

Draft for Explanation

(Nov. 3, 1941/the 16th
year of SHOWA/)

I respectfully state that the cardinal point of our Empire's policy toward foreign countries is to contribute towards the maintenance and development of world peace by firmly establishing international relations which are based on justice and fairness. For this purpose our Government has decided to renew the friendship of good neighbors and further to proceed resolutely to achieve the great work of establishing a new order in Greater East Asia, and all classes, high and low, have united in doing their best with their utmost enthusiasm. In spite of both Germany and Italy having been the first to act in harmony with us and take a cooperative attitude, unfortunately the various countries like Britain and America have not understood the real intention of our Empire and the circumstances in East Asia; still worse, they have been disturbing our Empire's peaceful undertakings.

It is simply deplorable for world peace that we have been driven to such a situation in which the stability of East Asia is denied to us and consequently the root of disaster might be left uneradicated for a hundred years to come, if we should allow the circumstances go as they would.

I will now describe the recent circumstances of international relations and the outline of what the Empire has done in carrying out its national policy, and submit this for Imperial decision.

1. The carrying out of the Chino-Japanese Incident and the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere guarantees the existence of the Empire, and at the same time these are the foundation stones for the stability of East Asia. The Empire is independent in carrying these out and will permit no interference by the Powers.

Simultaneously with the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese basis agreement on November 30th of last year, the Empire recognized the Nanking Government, thus the China Incident marked a great phase. Since then the Empire has cooperated in promoting and strengthening of the said Government, and on the other hand, it has continued to apply military pressure to the Chiang Kai-shek Regime to urge it to reconsider the matter. Nevertheless, we have failed in disillusioning the Chiang Regime after the four and a half years' Holy War, though conspicuous disturbances are found in them due to the shortage of goods and materials, financial stringency, and the alienation of public feeling. It is a clear fact that the situation has come chiefly from the international situation, in particular, from the support of both Britain and America. Above all, we must pay extreme attention to the fact that they /the Chiang Kai-shek regime/ are maintaining their present attitude, blindly believing the propaganda of Britain and America that the European War will, after all, terminate in victory for Britain and America, and that the finance and economy of the Empire will go to ruin sooner or later. And now, I believe it would be absolutely difficult for the Empire to expect success-

ful carrying out of its national policy in East Asia if the current international situation is left out of consideration.

2. Turning to the situation in Europe, the war which started from the conflict between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other in the summer of the year before last brought about the German domination of North Europe and the Balkans, and further developed into the German-Russo war; and as to America, it is giving assistance to Britain and the Soviet Union, which is actually equal to its participation in war. From these, it is admissible that there is a prospect of protracted war. That is to say, the German-Russo war is predicted to be disposed of in near future with German success of operations in the capture of Moscow, while the Soviet Union, making good use of its political foundation which has been built up in the last 20 years and of the current situation which is assuming an aspect of racial war, might be considered to devise some means of negative resistance again in the future, relying on its resources east of the Volga, inadequate as they are, and on the support from Britain and America. On the other hand, I presume that Germany will not easily lay down arms before dealing such a severe blow to the Soviet Union as will make it impossible for the country to rise again, because in view of its past declarations, etc., it is determined to effect a complete overthrow of communism. However, it is predicted that after the capture of Moscow, Germany will debouch into the southern area of Ukraine, will continuously put forth its strength into the Near East and the Mediterranean area, and at the same time will concentrate its main force on the war against Britain.

On the other hand, Britain, which not only has its time-honored national character and a pride worthy of a great nation but has recovered its national defense repulsive force by taking advantage of the Soviet-German war, is predicted to continue stronger resistance hereafter with the aid of America. Therefore, we can not attempt to forecast its easy surrender. Germany will have achieved her first phase objective in the New Order of Europe the day when she secures the oil fields in the Caucasus, the treasure-house of Ukraine, and of capturing the Near East and Mediterranean areas; while Britain, it may be observed, has an intention to absolutely avoid a crushing defeat. Consequently, it may also be necessary to take into consideration such a case where peace may be realized in Europe according to the situation.

