war games as a member of "A" Team.
6. On 15 September, 1941 naval staff members conferred with army representatives at IWAKUNI. It was rumored at the time that the Army had no previous knowledge of naval plans for an attack on PEARL HARBOR.
7. On an unknown date at the end of October 1941 the Army Department and the Navy Department of Imperial General Head-

quarters jointly issued "The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement." This seems to have been the basic document specifying the relative commands, spheres of jurisdiction, tasks and responsibilities of the two services in all cases where joint army-navy operations were envisaged. It seems a valid presumption that the period between 15 September and the end of October was occupied in large part with the working out of the details of this agreement.

8. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was dated 1 November 1941, aboard Admiral YAMAMOTO's flagship, the Battleship NAGATO, at SAEKI Bay. Together with its annexes, this order sets forth the basic plan of all naval operations attendant upon the commencement of hostilities. The following aspects are noteworthy in respect to the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

- a. Ships comprising the striking force were ordered to depart from their naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day (24 November 1941).
- b. Submarines comprising the Surprise Attack Force were ordered to depart from the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day (20 November 1941). Strength was to be so disposed as to command the mouth of PEARL HARBOR. American warships escaping the harbor were to be attacked.
- c. If possible, midget submarines were to carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships within PEARL HARBOR after the air attacks were completed.
- d. Beginning on Y-Day (23 November 1941) the Commander of the First Combined Communication Unit was ordered to send out false messages calculated to give the impression that the main strength of the Japanese Fleet was in the western part of the INLAND Sea.
9. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 2, dated 5 November 1941, designated 23 November 1941 as Y-Day, the day upon which Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was to become effective.
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THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

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13. Task Force consisted of the following units:

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Submarines—

Submarine force from Sixth Fleet, probably from 20-30 ships in all. (Submarine force, with the exception of three I-Class ships, proceeded independently to the area of operations).

Oilers—

Three.

Supply Ships—

One.

14. Task force left TANKAN Bay on 27 November 1941. It sailed east until 4/5 December, then altered course to the south-

east toward HAWAII.

15. Upon reaching a point approximately two hundred and fifty miles from HAWAII, the first wave of planes was launched. This took place at 0100-0200 hours, JAPAN time. The weather was very poor.

16. Evidence does not agree, but it seems probable that from twenty to thirty Japanese submarines of the Sixth Fleet were assigned to reconnaissance duties outside PEARL HARBOR before the strike. They were to engage any American ships escaping from the harbor.

17. Five midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the harbor. Evidence indicates that some succeeded, lay concealed on the bottom till night and then attacked. Four seem to have been destroyed by American counter measures. One was beached and captured.

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2. "Black smoke rises over WHEELER Army Air Field, which is being reduced to ashes."
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THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION




3. "Beginning of the Battle of HAWAII. The American PACIFIC Fleet just before its destruction."



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APPENDIX A



5. "Enemy installations and warships 'left buried' around FORD Island."




6. Surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR. Main fleet burning and being destroyed near FORD Island. Scattered about in the harbor are enemy ships scurrying in all directions as a result of our sudden attack. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION



7. "Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above, two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Hull of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special seaplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."



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


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THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION



3. "Beginning of the Battle of HAWAII. The American PACIFIC Fleet just before its destruction."



4. "Concentration of the enemy main fleet cowering under our deadly attack."

APPENDIX A



5. "Enemy installations and warships 'left buried' around FORD Island."



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THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION



7. "Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above, two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Hull of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special seaplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."



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APPENDIX A



9. Enemy key positions burning up as a result of our accurate attack."



10. "Magnificent !! PEARL HARBOR gasping under our fierce bombardment."