

Def. Doc. No. 1401-Q-1

From Toyoda to Nomura
22 September 1941
No. 589

Ex 2901

I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me at 4:30 P.M. on 22 September, and expressed my opinion to the following effect. The American Ambassador replied that he would convey it to the home government immediately.

(1) The intention of Premier Konoe in connection with the meeting of the two heads is evident in the message to the President of the United States itself.

(2) His intention is that the general principles shall be decided at the meeting of the two heads and the details shall be left to negotiation by the competent authorities of the two Governments. The American Government, however, takes the attitude that agreement on the pending points should be reached beforehand.

(3) As I have repeatedly stated, the Japanese Government has readily made replies to the inquiries of the American Government. Explanation with respect to the policy and attitude of the Japanese Government has been exhausted, and it now remains only to wait for the reply of the American Government.

(4) The Japanese proposal which I handed to the American Ambassador on 4 September not only includes all the pending points, but expounds the Japanese attitude covering a wider scope, and in no way narrows down the original proposal of the Government of the United States.

(5) The American Ambassador's inquiry of 10 September reminded me of the fact that the Government of the United States had a doubt as to using its good offices to restore peace between Japan and China. In this connection, I showed the American Ambassador privately the basic terms of peace between Japan and China. We are not taking a new position thereby, but it should be taken as an explanation of the Japanese proposal of 4 September. (The basic peace terms which I presented will be cabled to you separately as No. 590.)

(6) As for the situation in Tokyo, there is a great difference compared with that of a month ago, as the American Ambassador, conversant with Japanese affairs, must be well aware. This is an undisputed truth, and I hope that the American Ambassador will strongly impress the fact upon the Government of the United States. The present Japanese-American negotiations became a topic of conversation everywhere in the world from about the time the news began to appear in the American press, and in Japan also they have interested a part of the general public. Meanwhile, the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance will come within a few days. The function in celebration of the anniversary will be held as last year, but the Government intends to have it performed in as calm a way as possible. I fear, however, that there may be some in this country who will try to seize the opportunity to arouse public opinion against the Japanese-American negotiations, and also that there may be some disturbances.

(7) The situation in Japan is very delicate, as explained above. The earliest possible consent of the Government of the United States to the meeting under consideration, at least as a matter of principle, is hopefully awaited. The situation is now extremely critical. It is requested that you should promptly convey the contents of the conversation to the Secretary of State and report his reaction to it.

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Def. Doc. No. 1401-R-1

From Toyoda to Nomura
23 September 1941
No. 591

In the afternoon of 23 September, I had the reasons for the stationing of Japanese forces in China transmitted to the counsellor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, so that they might be conveyed to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and to the Secretary of State. It is requested that you, too, should promptly inform Hull of them.

Japan finds it necessary to station her forces in certain areas of China for such a period as may be necessary after the restoration of peace between Japan and China, for the sake (1) of cooperating in constructing a peaceful China, and (2) of defending the safety of Japan herself.

(1) History proves the instability of peace in China, and it is especially difficult to maintain peace and order after wars. We have seen not a few instances of foreign powers taking advantage of such a situation to menace the peace of China, which often caused China to open hostilities against Japan or some other third Power. The unstable situation within the country thus very often developed into international strife. It is also a fact patent to all that the vehement activity of the Communist Party is actually doing much harm to the maintenance of peace and order there.

If such conditions were to be repeated in future, it would be quite impossible to stabilize the life of the Chinese people and promote their happiness. The most important thing of all, therefore, is that order should be maintained after the restoration of peace between Japan and China. Accordingly, Japan desires that order should be maintained so as to have China concentrate her energies on the prompt realization of a stabilized life for her people. As Japan recognizes that it is hardly possible (besides there are reasons in (2)) in the light of the present situation in China that she undertake it herself unaided, even though Japan desires that China do so, it is intended to station the necessary number of forces for such time as may be necessary, in certain areas of China.

(2) It is self-evident that, even from an economic point of view, peace and order in adjacent areas have an important bearing upon the existence of Japan. Equally self-evident is it that the situation of China viewed from the military point of view, when peace is restored after four years of large-scale modern war, may exert a direct and immense influence upon the very existence of Japan. Now that all the world is in the throes of war, it is obvious that any sort of grave situation may be brought about on the stage of China, owing to causes within and without China. To prevent the coming about of such a situation, and also to defend the existence of Japan herself, the stationing of forces is indeed inevitable.

In brief, it is absolutely necessary for Japan to station her forces in China for the above reasons, though Japan is ready to withdraw them whenever their presence is no longer necessary.

As for such a suggestion as the creation of an international force for the maintenance of peace and order, the Japanese public opinion in Japan and Japan herself, directly and vitally concerned with the peace and order of China, can accept it.

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