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The Situation in the North Caucasus: November 2006 - May 2007:

Apotheosis of the "Chechenisation"

The presence of the Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic remains significant although their size has been considerably reduced over the past years.

The troops deployed in the republic on a permanent basis are: the 42nd Motor Shooting Division of the Ministry of Defence of the RF (around 15 thousand people) and the 46th separate operative brigade of the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation and in the mountaineous regions: the forces of the Federal Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia. In addition to these, elements of other forces of the Russian Ministry of Interior and special task units of the Ministry of Defence are deployed in Chechnya on a temporary basis.

The data concerning the size of the United Military Forces in the Chechen Republic are controversial. Even the data provided by the Command of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation and those provided by the Ministry of Interior differ significantly.

The majority of the troops belonging to the Russian Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence deployed in the Chechen Republic now spend more time on their deployment bases and rarely participate in active operations against militant groups. The exception would be the special task units who still actively operate in the mountaineous areas.

The main operations against militants groups and underground groups are now carried out by law enforcement forces predominantly consisting of ethnic Chechens. Only recently most of these units had no legal status at all, however, by the end of 2006 the vast majority of them had been legalised in the process of "Chechenisation" of the conflict and were nominally assigned to one or another law enforcement structure.

In February - March 2007 the process of "Chechenisation" of the armed conflict in Chechnya was completed with the regime of Ramzan Kadyrov being definitively established as one and the only power and political authority in the republic. On 15 February 2007 the President of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov handed in his resignation which was immediately accepted by the President of the Russian Federation. On 2 March 2007 the Parliament of the Chechen Republic approved the candidature of Ramzan Kadyrov proposed by President Putin for the presidential office of Chechnya.

Long before his own appointment as President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his loyal friends and companions and often members of his extended family to all key positions in the Republic, especially the positions related to law enforcement functions. Currently practically all key positions in both law enforcement and economic sector are occupied by either members of the Kadyrov clan or his personal and loyal friends.

What was the intent behind the decision of the Kremlin to eliminate the last remaining obstacles on Kadyrov's way to establishing the regime of his own absolute personal power in Chechnya? It is evident that the group lobbying the option of "appeasing" Chechnya through "Chechenisation" of its power (V.Surkov and others) has itself become the hostage of its own line. Now the Kremlin initiators of the idea have to carry their plan through

to its logical conclusion. Otherwise, they will have to go as far as introduce serious alterations and acknowledge their own mistakes and, consequently, face the prospect of losing the points which had gained in their confrontation with the opposing pro-Kremlin alliance of security and defence forces.

The gist of the policy of "Chechenisation" consisted of the following:

- firstly, creation of a local government: nominally through elections, in actual fact - through appointment by the Kremlin.
- and, secondly, creation of law enforcement and military forces consisting of local people, ethnic Chechens. Their task was fighting the armed militants by means of terrorising and intimidating those strata of the society, groups, families, residents of particular localities who were suspected of supporting or hiding militants. The new law enforcement forces were practically given permission to act without concern for the law and with almost total impunity. Good knowledge of local realities, customs, family ties and clan relations allowed members of these forces to act more selectively and efficiently than the federal forces were ever able to.

This policy resulted in actual power being concentrated in the hands of a limited number of people who had control over various armed groups ("kadyrovtsy", "yamadayevtsy", "baysarovtsy").

The Kadyrov clan, supported by its Kremlin patrons, was gradually winning the battle for power in the republic and this gave it opportunities for constant increasing of the military forces under his control. This in turn strengthened and secured its own power.

Now that Ramzan Kadyrov is the president of the Chechen Republic he has absolute control over the parliament and the government of the republic. The positions of the heads of districts are all held by Kadyrov's loyal people. Most key positions in the Chechen Ministry of Interior are held by people from Kadyrov's personal Security Service (former separatist fighters). The elite troops of the Ministry of Interior - the patrol militia regiment N2 (PPSM-2) named after Akhmad Kadyrov¹ and the Oil Regiment (a militia regiment of the Extradepartmental Security Department of the Ministry of Interior of the Chechen Republic)² - were entirely formed of the Kadyrov's Security Service members. Kadyrov's loyalists who were previously part of the illegal armed formation known by the name of "Counterterrorism centre" became members of the South and North battalions in 2006. Nominally, they are included into the 46th brigade of the Interior Troops of the Russian Ministry of Interior. However, in practice the members of these armed formations still consider themselves Kadyrov's people.

In November 2006 the only pro-federal armed group which was not under Kadyrov's control has been liquidated. The group was led by Mowladi Baysarov, who himself was finally assassinated.

This armed gang received in 2004 a semi-legal status of a special task unit "Gorets" attached to the Operation Department of the Federal Security Forces of the Russian Federation responsible for coordinating and conducting the counter-terrorism operation. Numerous conflicts arose between Baysarov's people and Kadyrov's people on the grounds of dividing control over the illegal oil extraction and transportation business. As the conflict developed, Baysarov began to position himself as a President Alkhanov's supporter. At the beginning of the year 2006 Baysarov's people were denied the vague status of a special task unit attached to the FSB. In the autumn of the same year Kadyrov's people blocked up Baysarov's forces inside their deployment areas. Baysarov fled to Moscow counting on his FSB patrons' support. The majority of his men were disarmed.

The Ministry of Interior of the Chechen Republic immediately "discovered" the evidence of various crimes of the former head of the special task group attached to the FSB - he was accused of abductions and murders of civilians. However, the accusations concerned Baysarov alone although it was evident that he would not have been able to commit all these crimes on his own. On 18 November 2006 Baysarov was shot dead in Moscow by the Chechen Ministry of Interior officers, allegedly while they were trying to detain him. Shortly before the

assassination of their leader the Baysarov people were invited to meet with Ramzan Kadyrov who offered them to come over to his side and serve in the Ministry of Interior Forces.

Elimination of Baysarov's terrorist unit would be a welcome step if only it had been done through administrative arrests and judicial persecution of those guilty of crimes against civilians. However, instead of that, the leader was shot out of court and his people were pardoned in order to later become members of the state law enforcement forces.

Nevertheless, not all military and law enforcement units operating on the territory of the Chechen Republic are controlled by Kadyrov.

The battalions East and West consisting predominantly of Chechens and belonging to the 42nd motorised infantry division of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation are also deployed on the Chechen territories and are under the command of Kadyrov's adversaries of long standing Yamadayev and Said-Magomed Kakiyev.

Among other forces operating in Chechnya are the ill-famed Operative Searching Bureau N 2 (OSB-2) of the North Caucasus Operative Department of the Russian Ministry of Interior Affairs in the Southern Federal District. This armed unit which is not answerable to the local authorities and which widely resorts to torture in order to "knock" out false confessions and to trump up charges and criminal cases is currently the bone of contention between the federal and the local authorities.

A certain counterbalance with regard to the absolute power of Kadyrov's clan in the Chechen Republic could be created by the Republican Public Prosecutor's Office which is responsible directly and exclusively to the Public Prosecutor's General of the Russian Federation. Russian officials and authorities have on numerous occasions reported that a number of criminal cases relating to crimes committed by the Ministry of Interior forces have been initiated. However, in reality the prosecuting authorities of the Chechen Republic do not willingly investigate the crimes committed by Kadyrov's people.

The following example can serve as a typical illustration of the situation in Chechnya: a resident of the city of Argun Abdulbek Abzuyev was kidnapped in 2005, severely beaten and later strangled by members of Kadyrov's forces - officers of the Counterterrorism Centre. The Public Prosecutor's initiated a criminal case, the names of the suspects were ascertained. One of them, Sultan Buluyev, currently served in the patrol regiments named after the late Akhmad Kadyrov, the two others, Anzor Batayev and Arbi Mamayev, are serving in the South battalion of the Ministry of Interior. For a whole year the Public Prosecutor's Office has been proving itself unable to conduct the essential investigative procedures with regard to these people. Meanwhile, the victim's mother, Saman Abzuyeva, who was the witness of her son being kidnapped and who is demanding fair investigation continues to be subjected to demonstrative threats and attacks. Her son's abusers have on numerous occasions in the course of 2006 and 2007 tried to forcefully take her away in a car in an unknown direction, during those attempts she had also received numerous blows from them. As a result, Abzuyeva lives practically under home arrest since she is afraid of venturing out of her house and even at home she does not feel completely safe.

On the night of 13 September to 14 September 2005 armed strangers kidnapped the residents of the Noviye Ataghi Ruslan and Sharudin Khalayeva, Magomed Elikhanov and Magomed-Emi Aguyev. The District Public Prosecutor's initiated a criminal case pursuant to Article 127 (illegal deprivation of liberty) of the Criminal

Code of the Russian Federation. It was later proved that the kidnappers were in fact officers of the 1st squadron of the PPSM-2 regiment of the Ministry of Interior. The four kidnapped victims were taken to the regiment deployment base in the village of Pyskhara where they were subjected to torture and humiliation. Under torture they confessed to gangsterism, illegal possession of arms, armed robberies and a murder of a policeman. And only after that were all the four finally handed over to the Shali District Department of Interior. The fact of illegal deprivation of freedom was evident, however, the police took no measures that could be directed against Kadyrov's people. On the contrary, the arrest of the people handed over to them was legalised.

The Public Prosecutor's Office of the Chechen Republic, basing its decision on the testimonies of the four residents of the village of Noviye Ataghi solely, charged them with committing the above-mentioned crimes and took the matter to the court. The case hearing did not last long, the case went through several courts. And, finally, the case fell to pieces.

The final decision was announced in April 2007. The four residents of Noviye-Ataghi were acquitted of almost all charges and were found guilty of "participation in an illegal armed formation". And despite the lack of evidence, bar the confessions made under torture, the court sentenced them to 1 year imprisonment each for participation in an illegal armed formation. With the term of imprisonment during the inquest being taken into account, all the four were immediately released.

However, the question of investigation into another criminal case concerning illegal detention and application of illegal methods of methods of interrogation to which these people were subjected.

The court had brought forward irrefutable evidence of the responsibility of a number of officials for the kidnapping and torture of the four residents of Noviye Ataghi. Among the officials charged with these crimes were the former commander of the PPSMO-2 regiment and currently Deputy Minister of Interior of the Chechen Republic A.Yasayev and an MP V.Mitsayev. However, the Public Prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic makes no haste to investigate into this case. And nevertheless, high-rank officials continue to force the victims and their relatives to sign written statements on the absence of complaints against PPSM-2.

On 14 December 2006 a resident of the village of Kurchaloy Usman Timerbulatov, 25, died in the local hospital of the village of Kurchaloy. Usman was kidnapped on December 4 by police officers and put into detention into the secret prison located in Tsentoroi, the native village of Ramzan Kadyrov. On 11 December Temirbulatov was released. His family immediately put him into hospital.

According to the villagers, while in detention Temirbulatov was severely beaten with a truncheon (he had severe injuries of muscles on his back, belly, arms and legs), his genitals were crushed, he had cold water thrown over him while outdoors. According to the doctors' conclusion, Usman had no chances of surviving.

The District Public Prosecutor's Office has initiated a criminal case on Temirbulatov's murder. Its staff had interrogated his father and his cousin. Before interrogation the father of Usman, Uvays Temirbulatov, received a visit from the Police Superintendent of the Civil Security department of Kurchaloyev District. He dictated the testimonies which Uvays was supposed to give to the Public Prosecutor's staff and which ran thus: Usman had been kidnapped by unidentified people, the location where he was kept was unknown to him.

The following course of conduct of the Public Prosecutor's investigators shows that they are presumably "in a deal" with the local police, show marked unwillingness to solve this case and are inclined to take up the theory of abduction by unidentified persons.

Only in the cases concerning OSB-2 officers do Chechen Public Prosecutors show their ability and willingness to investigate crimes and violations.

