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Doc. No. 2577

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Excerpt from "Important Decisions Regarding International
and National Policies -- August and November 1938"

Despatched to the Foreign Ministry
November 26th at 1 p.m.

Section 7

Top Secret

The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at Five Minister Conference on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship.

While the main purpose in settling the present incident is the establishment of a new order in East Asia, based on the security gained by military victories, we must also guard against a third power checking our activities.

However for this purpose our attitude towards a third power should be defensive at present, meanwhile without neglecting to supply our army and navy with necessary armaments. Backed by this potential force we must exert our effort in the diplomatic field.

Above mentioned points are only an outline of our present policy for adjusting the Sino-Japanese relationship and may be regarded as a part of our national policy. But there is an urgent need at the present juncture to reinvestigate with the basis of our national policy for both defensive and diplomatic fronts in order to establish a policy capable of coping with the new situation.

The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at Five Minister Conference on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship.

As for the Hainan Island, it will be captured by military action in case of necessity.

(Note) Exclusively for Five Minister Conference.

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Understanding of Foreign Minister November 25th, 1923

It is natural that the economic activities and interests of a third power in China should be affected to some extent by the strengthening of economic ties between Japan, Manchuko and China. But, I understand that this cooperation should not extend to the limit imposed by the necessity for national defense and existence and the activities and interests of a third power should in no way suffer accordingly. Otherwise, it would not only complicate the international situation unnecessarily but would also check Japan's economic expansion elsewhere outside of China and considering from the wider point of view it would be a great disadvantage to Japan.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 2577

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated Aug. Nov., 1938 and described as follows: Sections from handwritten, type-written and mimeographed binder re. "Important Decisions regarding international and national policies" November 1938.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
21th day of Sept., 1946.

K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of Sept., 1946.

RICHARD H. LARSH
NAME

Witness: T/4 Taguchi Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity