

TOP SECRET

(CHINA POLICY) /TN: Marginal note  
in pencil/

Sent by Lt. Colonel SUZUKI of the  
War Ministry on 29 June 1932.  
Probably submitted to higher au-  
thorities by the Military Admini-  
stration Section.

/TN: Above is a marginal note in  
ink./

TADA /seal/

Vice Minister /TN: Written in red pencil/

Chief of Information Bureau /TN: Written in red pencil/

AMAGI /seal/

ASIATIC BUREAU, First Section/seal/

Concerning the Empire's Attitude Re-  
garding the Return to His Post of  
the Chinese Minister to JAPAN,  
CHIANG TSUO -PIN

(29 June 1932)

#### Conclusions

No matter how pro-Japanese the Chinese profess to be nor  
how much they seek to negotiate directly, the Empire must ad-  
here strictly to its established policy and must not display  
in the least a conciliatory attitude, particularly as regards  
the MANCHUKUO question.

Furthermore, proper caution must be exercised with re-  
spect to the Powers' suspicious which would be aroused by  
direct negotiations between JAPAN and CHINA.

#### Reasons

It appears that the Chinese Minister to Japan, CHIANG  
TSUO-PIN, is at last to return to his post on about the 4th  
of next month accompanied by military and naval attaches.  
It is rumored that after his return to his post his movements  
will probably be governed by such considerations as:

1. He will negotiate Sino-Japanese problems  
after arrangements are made with Lt. General  
SAKANISHI.

2. He will ascertain JAPAN's minimum demands regarding Manchurian problems.
3. The underlying intention on the part of CHINA is not to let JAPAN recognize MANCHUKUO for the time being.

Moreover, the report has been spread that CHIANG TSUC-PIN is returning in order to carry out CHIANG KAI-SHEK's epochal policy of friendship with JAPAN. By nature, however, the Chinese are a race of thorough-going opportunists and have no set plan in the management of administration. Therefore, they will never discuss matters seriously with the Empire. All of their decisions are based on so-called trends (not trends in the true sense) i. e., the surrounding atmosphere. Even while conferring with us, if the atmosphere in BRITAIN, AMERICA, etc. is unfavorable to us, it is clear that they will immediately reverse their stand. They are now racking their brains on how to alienate JAPAN from BRITAIN, AMERICA, FRANCE, etc. It is proper to judge that every alluring bait offered the Empire proceeds from this motive. Today, there is not a single Chinese who may be trusted. This is the source of CHINA's /internal/ disturbances year after year.

If CHINA is really going to discuss matters with the Empire, it can be confirmed only by her acknowledgement of the following matters:

1. To recognize that every problem concerning MANCHUKUO and MONGOLIA shall be settled between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO; and, consequently, to withdraw the complaint to the League of Nations concerning the Manchurian question.
2. To settle every problem between Japan and China proper, after agreement to the above. (The Empire shall show her resolution to be indifferent to participation of the Powers in this settlement.)

In short, the Empire must continue to maintain her former attitude until China approves the above two clauses, and must not assume an attitude of seeking an easier way. Should the Empire change her former attitude by being too eager for friendship with CHINA, she will thereby incur the Powers' suspicions, and meanwhile, will run the extremely great risk of bringing about a handicap which CHINA will again turn to her advantage.