A good example here would be the case of infliction of torture upon Ramzan Khasiyev (resident of the village of Goyskoye Urus-Martan District of the Chechen Republic, Pervomayskaya ul, 27). On 20 February 2007 he was detained together with a relation of his Shakhid Ipayev by armed officers in camouflage who took them to the premises of the OSB-2 department of Urus-Martan. On orders from the OSB-2 department chief Rukman Yakubov, Khasiyev was subjected to torture, including torture with electric shock. Khasiyev spent over 11 hours at the OSB-2 department. Shakhid Ipayev was also subjected to harsh beatings at OSB-2. His torturers insisted on his confessing to a number of crimes. Both were released exclusively owing to the fact that Khasiyev's brothers also serve in the Chechen Ministry of Interior forces.

Immediately upon his release Ramzan Khasiyev was taken to hospital in Urus-Martan where he was diagnosed with a concussion of the brain, numerous bruises and grazes on his body, on his upper and lower extremities, contusion of the right lumbar region and the lumbar spine. With an unexpectedly prompt for such cases reaction, the Public Prosecutor's Office of Urus-Martan district initiated as soon as on March 5 2007 a criminal case pursuant to Article 286 para 3 of the Criminal Code of the RF (Exceeding Official Powers). Currently the case has been sent up to the Public Prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic.

There are a number of similar examples of different processes that were started after evidence of tortured detainees by the workers of OSB-2 were revealed. This can be explained by the fact that OSB-2 was opposed by Ramzan Kadyrov, who is attempting to gain popularity among the population. Kadyrov can be quite successful with this at times with the help of different populist steps. While he is quite tolerant when the services under his control break the law, he publicly opposes the suggestion to "move [OSB-2] out of the republic" of Chechnya. His arguments for this are the tortures and kidnappings performed by the people working in this organization. The parliament of the Chechen republic suggested the same thing- they even sent a note to the minister of domestic affairs of the Russian Federation.

It is evident that there are enough proven facts to accuse OSB-2 of systematic lawbreaking.

OSB-2 is located in Grozny, but there are a number of branches in other regions of Chechnya. They keep people who are arrested and detained in the local branches of OSB-2. According to the legal code of the Russian Federation, people who are detained and arrested cannot be kept in OSB-2.³ This legal norm was broken and they created a temporary detention facility, in violation of the legal code.⁴

We know of cases when people who were kidnapped were then "legalized" in OSB-2. After a day or two, or several weeks, these missing persons suddenly appeared in OSB-2s, as officially arrested. The employees of the ministry of domestic affairs and of the prosecutor's office either totally denied that these were cases of kidnapping, or claimed that the missing person was kidnapped by "unknown kidnappers" and then right after his release, he was arrested by the employees of OSB-2.

On no grounds can the existence of this unlawful Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) be justified or given any logical explanation, unless we consider that they needed to create special conditions in order to pressure the detained and arrested people (for example, by torture), in order to coerce the detainees into giving the "necessary" evidence. There are also some arrested people, mostly accused of crimes related to terrorism, who are transferred from lawful detention facilities to OSB-2 on a regular basis. They are usually kept for longer than 10 days, and there the investigators of the prosecutor's office conduct interrogations. Their attorneys complain, because during the interrogation the employees of OSB-2 are constantly present. When the attorneys ask OSB employees to leave the room where the accused is being interrogated, these employees usually answer with a rude refusal. Some attorneys also reported that when the interrogator of the prosecutor's office would leave, OSB-2 employees would start directly threatening them, reminding them about kidnappings and disappearances

of a number of attorneys in the Chechen Republic in recent years. The attorneys noticed that during such interrogations, the evidence given by the accused sounded as if they were texts that the detainees had learned by heart, and that the OSB-2 employees who were present closely followed the words of the interrogated person. OSB-2 employees use all possible means to prevent private meetings of the accused with their attorneys. After the arrested person is transferred from OSB-2 back into the detention facility of Grozny, he or she usually reports to his/her attorney that it was impossible to give evidence that would be different from what the OSB-2 employees had forcefully suggested (the detainees reported that they were threatened with violence, if they were to say something different). Because the accused person remains on the territory of OSB-2 after the interrogation, the employees of OSB-2 taking part in investigating the crime have unlimited opportunities to coerce the person in to giving the "necessary" evidence- if they beat and torture their detainees, these detainees can be held long enough to cover up the evidence of physical abuse.