3. The international state of affairs surrounding the Far East, as stated before, changed with /the outbreak of/ the China Incident. Both the British and the American Governments, considering that Japanese development in the continent was nothing but infringement of their rights or contrary to their claims,

took pro-Chiang action on the one hand, and on the other hand assumed the same attitude toward the Empire or took the same steps as they would toward a hostile country: They checked our actions on the spot and at other times put economic pressure on us, and the like. It goes without saying that Britain which had established its rights and interests most in East Asia took various steps from the first. In concert with this, America has strengthened its pressure upon Japan day by day by denouncing the commercial treaty, by prohibiting or restricting imports and exports, and by other matters; above all, it has adopted on recent steps which are as good as a commencement of hostilities ever since the Empire concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy: that is, it formed a so-called outflanking position against Japan, and such like by inciting Britain and the Netherlands and by instigating Chiang Kai-shek. After the outbreak of the German Soviet War, it was busy in supplying petroleum and other necessary war supplies through the Far East and dared to take actions which would constitute an indirect menace to the Empire. No sooner did Japan advance into French Indo-China after concluding a treaty with the French Government for the sake of its self-defence and guard and also out of the necessity of carrying out the China Incident than America began to act more and more bluntly: it not only effected a rupture of economic relations at home under the name of freezing funds, in concert with all the countries in South America but also formed an outflanking position against Japan, which was perfect from the military, political, and economic point of view, in cooperation with Britain, China, and the Netherlands, and further with the Soviet Union. And thus, America not only threatened the existence of the Empire but caused a situation which would completely check Japan from carrying out the YOKUSAI/T.M. This may be a typographical error of 'YOKUSAI', i.e. 'national policy' it cherished; So the Empire, as a power for the stabilization of East Asia, is now obliged to correct the situation with a resolute attitude.

4. Roosevelt, President of America, laid emphasis, as a national policy, on the denouncement of Hitlerism, that is, an armed policy, and for that purpose, utilizing the economically advantageous position America itself has, he has carried out a pro-British policy almost as good as participation in the war; at the same time, he has dared to carry out a reckless oppression policy toward Japan. But on the other hand, he has approached us with an informal proposition on the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations since April this year.

Of course, the Japanese Government, which laid the stabilization of East Asia to heart and had cherished a desire to bring about world peace, accepted the said proposition of the American Government and, since then, has been dealing for the long period of more than six months up to this day with the sincerest and fairest attitude.

The late cabinet concentrated all its sincerity on a break in the deadlock by an interview between the leaders of the two countries, but the American Government did not make concessions at all adhering to the proposition of June 21, which might be said to be its original plan.

Although there is a report regarding an observation that recently at the conferences held after the formation of the present cabinet America seems to be showing a mood of compromise in some degree, substantially it has made no concessions; moreover its strengthening of military preparations and institutions in the South, its acceleration of the support of Chiang, the meeting of the military authorities in Manila, and its steps and actions for encircling Japan can not be overlooked. Such being the case, we can hardly recognize its sincerity and accordingly we can not but conclude that the negotiations, if left alone, have absolutely no chance of reaching an immediate understanding.

And when we scrutinize the proposition of June 21 minutely, there are /not/sic/ points Japan has no objection to accepting, but when we observe as a whole, we see that it leads to the re-confirmation of the Nine-Power Treaties or to a strong inducement to pro-Britishism and pro-Americanism this would indeed reverse the Empire's policy maintained ever since the Manchurian Incident. And we are firmly convinced that we cannot guarantee that there is no fear that it will cut off the course of establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and disturb the Empire's dominating position.

5. In short, the present international situation is as follows:

In East Asia, the pro-Chiang policy of Britain and America and the offensive attitude of the so-called A-B-C-D encircling of Japan have been day by day strengthened and the Soviet regime gradually entrenching itself in the Far East, is threatening to wield its reserve power because of the support from Britain and America. Therefore, we cannot say that there is no fear that the settlement of the China Incident the Empire is seeking for and the establishment of a New Order in East Asia may be fundamentally upset. While the European war situation shows that even if Germany and Italy should attain their first phase objective, the domination of the Continent, the rapid settlement of the whole situation cannot be expected and /the war/ will assume the appearance of a prolonged war. Moreover it should be admitted that in reality, we can not count much on the cooperation of Germany and Italy with the Empire.

At the same time, judging from the past Japanese-American negotiations, we can conclude that the true intentions of the United States are not to try to understand the intention and actions of the Empire and to carry through its claims by continuous procrastination under the name of adjustment of relations between the two countries, by gradually strengthening its economic

overthrow of Germany in the Atlantic and threatening the Empire in the Pacific.

Accordingly, if the Imperial Government allows the present situation to take its own course the accomplishment of the Incident and the establishment of the new order will become more and more difficult. It is recognizable that the right of existence of Japan will finally be threatened, its policies will completely be prevented from being carried out, and the accomplishment of the great work of achieving world peace will be greatly impeded and this is indeed a matter of great anxiety.

It is the glorious traditional spirit of our Empire, however, to exercise discretion and do her best at all times by just and peaceful means in dealing with complicated international relations.

I (the Minister) consider that even in the present situation, if final efforts are made to adjust the Japan-American relations -- this is a most difficult thing and it is quite impossible to foretell whether we shall succeed or not -- it will not be an utter impossibility to force through our Empire's demands and gain understanding for them.

And, therefore, I am going to make a last effort with the two attached plans that are within the bounds in which our Empire's honor and self-defense can be secured.

I respectfully report as above.

説明案

(昭和十六年二月)

謹ニテ按シマスルニ帝國對外國策ノ要諦ハ正義ト公正ト
ニ立脚スル國際關係ヲ確立シ以テ世界平和維持増
進ニ貢獻セシトスルモノテアリマス之ヲ爲政府ニ於テハ
先ツ善隣友好ノ誼ヲ新タニ進ンテ大東亞新秩序ノ
建設ノ大業ニ邁進スルコトナリ上下一體鋭意萬全ノ
努力ヲ傾倒致シマシタカ獨得兩國ヲ率先同調協力の
態度ニ出ヅマシタキモ不韋ニシテ英米等ノ強國ハ高
國ノ真意ト東亞ノ事態トヲ了解セズ一帝國ノ平和
的意圖ヲ妨害シ此儘推移致シマスルニハ予ハ不満足
期スル能ハサルハ勿論延テハ禍根ヲ百年ノ後ニ遺スナキヲ
保セサルノ情勢ニ至リマシタコトハ誠ニ世界平和ノ爲遺
憾至極ニ存スル所アリマス茲ニ最近ニ於ケル國際情勢ト
之ニ對遠致シマシタ帝國國策遂行ノ概略ヲ申述ヘ以テ
御聖斷ヲ仰キ奉ラントスル次第ニアリマス

一、日支事変ノ完遂ト大東亞共榮圈ノ實現トハ中國存
ヲ保障シ同時ニ東亞安定ノ礎石ヲアリマシメ帝國ハ之
カ遂行ニ當リマシテハ獨立自主敢テ列國ノ公認ヲ許サ
サル所テアリマス

昨年十一月三十日日支基本條約ノ成立ト共ニ中國ハ南
京政府ヲ承認シ茲ニ支那事変ハ一大段階ヲ劃シタノヲ
アリマス爾來同政府ノ育成強化ニ協力シタコト他面蔣介
石政權ニ對シマシテハ引續キ武力加へ其ノ

P 22 Nov 1900

1000 Dec No 1350-C
Stein 10

通達人之心、離反逆ニ決リ、窮極三國敵ニシテ、
不拘留戰四年、有半、今尚其、決意ニ成、
所以、予、國際情勢殊ニ荒涼、
一極メ、大ニ予、予、明カニ、
又殊ニ歐洲戰爭ハ結局英米ノ勝利ニ歸ル、
帝國、時、
宣傳ヲ首倡シ、今日、
最モ注意ス、
帝國圖策、遂行ハ視下國際情勢ヲ度ス、
テ到底成功ヲ期シ、雖キモ、上信ス、次第ニ

以上六回

此對日外交政策、敢行ニ至リ、シテ他國和平四國以來
自來國文調整、固非公不、提議、
東亞、安定ヲ願、今ニ世界平和、將來ヲ念、願、
帝國政府ニ於テ、何論、百米、國政府、提議、
今自、近六月、有餘、久穀、二、直、最モ、具、穀、且、公、正、
態度、以、テ、對、於、敵、前、內、閣、於、二、米、國、首、腦、會
談、依、リ、以、テ、局、面、打、開、計、ラ、シ、ト、凡、此、誠、意、ト、傾、倒
致、シ、シ、カ、米、國、政府、強、ト、最、初、ノ、原、案、ト、モ、申、ス、ベキ
六月、三十、日、米、國、閣、議、一、步、モ、步、ミ、シ、テ、示、サ、ス、最、近
現、因、國、成、立、後、諸、合、ニ、於、キ、ニ、米、國、側、ハ、終、合、ハ、抑、
氣、持、ヲ、示、シ、在、此、中、觀、測、ス、ル、報、告、ハ、ア、リ、マ、カ、実、情、
三、同、等、議、事、ヲ、示、サ、ル、ハ、ミ、ナ、ス、南、方、軍、備、施設、ノ、強
化、援、將、促、進、ト、ミ、ナ、ス、於、ニ、於、テ、米、國、當、局、會、合、對、日
包、圍、指、導、具、體、動、向、ハ、更、ニ、目、ニ、ミ、ル、モ、カ、ア、リ、ニ、ミ、誠、
意、認、ム、ベキ、ハ、強、ト、無、ク、從、テ、又、涉、モ、此、儘、ニ、ハ、急、遽、
新、結、見、込、ハ、到底、ナ、キ、ト、斷、セ、サ、ル、ヲ、得、ナ、イ、テ、ア、リ、マ、ス、而、シ
テ、六月、二十、日、米、國、閣、議、ニ、於、テ、仔細、檢、計、致、シ、マ、ス、中、ニ、ハ、部
國、於、テ、受、託、シ、テ、是、文、無、キ、點、モ、下、リ、テ、セ、リ、之、ニ、全、般、的、
觀、察、致、シ、テ、ハ、或、ハ、凡、國、條、約、再、確、認、ト、ナ、リ、或、ハ、英
米、的、主義、強、從、ト、ナ、リ、實、ニ、滿、洲、ヲ、變、以、米、帝、國、
政策、ヲ、逆、轉、セ、シ、テ、延、テ、東、亞、共、榮、國、建設、ノ、針、路、ヲ
遮、斷、シ、東、亞、ニ、於、テ、米、帝、國、之、既、得、地、位、動、搖、ヲ、来
ス、無、キ、ヲ、深、ク、サ、ル、モ、ヨ、リ、ト、確、信、致、ス、モ、ニ、御、座、在、
イ、マ、ス

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五、之ヲ要スルニ現下、國際情勢、東亞ニ於テ、東米、據將致
策ト所謂英米蘭將一休、対日包圍陣攻撃ト、日ト共ニ強
化セリ又ハ蘇聯政策ヲ漸次極東ニ立籠リ莫大ニ支援ニ依リテ
其、餘勢力ヲ張ラシムル形勢ニテリ、シテ尙ニ帝國主義國大
ニ重要、解決ト東亞新秩序建設ト、尙莫、根柢ヲ得ナシ
ト元寇トシテ改シテ又他方歐洲、戰局、独伊リ大陸制覇ヲ爲
スルヲ一級目的ニ達成得ルトスルモ全局、收拾又迅速ニ期待
ルヲナカズ長期間、戰禍相ヲ呈スル、其、独伊、帝國ニ対シテ協
力ニ實際ニ於テ多ク、期待ニ得サル実情ニ在リト申サザレバ
ナシ又一方日本、及チ過去ニ徴シテ前途トシテスルニ米國、莫
ハ能ク遠シテ帝國主義國ト行動ヲ理解セズ日本國交調整ニ名
藉リ遠シテ多ク、漸次対日經濟壓迫ヲ強化シテ太平洋
於テ、独逸打倒ニ全カヲ注シ太平洋地域ニ於テ、帝國ヲ威嚇
シテ其、主張ヲ貫徹セトスルモナリト認ムル、ナリトス從テ
若シモハ帝國政府此儘ヲ能ク、雅俗ニ答セザル、變宛遂
新秩序建設ハ遠國難トナリ遠シテ帝國主權ヲ削グリ
其、國策ニ遂行ヲ根柢ヨリ阻害セザル和平克服大業完
成トスル、阻害ヲ来スモト認ムルニ要ニ憂慮、堪エ九所ナリ
ニ然レモハ復能ク收ル國際關係ニ處テ常ニ正義ト平和的
主義ニ依リ慎重意思ニ込メスル、トハ光榮ナル帝國、傳統的精神
ナリトス本大臣、今日ニ至リテシテモ今日最後、努力ヲ尽
日本國又調整ニ力ヲ致シテスルニ種々、困難ニシテ成否莫
豫斷ヲ許シテモ又カ、帝國、主張ヲ貫徹シ理解セズルトスル
迄不可能ナリナリト認メ茲ニ帝國、名譽ト自前ヲ確保ニ得
限度ヲ越スル別紙ニ示サザル、其、最後、努力ヲ試ミテ元寇ナ
申産メ又
右謹シニ報告スル、又

Top Secret.

Limits of War Aims and Demands

Nov. 28, 1941

(Subject to correction)

I. War Aims

1. What JAPAN aims at in the war against both the United States and Great Britain is to eliminate the immediate threat by both powers to the Empire's existence and to end their unlawful interference with the stability and independence of EAST ASIA.
2. The pressure against the Empire from the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN constitutes more of an immediate threat to the Empire's very existence rather than an obstacle to the Empire's demand for her right to live or for lebensraum.
3. The pro-CHIANG policy which the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN have been following and the CHIANG regime's policy of reliance upon the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN are displeasing to the Empire. However, the Empire aims, on the one hand, to convert ultimately the anti-Japanese CHINA under control of the CHIANG regime /a policy of/ co-operation with JAPAN and, on the other hand, to correct the UNITED STATES' and BRITAIN's traditional attitude of regarding the Far Eastern countries as their dependencies, and make them retreat to a position where they would have to give up permanently the idea of unlawful meddling and interference with the stability and independence of EAST ASIA. Therefore, the Empire does not regard the present anti-Japanese CHINA as an essentially irreconcilable enemy, and even during the course of the development of the war against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN, will cherish the hope of having anti-Japanese CHINA join as soon as possible as a companion in the war for the liberation of EAST ASIA. From this point of view, it will be necessary for the Empire, in declaring her war aims and carrying out other measures hereafter, to take into special political consideration the relations between the present CHIANG regime and the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.
4. The Empire's existence as a predominant power is inseparable from the stability and independence of EAST ASIA. Accordingly, it must be said that the above war

aims---the elimination of the threat to the Empire's existence, and the ending of interference with the stability and independence of EAST ASIA---are directly related to each other in substance.

II. Limits of Demands

1. It is natural that what the Empire demands through the war against the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN must be governed by the above war aims. It is necessary moreover, to decide its concrete essentials after examining them separately and precisely. However, to give an outline of them, the first principle---to eliminate roots of evil from the EAST ASIA area and to ensure the leading position of JAPAN in EAST ASIA---consists in sweeping the influence of the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN from the various southern regions which are absolutely necessary to the Empire's existence, bringing these regions substantially under the grasp of the Empire, and at the same time blocking the Anglo-American invasion routes to EAST ASIA by severing the makeshift connection between the Anglo-American influence and Anti-Japanese CHINA.
2. In deciding upon the concrete essentials of the Empire's demands which are to be secured through the war against UNITED STATES and BRITAIN, an important factor which must be considered is their correlation with the limits of the Empire's demands on CHINA to be fulfilled through the CHINA Incident. This matter must be concretely investigated in detail separately but, in general, while increasing the relative importance of the claim of making secure the southern regions, attention must be given to the moderation, as far as possible, of the demands, particularly those for rights, on CHINA, in keeping with the degree of relative importance mentioned above.

EXHIBIT No.

陸 海

I.P.S. Doc. No. 1358D
(Item 20)

戦争目的と日本

昭和十六年十一月二日

陸海軍省

第一 戦争目的

- 一 米英兩國ニ對スル戦争ニ於テ帝國目的トスル所ハ兩國勢力ノ帝國生存ニ對シ直接ノ脅威ヲ排除シ東亞ノ安定及自主独立ニ對スル不當ノ妨礙ヲ斷絶セシムルニ在リ
- 二 米英兩國ノ帝國ニ對スル壓迫ハ帝國ノ生存ニ他ノ生活圈ノ要求ニ對スル障礙トシテ在リ、寧ろ帝國ノ生存自体ニ對スル直接ノ脅威ヲ構成スルモノナリ
- 三 米英兩國ノ現ニ來ル侵略政策及專政權米英依存政策ハ帝國ノ不愉快トスル所ナル帝國ノ祖國ノ所、一面究極ニ於テ將政權領導下ノ抗日支那ヲ對日協調ニ轉向セシムルト共ニ他方米英ノ要求ニ應答シ東亞ノ安定及自主獨立ニ對シハ現ニ抗日支那ハ本國對テ不侵戰ヲ敢テ見ス對米英戰ヲ展開シ過程中ニ在リテモ出來得ル限リ達カナル段階ニ於テ之ニ東亞解放戰ニ於テ同是關係ニ含流セシムル含ミヲ藏メテ此見地ヨリテ戦争目的ノ宣示及今後諸絶案ノ實施ニ當リテハ現ニ將政權ト米英兩國トノ關係ニ關シテハ特別ノ政治的考量ヲ加フルヲ要ス
- 四 雄辯トシテ帝國ノ存立ト東亞ノ安定及自主獨立ハ不可分ノ關係ニ在リ從テ前記戦争目的ハ帝國生存ニ對スル脅威排除及東亞ノ安定及自主獨立ニ對スル妨礙ノ斷絶ノ實質上ノ要求ニ在リト言ハルルモノナリ

L.P.S. Doc No. 1358 D

(Item 20)

課三、要求、限