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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)	A F F I D A V I T
- VS -	of
ARAKI, Sadao, et al	Paul W. Wenneker

1. My name is Paul W. Wenneker. I reached the rank of Full Admiral in the German Navy. From 1934 until 1937, and later from 1940 until the surrender I was the chief German Naval Attache to Japan, residing in Tokyo. After returning to Germany in 1937 I was given general naval duty including command of the German pocket battleship Deutschland.
  
2. My duties as German Naval Attache were quite similar to the duties of attaches of other countries at that time. During my first stay in Japan from 1934 to 1937 I had absolutely no instructions of any kind with reference to military collaboration with Japan. In fact my association with the naval men of other countries, namely Great Britain, the United States and Russia was much closer than with the Japanese. We were all treated with like suspicion and distrust by Japanese naval officers. Even when I returned the second time in 1940, after the outbreak of the European war, the situation relative to cooperation between my country and the Japanese naval officials was not greatly improved. I seldom was able to inspect their ships. My request to visit the Mandated Islands had been repeatedly refused. I was never afforded the courtesy of discussing matters with Japanese naval officers of my own rank but was forced to deal with captains and younger officers. Even after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, cooperation was sadly lacking between German and Japanese naval officials.
  
3. I was not informed by the Japanese that they were to attack Pearl Harbor. I did not know that hostilities would commence on December 8, 1941. Such information had not been conveyed to my country through my office or through the Embassy, even though both Germany and Japan were then faced with a common

enemy. As to the real strength of the Japanese Navy, the number and size of ships under construction, the construction projects under consideration, the oil supply in stock and operational plans under contemplation, I must state that I possessed not even an approximate knowledge concerning them, even though I was the logical person to receive such information. I had inquired concerning these matters frequently both officially and privately but received either no replies or such vague answers as to be of no value whatsoever.

During the Pacific War, further evidence of lack of cooperation was the fact that the Japanese failed to reveal vital information concerning their losses incurred during important naval battles. I distinctly remember that it was around a year after the battle of Midway that I first learned that Japan had lost four carriers. We had requested information concerning this particular matter on many occasions since we had heard American broadcasts to this effect but the Japanese consistently refused to inform us.

4. Relative to cooperation between Germany and Japan in regard to submarine warfare, I wish to say that the utter lack of cooperation would be the better topic for discussion. Germany did attempt to school Japanese naval officers in the thought that submarines should be used to attack enemy merchant shipping and thereby to cut off the supply lines. The Japanese Navy contended that they could better use their submarines for direct attack against fighting vessels of the enemy. Hence our proposal was completely rejected. We wished to assist the Japanese toward the construction of modern and efficient submarines. To this end we presented them with two new submarines. The first was delivered by German crew at Kure. The second was lost in the North Atlantic and never reached the Japanese Islands. The first submarine was minutely inspected by the Japanese but I was later informed that they did not feel they could duplicate it and did not intend to do so. Therefore, insofar as German

activity is concerned, the Japanese submarine warfare was not effected in any way.

5. In April of 1942, I was finally allowed to visit some of the Mandated Islands. I went to Palau and Saipan, also stopping at Guam. I have been asked if there were any fortifications on Saipan or Palau. I, like the Italian Attache who was with me, was greatly surprised to note there were absolutely none. We saw air strips, some good billets, houses and store houses, but no guns and no fortifications. I saw a large field on Saipan which was supposed to be an airfield but which was grown over by weeds. The harbors were very poor and they were only commencing the building of oil tanks. As I said before, we were greatly surprised at the lack of precautionary measures taken by Japan on these islands and I felt that the reason for the prior refusals to visit the islands was more to conceal the lack of fortifications than to reveal fortifications.
6. Germany lost two auxiliary cruisers, three submarines and six steamers in Japanese waters during the war. Most of these were lost out of lack of cooperation, that is, insufficient escort or the relaying of vital information concerning the enemy's position by the Japanese.
7. During my stay in Japan and from my many social and business contacts with various military men, I noticed a decided lack of cooperation even between the Japanese Army and Navy. They were constantly suspicious and jealous of each other and I personally tried to smooth matters over as best I could. The Army escorted its own convoys and except for those military movements which necessitated the use of the Navy in transporting Army troops the disunity was quite amazing to me.

Karuizawa  
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul W. Wenneker, being duly sworn upon my oath  
do hereby state that the foregoing writing consisting  
of three typewritten pages is true and accurate  
according to my best knowledge and belief.

PAUL W. WENNEKER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of  
August, 1947.

DAVID W. PARSONS, 0244429  
Captain, Infantry  
Investigating Officer