If the accused person were immediately transferred back to the (lawful) temporary detention facility, or even after the maximum possible period of 10 days, then it would be a lot more difficult to conceal the traces of tortures and beatings. However, people are often kept in OSB-2 for several months, until they give the investigators all of the "necessary" evidence, and until the traces of the tortures disappear.

Kidnappings which often result in untraceable disappearances, are one of the most terrible human rights violations in the Chechen republic. The impossibility to figuring out the destiny of the missing person forces his or her relatives and friends to constantly relive this tragedy in their memories; this makes the relatives and friends very susceptible to the propaganda of the terrorist groups and separatist fighters.

When considering kidnappings in general (including people who were later released) Memorial has information about the kidnapping of 2,018 inhabitants of the Chechen republic, as of 2002. Out of this number, 1,057 went permanently missing.

The monitoring of Memorial covers only 25-30% of the entire territory of Chechnya, and even in the areas covered, our information is probably not comprehensive. So, in order to get the real picture, our numbers should be multiplied from 2-4 times (according to different estimates). The extrapolation of our data and the analysis of the official data gives a similar result. Memorial can claim that the total number of people who went missing during the period of the second Chechen war (since the fall of 1999 until the present) as a result of kidnappings, unlawful arrests, and detentions, is more than 3,000 and it could be as high as 5,000 people. Unfortunately, we cannot give more precise numbers at this point- right now Memorial is working on creating a detailed and comprehensive database of missing persons. In most cases of kidnappings, everything points to the fact that the crime was committed with the help of the representatives of the state, or of the armed forces who are in collaboration with them. 90% of the criminal cases where the legal proceedings were commenced when people were kidnapped are not solved. At the same time, we can note that there is a certain systematic decrease in the number of kidnappings- and it is especially noticeable since 2005.

Year	Kidnapped (number of individuals)	Of them:			
		freed or ransomed	found murdered	disappeared	"discovered" in detention facilities and jails
2002	544	91	81	372	-
2003	498	158	52	288	-
2004	450	213	26	203	8
2005	323	155	25	128	15
2006	187	94	11	63	19

2007 (to March)	16	10	1	3	2
Total	2018	721	196	1057	44

We suspect that these dynamics are probably connected to the final "chechenization" for the armed conflict and to the predominance of "latent violence" in Chechnya, which is registered neither by the human rights activist, nor, even more so, by the law enforcement bodies. We cannot be certain about how the overall number of kidnappings actually changed; however, the methods and tactics of the power departments have definitely changed: the majority of the kidnappings are committed by the security forces controlled by R. Kadyrov, as well as other local law enforcement authorities. As we have already said above, these structures do not need to murder all the kidnapped Chechnya residents or to make them "disappear" - usually they are able to extract all the necessary information after a few days of torture and beatings. On the other hand, the relatives of kidnapped individuals try to use all means to release them, and often the only way out is ransom; after this, neither the victim, nor his or her relatives complain to any official structures.

Recently, the percentage of people who were kidnapped and then disappeared, or whose corpses were found, has decreased. In 2002, when "mass cleansings" were at their peak, more than 80% of detained people got "lost". It is evident that the responsibility for most of these crimes is on the federal army, police, and special forces. As the process of Chechenization is developing, we observed a gradual decrease in the percentage of missing and murdered people among the kidnapped. This is a decrease of more than 35% over the last 2 years.

The greatest decrease in the number of kidnappings has occurred since January 2007. In our opinion, it is related to the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov gave very definite instructions to the leaders of the armed forces under his control to stop kidnappings. Consequently, most of the kidnappings in 2007 were probably done not by the armed forces but by the employees of OSB-2 or by the employees of the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSI).

The fact that Kadyrov's people were not (may be temporarily) as involved, and the outspokenness of Kadyrov against OSB-2, caused an increase in his popularity among part of the population of this republic. People who are greatly tired of living in constant fear are ready to love the government for a decrease in the level of state terror.

Kadyrov has also gained popularity through some of his populist PR. He periodically scolds bureaucrats in front of the TV camera, he makes a show of giving money to one or another poor family, etc□

But the main factor that makes Kadyrov popular is his rebuilding of the center of Grozny and repairing of houses and towns of Argun and Gudermes. We should take into account the fact that a lot has truly been done in this direction during the last year, especially in recent months. What is no less important- many people have received jobs. However, the quality of construction work is questionable. For example, in many houses that were restored, there was no interior repairs made.

All the restoration work is being done in the Bolshevik, fast fashion. Only several days after he was appointed president, Kadyrov went ahead with a whole plan of developing Chechnya through a stage of "mobilizational economics". The main features of this stage are: obligatory deductions from incomes of up to 30% from all state workers and a systematic tribute that is being paid by business. Not only Chechens that live in Chechnya have to "invest money" into the development of Chechnya, but also Chechens who work in business of other regions of Russia. The deductions from those who are working out of the country are acquired through the use of their relatives that live in Chechnya. So in this way the money that comes to the republic is very non-transparent. It is

not controlled either by the state or by the society. It is unclear where this money goes, and what it is actually spent on.

Each of the leaders of the different regions of Chechnya is obliged to restore a certain number of buildings in Grozny, and the finances for this restoration are their responsibility. Consequently, this approach to restoration results in unlawful spending of the state-budget, theft, and taking tribute from the population.

It should be mentioned that most of the population of Chechnya who has been unemployed for a long time approve of the tribute taken from state workers and businessmen.

In its propaganda the government of the Chechen republic constantly stresses that Grozny is being restored only by the money that was raised by Kadyrov- but it is clear that this money is coming mostly from the budget of the Russian Federation.

In May and June of 2007, the places of temporary housing for the refugees of the territory of the Chechen republic is supposed to be transferred into their newly restored original houses. We will see if this will come true or not.

Despite the fact that there are many signs of peaceful life in Chechnya, the armed conflict is still not over, although it has been greatly reduced. In the Fall of 2006, the militants suddenly became more active, and there were a number of attacks on the army and "militia" (police) in the mountain regions.

In November, the commander of the United Armed forces, Colonel-General Yevgeny Bariayev repeated in a meeting in Grozny the statistic mentioned by the army three years ago- saying that, "there are around 700 militants in Chechnya."⁵ Bariayev stressed that, "many young people join the unlawful armed forces. The number of militants is growing. This situation cannot be solved only by the effort of the army and militia." And he did not exclude that, "Certain heads of administration are flirting with the militant troops."

It is interesting to compare his words with Kadyrov's assurances that there are no more than 60 Chechens in these unlawful armed groups in the territory of Chechnya.⁶

On the separatist site Kavkaz-Center, we find the following numbers of army and police men losses in the north Caucasus (in the Chechen republic, Ingushetia, Kazakhstan, the Karachayevo-Cherkessian Republic) ; in December 2006, 57 were killed and 39 wounded, in January 2007, 92 were killed and 64 wounded, in February 47 were killed and 50 wounded.

The official data that is given by Russian informational agencies suggests the following degree of losses only among the army and police forces in the Chechen republics. In November 2006, 12 were killed and 10 wounded. In December 2006, 6 were killed and 13 were wounded. In January 2007, 9 were killed and 15 wounded, and in February 2007, 11 were killed and 26 wounded.

The main tactics of the militants in winter months consisted of mining the roads, and shooting at small columns.

According to general Bariayev, the militants are "constantly moving from Dagestan to Ingushetia. They have their own routes".

In Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkesy there are numerous operations aimed at eliminating the militants during the winter. There were terrorist attacks, murders of bureaucrats, and also of religious leaders. According

to the leaders of the federal forces in the Northern Caucasus, there are "two well prepared and highly conspiratorial terrorist groups in these republics." (Rossiskaya Gazeta, Feb 2nd, 2007)

During winter in Ingushetia and Karachaevo-Cherkesy, there was a whole set of operations aimed at neutralizing militant groups. Mostly these operations consisted in besieging the apartments and houses where the militants were staying. Often such sieges bring about the destruction of nearby apartments and houses, as well as death or wounds for peaceful civilians.

In Dagestan, the underground of hunting high officials, representatives of the Power Department, and spiritual leaders continued. From December 2006, through February 2007, the following people were killed: Judge Akhmed Ibragimov, Imam of one of the mosques- Magomed Saidmagomedov, and the captain of the management of the extra departmental security, Magomed Gadzhimagomedov, etc □

Towards the end of winter in Dagestan, the relations between the higher leaders of the ministry of domestic affairs of the republic and the low-ranking police force deteriorated. On the 15th of February, in Makhachkala, an unsanctioned meeting of the offices of the militia men of the second regiment of the patrol and inspection service of the ministry of domestic affairs of Dagestan was held. They were protesting against the mass corruptions in the militsia, against the tribute system, against not paying extra for over-time, the money for which it is thought is going in to the pockets of the higher echelons of power. The meeting resulted in a physical confrontation. The authorities managed to stop this incident, and there was little information about it in the mass media. The protest organizer, lieutenant-colonel Abdurashid Bibulatov, is being persecuted by the authorities of the republic. Bibulatov has lost his job, he is being spied on, and he is afraid for his life.

One can hardly doubt that the collapse of law enforcement in Dagestan has direct negative effects on the safety of the inhabitants of the regions that border on Chechnya. In the fall, 2006, there was a number of protests on the part of the population against the disappearance of people and the law violation by the Chechen power structures on the territory of the Khasav'yurt region of Dagestan. However, the kidnappings didn't stop. For example, in December 2006, a local inhabitant, Tavbulat Saidov, born in 1966, was kidnapped from the territory of the Novolaksky region of Dagestan, which borders on the Khasav'yurt region. He was kidnapped by armed people, put in a truck , and accompanied by two armored transportation vehicles (ATV's). The military left in the direction of Chechnya. After some time, Saidov was found dead with gun wounds in the territory of the Nozhaiyurtovskiy region, close to the administrative border with Dagestan.

In the end of January and the beginning of February 2007, the situation in Ingushetia also worsened. In February, there were three attacks on religious leaders, including an attack on a Mufti, and one attack on an army column by unknown people. In March, the uncle of the president of the Ingushetia Republic, Murat Zyazikov was kidnapped by unknown people.

What the power forces do in return only makes the situation worse, and causes protesting from the population. There are armed people in Mosques, houses are broken into and the intruders do not introduce themselves, show any documents, or badges. They beat up people who dare to protest, and steal money and valuable possessions during searches. Detained people are taken away in an unknown direction. Usually, after a few days they are found in the detention facility in the neighboring republic, North Ossetia-Alania. There the detained are being tortured, and the responsibility for such actions is primarily on the investigative group of the General Prosecutor's Office, under the guidance of investigator Sobol, who was granted special powers.

These actions from the authorities in Ingushetia along with the widely spread corruption is resulting in a further decrease of the level of trust that citizens have in the authorities.

Footnotes:

¹ The commander of this regiment was Aslambek Yasaev, the former separatists' field commander, then commander of one of the units of Kadyrov's Security Service. At present A.Yasaev is the deputy minister of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Chechen republic.

² Adam Delimkhanov, Ramzan Kadyrov's cousin, was in command of this regiment for a long time. Now A. Delimkhanov is occupying the position of the deputy Chairperson of the Chechen government and is in charge of the force block. Sharip Delimkhanov was appointed the regiment commander.

³ The places where detained people can be kept is contained in the fed law of the Russian federation "(detained while waiting for their trial-one word) where people who are suspected and accused of committing crimes are kept" from 15th July 1995, this law was passed. List of places which is mentioned in this law is comprehensive and cannot be altered in any way.

⁴ Reeping people who are detained/arrested in the building of operative search bureaus is in violation of the federal law of the Russian federation (can copy name of law form prev. footnote, the law of the Russian federation on the police also contradicts the decrees of the gov. of the Russian federation

⁵ Russian Informational Agency, Novosty News, 8th of November, 2006

⁶ Russian Informational Agency, Novosty News, 20th of July, 2006