INDONESIA: ENDING REPRESSION
IN IRIAN JAYA

20 September 2001
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INDONESIA: ENDING REPRESSION
IN IRIAN JAYA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indonesian policy in Irian Jaya is at a critical point. Since August 2000 the government has been able to restore its authority in the province by closing in the political space that had developed after the fall of President Soeharto. The government has curtailed open demands for independence and the mobilisation of popular support for this objective. However, the methods used represent a return to those employed by President Soeharto -- relying principally on the government’s near monopoly of military power. The effect of this has been to compound the political problems posed by Papuan demands for independence.

Simultaneously with the crack-down on Papuan political activity, the government has been promoting a policy of Special Autonomy for the province. This policy offers the best prospects for a long-term resolution of problems that have plagued Irian Jaya’s integration into Indonesia since 1963. A strong Special Autonomy law could help break the cycle of repression and alienation. However, it is difficult to envisage that this policy can be successfully promoted and implemented in conditions where Jakarta’s authority rests on its use of repressive security measures and the seemingly inevitable abuse of human rights.

Irian Jaya was the last region of the Netherlands Indies to be incorporated into Indonesia, twelve years after the rest of the country. Papuans were only marginally involved in Indonesia’s struggle for independence. During the last eighteen years of colonial administration, the Dutch successfully fostered a Papuan identity separate from Indonesia. They established a program of decolonisation that envisaged the establishment of an independent state of West Papua by 1970.

Incorporation in Indonesia, rather than transforming Papuans from being subjects of a European colonial power into citizens of an independent state, has served to consolidate a separate Papuan identity. The Papuan feeling of marginalisation is related to the massive influx of migrant settlers from elsewhere in the archipelago, facilitated and supported by Indonesian governments. The Indonesian migrant settlers dominate the economy of the province. Many Papuans consider that Indonesia is more interested in exploiting their land’s resources than in its indigenous peoples.

Papuan resistance to Indonesian control commenced with incorporation. The guerrilla resistance was more effective in keeping alive the ideal of independence than ever threatening Indonesian control. The fall of President Soeharto facilitated the transformation of Papuan resistance into a movement led by an urban elite, supported by key leaders with traditional authority, advocating independence by non-violent means. The pro-independence leaders, who came to form the Papuan Presidium Council, successfully mobilised support broadly in Papuan society and established a province-wide organisation.

The Indonesian government’s policy responses to the Papuan demands for independence have been uncertain and inconsistent. The revival of Papuan national ideals poses particular difficulties for the government and the broader political elite. The twelve year struggle Indonesia waged to reclaim Irian Jaya from The Netherlands had broad support and its success in 1962 is regarded as a national triumph. Like Aceh, Irian Jaya is resource rich. The governments of presidents Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid recognised that the people of the province had suffered political repression, abuse of human rights and economic exploitation during Soeharto’s New...
Order government. President Megawati apologised for the suffering caused by past policies. The post-
Soeharto governments have had considerable difficulty in formulating new policies of regional
governance in Irian Jaya that are compatible with national ideals for democratising the political system.
This challenge has become more acute since the separation of East Timor heightened fears of the
disintegration of the state.

Presidents Habibie and Wahid established a dialogue with Papuan leaders. Wahid made important
symbolic gestures by allowing the Papuan “Morning Star” flag to be flown and gave his blessing for
“Papua” to be used as the name for the province, rather than “Irian Jaya” although this change was
never formally implemented and was in fact rejected by the MPR in August 2000. He provided financial
support for the pro-independence Papuan Congress. However, his accommodating and tolerant attitude
was severely criticised by national legislators and the President was instructed to take more decisive action
against separatist activities in Irian Jaya, as in Aceh.

In August 2000, the Special Session of the National Consultative Assembly’s criticism of the President
marked the beginning of a much tougher approach to pro-independence activities in Irian Jaya.

The detention and trial of pro-independence leaders, the show of force to mark Papuan “independence”
day and the tough security measures that have been taken subsequently mark the end of political
openness and the return to the forms of governance, dependent on the use of force, that have characterised
the Indonesian administration of the territory since 1963. Unlike in Aceh, Indonesia has been able to
reassert its authority in Irian Jaya. However, killings, torture and indiscriminate reprisals have
accompanied this. The counterproductive dynamic of repression and alienation has been resumed.

The government of Indonesia has a responsibility to maintain its territorial integrity. The issue with
respect to Irian Jaya is whether the methods currently being employed will assist in the resolution or
whether they will compound the problems that have bedevilled Indonesian governance since 1963.

The objective of the “Special Autonomy” is political. It is to persuade Papuans that their preferred future
should be as citizens of Indonesia – an Indonesia in which they can manage their own political
development and enjoy the produce of their land and its resources. Experience has made Papuans highly
sceptical of the government’s intentions. A form of “Special Autonomy” that does not reflect Papuan
aspirations will have little or no utility and will serve to discredit autonomy as an alternative to
independence and undermine the credibility of those Papuans leaders who have publicly advocated
autonomy. The House of Representatives has passed “Special Autonomy” legislation for Aceh and is
considering a draft for Irian Jaya.

A strong Special Autonomy law, however, will only be the first phase of a long process of capacity and
institution building. It will provide an institutional and policy framework in which Papuan social and
economic disadvantage can be addressed but it does not in itself overcome those disadvantages.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA

1. Adopt the law on Special Autonomy based on the
   proposals submitted by the governor of Irian
   Jaya.

2. Conduct a systematic dialogue with Papuan
   political groups, including those represented in
   the province’s legislatures and pro-independence
   groups, including the Papuan Presidium Council.

3. Release all political detainees not accused of
   crimes of violence  and end the trial for
   subversion of the five leaders of the Presidium.

4. Withdraw military units not required for the
   external defence of the province.

5. Minimise the use of force in police and military
   operations to help the implementation of the
   Special Autonomy law and the establishment of
   political dialogue.

6. Make the security forces accountable for human
   rights violations.

TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN IRIAN JAYA

7. Step up training of officials, particularly in
   financial management and policy formulation, to
   ensure locals can manage autonomy.

8. Seek support of the UNDP and other
   international organisations such as the World
   Bank in the design and provision of capacity-
   building programs to manage the increased
   revenues under Special Autonomy.

9. Take steps to ensure a greater role for Papuans at
   all levels of government.

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca9cf/
10. Establish programs to encourage and support Papuan participation in the non-government sector and in the economy.

11. Work with churches and Moslem organisations, Papuan and non-Papuan, to establish processes of reconciliation in local communities.

12. Request the assistance of the UN Commission for Human Rights, under the Technical Cooperation Program, to train the proposed Papuan police force and officials of the provincial Justice Department.

13. Request the assistance of the UN Commission for Human Rights in making human rights a priority in provincial legislation and to build up local human rights bodies

TO INDONESIA’S MAJOR DONORS:

14. Support the Indonesian government’s determination to implement Special Autonomy in a form that reflects Papuan aspirations.

15. Encourage the Indonesian government to minimise the use of force in its military and police operations.

16. Make clear that continued human rights violations by the military and police will incur tangible sanctions against the institutions involved and the leaders responsible.

17. Support Elsham and other human rights organisations in Irian Jaya with training and financial aid.

TO THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM:

18. Encourage the Indonesian government to use the Forum’s ‘good offices’ in the search for a peaceful resolution to the violence in Irian Jaya.

19. Consider granting the autonomous province of Papua observer status with the Forum.

TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:

20. Appoint a Special Rapporteur for West Papua to report on human rights.

21. Include Elsham, and other human rights organisations in Irian Jaya, in UNCHR technical cooperation projects in Indonesia.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 September 2001
INDONESIA: ENDING REPRESSION IN IRIAN JAYA

I. INTRODUCTION

In her Independence Day speech on 16 August 2001 President Megawati Soekarnoputri offered the nation’s apology to the people of Irian Jaya for the repressive policies of the past. She committed her government to a new policy framework that would not only respect the cultural identities and special characteristics of the people, but also give the provincial government wider authority to manage its own affairs in the form of special autonomy. This new policy framework would be realised in the context of preserving the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. President Megawati established the preservation of the unitary state as her government’s top priority. In her intense commitment to the unity of Indonesia, she espouses the ideals of her father, Soekarno, the founding President. For both, Irian Jaya has a special place in the Republic. Recalling her father, Megawati has said that “…without Irian Jaya, Indonesia is not complete.”

Irian Jaya is but one of the challenges confronting Indonesia’s new President. Whether President Megawati is able to realise her father’s ideal of national unity as well as accommodate the aspirations of the Papuan people is related to a broader question of her ability to, and interest in, controlling the military. Breaking the cycle of repression and alienation together with the provision of broad autonomy are necessary preconditions if Megawati is to realise her father’s dream. If the President can resolve the problems of Irian Jaya through inclusive non-military means, she will make an important contribution to both the maintenance of Indonesia’s territorial integrity and the processes of democratisation.

The Papuan struggle for independence and the Indonesian government’s determination to maintain Irian Jaya as a province in the Republic pose difficult choices for policy makers in Indonesia and the region. In the international community there is a strong commitment to Indonesia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in Irian Jaya. However, this support is qualified by opposition to the harsh military measures and abuses of human rights that have accompanied Jakarta’s efforts to assert its authority in Irian Jaya. The Indonesian government’s policy of “Special Autonomy” for Irian Jaya has received strong encouragement internationally as a means to resolve peacefully the conflict in the province as well as ensuring the territorial integrity of Indonesia.

Jaya is used to refer to the province currently. Papuan is used to refer to the indigenous population as it is the term they tend to use themselves.

1 Kompas, 18 August 2001
2 The name of Indonesia’s easternmost province is a matter of political dispute and has been since the 1940s. The official Dutch name was Netherlands New Guinea (Nederlands Nieuw Guinea). In the English-speaking world the term Dutch New Guinea or West New Guinea was used. Most Papuans preferred Papua, while pro-Indonesia Papuans and Indonesians adopted Irian. Some Papuans disliked Papua because it had negative connotations (slave and dumb) in Ternatanese and east Indonesian Malay dialects. In 1961 the Dutch agreed with the National Committee's request that the name should be West Papua although they continued to use Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in Dutch language official documents. In 1969, the Indonesian government officially changed the name from West Irian to Irian Jaya. This remains the official name, despite the fact that President Abdurrahman Wahid gave his blessing to the use of Papua as the name of the province; no follow-up action was taken to formalise this. Papua is the name preferred by the indigenous peoples of the province. In this report, Irian Jaya is used to refer to the province currently. Papuan is used to refer to the indigenous population as it is the term they tend to use themselves.

Central to the political issues discussed in this report is the disaffection of the indigenous peoples of Irian Jaya. Many Papuans think of themselves as being under a form of colonial rule; economically, politically and culturally marginalised in what they consider to be their own land.

Indonesia has been able to sustain its administration in Irian Jaya since the incorporation of the province in 1963 largely without the consent of the indigenous population. The ad hoc and localised guerrilla resistance led by the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) never threatened Indonesian control of the province. The OPM was established in 1964 and the first substantial revolt took place in Manokwari the following year. It became the principal organisation of Papuan resistance to Indonesian control. The OPM’s operations along the border were the most effective of its activities, where it found sanctuary in PNG territory and support from West Papuan refugees. The OPM’s activities along the border have caused considerable tension between Indonesia and PNG. The OPM’s limited military capacities and internal conflicts do not diminish its importance as the bearer of the ideal of independence. Most of the Papuan leaders in exile identified themselves with the OPM.4

Indonesian authority has appeared most vulnerable in the period of political openness that followed the fall of President Soeharto, during which relatively free expression and organisation of Papuan national sentiments was permitted. Indonesian control seemed fragile because it became apparent that Indonesia had made little progress in convincing Papuans that their preferred future should be as citizens of the Indonesian State.

Since 1998 Papuan disaffection and marginalisation has been expressed in a strong and simple demand for independence from Indonesia. Papuan national aspirations have historical roots going back into Dutch colonial times and Papuan experience of Indonesian rule has further consolidated a separate identity.

The post-Soeharto governments presided over the creation of a political space that enabled the transformation of Papuan resistance from a sporadic, localised and low-level armed struggle in the jungles of the province to an urban-led mass-based, open and largely peaceful struggle against Jakarta’s authority.

II. PAPUAN NATIONALISM

History is central to an understanding of contemporary Papuan politics and relations between Irian Jaya and the Indonesian government. It is in part history that distinguishes Irian Jaya from the rest of Indonesia. History is one of the issues of dispute between Irian Jaya and the Indonesian Government. History is an important influence on Papuan political rhetoric and it shapes the way many Papuan leaders think about the political issues they confront. The nationalist slogan: “Correcting the Course of Papuan History” conveys something of the influence of history. The history that many Papuans want to “correct” is the integration of Papua into Indonesia. This interpretation of history has become dominant in Papuan political circles and is in sharp contrast to Indonesia’s official history.

Papua was one of the neglected backwaters of the Netherlands East Indies. Prior to the Pacific War, the colonial presence was a handful of administrative posts, where east Indonesian officials, teachers and missionaries far outnumbered the Dutch. Christian missionaries had a more extensive infrastructure and network of contacts in Papuan society than the colonial authorities and were largely responsible for the education system. This history is reflected in the importance of the Christian churches in contemporary Papuan society and politics.

Papua was part of the Netherlands East Indies and as such became part of the territory claimed by Indonesia’s founding fathers. Papua became an object of dispute between Indonesia and The Netherlands during Indonesia’s struggle for Independence. It was under Dutch control during the Revolution and support for Indonesia was limited to minor revolts in Jayapura and Biak. Papuan political groups were divided between those supporting integration with Indonesia and those supporting continued Dutch administration. From mid-1949, the Dutch sought to separate Papua from the transfer of sovereignty of the rest of the Netherlands East Indies. Ethnic, cultural and religious differences between Papua and the rest of Indonesia were prominent among the publicly advanced arguments as to why The Netherlands did not consider Papua to be part of Indonesia. Dutch determination not to cede Papua to Indonesia developed into a protracted international dispute that by the late 1950s became intertwined in the politics of Cold War Southeast Asia.5

The dispute between Indonesia and The Netherlands meant that Papuans did not share with other Southeast Asians the crucial nation-forming experiences of the revolutionary struggle for independence and initial period of independence. Dutch policies were directed towards the promotion of a Papuan identity separate from Indonesia and, from the late 1950s as international pressure on The Netherlands increased, towards rapid political advancement with the ultimate objective of creating an independent state of West Papua by 1970. As part of this program the Dutch cultivated a Papuan elite committed to this goal.

As an international dispute, the conflict between Indonesia and The Netherlands was resolved in August 1962 with the signing of the New York Agreement which transferred administration to Indonesia. Negotiations for the agreement had been conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Self-determination for Papuans had been a cornerstone of Dutch policy and, as a face-saving gesture, the New York Agreement contained provision for an act of self-determination, according to international practice, within six years of Indonesian administration. The Act of Free Choice was conducted in 1969, under United Nations supervision, in very controversial circumstances.6

The “return” of West Irian to the nation was regarded as the successful outcome of a nationalist struggle, led by President Soekarno and supported by all significant political groups. Soekarno constructed the struggle against the Dutch in West Irian as an issue to unify the nation – to complete the Revolution. He astutely used the dynamics of the Cold War to acquire substantial armaments from the Soviet bloc and detach United States support from its NATO ally, The Netherlands. The Indonesian struggle was largely diplomatic, but the limited use of armed infiltrations and the threat to deploy its Soviet arms proved an effective support to diplomacy. The Act of Free Choice was finally conducted in 1969 under the Soeharto government. Jakarta brought 1025 traditional leaders to Jakarta where, under great pressure, they voted unanimously on behalf of the Papuan people to join the Republic of Indonesia. No meaningful consultation was conducted with the people themselves.

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Indonesia derives satisfaction from the fact that, through the UN’s acceptance of the results of the Act of Free Choice, the international community had endorsed the process through which West Irian had been returned to Indonesia. In the light of the strong sense of national pride Indonesians feel about the “return” of West Irian, the revival of Papuan national aspirations is particularly difficult for them to understand. Soekarno’s daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, captured this sentiment when she recalled a childhood conversation with her father. She had asked why he had visited Irian. It was so far away. To which he replied: “Without Irian Jaya Indonesia is not complete to become the national territory of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.” She wanted to maintain her father’s vision. She appealed to the people of Irian Jaya that the territory had been entrusted to the nation through the sacrifice of heroes.7

The dominant Papuan view is completely different and summarised in the first three resolutions of the Second Papuan Congress (Kongres Papua), held in Jayapura 29 May – 4 June 2000:

- “The people of Papua have been sovereign as a nation and a state since 1 December 1961.
- The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the 1962 New York Agreement on moral and legal grounds as the agreement was made without any Papuan representation.
- The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the results of Pepera (the Act of Free Choice) because it was conducted under coercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and immoral conduct contravening humanitarian principles. Accordingly, the people of Papua demand that the United Nations revoke resolution 2504, 19 December (sic) 1969.”8

The first resolution refers to the occasion in 1961 when the national symbols – the Morning Star flag and “Hai Tanahku Papua” (the anthem) - were unveiled. In October 1961 the National Committee of leading Papuan members of the New Guinea Council had adopted the flag and anthem as the symbols of state for an independent West Papua together with a Political Manifesto that demanded independence. On 1 December 1961 the flag was raised and the anthem sung for the first time, in front of the New Guinea Council and in the presence of the Governor of Dutch New Guinea and members of the Council.9 The Congress resolution represents the view that 1 December 1961 was the date on which Papua became independent. Not without some irony, President Soekarno’s instruction to his armed forces on 19 December 1961 to destroy the puppet State of West Papua has been used as evidence that such a state existed.10

The commitment to this interpretation of Papua’s history is not restricted to pro-independence groups. In the provincial government’s proposal for Special Autonomy there is provision for the establishment of the “Commission to Correct the Course of Papuan History”, which would research the history of integration.11 Across the political spectrum, there is a keen awareness of Papua having been the ‘object’ of international conflict, rather than Papuans having been participants. Hence, the rejection of the New York Agreement because Papuans were not party to the negotiations about the fate of their homeland. The New York Agreement and the UN supervision and acceptance of the results of the Act of Free Choice support, in Papuan eyes, the contention that Papua was sacrificed for the interests of others.12

It is the link that Papuans make between this history and the contemporary struggle that is critical to this report. Commenting on the “Act of Free Choice” a Foreri [Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society] report has noted: “All the Papuan people witnessed the injustice, the deceit and the manipulation. Papuans could not resist. All resistance

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8 Resolusi, Kongres Papua, Port Numbay (Jayapura), 4 June 2000. The UN resolution was on 19 November 1969.
9 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden November en December 1961, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dosier G 16725, Dutch State Archives
11 RUU Republik Indonesia Nr…. Tahun 2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Propinsi Papua Dalam Bentuk Wilaya Berpemerintahan Sendiri, pasal 43.
12 The Papuan interpretation of the Act of Free Choice has received support from recent research based on previously classified UN documents as well as Netherlands, United States, British and Australian government sources. John Saltford argues that under the 1962 New York Agreement, “…the Netherlands, Indonesia and the UN had an obligation to protect the political rights and freedoms of the Papuans, and to ensure that an act of self-determination took place, in accordance with international practice. On both these points, the three parties failed, and they did so deliberately since genuine Papuan self-determination was never seen as an option by any of them once the [New York] Agreement was signed.” John Saltford, “United Nations Involvement with the Act of Self-determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 1968 to 1969”, Indonesia 69 (April 2000), p. 91
at the time was suppressed with arms. The widespread murders conducted since then have instilled the desire for independence in the heart of the people.\textsuperscript{13}


### III. \textbf{INDONESIAN SETTLER COMMUNITIES}

The dramatic demographic changes during the Indonesian administration are not part of the public political discourse in Irian Jaya or about Irian Jaya, but they are of the greatest importance in understanding the evolving political situation. The influx of Indonesian settlers, and their dominance of the economy, contribute much to the Papuan sense of no longer being in control of their homeland. Despite the heterogeneous composition of Papuan society constituting more than 250 ethno-linguistic groups, Papuans define themselves in reference to the settlers, often in simple physical terms - curly-haired Papuans and straight-haired Indonesians. Externally, Papuan identity is an ethnic identity. In its political expression, it is an ethnic nationalism. The leading pro-independence organisation, the \textit{Presidium Dewan Papua} (the Papuan Presidium Council, hereafter the \textit{Presidium}), is a Papuan ethnic organisation. At the anniversary of “independence” on 1 December 2000 there were a few migrant settlers observing from the periphery, but otherwise the only Indonesians present were the police and military. The substantial non-Papuan minority represent the major constraint and greatest challenge for pro-independence leaders. As the conflicts in Wamena and Abepura in October, November and December 2000 suggest, tensions between Papuans and non-Papuans have the potential to be the source of widespread social disruption and violence.

The demographic transformation in Papua had been considerable by any standards. In 1960 the “Asian” population, mainly eastern Indonesians, Javanese and Chinese, numbered just 18,600 out of an estimated population of 736,700 or 2.5 per cent.\textsuperscript{14} The Indonesian census does not provide figures for Papuan and non-Papuan populations of the province. The census data for religious affiliation gives some indication of the ethnic composition, but there are Papuan Moslem populations in some western coastal areas of the province around Fak Fak, Sorong and the Raja Ampat islands and many of the Indonesian settlers are Christians from Maluku and North Sulawesi. In 1998 there were 452,214 Moslems, constituting 21.14 per cent of the province’s population\textsuperscript{15}, an increase from 139,739 or 11 per cent

\textsuperscript{14} Netherlands Government Annual Report to the United Nations on Netherlands New Guinea, 1960, The Hague, pp. 6-7


PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca9cf/
in 1982. The 1990 census indicates that 16.13 per cent of the population were born outside the province. The figure was higher for urban areas of the province at 35.1 per cent. The capital Jayapura is where the settler communities are most evident and where the Moslem portion of the population in 1998 was 42.72 per cent. University of Cenderawasih demographer, Michael Rumbiak, estimates that there were fewer than 1.5 million Papuans, which would mean that settler communities constituted about 30 per cent of the population.

Under the Netherlands Administration, Indonesians, especially Ambonese, Menadonese and Keiese as well as Eurasians were officials, police, teachers and missionaries. Papuans experienced a form of dual colonialism, as much eastern Indonesian as it was Dutch. The emerging Papuan elite of the 1950s and early 1960s sharpened its identity in reference to the eastern Indonesians, who held the jobs to which they aspired. The sense of competition with settlers for positions within the bureaucracy and the resentment felt about settler domination of key positions remains a strong motive force in Papuan nationalism among the educated elite. Michael Menufandu, a senior Papuan civil servant and former Mayor of Jayapura, complains of the intellectual arrogance of officials in believing that policy can only be made in Jakarta. Whereas it is the local people who know the region and its problems best. Another cause of resentment among Papuan officials is that, while they have to compete with Indonesians for the senior positions in Irian Jaya, they are rarely appointed to positions in other provinces.

Migration to Irian Jaya has been in two forms: the central government’s transmigration programs and voluntary migration, which in turn have created two patterns of settlement. The transmigrants, mostly from Java, have been settled in rural areas, while the settlers who come by their own means have been attracted by the economic opportunities in the urban areas of the province. The largest groups of settlers are Javanese, Buginese, Makasarese, Ambonese, Menadonese and Bataks. Although Indonesian settlers form a small minority in the rural areas of the province as a whole, in the transmigration sites around Jayapura, Merauke, Paniai, Fak Fak and Sorong the rapid increase in transmigrants has overwhelmed the local Papuan population.

The voluntary migrants have tended to settle in the urban areas of Papua. The statistics noted above support the visual impression that Jayapura, in particular, is an “Indonesian” city. Settlers have been economically successful. They dominate the city’s economic life. The streets of Jayapura’s central market reflect the economic hierarchy. The shops are Indonesian Chinese- and settler-owned, settler traders run the market stalls in front of the shops. In front of stalls sit Papuan traders, mainly highlanders, selling small quantities of fruit and vegetables. One Papuan observer noted that the “…presence of the settlers has created a colonial economic structure, where only the traditional sector is run by the indigenous population.”

The urban markets have become a focus of conflict between the settler traders and Papuans. They symbolise the economic disparities between the communities. In April 2000 there were clashes between Papuans and Bugis-Makasarese settlers in Entrop, one of the principal market centres in Jayapura. In November 2000, the market at Abepura, near Jayapura was the locale of two violent clashes. The first violence occurred when three Papuans (highlanders) refused to pay for a meal and a fight followed, in which the Bugis-Makasarese traders armed with home-made weapons wounded 5 Papuans. The police account of the incident noted that disputes between the settlers and the Papuans were common around the market. “The migrants are usually vendors who work hard to earn their money, while some locals tend to extort money from them. In

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16 BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya cited in John RG Djopari, Penduduk Indonesia, Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, p.69
22 Penduduk Indonesia, Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, p.69
23 Jhon Wanane, Mth, “Politik Ekonomi dan Migrasi Bangsa Melayu di Tanah Papua”. Tifa Papua, 11-16 December 2000, p. 6
the Abe pura case, the migrants fought back. A couple of days later a further clash occurred involving larger numbers of Papuans and leaving 16 people injured. In April 2001 a Buginese boy was killed and a Papuan stabbed in a clash between Papuans and settler traders at the Abe pura market.

On 7 December 2000 about 300 people armed with traditional weapons attacked the police station near the Abe pura market killing three policemen as well as burning down shops. The police were unable to identify or capture any of the attackers. On suspicion that the attackers were highlanders, the police raided the student dormitories (mainly highlanders), attacked the sleeping students, and detained 90 of them. In detention some were tortured and three killed. The patterns of conflict between highlanders, on one side, and security forces and settlers, on the other, were most evident in the violence in the highlands town of Wamena on 6 October 2000. The violence and loss of life in Wamena occurred in the context of the Government’s determination that the Papuan flag should no longer be flown. On 6 October, the Wamena police lowered the flag at a number of Satgas Papua (pro-independence militia) posts in the town without any resistance. By the time they approached the main Satgas Papua post, near the police headquarters, a crowd of independence supporters had gathered to defend the flag. Neither the Satgas nor the crowd heeded the police instructions and in the violence that followed two police were wounded and police shot one Papuan.

The death of Elieser Alua was a catalyst for Papuan police were wounded and police shot one Papuan.

The immediate impact of the violence in Wamena was an exodus of Indonesian settlers and coastal Papuans. The scale of the exodus out of Wamena is difficult to quantify. Kompas estimated that about 1000 settlers (of a settler population of 15,000) had left in the two weeks following the violence. When ICG visited Wamena in early November 2000 the exodus was continuing. Settlers and coastal Papuans, including many long-term residents, were leaving for security concerns. Most of the schools outside Wamena had closed and those in town were functioning with reduced staff. The Wamena Humanitarian Investigation Team asserted that the education system had suffered long-term damage. Many teachers had fled the region. Some 200

25 “Papua council leaders to go on trial soon”, Jakarta Post, 15 November 2000
26 “Abe pura market brawl leaves 16 injured”, Jakarta Post, 14 November 2000
27 “Overnight clash in Abe pura market claims one life,” Jakarta Post, 5 April 2001
29 Wamena is the administrative centre of the Baliem Valley in the central highlands, located about 290 km from Jayapura.
30 Although Papuan society consists of some 250 ethnolinguistic groups, a broad distinction can be made between highland and coastal communities. Among the latter there has been much longer contact with the world outside Papua. Some coastal societies were converted to Christianity in the late 19th century. In 1930 the island of Biak had a higher rate of literacy than Java. The densely populated communities around Wamena were only “discovered” in 1938.
31 Dance Bles kadit, “Jika Polisi Sembunyi di Rumah Warga Sipil”, Tifa Papua, 16-21 October 2000, p. 5. Some of the survivors deny that the security forces had used their houses for cover. ICG confidential interviews with refugees in the Military headquarters, Wamena, 8 November 2000.
32 Dance Bles kadit and Kris Ansaka, “Kebiasaan Perang yang Sengaja Dibangkitkan”, Tifa Papua, 16-21 October 2000, p. 5. This figure probably underestimates the number of Papuans killed and wounded by the security forces.
33 “Suara Pengungsii Wamena: Biar Dibangung seperti Surga, Kami Tetap Trauma”, Kompas, 24 October 2000
34 ibid
35 “Nasib Ribuan Guru di Jayawijaya Belum Jelas”, Kompas, 11 October 2000. It is estimated that about 95 percent of the teachers in regency areas of Wamena (Kabupaten Jayawijaya) were settlers or coastal Papuans who had migrated to the region.
teachers had applied for transfer and many schools were without teachers. As of January 2001, the education authorities had not taken any measures to remedy the situation.36

The violence in Wamena and the uncertainties about what might happen in Irian Jaya on 1 December, the anniversary of Papuan “independence”, appears to have stimulated a significant exodus of people and goods, including vehicles, from the province. The inter-island shipping line, Pelni, reported an “explosion” of demand since the Wamena affair and that it had been forced to sell tickets without berths or seats. In October and November 2000 about 25,000 people had left Jayapura on Pelni ships. The shipping of vehicles from Jayapura and Biak by their owners would suggest that the principal factor was the security concerns generated by the political situation, rather than a larger than usual number of people wanting to celebrate the end of the fasting month or Christmas outside Papua.37

There is a suspicion among some Papuans that the violence in Wamena was related to an attempt by the security forces to shift the dynamics of political conflict from the demand for independence to one of ethnic tensions.38 This suspicion was given some credence a few days after the violence at Wamena by Brigadier General S.Y. Wenas, the then Chief of Police in Papua. Wenas encouraged settlers to arm themselves against any attacks from Papuans. In the Abepura market clash in the second week of November the market traders from Sulawesi were armed.39 The identification of highlanders, particularly those from Wamena, as pro-independence hard-liners and as being responsible for the attack on the police station at Abepura on 7 December, further heightened ethnic tensions and fears. The Abepura police chief, Alex Sampe, “declared war” on the highlanders.40 The Director of the Legal Aid Institute in Jayapura, Demianus Wakman, noted that it was the responsibility of the security forces to arrest those who attacked the police station, not to hunt and capture an ethnic group, such as happened with people from Wamena.41 The tension between highlanders and the security forces is also reflected in the exodus since early December of Wamena people, resident around Jayapura, seeking refuge across the border in PNG.42 A Catholic Church report noted that the number of refugees in Valimo (PNG) alone had more than doubled since November 2000. The report identified the absence of security and peace in West Papua since December 2000 and the attitudes and behaviour of the security forces towards Papuans, particularly highlanders as key factors in the exodus.43

The exodus of refugees from the conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and more recently Central Kalimantan provides some insight into what might happen in Irian Jaya. The demographic transformation in Papua has been extreme and the cultural tensions and economic rivalries generated make ethnic conflict and exodus of refugees a matter of great concern. The modest refugee flows in 2000 and early 2001 are a measure of political tension. Indonesian settlers left Irian Jaya in the last months of 2000 because of the rising tensions between the pro-independence movement and the Indonesian authorities as the commemoration of “independence” day approached. Papuans, particularly highlanders, sought refuge across the border in Papua New Guinea as a response to the security forces pursuit of them.44

36 Tim Kemanusiaan Wamena Bagian Investigasi, “Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena, 6 Oktober 2000, Sebelum Dan Sesudahnya: Sebuah Laporan Investigasi”, Jayapura, Januari 2001. This report was compiled by a team from Justice and Peace Secretariat of the Catholic Church in Jayapura, Kontras Papua, Elsham-Papua and LBH Jayapura.
40 “Police raid student hostels in Jayapura, arrest scores”, AFP, Jakarta, 7 December 2000
42 “Pengungsi Jayapura”, Astaga.com, 6 January 2001; A Tifa Papua editorial, 11-16 Desember 2000, made a direct link between the security force’s pursuit and detention of highlanders and refugee flow of highlanders into PNG.
43 Letter, the Catholic Bishops in Papua to the Governor of Irian Jaya, drs. Jaap Solosa, 16-2-2001
IV. THE PAPUAN ELITE

The Papuan elite has been the key agent in the development of a Papuan identity. They were the first ‘Papuans’, brought together from many regions of the province and educated in the schools and training colleges established after the Pacific war. The selective and elitist approach of the Dutch has given way to a more broadly based education system involving much larger numbers under the Indonesian administration. The graduates of the Dutch and Indonesian education systems have assumed the leadership of political, religious and community organisations.

The leaders of Papuan society have grown up, been educated and developed careers often in circumstances that have demanded difficult decisions about access to education and employment opportunities, personal and family welfare, cultural identity and political values. Those in positions of responsibility have often been confronted with choices between the interests and values of the people they represent, on one side, and institutional, community and personal advancement and survival in the Indonesian State, on the other.

The pressures of living within what many of them regard as a colonial system have involved accommodations that since the fall of Soeharto have sometimes been the source of embarrassment. Most of the contemporary Papuan leaders have New Order ‘pasts’. Prominent Presidium members, Theys Eluay and Yorrys Raweyai, are but the most controversial examples.

The Papuan elite is a bureaucratic elite. In an economy dominated by Chinese and Indonesian settlers, there are few Papuan business figures of substance. Besides traditional (adat) legitimacy, status is based on educational achievement and occupation. The Papuan elite is in the senior and middle positions of the provincial and district government, the churches, institutes of higher education and NGOs.

The older generation still in the senior positions within the bureaucracy and the churches were Dutch-educated. Dutch education and Dutch values remain much more apparent than elsewhere in Indonesia. The last of the Dutch-educated Papuans are 13 - 20 years younger than their Indonesian counterparts. The preservation of Dutch values is stronger, not because Dutch education was at more advanced levels or more broadly accessible, but rather because it remains highly valued, at least in comparison to the political, cultural and educational values of New Order Indonesia. There is a much less ambivalent attitude to the Dutch colonial past than elsewhere in Indonesia.

The Papuan elite’s accommodation with the Indonesian State is a key factor in understanding contemporary political change. The dominant mode of accommodation is borne out of a pragmatic acceptance of Indonesian authority over Irian Jaya and the opportunities it provides for economic, political and social development of the territory as well as for personal political and career advancement. With respect to the Papuan Churches’ leaders, Benny Giay has argued that senior churchmen became agents, mediators and peacemakers for the government. They were motivated by their sense of responsibility to protect their flock against what they perceived to be the overwhelming force that the Indonesian authorities were able to mobilise. The political agenda of the more conservative members of the elite remains structured by their appreciation of political realities: How can less than two million Papuans hope to wrest their freedom from 210 million Indonesians?

Church leaders have their counterparts in those members of the elite in senior positions within the Indonesian administration. At critical moments, such as the Act of Free Choice and the 2000 anniversary of Papuan “independence”, when the Indonesian authorities were determined on a course of action, those Papuans in the senior posts were in a position where they felt they had to use their influence to contain Papuan resistance in order to save lives and limit violence. They see themselves as acting to secure the continuation of Papuan society. Governor Jacobus Solossa was in this position on “independence” day 2000. In an interview with Radio Nederland, he provided some insight into the predicament that confronted him. In response to a question about why, in the circumstances of a broadly conceived freedom (Merdeka) that the governor was advocating, the Papuan flag could not be flown, he stated: “Don’t incite our people to demand independence. It has to be explained that Indonesia would not accept the demand that easily. It must be flown, he stated: “Don’t incite our people to demand independence. It has to be explained that Indonesia would not accept the demand that easily. There would be many complex problems and our
people would be the casualties. We must explain clearly and see with clarity so that we do not behave emotionally. [If not,] our people will become the victims. Who will be responsible for the people?"  

The governor implicitly recognised the widespread support for independence in Papuan society. He was among the 100 Papuan leaders who demanded independence at a meeting with President Habibie in February 1999. Yet, as a long-serving Golkar politician, he is keenly aware of the political realities of the struggle for control of government in Jakarta, the determination of nearly all sections of the Jakarta political elite to maintain Irian Jaya as part of Indonesia and the implications that has for the province. There is a duality in the Papuan elite’s accommodation with the Indonesian state. Those Papuans who reach the middle and senior levels of the administration have publicly accepted the demands of loyalty the state imposes. However, their commitment to the state, its values and ideals may not be what it seems.

The duality of loyalties among senior Papuans is captured by the striking figure of Filip Karma, an independence activist and senior government official, who was often seen in Jayapura in the days before the “independence” anniversary, in his Indonesian bureaucratic attire, with a Papuan flag proudly pinned to his chest. The government’s own intelligence assessments have acknowledged the ambiguity of elite loyalty. In one leaked intelligence document, some of the most senior Papuan officials, including the present governor and the former governor, Bas Suebu, currently the Ambassador to Mexico, were included in what was labelled the “Papuan political conspiracy”. It recognised the provincial government had been “contaminated” by the independence ideal and recommended that strong sanctions be applied to well-known supporters of independence amongst local officials. It was announced in September 2000 that sanctions would be taken against Papuan government officials who openly supported the independence movement.

V. REFORMASI AND THE PAPUAN RENAISSANCE

Until the fall of Soeharto the only alternatives for the elite other than co-operation were joining the OPM’s armed resistance, other forms of open protest or exile. The response to Reformasi in Papua was complex. On the one hand, it created political opportunities successfully suppressed in the past by Presidents Soekarno and Soeharto. Reformasi represented the revival of the values of a more open, accountable, egalitarian and less corrupt polity that appealed to activists across the archipelago. On the other hand, Papuans tended not to join their fellow Indonesians in the struggle for a more democratic Indonesia; rather they seized the opportunity to revive the struggle for an independent Papua. Human Rights Watch argued that the expectation for change was even greater in Papua than elsewhere in Indonesia, because of the “…accumulated resentment of three decades of harsh and often discriminatory rule…”.  

In August 1998, within weeks of the suppression of pro-independence demonstrations in Jayapura, Sorong, Wamena and Biak intellectual, Church leaders and activists had established the Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (Foreri). Foreri sought the opportunity for Papuans to manage their own affairs, through autonomy, a federal system or independence. There was awareness among activists in Jayapura that they had to disassociate themselves from the OPM after the 1996 Lorentz Expedition kidnapping affair, if Papua was to be

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50 Biak was the most significant of these demonstrations. The demonstrators occupied the centre of Biak town for several days and raised the flag. The demonstration was brought to an end when the military opened fire on the demonstrators, killing 26 of them. Human Rights Watch press release, 12 December 1999; Mark Worth, “Banner Day for strife-torn Province”, Australian, 2 December 1999.
52 In January 1996 12 members of a joint European-Indonesian scientific expedition were kidnapped for over four months by an OPM group led by Kelly Kwalik. Two Indonesian members of the expedition were killed in an attempt to release the hostages. The military’s “perfidious” use of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ role in the affair has been a matter of controversy. Summary
attract international support. A letter sent to President Habibie by 15 US congressmen on 22 May 1998 encouraged them. The congressmen urged Habibie to open a dialogue with the peoples of East Timor and Irian Jaya on human rights and a just solution to their political status.53

Foreri, with the support of the three major churches54, leading intellectuals and NGOs as well as a number of traditional leaders, emerged as the principal vehicle of Papuan ideals. Foreri became the dialogue partner with the central government in a series of meetings – the Jakarta Informal meetings – which led to the Team of 100 Papuan leaders meeting with President Habibie in February 1999. The 100 members of the delegation were broadly representative of the Papuan elite both geographically and in terms of social and religious background. The statement that Thom Beanal, the leader of the Team of 100, read to Habibie and his cabinet stated that Irian Jaya wanted to secede from Indonesia, that a transitional government be established in Irian Jaya under United Nations supervision and, if necessary, the UN become part of an international dialogue between the government of Indonesia and the Papuan people.

The absence of any formal response from Habibie at the meeting, and subsequently, has meant that from a Papuan perspective the hoped-for “national dialogue” with the central government has not eventuated. Nevertheless, the meeting with Habibie was an important stage in the transformation of the Papuan resistance and in the emergence of a new leadership. The meeting provided legitimacy to the Team of 100 and gave credibility to non-violent strategies for attaining independence.

Since November 1999 the key Papuan leaders of the “Team of 100” have organised a series of mass meetings the principal objectives of which were to mobilise support, establish their leadership credentials and articulate their demands to the Indonesian government and the international community.

The first such political gathering was held just outside Jayapura on 12 November 1999 – to mark Theys Eluay’s 62th birthday. Theys Hiyo Eluay, a traditional (adat) leader from Sentani and long time Golkar politician, had emerged as the foremost leader of the pro-independence movement.55 Theys Eluay led the celebration for the 38th anniversary of the occasion many contemporary Papuan leaders consider their independence day. The anniversary on 1 December 1999 was marked in Jayapura with a flag raising of both the “Morning Star” and the Indonesian flag in the same place as in 1961, outside the building that had housed the Dutch-established New Guinea Council, ironically, opposite the Merdeka Square, where Indonesia built a monument to those lost in a naval encounter against the Dutch in January 1962. In stark contrast to the anniversary in 2000, the flag raising took place with little or no Indonesian military presence.56 Theys Eluay described the absence of military intervention as a “miracle”.57 The lack of military intervention in these political gatherings signified the beginning of the nearly year-long period of substantial political openness that Wahid’s presidency facilitated.

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54 The largest Christian denominations in Papua are the Christian Evangelical Church in Papua (GKI), the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church of Indonesia (GKII).
57 Mark Worth, “Banner day for strife-torn province”, The Australian, 2 December 1999; The Jakarta Post, 2-December 1999, noted that: “Police and soldiers, who in the past have shot West Papuans for raising the flag which symbolises the separatist cause, showed greater restraint.”

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca9cf/
VI. THE PAPUAN PRESIDIJUM COUNCIL

The flag raising of 1 December 1999 was a symbolic moment, however in terms of establishing and consolidating a new leadership structure and mobilising support throughout the province, the most important meetings were the Musyawarah Besar Papua 2000 (Mubes, Papuan Mass Consultation), 23-26 February, and the Kongres Papua II (the 2nd Papuan Congress), May – June 2000. Delegations from the province’s fourteen regencies (kabupaten) attended both meetings along with representatives of Papuan communities overseas. The Mubes established a Papuan Presidium Council, which became the principal organisation of the pro-independence groups. In terms of personnel, there is a strong element of continuity among Foreri, the Team of 100 and the Presidium. The Council consisted of 22 members, with two chairpersons and two moderators. The Council as an executive was responsible to a “Panel”, a legislature of 200 representatives of the regencies and Papuan communities overseas. The Presidium described itself as being a form of collective leadership. Theys Eluay and Thom Beanal, the two chairpersons, were recognised as the senior leaders.

The Presidium provides a leadership structure for the diverse forces in favour of independence as well as some legitimacy to the ongoing dialogue with the Indonesian authorities. Associated with the Presidium, particularly with Theys Eluay, was a militia, the Satgas Papua (the Papuan Task Force). The Satgas Papua was led by one of his sons, Boy Eluay, and commonly thought to have been funded by Theys Eluay’s close associate in the Presidium, Yorrys Raweyai. The security forces permitted the Satgas Papua to maintain security at the two meetings.

The leadership that emerged from the Mubes was collective and inclusive. Many hoped that the collective leadership would be confirmed at the Congress. Instead Theys Eluay took the initiative to have himself acknowledged as the supreme leader. Unexpectedly, he proposed to the Congress that he become the leader and Thom Beanal the deputy.

The manner of his self-appointment reflected Theys Eluay’s conviction that he was the one to unite Papua and lead it to independence. How was it that someone who had been among the 1025 Papuans to vote for incorporation with Indonesia in the 1969 Act of Free Choice, was suspected of involvement in human rights abuses and had served for three terms in the provincial parliament as a Golkar member could be recognised as the leader of the independence movement? Theys Eluay was a traditional leader from Sentani with limited education and experience of the world outside Papua. However, he had the forceful personality, imposing physique and the ability to communicate to a broad cross section of Papuan society. The latter capacity together with his status as a traditional leader helped convince his colleagues in the Presidium to accept him as leader, despite reservations about his autocratic style, reluctance to consult and tendency to make unrealistic promises to his supporters. Theys Eluay and Yorrys Raweyai’s role in the Presidium, given their links to the Soeharto past, remains a concern in intellectual circles and has cast a shadow over the independence movement in Indonesia and overseas among groups that might otherwise be expected to be sympathetic.

Despite the reservations about Theys Eluay and Yorrys Raweyai, the Presidium leadership that emerged from the Congress was broadly reflective of Papuan society. The highlands were less well represented than the coastal regions, but intellectuals, the Churches, Papuan Moslems, women and Dutch-era activists had their representatives. Theys Eluay and Thom Beanal had stature as traditional leaders.

If Theys Eluay illustrates one aspect of the transformation of Papuan politics post-Soeharto, Thom Beanal sheds light on another. He is a traditional leader of the Amungme, on whose land

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58 Decree No. VII/Mubes Papua/2000; Decree No: IV/Mubes Papua/2000, Jayapura, 26 February 2000. The size of the legislature was later expanded to 501.
59 Lindsay Murdoch and Andrew Kilvert, “Golkar Youth Funding Separatists”, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 2000, p. 17. Yorrys Raweyai is a controversial figure in Papuan and Jakarta politics. He is deputy leader of Soeharto’s notorious youth group, Pemuda Pancasila, and is thought to have close links with the former first family. He is the son of a Chinese father and Papuan (Serui) mother.
60 “Kongres Rekomendasiakan Bangsa Papua Keluar dari NKRI”, Tifa Papua, 5-9 June 2000, p. 4
61 In 1996 at the time of the OPM’s kidnapping of members of the Lorentz expedition (see footnote 51), Thesys Eluay, as head of the Lembaga Adat Irian Jaya (the traditional law council of Irian Jaya), was dismissive of those who wanted to establish a Papuan state. “This is rubbish (omong kosong), we have been independent since 17 August 1945 and confirmed by the 1969 Act of Free Choice.” Tifa Irian, minggu ketiga januari 1996, p. 6.
the giant Freeport mine operates. Freeport is one of the largest gold and copper producers in the world. It dominates the economy of Irian Jaya and is a significant corporate player in Indonesia. Beanal came to prominence as a defender of his people against Freeport. In 1997 he took the company to court in the United States on environmental and human rights issues. In early 2000, however, he seemed to reverse his position when he was appointed as a well-paid Commissioner of Freeport. Later in the year he signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the company on behalf of the Amungme and Kamoro peoples concerning socioeconomic resources, human rights, land rights and environmental rights. The transformation of Freeport from the symbol of exploitation of the province’s resources and degradation of its environment and society to being a potential benefactor and partner has not been without controversy. John Rumbiak, the human rights leader, criticised Freeport at its Annual General Meeting in 2001. He questioned the company’s economic development and human rights programs for the local communities. He described the company’s occasional financial support of the independence movement as “Classic Politics of Freeport”. “It is no secret that Freeport is playing a deceitful game by contributing to the independence movement of West Papua when their real purpose is to pacify the Papuans.”

The participation of regional delegations in the Papuan Mass Consultation and Papuan Congress also created the opportunity for the returning delegates to disseminate the ideas in their local communities. The delegations established themselves as local Panel, recognising the leadership of the Presidium in Jayapura and being responsible for the “socialisation” of the ideal of independence as well as establishing local Satgas Papua and Posko (Command Posts). With the establishment of the Presidium and the local Panels, the independence movement had the beginnings of a province-wide organisation and a central leadership – something that neither the first generation of Papuan politicians during the Dutch administration or the OPM had ever achieved. Around Wamena in the Baliem Valley the process of “socialisation” seems to have been particularly intensive and far-reaching. Delegates from Wamena had made a mark with their traditional attire at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. held in Wilmington, Delaware USA on May 3, 2001 Congress and by the fact that many of them had walked the 300 kms to Jayapura for the occasion. Senior members of the Presidium as well as local leaders undertook propagating the results of the Congress. Socialisation involved mass gatherings, inspiring speeches and often emotional appeals. Outside the town of Wamena the local leaders, in their enthusiasm to spread the ideals of independence, went beyond the policies established by the Presidium, making unrealistic promises. According to one report, “The element that most of all found a place in the hearts of people of the Baliem [Valley] and Papua in general was that the demand for independence was non-negotiable.” The mobilisation of Satgas Papua and the establishment of Posko were extensive both in Wamena and the surrounding districts. Referring to Irian Jaya more generally, an intelligence assessment from the Department of Internal Affairs observed that the atmosphere down to the village level following the Congress was one of euphoria and enthusiasm with the idea of Merdeka (independence). The “conspiratorial groups” supporting Merdeka were increasingly cohesive and were endeavouring to “socialise” the results of the Congress throughout Irian Jaya, elsewhere in Indonesia and internationally.

It is important to note that Wamena and the surrounding districts in the Baliem Valley have experienced some of the most extreme brutality and repression at the hands of the security forces, particularly in 1977. The Humanitarian Investigation Team report argues that many of the older generation are still traumatised by the experience. The independence ideal was so readily and enthusiastically accepted in significant part because of the experience of repression. The understandings of what independence would mean might be naive and people might be all too ready to accept unrealistic promises, but their support for independence should not be dismissed. On the contrary, it is strong because it is based on their own experience.

63 Statement by John Rumbiak, the West Papua Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy ELS-HAM), based in Jayapura, West Papua. Submitted at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. held in Wilmington, Delaware USA on May 3, 2001

The widespread, straightforward and uncompromising support for independence at the village and provincial town level of Papuan society has created a particular dynamic within the pro-independence groups. The new political leadership – the Foreri, the Team of 100 and the Presidium – are part of an elite that seized the opportunity created by Reformasi to advocate independence through non-violent means. By doing so they quickly mobilised broad support from sections of Papuan society that did not share their experience of accommodation with the Indonesian State. The mass support base’s experience of Indonesia is that of the cutting edge of repression. This is not to suggest that the elite had escaped the heavy hand of the State, but they had a range of alternatives not available to other Papuans. The movement’s supporters might have naive and unrealistic notions of independence, but they have direct experience of what they do not want. The pro-independence leaders, on the other hand, tend to be moderate, pragmatic and open to negotiation and compromise. Their supporters are the ‘hard core’ of the movement. There has been tension between the leaders who felt the need to articulate their ideals in simple terms to communicate with their supporters, on one side, and the imperative to preserve some room for manoeuvre in their negotiations with the government. Within this dynamic, there is the risk that unfulfilled promises will lead to disillusionment and feelings of having been betrayed.

The emergence of new leadership and the establishment of the Presidium did not mean that the OPM disappeared. It continued to operate throughout the period of political openness. Indeed, since December 2000 there has been a reversion to kidnappings and OPM and OPM-like attacks on the security forces. The relationship of the Presidium and the OPM factions has been an uneasy one. They share the ideal of independence, but the new leaders sought to disassociate themselves from the OPM and its methods. The Presidium considers itself the leaders of the struggle for independence for all Papuans, including the OPM.

That part of the elite that led the pro-independence groups, because their message found such ready acceptance, quickly acquired authority and legitimacy as the “representatives” of Papuan society. It was they, rather than their more cautious colleagues, who held the formal position of political leadership in the provincial government and parliament, who are the de facto leaders of the society. In June 1999 Irian Jaya elected a provincial parliament, democratically, for the first time since integration with Indonesia. Yet it was a group of self-proclaimed leaders, the Presidium, who, from late 1998 to December 2000, were the negotiating partners of the central and provincial authorities. It was those involved in Foreri, the Team of 100 and the Presidium who set the political agenda in Papua.

Ethnicity also influences the issue of legitimacy. The Presidium is an ethnic Papuan organisation, whereas a majority of the members of the provincial parliament and the senior officials of the provincial government are Indonesians from outside Papua. Their association with Golkar and the Soeharto past disadvantages many of the senior Papuans in the parliament and government. There are two sets of opinions that distinguish those members of the elite who became the pro-independence leaders and those, their ideals not withstanding, who remained cautious. Firstly, there are the pragmatists, who while recognising the changes that followed the fall of Soeharto, were nevertheless sceptical about the limits of tolerance of the Indonesian authorities. They recognised the economic and symbolic importance of Irian Jaya to Indonesia and did not believe that any Indonesian government of this generation, even a democratic one, would permit the separation of the territory and would use the military means at its disposal to prevent secession. Pushing the limits of Indonesian tolerance involved risks both for the pro-independence leaders and their followers. The loss of life that followed from the security forces’ determination to lower the flag in late 2000 and the pattern of repressive military activity in the first half of 2001 confirmed these views. The pragmatists, particularly those in formal positions of authority, were critical of the Presidium leadership because they were risking the lives of their innocent supporters as well as risking the return of more overt repression for Papuan society as a whole. This criticism was tinged with resentment of the legitimacy and authority the Presidium leaders had acquired in Papuan society through their advocacy of independence.

67 Under Indonesia’s electoral system, the provincial parliament is elected by proportional representation from a province-wide constituency. Jayapura-based non-Papuans continued to dominate the main parties and selected the party’s representatives in parliament, whose identity’s were not known to the voters at the time of the election. The result was heavy over-representation of urban non-Papuans.

68 The Rev Herman Saud, Moderator of the Christian Evangelical Church in Papua (GKI), held Theys Eluay and the Presidium responsible for the loss of life at Wamena. “Tragis”, Republika Online, 8 October 2000

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Secondly, many within the NGOs, Churches and Cendrawasih University were concerned that Papua was not ready for independence. They pointed to the settlers’ domination of economy and the senior levels of the bureaucracy and the need to improve the education levels of Papuans. They doubted whether the provincial government had the capacity to manage a nation state. Papua needed time to develop its human resources, its institutional capacities and address the numerous areas of Papuan socio-economic disadvantage. Like other Papuans, they know that Papua is one of the richest provinces in Indonesia with one of the lowest standards of living, levels of educational attainment and health status, particularly among the indigenous population.

One of the implications of this analysis of elite political opinion is that which divides members of the elite are pragmatic political assessments and differing views of Papua’s development needs and capacities, rather than disagreements about the ideal of independence. In other words, the differences are about the timeframe, means and likelihood rather than the objective. There are few Papuans who publicly advocate that remaining part of Indonesia represents the preferred future for the territory. The Department of Internal Affairs intelligence assessment that pictured the Governor and the Ambassador to Mexico together with Theys Eluay and Thom Beanal as being members of a “Papuan Political Conspiracy” is correct.

As noted above, the Governor criticises those who want independence because Indonesia will not tolerate separation and that innocent people will suffer if pro-independence activities persist, rather than that independence is an undesirable objective. The Governor’s promotion of Special Autonomy reflects these pragmatic considerations. Indonesia will oppose independence and Papua needs time to prepare for independence.

The Presidium emerged from the Congress with greatly enhanced stature. President Wahid had funded the occasion. The leaders of the provincial parliament and government had attended. The event attracted considerable coverage in the Indonesian and international media. The Presidium considered that it had received a popular mandate from the Congress to advance the struggle for independence. Inter alia, the Presidium was to seek recognition for the sovereignty of West Papua from the international community and initiate negotiations with Indonesia and The Netherlands, under UN auspices, for a referendum for the recognition of Papuan sovereignty. On 1 December, the anniversary of “independence”, it was to account for the implementation of this mandate.69

VII. INTERNATIONAL LOBBYING

By the time the Presidium accounted for its efforts to involve the international community in the struggle with Jakarta, it could only point to formal support from two microstates in the South Pacific. The President of Nauru and the Prime Minister of Vanuatu spoke in support of West Papua at the UN Millennium Summit and Theys Eluay and other members of the Presidium were able to attend the Summit. Of greater significance was the profile that Papua acquired at the Pacific Islands Forum in Kiribati in October 2000. Presidium representatives attended as members of the Nauru delegation. Despite the reluctance of Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, the communiqué expressed "deep concerns about recent violence and loss of life in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya [West Papua]." The Forum "called on the Indonesian Government, the sovereign authority, and secessionist groups to resolve their differences peacefully through dialogue and consultation. They also urged all parties to protect and uphold the human rights of all residents of Irian Jaya." The Presidium did not enjoy the same success at the 2001 meeting of the Forum. The host government, Nauru, excluded the Presidium representatives. Since a change of government, Nauru has become a less fulsome supporter of the Papuan cause. The 2001 Forum meeting was Indonesia’s first as a dialogue partner. Nevertheless, the Communiqué restated the Forum leaders’ concern about the continuing violence and loss of life. The Forum leaders urged Indonesia to seek a peaceful resolution through dialogue with all parties. They welcomed the Special Autonomy proposals.

The Presidium’s diplomatic network in the Pacific has enabled it to make contact with other powers, most notably China. Foreign governments have voiced their concerns in response to increased levels of violence from the Indonesian security forces. As tension mounted in late 2000, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Phil Goff, at a meeting with Presidium international representative, Franzalbert Joku, offered to act as an impartial broker. New Zealand wanted "to encourage peaceful dialogue with a view to exploring the parameters of autonomy which might give people in West Papua a high level of control over their own lives." Following military reprisals around Wasior (Manokwari) in June and July 2001, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, indicated that Australia and the international community would be outraged if there were to be a reversion to the type of human rights violations in Irian Jaya which took place in East Timor in the past. A State Department spokesman noted that US support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity did not mean support for harsh military crackdowns in places like Aceh or Irian Jaya. The achievement from the Presidium’s perspective was that its struggle had found a place in the international diplomatic agenda and that violence and abuses of human rights has become a focus of pressure on Indonesia.

70 Hamish McDonald, “PM softens Pacific swipe at Jakarta”, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 2000
71 Craig Skehan, “Nauru bars warring West Papuan secessionists from Pacific Forum”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 2001
72 Communiqué, 32nd Pacific Islands Forum, Republic of Nauru, 16-18 August 2001
73 “West Papuans seek Beijing’s support”, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 2001
VIII. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY

Irian Jaya’s historical and ideological importance to the Indonesian nationalist enterprise has been discussed. Like Aceh, it also has an economic significance as a resource-rich province that generates substantial export revenue. Measured by per capita GDP, Irian Jaya is the fourth-richest province. The province’s economic significance will grow further as BP Amoco and Pertamina develop a large gas field in Bintuni Bay, Manokwari. The giant Freeport gold and copper mine symbolises the province’s Eldorado status. Freeport is one of Indonesia’s largest corporate taxpayers. Between 1991 and 1999, it paid US $1.42 billion in taxes, dividends and royalties. Freeport also has a complex profile. It developed close relations with Soeharto’s New Order and has a symbiotic relationship with the Indonesian military. As noted earlier, one of the independence leaders is a Commissioner. Although seemingly contradictory, Freeport is endeavouring to secure a future for its operations in a turbulent and unpredictable political environment.

The New Order Government’s response to Papuan demands for independence and use of national symbols had been one of suppression and detention or elimination of those involved. This approach was still evident after the fall of Soeharto in the violent suppression of the pro-independence demonstrations in July 1998. Although not consistently maintained, Reformasi ushered in a new approach. There was some tolerance of political activity and occasional dialogue, which led to the Jakarta Informal meetings and the Team of 100 meeting with President Habibie and intermittent discussions with President Wahid. They recognised the suffering of the Papuan people at the hands of the New Order Government, but were confronted by the simple and uncompromising demand - independence - that they could not possibly concede and remain in power.

The revival of Papuan demands for independence, under an urban-based leadership advocating a non-violent struggle, posed an acute dilemma for the governments of Habibie and Wahid. They sought to democratise Indonesia, but how much democracy could be extended to Papuans whose principal objective was to separate from Indonesia?

Wahid gave his blessing to the flying of the Morning Star Flag and the change of name of the province to Papua. These symbolic gestures together with his tolerance of discussion of Papuan ideals, provided that nothing was done to achieve the ideals, combined with his stated determination to defend Indonesia’s territorial integrity, produced an unsustainable policy framework in the post-East Timor environment. The Papuans considered that East Timor established a precedent and Wahid’s willingness to dialogue encouraged a belief that a peaceful struggle for independence was a viable strategy. The President provided a billion rupiah to support the Papuan Congress. Whereas, the loss of East Timor strengthened the Jakarta elite’s determination to resist any further separatist pressure.

The Papuan Congress was a critical juncture in the government’s policy making. Despite the attempt on the part of some in Jakarta to dismiss the Congress as unrepresentative and illegitimate, the threat posed by the independence movement began to be taken more seriously.

As part of the Government’s public response, the President appointed a team of special envoys, including a number of prominent Papuans. They recognised that the Congress represented “…the whole indigenous people of Irian Jaya…” and recommended that the President continue his policy of open dialogue. The Department of Internal Affairs advocated a less accommodating approach. In its view, the independence ideal had spread quickly to village level and the Presidium leadership was cohesive and working to propagate the results of the Congress throughout Papua and beyond. A memorandum to the Minister of Internal Affairs argued that it was necessary to take immediate, concrete and appropriate actions to anticipate the further expansion of this political climate. It envisaged graduated activities, both overt and clandestine, targeting a broad spectrum of Papuan leaders. The Memorandum stressed the need for consistency in the statements made by officials of the

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78 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc, Economic Impact in Indonesia, see: http://www.fcx.com/mr/fast-facts/ff-econimpact.htm. Freeport estimates that its operations contributed a further US $6.32 billion in the form of purchases, wages and benefits, charitable contributions and re-investments.
79 The Special Envoys of the State Secretary for (West) Papua Problem, Executive Summary, Jakarta, 22 June 2000, www.kabar-iran.com

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca9cf/
central government so that provincial officials were not hesitant or uncertain.80

The Department’s draft strategy envisaged a series of measures to be taken at provincial, national and international levels. The objective of the former was to create a more “conducive” environment by raising the levels of material welfare in Irian Jaya. By doing so it is hoped that the credibility of the government could be improved and the people persuaded to support Indonesia. Specific measures included plans to:

- improve communication with leaders thought to have influence in society
- give honours to local leaders and recognise national heroes from Irian Jaya
- compile and disseminate a history of the integration of Irian Jaya in Indonesia
- accelerate implementation of regional autonomy
- accelerate the division of the province into three
- provide those leaders who support Indonesia with positions in government at all levels from the village to the province
- minimise the use of force in control of unrest
- recruit train and support militia at village level

These policy recommendations illustrate some of the difficulties intelligence analysts and policy advisers in Jakarta had in responding to the new political environment in Irian Jaya. Their ability to reflect on the efficacy of similar policies pursued in East Timor seemed limited.

The Annual Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in August 2000 established a further hardening of the Government’s attitude on Irian Jaya. Despite the efforts of Papuan representatives to defend and explain Papuan ideals, members of all factions attacked Wahid’s accommodative attitude. The President’s agreement to change the name of the province’s name to Papua and his granting of permission to fly the “Morning Star” Flag was rejected. Commission C of the MPR stated that “The President has not yet been able to deal with separatist movements which have been threatening the totality of the unitary state of Indonesia especially in Aceh and Irian Jaya provinces.” Wahid was given the task of taking decisive actions against separatism and implementing special autonomy for Irian Jaya and Aceh.81 The MPR session was indicative of how the President’s approach to the separatist movements had become an issue that his opponents used to attack his Presidency. Wahid’s approach had few supporters and the detractors came from across the political spectrum. The MPR members’ desire to see a more decisive and less tolerant stand reflected a broader body of opinion in Jakarta. A Tempo survey of Jakarta residents on attitudes towards the Papuan struggle for independence found them to be unsympathetic and strongly supportive of the government’s endeavour to maintain the unitary state and Irian Jaya as part of it.82 Even among democracy activists there are mixed feelings about the Papuan struggle for independence.83

There were three key elements in the Central Government’s policies to emerge following the Papuan Congress and the MPR directions for the President:

- Provide a program of special assistance to Irian Jaya – known as the “Crash Program”.
- Remove the Presidium from the centre of the political stage and the symbols of Papuan nationalism from the public arena.
- Promote the alternative of Special Autonomy.

The “Crash Program” appears to have been initiated by then Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri following a visit to Papua to support social and economic development, development of human resources and places of worship. The “Crash Program” represented a sum of money nearly the size of the provincial budget, to be dispersed at the district level (Kabupaten) in a period of four months.84 The “Crash Program” was very much in keeping with the Department of Internal Affairs’ strategic objective to improve the levels of material welfare and by so doing enhance the credibility of the government and persuade people to support Indonesia. Papuans appreciated that the “Crash Program” represented a substantial sum that should be effectively used to address social and economic disadvantage. This appreciation did not deflect Papuan attention from the central government’s political purpose, however.

80 Nota Dinas, Direktur Jenderal Kesbang dan Linmas, Ermaya Suradinata to Menteri Dalam Negeri, 9-6-00, 578/CD/kesbang/D IV/VI/2000. This document was compiled with input from the police, military and the intelligence services. It circulated widely in Papua and was summarised in “Papua Punya Aspirasi, Jakarta Punya Jurus”, Tifa Papua, 13-18 November 2000.

81 “Indonesia’s Assembly Assigns President to Curb Separatism” Xinhua News Agency, 15 August 2000
82 “Papua Membara, Jakarta Kecewa”, Tempo, 29 October 2000, p. 12
83 Stanley, “But is it democratic?”, Inside Indonesia, July-September 2001, p. 29
84 Tifa Papua, 4-9 September 2000, pp. 1-3
Tifa Papua’s banner headline read: “Crash Program: Will it dampen the desire for independence?”

The removal of the Papuan national symbols and marginalising the Presidium was a three-and-a-half-month struggle, beginning with the MPR session and ending in early December, as will be discussed below, when the “Morning Star” flag was no longer flown in the middle of Jayapura and key leaders of the Presidium were safely in detention. The struggle transformed Papuan politics and relations with the Central Government. The political space for the articulation and mobilisation of Papuan aspirations that developed after the fall of Soeharto was closed.

The “Morning Star” flag became the focus of the struggle. For Papuans it had long been associated with acts of defiance against Indonesian authority. Since the fall of Soeharto and after Wahid had sanctioned the flag’s use, there had been seven clashes with the security forces about flying the flag in which scores of Papuans had lost their lives. By the end of 2000, the Indonesian authorities’ determination to prevent the flag from being flown extracted a heavy toll in human life and reinstated the use of force as the centrepiece of governance in Irian Jaya. This happened despite much official rhetoric about the government taking a “persuasive” approach and the Department of Internal Affairs’ recommendation that the use of violence be minimised.

The violence at Wamena on 6 October 2000 was the most important of the incidents that flowed from the Government’s determination to remove the Papuan flag. Wamena illustrated the fragility of the crisis management processes between the Indonesian authorities and the Presidium as well as that of the military and civilian command structures. The police attack on the Satgas positions and the lowering of flags took place despite an agreement between the Presidium and the provincial authorities that the implementation of Jakarta’s orders to lower the flag would be postponed.

With tensions mounting in Papua amid fears of further violence, the Presidium and the provincial civil and military authorities (Muspida) reached an agreement on 9 November concerning the “Morning Star” flag and how the Papuan “independence” day could be marked. The flag could be flown in public until 1 December. From 2 December it could only be flown at the houses or offices of the traditional leaders in 5 regions (kabupaten) in the province. A thanksgiving service would be permitted on 1 December, after which the Irian Jaya Arts Centre would have to be vacated by the Satgas who would, along with the flag, move to Theys Eluay’s house in nearby Sentani.

The deal involved significant concessions on both sides. The authorities had to postpone the implementation of Jakarta’s instruction to remove the flag in the centre of Jayapura and indeed continue to permit it at traditional leaders’ houses. The commemoration of “Independence Day” would be tolerated. The Presidium’s supporters had very high expectations about what might happen on 1 December. Some hoped there would be a proclamation of independence. In any case the Presidium had to account for its activities undertaken under its mandate from the Papuan Congress. To convince its supporters to accept that the flag would no longer be flown after 1 December was a challenge as it indicated that the independence movement had lost some of its momentum. The Presidium was nevertheless optimistic. They thought they had secured the authorities’ agreement to “Independence Day” activities. They were confident that agreement on the flag could be extended to all 14 regions. They considered that the proposal to declare Papua a “zone of peace” had been placed on the agenda.

The Presidium’s cautious optimism persisted throughout the preparations for 1 December, despite ominous signs from Jakarta. Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono warned that any commemoration of the independence declaration would be regarded as an “act of treason” and tough measures would be taken. Additional troops were dispatched to Papua following the MPR’s August session and further reinforcements were sent during the last weeks of November. Estimates of the

85 Kris Ansaka, “Menebar Kemerdekaan, Menulia military and civilian command structures. The police authorities and the Presidium as well as that of the management processes between the Indonesian flag. Wamena illustrated the fragility of the crisis Government’s determination to remove the Papuan most important of the incidents that flowed from the violence at Wamena on 6 October 2000 was the By clashes with the security forces about flying the flag scores of Papuans had lost their lives. By the end of 2000, the Indonesian authorities’ determination to prevent the flag from being flown extracted a heavy toll in human life and reinstated the use of force as the centrepiece of governance in Irian Jaya. This happened despite much official rhetoric about the government taking a “persuasive” approach and the Department of Internal Affairs’ recommendation that the use of violence be minimised.

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87 The Centre occupies the building that once housed the New Guinea Council – the territory’s first elected representative institution – established by the Dutch as the first phase in the process of decolonisation. This history has made the Centre a symbol of Papuan national aspirations.

88 “Papua separatists and Indonesian government compromise over flag”, Radio Australia, 9 November 2000

89 ICG Interview with Willy Mandowen, Jayapura, 10 November 2000

90 ICG attended a number of Presidium meetings

91 “West Papuans ignore warnings”, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 November 2000

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca9cf/
numbers varied, one source reported that 4 battalions of army and mobile police were assembled in the port area of central Jayapura.\(^\text{92}\) Some of the reinforcements were landed very publicly in the main harbour.

\section*{IX. A SHOW OF FORCE}

The arrest of five of the Presidium’s senior leaders in the days before the anniversary dramatically changed the political atmosphere. The five Papuans – Theys Eluay, Thaha Al Hamid, the Rev. Herman Awom, Don Flassy and John Mambor – were detained on charges of subversion. For the previous two years these people had been the negotiating partners of the authorities in Jayapura and Jakarta. It was easy to forget, given the seemingly dramatic nature of the change, that accusations of subversion, summons and interrogations have been a means used by the authorities to keep pressure on the pro-independence leaders for most of the period of political openness. This pressure gave an ambiguity to the notion of political openness. The occasions by which the political openness was measured – the flag raising on 1 December 1999 together with the two mass meetings of 2000 - are also the basis for the charges of subversion.

On 7 December a delegation of four senior Papuans appeared to have persuaded Wahid to order the release of Theys Eluay and his colleagues. It transpired that on this matter the President was a in a small minority in his own Government and the instruction was not carried out.\(^\text{93}\) The Presidium leaders remained in detention until 15 March 2001. Their trial commenced in mid-May.

On 29 and 30 November, Jayapura was placed under military occupation and the security forces put on an impressive “show of force”. Convoys of trucks fully laden with troops sped up and down the main thoroughfare between Jayapura and Sentani with sirens blaring and motor cycle escorts. The key installations in central Jayapura were occupied.

On hearing of the military convoys, the leaders of Papua’s Christian Churches held a press conference in which they appealed for restraint and avoidance of anything that might provoke conflict between the security forces and the people or between different groups within the society.\(^\text{94}\) The substance of the press conference, rather than the text of the press release, was that the Church leaders had no confidence in the Indonesian authorities. They feared that the authorities’ handling of what had become a tense situation would lead to violence. The Church

\(^{92}\) “We Will Stop Papuan Independence Declaration”, \textit{DetikWorld}, 30 November 2000

\(^{93}\) “Gus Dur Memang Meminta Agar Theys Dibebaskan”, \textit{Tempo Interaktif}, 8 December 2000

\(^{94}\) “Gereja di Irja Serukan Aparat dan OPM Tahan Diri”, \textit{Astaga.com}, 30 November 2000

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca9cf/
leaders did not believe that their opinions were taken seriously.95

Under great military pressure the “Independence Day” anniversary was marked. The Imbi Square in the centre of Jayapura, where the flag raising, thanksgiving prayers and speeches took place, was cordoned off by police in full riot gear. The riot police surrounded those Presidium leaders still at liberty and a crowd of a couple of thousand Papuan supporters. Apart from the fact that the ceremony took place at all, there was a small symbolic victory for the Presidium. The program began with the raising of the two flags. The Indonesian flag was raised first then the “Morning Star”. The Indonesian flag was faded and tattered, perhaps reflecting how many Papuans view the Indonesian State, while the “Morning Star” was twice the size, bright and new. In marked contrast to the impassioned prayers and sermons that followed the flag raising, Thom Beanal gave a brief and cautious address referring to the constraints he was under. The Presidium leaders just managed to contain the dissatisfaction of their supporters with the agreement that the flag would no longer be flown and that there would not be a full accounting of the Presidium’s activities under its mandate from the Papua Congress.96

The following day the “Morning Star” flag was not raised and the Papuan militia were removed from the symbolic centre of Papuan nationalism. Three months after the MPR session, the Government had secured an important symbolic objective.

While there was no bloodshed in Jayapura in connection with the anniversary, in Merauke eight people lost their lives and in Fak Fak two people were killed in clashes between demonstrators and the security forces.97 There was a strong military presence in place for the anniversary in most regional centres. The commemoration was relatively peaceful in Biak and Serui, while in Nabire there appears to have been cooperation with the local authorities, indeed the head of the regional government (Bupati) attended the occasion.98

X. RETURN OF REPRESSION

The first edition of Tifa Papua for 2001 observed that:

“The Satgas Papua (pro independence militia) are no longer to be seen. The Papuan flag flies no more. Nevertheless, the ideal of Papuan independence remains the topic of conversation in front of shops, in the markets as well as in food stalls and even in the villages.”99

Unlike in Aceh, the Indonesian Government have been able assert their authority in Irian Jaya. However, the means with which this was done suggest that Indonesia has few “assets” in its political control of the province, other than its near monopoly of the use of military force. There is fragility about Indonesia’s authority.

In June 2001 the leaders of Papua’s churches and the Moslem community issued an appeal for the establishment of “a culture of peace and dialogue”, so that Papua could become “a zone of peace”. They observed that over the previous six months a pattern of violence had emerged, with one act of violence being followed by another to the extent that violence was becoming the only way by which problems are handled.100 The atmosphere of open and vigorous debate had given way to the domineering presence of the security forces. The feeling that the people’s aspirations were being listened to had gone and people did not know what to expect.101 The human rights group Elsham likened the political situation in early 2001 to that of the 1960s, when “…the people were terrorised and intimidated, fear was spread everywhere, and at its peak PEPERA (the 1969 “Act of Free Choice”) was conducted”.102

95 ICG attended the press conference in Jayapura, 30 November 2000
96 ICG attended the ‘thanksgiving’ service in Jayapura.
97 Human Right Watch, “Violence and Political Impasse in Papua” vol XX, No. X (X), July 2001
100 “Appeal for a cessation of violence in Papua”, Jayapura, 14 June 2001. The appeal was signed by the leaders of the Islamic Council of Indonesia (MUI), the Catholic Church and the major Protestant Churches.
102 “Situasi Sarmi, Tor Atas, Betaf dan Bonggo pasca Pembunuhan 4 Anggota Kopassus: “Aparat Keamanan lancarkan operasi warga Sipil mengungsi”, Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (Elsham), Jayapura, 8-
This pattern of violence started almost immediately after the ‘independence’ thanksgiving service, with the attack on the Abepura police station on 7 December 2000, which was followed by the security forces’ pursuit of highlanders. The imprisonment, torture and killing of highlander students are discussed above. In their Appeal, Papua’s religious leaders cited seven cases of violence, as examples. This report will briefly discuss just the most recent case in Wasior, Manokwari.

On 31 March 2001, three Indonesian settlers, employees of a timber company, were killed in Wasior district. Additional security forces were deployed and they conducted what Elsham described as “arbitrary action against the civilian population”, including arbitrary arrests, torture and the killing of six civilians. On 13 June 2001, an armed unknown group killed five Brimob and a civilian. In June and July the security forces have conducted a "Sweeping and Clampdown." According to Elsham and Church sources, the operation has resulted in detention, torture and houses being burnt. Elsham estimates that about 5,000 civilians have fled their homes. Daily social and economic activities have been completely paralysed and everyone lives in a state of fear.

This pattern of violence suggests a change in the character of Papuan resistance. This report has argued that with the fall of Soeharto Papuan resistance was transformed from the localised, sporadic armed resistance of the OPM to an urban-led, mass-based largely non-violent struggle. With the closing in of the ‘Reformasi’ political space at the end of 2000, Papuan resistance has reverted to the earlier pattern. The kidnapping of the two Belgian filmmakers in Ilaga district, Puncak Jaya, in early June 2001 is part of this trend.

XI. SPECIAL AUTONOMY

The third and most important of the Government’s policies in Irian Jaya is Special Autonomy. Special autonomy offers the most obvious policy framework in which a political resolution can be negotiated. However, autonomy poses considerable political difficulties for the Government, the Papuan elite and broader society in the province.

Post-independence Indonesian history has not been kind to either the promise or practice of regional autonomy. From the perspective of regional elites throughout Indonesia, previous forms of autonomy, under various labels, have either not been implemented or have had little substance. Credibility is the first and most significant obstacle for the Government’s offer of special autonomy. President Soekarno promised autonomy to Papuan leaders at the time of the province’s “return” to the Republic and this was legislated for in 1969. It will be difficult to convince Papuans, across the political spectrum, that the Government’s commitment to autonomy is serious and that the devolution of decision-making powers, division of revenues and control of resources is substantial. It is in part the history of unfulfilled promises of autonomy that has enabled the advocates of independence to dominate the political debate in Papua and create a strong body of opinion that rejects any suggestion of autonomy.

Given this history, the Governor, Drs J.P. Solossa, and his supporters faced a formidable challenge to persuade their fellow Papuans that Special Autonomy was credible. On the face of it, the detention of the five Presidium leaders gave the Governor an opportunity to re-orient the Papuan political agenda. Yet, the pattern of violence that has developed since late 2000 has made the Governor’s task much more difficult.

Special Autonomy also requires a transformation of political culture and practice in Jakarta. The commitment to the unitary state, central control and uniformity has been an integral part of what constitutes the Jakarta political elite’s notions of the nation state. At a more material level, the devolution of decision making power and control of resources, revenues and business opportunities affects the vested interests of many groups influential in the government and the national parliament.

The Habibie Government legislated for regional autonomy and a fairer distribution of revenues between the centre and the regions in 1999 (Laws 22

02-2001

104 Elsham, Impact Of Sweepings And Clampdown In Wasior, Manokwari, West Papua, 16 July 2001
105 Johan van den Eynde and Philippe Simon were released on 17 August. “Separatists free abducted Belgians”, Jakarta Post, 18 August 2001
& 25). These nation-wide reforms began to be implemented at the beginning of 2001. They devolved authority from the central government to the second level of regional administration (kabupaten), not to the provinces. With respect to Irian Jaya, Habibie’s autonomy initiatives were complicated by the attempt to split the province into three. This move was rejected by the provincial parliament, but the legislation and the appointment of two additional governors remain in place, but not implemented. The Government’s commitment to Special Autonomy for Irian Jaya was enshrined in the MPR’s Broad Outline of government policy (GBHN), 1999-2004. The granting of special autonomy is specifically linked to the objective of strengthening the national integrity within the unitary state. A year later, the MPR’s criticism of Wahid’s handling of separatism in Papua and his accommodation of Papuan national symbols was paired with an instruction to implement special autonomy.

The absence of a clearly elaborated and public policy framework from Jakarta enabled groups within the Papuan political elite to draft their own proposals. By mid-December, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Jakarta, the provincial parliament, the provincial government and a group of Papuan NGOs had each produced a draft. As part of the consultative process, the Ministry organised a meeting between delegations from the Provincial Parliament and government, on one side, and representatives of various central government departments, on the other, to discuss the drafts.

Since January the Governor, Drs J.P. Solossa, has conducted a campaign to “socialise” special autonomy and consult broadly throughout the province. He appointed a team of leading Papuan intellectuals, officials, academics and church leaders to help conduct the consultations and draft the legislation. The governor’s advocacy of special autonomy has been a mixture of the positive and the negative. Special Autonomy was a “golden opportunity” for self-government in Papua. It would bring economic development and welfare. Christian and Papuan cultural values as well as customary law would be reflected in special autonomy. Given that the terms of autonomy had not been established by the central government, Papuans would be able to determine the conditions themselves. Early in the campaign, Solossa emphasised the determination of the Indonesian government to maintain Irian Jaya as a province and resist the Papuan struggle for independence. Given this determination, continuing the struggle would only bring suffering to Papuan society and the innocent supporters of independence would be the victims. If the opportunity of special autonomy was not grasped, Papuans would be condemned to be mere observers of the development of their homeland. As had long been the case, even security guards and taxi drivers in Papua were settlers. Towards the end of the campaign, the governor’s rhetoric against independence had softened. Autonomy was not about restricting or abolishing the ideal of independence. Bas Suebu, a former governor and member of the Special Autonomy team, acknowledged that Papuans supported independence and rejected autonomy, but argued that special autonomy was nearly the same as independence, although still within the Indonesian State. Independence and special autonomy should not be seen as alternatives. They were both heading in the same direction.

Governor Solossa’s campaign to propagate Special Autonomy in the first months of 2001 encountered significant resistance in a number of regions. In Nabire, the people who attended the Cendrawasih University information session destroyed the publicity material and demanded independence. The last set piece of the governor’s campaign was a seminar in Jayapura held on 28 March. Representatives of the fourteen regencies attended it. The proceedings were disrupted by thousands of uninvited guests with banners proclaiming support for independence and rejection of autonomy. A significant proportion of the delegates shared these sympathies and staged a walk out.

The governor’s proposal for Special Autonomy, in the form of a 76-clause draft bill presented to the President and Parliament on 16 April 2001, reflects Papuan political and cultural values and ideals combined with a substantial devolution of decision-

106 MPR Decree No. IV/MPR/1999.
107 MPR Decree No. VIII/MPR/2000, Appendix 1.1.a.
108 ICG attended the meeting at the Hotel Indonesia on 14 December 2000 at the invitation of the Department of Internal Affairs.
110 “Peserta Seminar Otonomi Minta Irja Merdeka”, Republika, 29 March 2001
111 “Sebagian Rakyat Irja Tolak Otonomi Khusus”, Republika, 7 March 2001
112 “Peserta Seminar Otonomi Minta Irja Merdeka”, Republika, 29 March 2001
113 RUU Republik Indonesia Nr.... Tahun 2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Propinsi Papua Dalam Bentuk Wilaya Berpemerintahan Sendiri

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making authority and distribution of resources from the centre to the province. It establishes Papua as a region of self-government within Indonesia. Under the proposed distribution of powers the province has authority in all areas of government except foreign affairs, external defence, monetary policy and the Supreme Court. The distribution of revenue is 80 per cent to the province and 20 per cent to the centre.\footnote{The share of its output that Papua currently retains varies each year and the figures are not made public but most estimates put the figure at between 10-15 percent of revenues.}

In its structure, the governor’s proposal shares much with the regional autonomy document discussed at the UN for East Timor in August 1998 and the law on special autonomy for Aceh adopted in July 2001. Its key provisions were developed from the Papuan NGO draft of late 2000.\footnote{Tim Perumus Foker LSM Papua, “Draft Undang-Undang Tentang Otoritas Khusus Propinsi Papua” Jayapura, 2000.}

The promotion and protection of Papuan interests is central to the proposal. The governor’s draft makes a distinction between indigenous Papuans and residents of the province. The governor and deputy governor have to be Papuans. Papuan dominance of the legislature is established through the creation of two houses of parliament, with a Papuan upper house consisting of customary (adat), religious and women representatives. In contrast to national law, local as well as national political parties will be able to contest the elections for the Lower House. The province will be called Papua and it will have its own flag, anthem and coat of arms, in addition to the Indonesian national ones. There will be no transmigration. Priority will be given to the employment of Papuans in all sectors of the economy.

The Provincial Government is obliged to protect and develop Papuan Culture. There is provision for the protection and representation of traditional institutions, the advancement of human rights and ecologically sustainable economic development.

The central government’s jurisdiction in external defence is recognised, but the deployment of military units in Papua will be subject to the consideration of the Papuan Parliament and government. Papua will have its own police force responsible to the governor. The central government’s external affairs powers are also qualified. The Province will be able to conduct external relations in the fields of trade, investment, education, culture and technology as well as establish liaison offices overseas.

There are safeguards against changes in the special autonomy law, the 1945 Constitution and treaty obligations. The supremacy of the special autonomy law is established. Where other laws conflict, they do not apply in Papua. If, five years after Papua becomes a self-governing region, the Provincial Parliament considers that special autonomy has not been effectively implemented, it can request that the People’s Consultative Assembly hold a referendum to ascertain the opinion of the Papuan people. If the “Commission to Correct the Course of Papuan History”, discussed earlier, finds that the integration of Papua did not accord with international law on self-determination, the provincial Parliament would take measures to resolve the matter.

It is not surprising that reaction from members of the national parliament and government leaders has been mixed. There have been concerns expressed about whether the proposal is compatible with the unitary state principle. There was some suggestion that special autonomy would create a “state within a state” and was too federalist in its orientation. The sensitive issues included the provision for Papuan national symbols, control over internal security and the possibility of representation overseas. Party leaders suggested that they were open to a compromise on the core elements of the proposal, but the principle of the unitary state was non-negotiable.\footnote{“Soal RUU Otonomi Khusus Megawati: Dengarkan Masyarakat Irian Jaya”, Kompas, 25 June 2001} Nevertheless, with the support of 60 members, the House of Representatives has accepted the Papuan bill as the basis for its deliberations. It accepted the Papuan bill instead of a much more modest one submitted earlier by the Government.\footnote{“House accepts special autonomy bill on Papua”, Jakarta Post, 30 June 2001} A special committee of the parliament was considering the Governor’s proposal as this report was being prepared.


**XII. CONCLUSION**

Indonesia has made little progress in recent decades in convincing Papuans that their preferred future should be as part of Indonesia. Indeed it has sustained an administration in Irian Jaya largely without the consent of the indigenous population of the territory. The protracted, but localised and sporadic armed resistance of the OPM has not, however, threatened Indonesian control. Indonesian authority has appeared most vulnerable in the brief period of political openness that permitted the relatively free expression and organisation of Papuan national sentiments. Indonesian control seemed fragile because it became apparent that opposition to their rule was widespread and deep-rooted.

Since the end of 2000 Indonesia has been pursuing two seemingly contradictory approaches. This report has argued that Special Autonomy offers the best prospect of resolution. Given the deep distrust of the government in Papuan society, it is difficult to imagine how Special Autonomy can be successfully “socialised” and accepted by broad sections of the society in political circumstances of great tension, uncertainty and fear created by the security forces. Continuing human rights violations by the security forces are contrary to Indonesia’s interests in two respects. First, violations serve to intensify the alienation of Papuans, both those directly involved and the community at large. Secondly, they attract international attention and the publicity like that generated by the recent Human Rights Watch report118 which further tarnished Indonesia’s reputation. Human rights violations of the Soeharto era created a political environment in which support for independence was easily mobilised. Continued abuses by the security forces will have the same effect.

The Papuan proposal for Special Autonomy has a strong commitment to the protection of human rights. The recommendations in this report are designed to support the development of norms and procedures in the provincial government and its legislation that will advance human rights for all residents in the province.

There is no possibility of the Papuan proposal for Special Autonomy being adopted in its entirety. However, if the policy is to be effective, the House of Representatives will need to enact a strong law.

Governor Solossa and his supporters took considerable political risks in their autonomy campaign. While the draft has broad support in the Papuan elite, including some pro-independence leaders, the law will need to be a strong one if the elite is to mobilise support for it in the broader society. The government needs to support those Papuans who are willing to back Special Autonomy. A law that does not contain the crucial provisions from the Papuan draft will serve to undermine the political credibility of the governor and his supporters and weaken their ability to argue that Special Autonomy within Indonesia is an acceptable alternative to independence.

The crucial provisions encompass Papuan values and ideals, the devolution of powers and the distribution of revenue. The name Papua, the flag and anthem symbolise the Papuan values and ideals in the draft; without them the Special Autonomy Law will have no legitimacy in the province. The maintenance of internal security is a responsibility of the province. The draft provides for the establishment of a provincial police force responsible to the governor. The deployment of army, navy and airforce units in the province is a matter of consultation between the Indonesian government and the governor and that, in principle, deployment of these forces be sufficient to defend the province against external threat. These forces would not be involved in the maintenance of internal security, except at the request of the governor and the Provincial Parliament. These provisions are crucial if the Special Autonomy law is to help break the cycle of repression and alienation. Internal security as a responsibility of the governor and the provincial police force will break the nexus between the maintenance of security and control from Jakarta.

One of the objectives of Special Autonomy is to provide Papuans with a sense of ownership of the land they regard as their own. This is conveyed in the title of the Papuan draft: “Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua in the form of a region of self-government” (Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua dalam Bentuk Wilayah Berpemerintahan Sendiri) There are a number of provisions that support Papuan authority in the provincial government. The creation of a bicameral legislature with an upper chamber in which Papuan traditional authority (adat), religious organisations, women and youth are represented is one element. Another element is the provision that the governor and deputy governor are Papuans as is the province’s control over migration. One of the reasons for Papuan opposition to Special Autonomy is the history of unfulfilled promises. The provision that the Special Autonomy law can only be amended

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with the agreement of the governor and the Provincial Parliament is crucial if Papuan distrust of Jakarta’s intentions is to be overcome. The division of revenue, 80 per cent to the province and 20 per cent to the centre, is the crucial economic provision to facilitate Papuan control over their own resources.

It is important to recognise that these provisions, crucial to the success of the policy, are also some of the most difficult for the House of Representatives to accept. They involve fundamental changes in regional governance as well as to the ideological values and nationalist principles that have developed since Indonesia’s struggle for independence.

A strong Special Autonomy law, however, will be only the first phase of a long process of capacity and institution building. It will provide an institutional and policy framework in which Papuan social and economic disadvantage can be addressed but it does not in itself overcome those disadvantages. Under Special Autonomy the provincial government will assume far greater responsibilities for financial management, policy development and service provision than under the present highly centralised system. The provincial government will have to function in a more open and democratic environment. Expectations of transparency and accountability will be high.

To facilitate the successful implementation of Special Autonomy the provincial government will need considerable external support in long-term capacity and institutional building. It will require training programs for its senior officials in financial management, policy formulation and service delivery. The institution building and training programs should have as their objective support of the provincial government to address the problems of Papuan social, educational and economic disadvantage. Under the New Order government, legislatures at provincial and regional (kabupaten) level did little more than affirm the actions of the executive. The elected representatives and officials of the legislatures will require training and support if they are to hold accountable and scrutinise the executives. The Irian Jaya Special Autonomy proposal vests considerable authority in the provincial parliament. The parliament will determine government priorities and allocation of expenditures. The present parliament has not been required to fulfil these tasks.

As noted earlier in this report, non-Papuans dominate the senior levels of the provincial government. They occupy many of the decision-making and policy adviser positions. The sense of rivalry felt by senior Papuan officials is one of the motivating factors in Papuan nationalism. They have a strong sense of not being the boss in their own house (tuan rumah di negeri sendiri) The promotion of more Papuan officials to senior positions within the provincial administration will need to be supported by training programs. Non-Papuans will continue to be employed in some positions while appropriate training programs for Papuans are established. The promotion of Papuans in the administration could be part of a broader policy framework of affirmative action to facilitate Papuan participation in education and employment in the non-government sector.

Progress with regional autonomy is the only hope of a peaceful resolution to the enduring conflict in the province. Restraining military action and controlling human rights abuses are essentially steps in the long process of building trust. Papuans need to be given considerable control over their own policing, politics, education, and economy. To do this successfully, there needs to be a major commitment by Indonesia, the provincial government and international donors to provide training and assistance to help the people of Papua control their own society.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 September 2001
APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA

Source: www.cia.org
## APPENDIX B

### GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ELS-HAM</td>
<td>Lembaga Studi Dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia; Institute for Human Rights and Advocacy, Jayapura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBHN</td>
<td>Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara; Broad Outline of government policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka; Free Papua Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea (eastern New Guinea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian National Army</td>
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APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts, based on the ground in countries at risk of conflict, gather information from a wide range of sources, assess local conditions and produce regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation’s internet site, www.crisisweb.org ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analysis and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. The ICG Board - which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media - is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has been President and Chief Executive since January 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris. The organisation currently operates field projects in eighteen crisis-affected countries and regions across three continents: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in Europe; Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe in Africa; and Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia.

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July 2001

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